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NOVEMBER 1, 1851.

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- ART. I.—(1.) *Eine Instruction des Staatskanzlers von Hardenberg.*  
- Mitgetheilt von Dr. JOH. JACOBY. Deutsche Monatschrift  
von Ad. Kolaczek. December, 1850. Stuttgart. Hoffmansche  
Verlagsbuchhandlung.
- (2.) *Russische Circulardepesche*, an die Bevollmächtigten Sr. Maj. des  
Kaisers zur vertraulichen Mittheilung an die bezüglichen  
Deutschen Regierungen. 1834.
- (3.) *Lettres sur la Hongrie.* Par M. DE SZALAY. Zurich. 1849.

WHEN Thomas May, that staid old Roman, gave himself to writing the history of the Long Parliament, he presented his readers with some account of the feelings and speeches of different parties in the kingdom, with regard to the long suspension of parliaments that had preceded, and about the irregular and arbitrary measures of the court which followed naturally enough from such a policy. 'The serious and just men of England,' he writes, 'who were no way interested in the emoluments of these oppressions, could not but entertain sad presages of what mischiefs must needs follow so great an injustice; that things carried so far on, in a wrong way, must needs either enslave themselves and their property for ever, or require a vindication so sharp and smarting as that the nation would groan under it. Another sort of men, and especially lords and gentlemen, by whom the pressures of the government were not much felt, who enjoyed their own plentiful fortunes, with little or insensible detriment, looking no further than their present safety and property, and the yet undisturbed peace of the nation, whilst other kingdoms were embroiled in calamities, and Germany sadly wasted by a sharp war, did nothing but applaud the happiness of England, and called them ungrateful and factions spirits who complained of the breach of laws and liberties. The kingdom,

‘they said, abounded with wealth, plenty, and all kind of elegancies, more than ever. That it was for the honour of a people that their monarch should live splendidly, and not be curbed at all in his prerogative, which would bring him into greater esteem with other princes, and more enable him to prevail in treaties. That what they suffered by monopolies was insensible, and not grievous, if compared with other states. That the Duke of Tuscany sat heavier on his people in that very kind. That the French king had made himself an absolute lord, and quite depressed the power of parliaments, which had been there as great as in any kingdom, and yet that France flourished and the gentry lived well. That the Austrian princes, especially in Spain, laid heavy burdens on their subjects. The courtiers would begin to dispute against parliaments in their ordinary discourse, and hoped the king should never need any more parliaments. Some of the gravest statesmen and privy councillors would ordinarily laugh at the ancient language of England, when the words—liberty of the subject was named.’ It has ever been thus. You cannot give liberty to a nation without forcing it to a large extent upon the unworthy—upon men beset with a selfishness thus contracted and base-born. In our own time speech-makers of this sort have not been wanting. With many, though happily with much fewer comparatively than at any preceding period in our history, to use ‘the ancient language of England’ about ‘the liberty of the subject,’ is still to find yourself classed among ‘ungrateful and factious spirits;’ while in the condition of a people possessing material comforts, it may be ‘wealth, plenty, and all kind of elegancies,’ these far-seeing and large-hearted persons find an ample vindication of the *regime* to which such a people may be subject, though it should be as absolute as that of a ‘Duke of Tuscany’ or of ‘the Austrian princes.’ We owe it to ‘the serious and just men of England’ in that time, and in later time, that we and our children have not been delivered into such hands.

According to Montesquieu, it is in the nature of despotism that it should cut down the tree to get at the fruit. No doubt, the administration of absolute power is not of necessity thus summary. It may be more or less short-sighted—more or less pernicious. But even in its best state, the material prosperity which it secures may be less than the good even of that lowest kind which it prevents. It is ever harmful—not always so harmful as it might be. It may not cut down the tree at a stroke, but it may sever some of its goodliest branches, and leave it to become sickly from the want of proper culture, so that its fate will be to die by

little and little. If even well cared for, it may be, and commonly is, with a care very much of the sort which the man, whose talk is about bullocks' bestows upon his quadrupeds. The good keeping is with an eye to the good return. Can any man look at certain of our continental states and need further proof or illustration on these points?

But while the absolutist derives advantage from the material wealth of his subjects, their intelligence and moral culture must ever be at variance with his maxims, and dangerous to the continuance of his power. It is not good, in his sight, that subjects should be capable of seeing that the work done by him might be done much more wisely; nor that there should be in them the feeling to suggest that it might be done—*ought* to be done, more justly, more humanely. Hence, at this hour, every expression of opinion to this effect, on public affairs, is suppressed by the absolutists of the continent, from Moscow to Naples. All things now tend to show that the great monarchies of Europe are not to be uprooted, except by becoming tyrannies more intolerable than this quarter of the globe has ever witnessed. In the most corrupt times of the Roman Empire, the sufferings of civilized men were trivial compared with what is now before them, if the present military rule is to be perpetuated. The free spirit to be suppressed is broader and deeper than has had existence in Europe, or in the history of humanity before, and the coercions to keep it down must surpass in Diabolism all that has gone before, if they are to be successful.

'Keep the army,' said Henrietta to Charles I., 'and that will bring back all.' But the popular leaders in the English parliament were as much alive to the importance of that article in the pending negotiations as the queen, and resolved on civil war rather than cede the command of the forces to the crown. It would have been to trust their property, their liberties, their lives, to the honour of the king; and that, in the circumstances, was more than could be reasonably demanded from them. In the recent changes on the continent, the army was left at the disposal of the sovereigns, and that alone, in the case of each of them, has been sufficient to 'bring back all.' What our Parliamentarians feared at the hands of Charles I., the Constitutionalists of Italy, Austria, and Germany, have experienced at the hands of their princes. Charles I., beyond a doubt, would have violated every solemn pledge, on the first fitting occasion, as these men have done. **NO FAITH WITH SUBJECTS**—is the royal maxim now made but too familiar to the mind of Europe. It will be remembered when the next turn of the wheel shall give subjects their power



- over sovereigns. All hope of constitutionalism for the chief monarchies of the continent may be said to have come to an end—that is, all hope of preserving those monarchies by allying them with popular institutions, has become manifestly vain. Every such adjustment—every such *constituting* of things, supposes mutual trust, and mutual trust is gone. One stipulation deemed strictly necessary in such monarchies is, that the king, if he be an hereditary king, should have the command of the army; and will the injured peoples of the continent ever dispose of that power after the same manner again, if it should once more come into their hands? It is by their care to save monarchy, that those communities have all but destroyed themselves. We venture to predict that they will give little sign of such care in the time to come. The absolutists know this full well, and they are taking their measures accordingly. They have now the command of their armies, they have resolved to do their best to keep possession of that power, and they have staked everything on the desperate chance of being able to rule purely by the sword. All the social and mental degradation, and all the corruptness both in morals and religion, which a thorough military despotism has ever entailed, are to be diffused, and, as far as possible, made hereditary, among some three-fourths of the people of Europe! Even more; as is the hatred of all such rule among the people who are to be made subject to it, so, as we have said, must be the strength and mercilessness of this power if it is to retain its ascendancy. To be successful, it must be a more awful embodiment of evil than history has hitherto recorded.

Happily, we see nothing in the capacities of the men who have given themselves to this enterprise to warrant us in supposing that they will be successful. This grand conspiracy of princes against peoples, of monarchs against men, will explode, and those who have committed themselves to it will probably perish in its ruins. But with this probability before us, we feel disposed to look a little beyond it, and to ask ourselves what is likely to come next?—what in the condition of the continental states is the most to be desired as coming next? We are ourselves constitutionalists—constitutionalists after the old English fashion. We have no wish to part with king, lords, or commons. But we are far from thinking that anything like a counterpart of the institutions so designated among us, is either desirable or possible in the case of the great majority of the people of Europe, as at present conditioned. Indeed, we begin to suspect that great mischief has resulted from the pedantic attempts that have been made in this direction. The course of true liberty, and of true social improvement, would probably have been better served

if the chief actors in the late changes on the continent had thought less of the historical constitution of the English, and of the paper constitutions of the French, and more about the practicable and the reasonable in their own special circumstances. It may be very agreeable to our vanity to suppose that England is destined to become the normal school in politics for all the world; but there are many circumstances which suggest that we should be careful to judge of our mission in this respect with a little more discrimination and modesty than is sometimes brought to the subject. In the present state of Sardinia we see how monarchy may be allied with free institutions even on the continent; but if you travel from the Rhine to Sicily you will see that the communities are few among whom such an order of things is at present possible. There must be a vast displacement of the things that are, before anything so much wiser and better can come into existence.

Among all the people that have been subdued by the military reaction on the continent, the Germans appear to have been in the least degree the object of English sympathy. Poland, Italy, and Hungary, have found their advocates in the public press and in public assemblies, while Germany, not less disappointed, not less sorrow-smitten under her blighted hopes, looks in vain for those expressions of generous and kindly feeling, which, if insufficient to remedy the past, have their value with the unfortunate, as tending to revive and sustain hope for the future.

Among the reasons which may be assigned for this apathy concerning the fate of the German people, there are two standing in near relationship to each other which we regard as being at the foundation of all the rest—viz., the singularly complicated nature of the evils with which that country is beset; and the failure of certain remedies in their case, which the physicians skilled in such practice have been wont to regard as of universal efficacy.

When the enthusiasm of a patriotic people has been opposed and subdued by a foreign power, the generous are naturally alive to the wrong and outrage thus perpetrated. The Pole, the Hungarian, the Italian—all are before us in these circumstances. But if we except the atrocious case of Hesse-Cassel, which our experience as constitutionalists prepares us readily to understand, almost everything German is felt to be a very labyrinth the moment we approach it. To see the nature of the late constitutional struggle in that country, we need to go through the discussions of more than thirty different assemblies, to institute inquiries as to the rival pretensions of as many

sovereigns, and to observe the relations of all these parties to the central power, which each endeavours to render as subservient as possible to his particular interest. We need to be observant, moreover, of the characteristics of some half-dozen different races, in different degrees of civilization, who, while subject to the same heavy yoke, are bent upon hostility against each other. Nor must we omit the mysteries of European diplomacy, whose handy-work depends not a little on the keeping up of that inextricable confusion of states and nations in the centre of Europe, upon which its crafty genius has been exercised for so many generations.

Such are some of the difficulties that must be surmounted by the man who would arrive at anything like a just view of the German question. We scarcely need say, that this is a task more likely to be inviting to the patience of the antiquary, than to become a favourite subject in our popular literature, or with our dealers in popular politics. The people at large do not trouble themselves much about what they feel they do not understand; while the large class of our politicians who imagine that they understand everything, write down every question as hopeless that does not shape itself to their mind when tested by one of their never-failing formulæ: and our diplomatists, who must also affect to know everything, are in fact well content to ignore a question, which, so long as it remains undecided, allows of their so remaining themselves. It is flattering to human vanity to be able to trace our own usage or habit to some general principle so elevated and comprehensive as to be fit to become a law or model for humanity. But with a due admiration of our Teutonic institutions, and with a sufficient dislike of all attempts to displace what has come to us from our history and experience as a people in favour of untried schemes upon paper, we cannot be insensible to the fact that the struggle for constitutional liberty on the continent has not been, and never can be, in more than a very partial extent, the same with our own. It is not there as it has been with us, a purely domestic question, carried on by a government on one side and a people on the other, without being mixed up with foreign relationships and foreign interferences. The mutual dependencies of the continental states, resulting as they do from their geographical position, and their conjoint history through so many centuries, must of necessity have influenced their internal condition in ways of which we are little conscious; and as the impediments to be removed are different, so the best means of removing them may be such as we should not ourselves be the most competent to devise. Few Englishmen are aware of what we owe as a people to the apparent accident

which has made our country an island—by placing the channel between Dover and Calais, instead of leaving it joined as a peninsula to the main-land of the continent. Providence has ordained that the chief force of this country should be on the deep, not on the land. But for this circumstance, the kings of England would have possessed as large a military armament as the monarchs of the continent, and would have been as potent as their neighbour kings in staving off all inconvenient demands on the part of their subjects. The navy cannot be applied to such uses. It becomes us, accordingly, to look well to the real conditions of political life in Germany, before we venture to determine what the institutions are, which such a people should, or should not, adopt for the purpose of extricating themselves from their present difficulties.

If for the purpose of giving a full trial to our own principles of government, we were to suppose the question of freedom or absolutism in Germany to be one solely between the person ruling and the parties ruled in each separate state, it would still remain to be borne in mind that the form of government enjoyed by us is the result of a series of conflicts and treaties between three principal powers—the king, the barons, and the commons, the people having acted all along, more or less, through the one or other of these parties, without being recognised themselves as an independent political body. Of course, the Aristotles of modern times have not failed to deduce from the stipulations embraced in the settlement that has taken place between these powers, an abstract political system, made up of a balance of three powers, said to be representative of three different political and social principles. But whatever value we may ascribe to such theories, it is manifestly expedient that we should inquire if there be in the states of Germany political bodies of the same nature with our three great constitutional powers, before we venture to urge upon those states that they should resort to precisely those forms of procedure which are familiar to ourselves. For if it should be found that such bodies do not exist in those states, it would not be to the credit of our reputation for practical wisdom to importune them in favour of the terms on which certain powers should agree, the powers themselves being only a fiction of the imagination.

Now with regard to the lords, we regret to say that we must account these as a power with which it is impossible to come to any wholesome understanding in Germany, for the simple reason that it cannot be said to exist there. In England, whatever changes may have come to the relative place of the crown, or of the peerage, as the consequence of the steady progress of the

commons, the three powers still exist together, and as strong definite realities. The time is far distant, we suspect, in which the peerage of England will cease to be a very powerful element in our political and social organizations. Its influence as a central power in our legislature is not what it once was; but its place among us from the ancient times of our history, and its relations in so many ways to our present interest, and to our present feeling and usage, are such as to furnish little ground of hope to those who wish to see class privilege in this form wholly extinct among us. But it is not thus in Germany. In that country, all remembrance of an aristocracy as an independent political body has died away from the mind of the people. This has been the natural result of the levelling despotism, and of the military and diplomatic usurpations, which have been in constant action there during the last three or four centuries. The power of the nobility, as all the world knows, came from the dependence of the king on their military services as his great vassals. Standing armies have come into the place of contributions in the shape of armed men by feudal chiefs. The changes in the mode of warfare, which have rendered this change in the composition and character of the royal armies necessary, have been changes greatly favourable to the power of the monarch, and in the same degree unfavourable to the power of the noble. In this brief statement we have the clue to the history of the continent from the times of Charles VIII. and Louis XI., to the close of the last century. The feudal organization, which sufficed as a means of protection against local feud or border incursions, was not adapted to the exigencies of distant and protracted wars. The service which the chief might claim from his vassal was limited to a certain number of days in a year. On the invasion of France by our ancestors, it was found that service thus restricted was wholly unavailable; and then began the custom, so pregnant with consequences, of carrying on war by means of mercenaries—or of men who became soldiers by vocation, and for pay. Self-defence, or ambition, prompted other kings to an imitation of this example. War became a profession and an art, and by the promise of new advantages, gave a new stimulus to princely ambition.

As wars became more extended, complex, and artificial, so was it with diplomacy. As the web expanded, alliances became of greater moment, and the *idea* of 'a balance of power,' became familiar to the sovereigns of Europe, long before that *phrase* had been constructed to express it. Concerning local feuds, the people of a locality might judge; but when public affairs came to be regulated by reasons of state, as between nation and nation

—or more properly, between cabinet and cabinet, the subject passed beyond the popular apprehension, and in the negotiations of diplomatists provinces and peoples were disposed of, as the chances of war, or the calculations of princely expediency, might suggest. In this manner the states of the continent have grown into the condition in which we find them. They are for the greater part purely artificial constructions; and to allow the natural to come into the place of the artificial, in only a slight degree, would be to see them drop wholly to pieces.

In states formed on this *dynastic* principle—the principle of their becoming a mere patrimony of certain houses or families—in such states, the existence of anything like independent power among the people is not for a moment to be expected. But in the prosecution of this dynastic policy, the first object was to break down the independence and power of the nobles: and almost all our historians, down nearly to our own time, have agreed in bestowing their highest praise on the sagacity of those princes and statesmen who have acted upon this policy with the greatest measure of success, and in this respect the Great Elector of Brandenburg has come in for a large share of eulogy.

The dynastic principle having become thus ascendant over the aristocratic, the only avenue open to the ambition of nobles was through the favour of the king—and to that low means of advancement the majority were soon content to betake themselves. From the position of the king's peers, capable of treating with him on equal terms; and from the possession of freedom to vindicate their own independent rights, in the exercise of which they often acted as the protectors of those beneath them, they degenerated, ere long, into so many court-lackeys, and soon became proficient in all the dignified arts proper to their new vocation. Servile towards their master, insolent towards their inferiors, the measure in which they might render themselves serviceable to the appetites or passions of the king, was the measure in which they might expect permission to enrich themselves from the spoils of the people. We must not trust ourselves to describe, or even to indicate, the beastly extent to which this subserviency was carried in not a few cases.

It is now, we think, fair to ask—what useful purpose could be served by calling together a house of peers, in a country where it must be composed of men reduced to this state of dependence and weakness, and who would come together bringing with them in the popular mind recollections like these? It is true there are some old families left, and some others, possessed of large landed property, have recently sprung up; but it is a great mistake to suppose that these two qualities exist in the measure,

or in the conditions, fitting them to become the foundation of a political power. The historical and the constitutional position of our own aristocracy has no parallel in modern Germany. All things considered, it is difficult to say which is most potent in the management of our own affairs, the lords or the commons; one thing is certain—the crown is as nothing in comparison with either. Nothing of this sort attaches to the vestiges of an aristocracy existing in Germany. Everywhere the men of this class are literally the servants of the king, and utterly powerless to defend either themselves or the people against the encroachments of the crown. Their great solicitude is to hang about the court, in the hope of obtaining public offices for themselves or the needy members of their families. It is common with us to regard a house of peers as the natural embodiment of conservative principles; but if we wished to damage such principles irreparably, we should deem no course more advisable to that end than to entrust them to the keeping of such a peerage as the German States would furnish. We should feel compelled to give up the German people as devoid of all self-respect, honour, moral sense, common decency, if they could be other than disgusted with the very name of nobility, after such a history of the noble as they have seen during the last three or four hundred years. They owe nothing to that source; they have never heard of that class of men as a political body; and are lamentably ignorant of all the finespun speculations of our Montesquieu and De Lolmes about the necessity of some such balancing power in every well-ordered government. Hence an attempt to create such a power where it does not exist, could hardly fail of being interpreted by such a people as a defiance of public opinion—as an attempt to create new class distinctions, and this at a time when the demand is, that certain old ones, which have too long survived, should be abolished. All advantage that should be assigned to such favourites would of course be so much disadvantage imposed on the people—and to institute them without assigning them any privilege beyond the privilege of a name, would be simply ridiculous. Of this last description, however, was the chamber of peers in France, under Louis Philippe; and in this light did the conduct of that steady and profound gentleman, the King of Prussia, appear to the wiser of his subjects when endeavouring to shape his political conceits after that model. The idea of creating powers for the mere pleasure, of seeing them balance against each other, according to pre-conceived notions, is a flight of extravagance much too refined to commend itself to German dulness.

It must be confessed, however, that this is one of the strong

reasons in its favour with not a few learned professors, and no less learned counsellors in that country—for men there are, who count everything foolish which the people can understand, and everything profound that is too obscure to meet the popular apprehension. It is a remarkable fact, that nearly all the more influential leaders of what was called the constitutional party in Germany were professors—indeed, that party may be said to have been created by them. The vulgar, we suspect, not seeing any three independent powers in real life, placed in such a balancing relation to each other, as to cause the product given by the process to be the public good, will never be able to understand why the heads of their learned sages should have proceeded so far in the work of construction and no further. It is true that Virgil tells us ‘the gods love the number three.’

Among ourselves, royalty has been so long restricted within limits comparatively harmless, that we can think of its ancientness and splendour with veneration and sympathy, and we can imagine much of the present harmony as subsisting between the crown and the people, even if there were no house of lords in existence. We are, in consequence, apt to think that a little mutual good will and forbearance should suffice to dispose German subjects to loyalty, and German sovereigns to be considerate of the freedom of legislative assemblies. We do not bear in mind that there is very little resemblance between such assemblies and our own house of commons. In fact, a house of commons, according to our notion, is as little possible in Germany, in the present state of German society, as a house of lords. With regard to the Austrian empire, it is clear that, could a general representative assembly for the whole monarchy be brought together, not half the provinces it would be said to represent, could ever be brought to yield a willing obedience to its authority. To require that the Hungarians, the Croats, the Poles, the Italians, and others, should send their representatives to Vienna, would be felt as requiring them to surrender for ever all their long-cherished claims in favour of their national independence; while the other races, such as the Tzcheks and the Germans, would convert their common parliament into a battle-field for the display of their national rivalries and hatreds. In truth, we have not to speak on this point from conjecture—we are warranted not only to say that such *would* be the result of such an experiment; we have seen it tried, and the consequences to be expected have followed.

We may pass on, therefore, at once to an examination of that state which is acknowledged as at the head of the really German powers, and regarded as the archetype of a German monarchy.



If the rapid sketch we have given as to the origin and history of the continental states be applicable to those states generally, it is eminently so to Prussia. Even for the incongruous architecture of the Austrian monarchy, some good reason may be found in the geographical position of the several states, and still more in that common interest which banded them together for their common defence through so long an interval against the power of the Turks. But Prussia is altogether a product of family ambition. No reason whatever can be assigned for joining its several parts together, except that it was regarded as for the interest of the Hohenzollern family that it should so be. Prussia exists, accordingly, as Prussia, purely for the sake of its princes—that its resources may be conveniently at their disposal. With all that it includes, Prussia is still the smallest of the European monarchies pretending to an independent international policy; and is in a position, moreover, very unfavourable to its acting on such a policy. These pressing exigencies have rendered it indispensable, if the dynastic interest is to be sustained in Prussia, that the properties and lives of all the members of the community should be placed at the absolute service of that interest.

That man is born to be a royal functionary, is a radical principle in the Prussian state. In so far as he is successful in this direction, he realizes his proper destination. It is well known, also, that by the wisdom and generosity of the Prussian government, it is provided that every man shall participate in a measure, and for a season, in this proper end of his being, by becoming a soldier, and by being liable to be called out in that capacity at the pleasure of the sovereign, so long as he may be deemed capable of service. But this military service, as may be supposed, is not the form of service to which the passion for place, so common among Prussians, most earnestly aspires. In that country, the poorest man will subject himself and his family to the severest privations, that he may secure to his son a university education, in the hope that one day he will become *something*, and to become *something*, in the language of Prussia—indeed in the language of all Germany, is to rise to a government appointment. The idea that to succeed in this way is to succeed in the way most honourable to a rational being, is so deeply rooted in the German mind, that not to have attained to title and office is a defect hardly to be compensated by birth, wealth, or even genius. Let a man become rich by his industry, famous by his talent, he will still covet, if he be a true German, the honorary title of a commercial or an aulic counsellor. Thus admitted into the functionary world, his existence is duly legalized. It is due

also to this functionary world to state, that whenever a man rises above the common level, he is sure to be taken into the guild of functionaries by means of some title, if not by means of office. That no man of status, in any way, may be without this badge of relationship and dependence, various orders of knighthood have been instituted, and every year numberless pieces of ribbon, of various hues and dignity, are scattered profusely abroad, so that it has come to be a common saying, that, in Prussia, there are two things which a man must not hope to escape—death, and the order of the red eagle. By such means the government has succeeded in drawing the substance of the middle classes as it were into itself; much as it succeeded in former times in bringing the nobility into a condition of abject servitude. The monarchy is the central power which for ages has been not only attracting everything in this manner to its own centre, but absorbing everything there. That the government may possess the power necessary to such a policy, it not only has the police and the judicial departments at its disposal, but extends its authority and patronage to the ecclesiastical, the educational, the artistic, the scientific, the medical, in all of which the chief appointments come from this centre, and the pay from this centre.

The extent to which the independent spirit of the middle classes is impaired and consumed by this base contrivance, may be inferred from the fact, that there is scarcely a student who does not go to the university with the avowed purpose of qualifying himself to obtain some government appointment; and that there is rarely a man of any pretension to respectability who does not send one or all of his sons to prosecute such studies in such hope—to give themselves to honest industry, being to lose caste, in comparison with becoming a government functionary.

Now a German house of commons, inasmuch as it would be impossible to exclude from it the most influential and intelligent portion of the middle classes, would of necessity include a *large majority of functionaries*—or of persons receiving pay from the government, and reckoned in that category—such as counsellors, judges, barristers, professors in universities or in gymnasia, and officers of the revenue. Indeed, if we take into our account all persons belonging to military or official families, we doubt much, if in a German house of commons, you would not have to pass by bench after bench to find a solitary member whose position in life could be said to be without any dependence on the government, so as to be compatible with an unbiassed course of utterance and action.

If it be indispensable, accordingly, to a constitutional government, that there should be a jealous separation between the

*legislative* power and the *executive*, how could that be possible in states, where the chambers would be called together only to transfer the discussions proper to them as public servants, from the board of green cloth to the *salle des députés*? If constitutionalism consists in the balancings of three powers, how could it be established in a state where two of the three are wanting. If it be described as the best form of self-government, how may that be carried on through the medium of assemblies made up so largely of men dependent on the public purse? And if in every such adjustment there must be a careful separation between the legislative and the executive, how would that be possible through the medium of conventions in which the great majority who make the laws would consist of persons in the pay of the government? By this time our reader will begin to see what the working of the Prussian monarchy has been, and will begin to wish, if we mistake not, that its days may be numbered. At present, Prussia is made for its king—the king is not made for Prussia. The state is what it is, simply that the king may be what he is. In that land, the end of all things is the elevation of a house, not the elevation of a people. It is a state in which everything institutional is constructed and worked so as to *exhaust public spirit*, and to place the men and the means of *all* families at the disposal of *one* family.

If there be apparent exceptions to the above statement, they are only apparent. Attempts to do something in the way of constitutionalism on a small scale, are not unknown among the Germans; but there has been a want of nature and sincerity in such appearances. There are reasons which may dispose princes, though great lovers of absolutism, to give their sanction to some puerile imitations of constitutionalism. Princes, in some of the smaller states, have so done, in the hope of placing a check by such means on the ambition of the greater—especially on Austria and Prussia. To the overwhelming material force of those great powers, they have sometimes opposed the threat of an alliance with popular disaffection at home, and with liberal principles abroad. Late events, however, have shown, that these petty princes, when such an alternative is really before them, will be sure to prefer that their principalities should pass under the yoke of Prussia or Austria, than that they should be permanently governed by means of really liberal institutions. For reasons very similar to those which have disposed the smaller states towards this sham-constitutionalism, Prussia has had her seasons of flirtation with all existing varieties of liberalism. In this manner she has endeavoured to turn the scale of popularity in her favour when opposed by the rivalries of Russia, Austria, France, and the smaller principalities.

In estimating the semblance of constitutionalism found in Germany, it should be borne in mind, that not only must the conventions to which that name is given consist for the most part of state functionaries, but that the life of a German official is by no means an enviable one. From their great numbers, it is inevitable that their pay, in the general, should be miserably small. At the same time, they are not a little overworked, by much useless writing, and still more useless learning, and the *surveillance* from which they suffer, as exercised, almost to the last, by those above them, they exercise in a manner not less pitiable towards those who are beneath them. Nearly all have risen from comparatively humble circumstances, and nearly all seem to be without memory of that fact when they have risen above that level. Filled as most of these men are with the dreamings of philosophy, it is no great marvel that their heads should go upon all sorts of political theories, in the hope of finding, through some such medium, an alleviation of evils which are constantly pressing upon them, though they scarcely know why or whence. Among the theories to which they have thus betaken themselves, is that of a balance of the three powers. There is much in this idea to commend itself to the bookish tastes of a German official. First, it is that form of government that would have been natural to Germany, had not the events of the last three or four hundred years taken such a course as to interrupt the tendencies of her social condition in the preceding times. Further, it is an idea which flatters the peace-loving and conservative spirit of the German, by offering him a *reform* which would in fact be only a *restoration*. Above all, it is a notion which accords with his book-vanity, his pretension to learning, as presenting a scheme which comes to him from history, and which historians only can be expected to verify; which rests on a profound philosophy, moreover, and which the philosophical accordingly can alone be expected to understand. Thus no status for learning, or for skill in refined speculation, needs be hazarded by the profession of constitutionalism. Hence in reading the speeches of any of the constitutional leaders, not only in Germany, but on the continent generally, including Guizot, Dahlmann, Vincke, and others of their class, one is struck with the *doctrinaire* complacency which comes out in almost every sentence, imparting to all they do in this way the cast of an esoteric science. Such men are ready to do much to secure the introduction of the abstract and formal belonging to the constitutional system of three powers; to inculcate the importance of the distinction between the executive and legislative functions; to set forth the order, and all 'the pomp and circumstance' of parliamentary life. But, strange to say, they have shown them-

selves capable of doing much more to check and put down that real exercise of a public will, the sustaining and guiding of which should be the great aim and end of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism, it would seem, is a piece of exquisitely beautiful machinery, so long as the working of it is restricted to the hands of historical and philosophical persons, but it becomes vulgarized in such eyes, and is sure to lead to all sorts of mischief, as worked by the natural intelligence of the people at large. So accustomed are these gentlemen to regard their own sort of wisdom as indispensable to good government everywhere, that in the face of all their fine speeches about constitutionalism, a world governing itself, would be, of necessity, in their view, a world in which brutality runs riot over intelligence. The wrongs under which the continent of Europe is now groaning, may be traced in no small degree to this political pedantry.

But selfishness has had fully as much to do as vanity in bringing about the present disastrous state of things in those countries. Let the people of a state like Prussia become in any tolerable degree self-governed, and some three-fourths of its public functionaries would be at once voted superfluous. Now whatever may be the charms of constitutionalism as a theory, to men filling state offices it must be subject to this terrible drawback, which would be sufficient we fear to prevent more than a very few from being thoroughly in earnest in seeking its realization. For this reason, it is hardly too much to say, that on the continent, all men are really more constitutionalists, than the men who have become loudest in their *praise* of constitutionalism.

Not to mention the government of Louis Philippe, as beyond our present subject, the conduct of the majorities in the Frankfort and Prussian chambers furnishes an instructive illustration of the constitutionalism of men who feel at every step that to quarrel with the dynastic organization of the body politic, is, in effect, to quarrel with the means of their own privileged existence. As the consequence, you see them follow the king of Prussia through every stage of his treacherous course, from Frankfort to Gotha, from Gotha to Erfurt, from Erfurt to Berlin, from Berlin to Brandenburg, always of course under the ready pretext of meaning to distinguish between constitutionalism and anarchy. Had absolutism required such service from their hands, they would no doubt have followed the royal person much further—to Dresden, to Olmutz, to Warsaw, to the *Bundestag*.

The case of Hesse-Cassel may be regarded as an exception to this statement, and in the main it is so—but what must the state of society be, which has made it an act of marked heroism that the Hessians should have acquitted themselves as they did in such circumstances as goaded to their acts of resistance? It must

be remembered, moreover, that it is the army of Prussia which is brought to act, not on the side of that heroism, but against it, so as to deliver up the men who had risen to it, to the tender mercies of their master. In legislating for a people we must legislate for the rule, not for the exceptions—according to the general feeling, not according to instances of extraordinary virtue.

Convinced, as we are, that any political system, which, in its working, must be hostile to the particular interests of the men who have to work it, is a monstrosity, we feel that constitutionalism, and the present dynastic functionaryism of Germany, can never work together. In such a state of society constitutionalism must be a sham—a pernicious sham. All who meddle with it are in danger of being damaged by so doing. Its effect upon the people must be to divert their energies into a wrong channel, and to augment the host of difficulties which in any course must press upon them. Seeing those who should be their leaders given up to abstractions, carried away by conceits, and skilful in inventing smooth names and hollow pretexts, in the hope of realizing only so much of change as may be consonant with their own interests, what marvel if the bitterness of disappointment, and the presence of fear, should prepare them for giving ear to desperate projects, and for putting themselves under some extravagant guidance. Such must ever be the result of placing men in positions thus false; and such has been the result of attempting to save continental royalty by allying it with popular institutions in the manner required by what is called constitutionalism. Dynastic organization of this complexion and free institutions cannot be worked harmoniously. It is to attempt a mixture of the iron and the clay.

Continental Monarchy, then, speaking generally, is no more to be compared with Monarchy in England, than Continental Nobles are to be compared with our House of Lords;—the distance, moreover, must be very wide, between our House of Commons, consisting, to a large extent, of independent men, chosen by an independent constituency, and a Continental Chamber of Officials.

The founding of the Prussian monarchy was a purely money affair, conducted in the spirit of a pawnbroker. The Emperor Sigismund of Germany, being unable to redeem the Markgrave-dom of Brandenburg from the ancestor of the present dynasty, to whom it had been pledged for a sum of money, scarcely more than would suffice now-a-days to purchase a very small estate, the land and the people of Brandenburg passed into the hands by which they have been since retained. In this proceeding, the people, as a matter of course, were expected to be as passive as

quadrupeds, and they appear to have been so. Part of Prussia Proper and Pomerania, devolved on the house of Hohenzollern by virtue of a family compact. Keeping in remembrance how this transfer of provinces and peoples from hand to hand has been sanctioned by European diplomacy and European law—species of slave-trade though it be—the acquisition of these two provinces may be regarded as the least censurable of all the measures by which the patchwork of the Prussian monarchy has been brought together. The province of Silesia was the pre-selected booty of a war undertaken to secure it. The grand-duchy of Posen, and the other parts of Prussia Proper, were the Prussian share of the spoil obtained on the partition of Poland—an event which has acquired an exceptional notoriety purely from the fact that the Poles bravely resisted the sort of wrong to which other peoples, more in the manner of the times, silently submitted. Almost all the remaining territory of Prussia, comprising the Saxon and Rhenish provinces, was assigned to that state by a diplomatic convention in a manner which, keeping in view its time and its circumstances, exhibited a more wilful and flagrant violation of popular rights than any of the measures of this description which had preceded it. For the peoples whom the diplomatists at the Congress of Vienna presumed to dispose of after this fashion, were not only the peoples whose valour had delivered the territories in question from the foot of the invader, but they were the peoples who had done that thing upon express stipulation that they should never again be assigned to the charge of authority of any kind without their consent. The diplomatists did not wait for that consent; and the crowned traitors who profited by that haste, ruled over them until 1848, in apparent utter forgetfulness of the vows that were upon them. Thus Germany, and the greater part of Europe, were parcelled out a second time, at the close of a great war, according to the power or policy of a few subtle and selfish men who chanced to be uppermost, very much as they had been some two centuries before.

It will be seen from these observations that we regard the foundations of some of the continental monarchies as being of a very peccable description. If the professors of constitutionalism in the Prussian chambers must remind us of the rights of the crown, we challenge the production of all charters in favour of those rights. Where are they? Nearly all the provinces of that monarchy belong to it as the result of processes in which subtlety has prevailed over simplicity, or might over right. In all instances the people have been handed over with the soil, as the chance of the game, whether played in the cabinet or the field, may have determined. These facts will account for the con-

tempt with which the King of Prussia is disposed to speak of 'pieces of paper with letters scribbled thereon'—meaning thereby such papers as he would be only too happy to produce in support of his royalties, if they had ever existed; and such also as contain stipulated rights on behalf of the people, which it would be pleasant to him to regard as wholly extinct and forgotten. The bare enumeration of the titles of the many duchies, provinces, districts, great and small, which have come to constitute this monarchy, is enough to suggest that the course of things in this respect must have been anything but natural.

Nor has it taken a very long time to bring these appropriating influences to bear on so many places and communities. Nearly half this ill-gotten wealth was allotted to the Hohenzollern family so late as the year 1815, and by far the greater portion of the other half was in the hands of other families not more than a century since. The many peoples, who within so short an interval have been compelled to abjure one allegiance and adopt another, at the peril of being deemed traitors, and punished as such, do not forget what has happened, though it may be convenient to some other parties that *they* should so do. Loyalty in such cases, if it exist at all, must be devoid of all intelligence and nobleness—a mere instinct, rising hardly higher than the fidelity of a dog to his master. Prussia and Austria owe their existence purely to functionaryism, civil or military. Apart from the interested fidelity of the officers in the army, and the almost endless gradations of placemen, from the village schoolmaster upwards, they would drop to pieces. The day in which the will of the disinterested and the patriotic should become ascendant, would be the day of their death-knell.

So little, then, is there in common between monarchy in England and monarchy in such countries. We much fear, accordingly, that attempts to set up agencies to which the names of king, lords, and commons shall be given, after our English fashion, while the institutions so designated have scarcely anything in common with the objects denoted by those terms in England, may not be the sure way to realize there, the system of liberty happily familiar to our own people. The names in this case may be the same, but if the things be widely different, the working and the result must be widely different.

In our judgment, this kind of policy has been in action quite long enough to determine what effects may be expected from it. Since the year 1815, there have been constitutions in nearly all the smaller states of Germany, in all since the French Revolution of 1830. During more than thirty years, Itzstein, Rotteck, Welcker, Roemer, Pfizer, Behr, Wirth, Gagern, Jordan, and



many such men, toiled on according to the most respectable notions about the virtues of passive resistance and constitutional equilibrating. They suffered calumny, banishment, penury, prison and all the horrors of prison discipline, with the most exemplary submission. If men could have merited to see the constitutional-balance theory realized, it would have been realized by those men. Some of them, as Behr and Eisenmann, came out of dungeons old and crippled, which they had entered in their prime. Others died from their sufferings while in such keeping, or, like parson Weidig in Hesse-Darmstadt, were cut off in their cell by the hand of the government bravo. But never, so long as they lived, did those men weary of their Sisyphus work. On being released you see them at their toil again, beginning precisely at the point where they left off some twenty or thirty years before. Our English sympathy, which the cannonading in Hungary and against Rome has called into such lively exercise, had left us wholly inobservant of the heroic deeds, and the grievous wrongs, of the men who had struggled for liberty many years before in Germany with the most resolute spirit, and after the most approved rules of constitutional chivalry. It would seem as though our very instincts had taught us that such labour, in such circumstances, must be fruitless. Still the labour was heroic: and if the press remained fettered, public meetings prohibited, the right of association denied, individual liberty down-trodden—in short, the lives, properties, and actions of all men as much as ever at the mercy of the police, it is certain that these perpetuated and augmented wrongs cannot be said to have been rendered necessary by any want of moderation, forbearance, or patient effort on the part of the constitutionalists. The great error in these men was the radical error of all men who expect the form to give them the spirit. They hoped to *create* liberty by an introduction of names and modes which with ourselves have been rather the *results* of liberty.

During the interval under consideration, the conduct of the Prussians was still more moderate and forbearing. Year after year passed since 1815, until nearly a quarter of a century had elapsed, and still the promises of their king as to a free government lacked accomplishment. One after another was openly ignored, until at last it could no longer be doubted that all the appearances which had seemed to prognosticate better things, had been only *parts* of an intended system of deception. Still they refrained from troubling the declining years of their old king, and *patiently* waited until the time should come in which they might solicit from his successor the rights for which they had so long since stipulated. To the sentimental speeches and imbecile

tricks of the new monarch, they opposed, calmly and respectfully, a simple recital of the written promises made by his predecessor some twenty-five years before. This was done by Dr. John Jacoby, a physician, in a pamphlet intitled 'The Four Questions'—a publication which brought upon the author the frown of the government, but secured him a testimonial of several thousand pounds as an expression of sympathy from the people. So things continued for another seven years.

But the news of the French Revolution of February 1848, which filled the hearts of so many kings with dismay, and of so many peoples with unwonted confidence, was felt in Prussia as elsewhere. Still, in the height of a European excitement, the petitions presented to the king by several municipal bodies and popular assemblies at Berlin, contained nothing, either in language or substance, that could have given offence to the most delicate constitutional ear. But when the people were assembled in expectation of a straightforward reply to their call for a liberal government, freedom of the press, trial by jury, and such like moderate petitions, a collision was provoked by the insolence of the soldiery, and, as there is too much reason to suppose, by the secret and sinister influence of a person more deeply interested than any one beside in the question as to what should be in future the nature and extent of the royal power in Prussia. Of course, in the judgment of some of our friends of order, and worshippers of the comfortable, it was a dreadful thing that the people should then have done as they did. They had waited thirty-two years for the royal answer they were now seeking—of course, they should have been willing to wait some thirty-two years longer. They saw their friends shot down by the musketry of the soldiers—their women and children trampled under the charges of the horse—but, of course, no thought of self-defence should have entered their mind. What are kings for but to be obeyed—what are subjects for but to obey? Verily, our wonder is, not at the alleged excesses of the people so dealt with, but rather at their moderation. For now, when they have vanquished the soldiery, how do they demean themselves? Do they call for a republic? Do they plunder the houses of the aristocracy? Do they proclaim martial law, flog women, hang the first men of their country by the dozen on the gallows? Why, they were no sooner victors than you hear them singing their hymn of thankfulness to God before the palace of their king—they lay down their arms as in his presence—and they are content that the securing of their long-desired and dearly-purchased liberties should be entrusted to the Vinkes, Schwerins, Hansemanns, Camphausens, Beckeräths, and such men, all known

for their decidedly moderate principles. Such is the history of that crisis at Berlin.

In all the other states of Germany the movement went off in nearly the same way. In no instance were the people the first to appeal to arms; when provoked to the struggle they were everywhere victorious; and the first act in their state of freedom was to entrust the guardianship of their rights to the wisdom of men who had been distinguished by a sincere but moderate constitutionalism. In short, if constitutionalism might be made to take natural root in the soil of Germany, we should say, then was the time for such an achievement; for not only in Germany, but in Europe, not excepting France, the powers of government passed into the hands of men who had won their position in public life as professed constitutionalists. Why did they make nothing of it? Your desperate constitutionalist will reply,—Because they were wanting in patience and forbearance—a very general defect in the German it seems—and instead of making the most of what they had gained, became unreasonable in their demands, called in the aid of the mob, and thus spoiled everything. Now, we do not mean to deny that some of those members of the German chambers who were opposed to the measures of the constitutionalists did make extravagant speeches; but the material question is, did the propositions which those speeches were meant to sustain take the majorities of such assemblies along with them? It is an acknowledged fact, that throughout the whole revolutionary period—as it is called—the constitutionalists were regularly in the majority; and those majorities were much more disposed to look for protection from the military than from the mob. In nearly all countries riots are the natural accessories of great political excitement, and there is nothing in what took place in this respect in Germany, beyond the outbreaks which have been common in our own history when great political questions have been in agitation.

We conclude, therefore, that the failure of constitutionalism in Germany, is not to be traced to any misconduct in its advocates, so much as to its inconsistency with the inherent maxims of *such* a monarchy as obtained in Prussia. Where the power of the king is very limited, constitutionalism may work with it; but where that power is such as we see in Prussia, constitutionalism is not the agency by which to impose wholesome restrictions upon it. According to the maxims of the constitutional theory, it belongs to the king to have the command of the army, to choose his own ministers, to have a veto on all resolutions of the chambers, to dissolve those assemblies at pleasure, and to conduct and determine

negotiations of all kinds with foreign powers. The English parliamentarians, as we have seen, committed themselves to a civil war rather than cede to the crown an amount of authority so incompatible with popular liberty. In England, as we have before said, our great force is in our navy, and the army at the disposal of the executive has been always very limited, compared with the armies of the continent. With us, moreover, the ministers of the crown are in the place of the crown, so that if wrong is ever done, it is not the king, but his ministers that do it, and the wrong-doers are the bearers of the responsibility of such doing. These ministers, again, are in effect assigned to the crown, partly by the power of the aristocracy, and partly by the monetary influence of the house of commons. In this state of weakness and dependence, the crown, in our case, rarely ventures upon a veto; and our princes, in place of exercising their ingenuities to advance the real or supposed interests of their family, are compelled to regard the agriculture, the commerce, and the industry of the country as the great interest. Under a dynastic rule these interests are valuable chiefly as they may become taxable, and the taxes raised from these sources, instead of passing into the charge of a responsible ministry, go into the hands of an irresponsible sovereign. Brought into existence as they have been by diplomatic fraud and military violence, the monarchies under consideration can hardly be sustained except by such means. So long as the military power of the king is unimpaired, he may bear with some free speech-making in the chambers or elsewhere, it being perfectly easy, when the season of popular excitement has passed, to find his means and occasions for setting all right again.

Such, in fact, has been the exact course of things in Germany since the spring of 1848. The change which then came, left the armies of soldiers and functionaries as much at the disposal of the crowned heads as before, only that the bands of discipline had been somewhat loosened by the new feeling that had come up. The republicans might have loosened those bands further—have destroyed them, but they were desirous to act, if possible, with the constitutionalists, preferring the prospect of an imperfect liberty, to the hazard of all liberty. But the constitutionalists, again, had to choose between a bias on the side of republicanism or of monarchy, and they chose the latter. By their assistance, the princes succeeded in reviving the military and bureaucratic spirit, and that done, all things returned fast towards their old level. The different powers pledged themselves to the help of each other in their common difficulties; armies surrounded the capitals where the chambers supposed to represent the people were assembled;

agents of the different governments stimulated the people to some excesses, and thus furnished a pretext for the summary course desired—viz., that of martial law. When the *agens provocateurs* did not succeed in producing the convenient amount of disorder, the prince fled in professed apprehension of it, and in the hope that attempts would be made to set up a republic—an event which it was calculated would bring back the more moderate and influential portions of the community to the side of the monarchy. But in no case did the people commit themselves to purely republican institutions. Nevertheless, the bare fact that they had put their prince into bodily fear—or that they were charged with having so done—and had thus forced him to leave his capital, was construed as enough to warrant the intervention of the allies for the purpose of restoring all things to a state of order, according to the old ideas on that subject.

In this manner absolutism has been re-established in Prussia, Austria, Saxony, Baden, Hesse-Cassel, and elsewhere. Twice Vienna might have been saved, had not the wish to perpetuate constitutional principles in the future government intervened to prevent it. The first of these occasions was when Windischgrätz had not as yet gathered his forces, and when he might have been precluded from so doing, if the diet had proceeded at once to an organization of the peasantry, who were everywhere ready to obey the first call. The second instance was when the diet declined the proffered assistance of the Hungarian army, and did not authorize it to enter the German territory. Had the wisdom and promptitude demanded by the exigency been present at either of these junctures, we think it probable that Vienna would not have been taken; that modern history would not have been stained with the atrocities, rare even among savage nations, that were there perpetrated; and that Hungary would not have fallen.

In Berlin, the chambers, being well up in their constitutional catechism, allowed themselves to be dissolved, re-elected, purified, ambulated, once and again, all in the most scrupulous conformity with the maxim that patience and constitutional principles will do everything. Some complaint, indeed, did arise, but it was of little worth or consistency, inasmuch as the plaintiffs had given the king full power to do all that he did.

Our conclusion from this series of instructive facts is, that the power of continental royalty, which has proved too strong for constitutionalism during the recent changes, is likely to prove too strong for it in any change yet to come. The choice of the people in these countries, accordingly, lies between submitting as heretofore—in truth, more abjectly than heretofore—to the power of their princes; and the use of some means for their deliverance

from that power, possessing more aptness to meet the necessities of the case than the constitutional theories in which they have been hitherto so much disposed to confide.

Now it is worthy of note that this is the conclusion to which the instincts of the German people had in a great measure conducted them before the year 1848. It is a remarkable fact, that whenever the wave of public feeling runs high in Germany, the idea that comes floating upward again and again is that of *the unity of the whole German fatherland*. The language of the constitutional speculators has been—get liberal institutions in each state, and dream not of anything so vast as the creation of a new empire. The language of the popular instinct, on the other hand, truer to nature, has been—the liberal institutions you seek cannot be realized, except as the dynastic policy so utterly incompatible with them shall be made to give place to a more natural policy—in a word, except as a care about the artificial elevation of families, shall give place to a care about the natural distinction of races. The so-called rights of thrones must submit before the inalienable rights of nationalities. This feeling points to the only sort of confederation promising to be powerful enough to rescue the continent from the monarchical tyrannies now ascendant there. The unity of Germany on the basis of nationality, would absorb or extinguish the dynasties of Prussia and Austria, and would be the signal for a similar emancipation of the Poles, Hungarians, Italians, and of all peoples now groaning under the sway of alien powers, instead of being left to become themselves powers. What diplomacy and the sword, working against nature, have hitherto kept together, would thus be dissolved, and the vocation of both, as we can fully believe, would be to a large extent superseded.

But if this be the kind of change which can alone open to Europe the prospect of regeneration, can it surprise us that the chances of a few months in 1848 did not prove equal to the realization of such a new order of affairs? This change involves something more than a nice adjustment of relations between kings, nobles, and commoners. It embraces a reconstruction of Europe, and a settlement of some very old accounts between nations and nations, between races and races, and between religions and religions. The differences and convulsions that come up from these sources are ceaseless, and must be, so long as the present system shall last. We are not insensible to the difficulties connected with this question, we do not mean to conceal them; our only regret is, that we cannot in this place deal with them at all in the extent necessary to completeness.

First, with regard to this German unity, if it mean anything, it must mean, at the least, the gradual diminution and final absorption of the several independent sovereignties and dynasties. The German princes, under the promptings of the law of self-preservation, saw this from the beginning—much more clearly than the constitutional party, who had honestly persuaded themselves that it would be possible to combine sovereignty in a variety of states, with the subjection of the whole to a strong central power, that power being so constructed as to be favourable to general liberty. When at last they saw this scheme to be impracticable, they offered Germany to the king of Prussia. But had the king accepted it, the other German sovereigns would have thrown themselves into the arms of France, Russia, or England, and his majesty of Prussia could have maintained his position only by placing himself at the head of a European revolution. For such a responsibility he was far from being qualified, either by inclination or capacity.

Austria and Prussia would very willingly appropriate to themselves the rest of the German sovereignties; but their policy is to aim at this object by means of all sorts of family contracts, military conventions, commercial leagues, and political unions. Diplomatic artifice is confided in as a safer agency than the sword. Prussia owes nearly everything to a game of this sort. Since the founding of that kingdom, the history of Germany has consisted very largely in the endeavours of the two great powers to gain an exclusive ascendancy over the smaller states; in the resistance of the smaller sovereignties to this policy; in the meddlings of the other European powers with this state of things, in the hope of turning it to their advantage; and in the gradually increasing disaffection of the people, from finding themselves made the everlasting tools of family ambition or foreign selfishness. The smaller states may be seen allying themselves with French liberalism or with Russian despotism, as may best contribute to secure them against the encroachments of powers nearer home. Russia is much less interested in the triumph of absolutism in Germany, than in the maintenance of this entangled state of things, which, as it occupies and consumes the forces of Europe, is regarded as preparing the way for Slavic ascendancy. Princely professions of sympathy with liberalism, are well understood by such diplomatists as Metternich and Nesselrode. So long as liberalism is under check from a sovereign, it is known to be comparatively harmless; but let the will of the people become stronger in relation to it than the will of the prince, and it is at once voted as a nuisance, and put down, if not by the prince himself, by so much of foreign inter-

vention as may be necessary for that purpose. So long as the prince has his uses to make of it, it may be borne with, but let the people attempt to turn it to some higher account, and its days are numbered.

Nothing can be more ambiguous in this respect than the position of Prussia. We have seen something of the incongruousness of the parts of which that monarchy is constituted. Besides being the smallest of the European powers pretending to an independent political action, her possessions lie scattered over a disproportionately wide extent, and are divided moreover by an intervening tract of land, which, as late events have shown, may at any time be seized by an enemy. Prussia, cut up thus through the middle, has to defend herself against the three most powerful states of Europe—against Austria, her arch-enemy on the south; against France, the most unsettled and warlike of nations on the west; and against Russia, bordering on her open frontier in the east. Among all the provinces included in this political card-castle, there are two only—Brandenburgh, East Prussia and part of Pomerania, that do not remember and regret the time when made to become parts of it. The Rhenish provinces, being catholic, and having retained the Code Napoleon from the times of the French occupation, have a strong bias towards France, and France is not less disposed to look with some longing towards them. The Poles subject to Prussia have always regarded their connexion with it as provisional, and, for reasons which will presently be stated, are directly interested in its extinction, not to mention their having been irreconcilably exasperated by the cruelties of the Prussian generals Colomb and Steinäcker in 1848. None of these provinces, with the exception of the two or three first named, know why they should belong to Prussia, more than to any other state, or why the Prussian state should exist at all. But they all know full well that they are Germans, and, the greater part of them, that they are protestants. It is for the reasons indicated in these facts, that the king of Prussia is obliged to flatter the spirit of German nationalism, and of protestant enlightenment: while for reasons also indicated, he must not be expected to attempt any realization of the idea of German unity. Nor must he be expected to encourage a protestant enlightenment of thought in relation to politics. What is called Prussia is a military and bureaucratic system, so spread over varieties of peoples as to draw off the power and substance of them all for its own maintenance and growth. To cede to these peoples independence, would be to assent to its own destruction. Placed by the nature of its origin between German patriotism and Dynastic interest—between



freedom of thought and military and bureaucratic absolutism, Prussia has calculated that the only means of existence open to her, is to practise a systematic deception on the spirit of her own subjects, by throwing over a power in reality absolute, some of the appearances of intellectual freedom. Indiscretion or accident has, from time to time, brought documents to light, which have exposed some of these state secrets, and demonstrated the fraudulence of the policy sanctioned as a system by the Prussian government.

In place of all further argument on this subject we here subjoin a few passages from an authentic document of the description mentioned. The first of these was published last year by Dr. Johann Jacoby, in a Review since suppressed. It contains prince Hardenbergh's commentary on the proper exercise of the censorship. Prince Hardenbergh being one of the two ministers who did most to secure for Prussia her reputation as a friend to liberalism and progress, his opinions may be taken as a favourable expression of Prussian enlightenment in this form. The governors of the provinces, to whom this liberal minister addresses his instructions, are informed that the chief object of that wholesome institution, the censorship, is, 'to promote among the people an *attachment to the person of his majesty, and his majesty's august family*—to give the citizens *just notions* concerning the events taking place in other countries, and to *represent the measures*, either taken or about to be taken, by the common consent of the German princes, in *such a light*, as &c. &c. But,' continues our liberal minister, 'if any author shall be so audacious (*sich unterfangen sollte*) as to *mean* to express a *blame* (*tadeln zuwollen*) of such measures, *such aberration must be absolutely prevented!*' What the instructions to clergymen and schoolmasters would be, from this Turkish vizier under the garb of a liberal minister, we can readily imagine. Having thrown his protective authority about the persons of their celestial majesties, the German princes, his care is extended beyond them to their ministers and functionaries, requiring that '*inasmuch as these are in the confidence of the German sovereigns, no censure whatever can be allowed to be cast upon them.*' The ideas of the prince in reference to a representative government are rich in the same oriental fragrance. 'It being,' he says, 'above the comprehension of the public at large to judge concerning the principles acted upon by representative governments, such judgments *ought never to be set forth in pamphlets, and much less in newspapers.*'

It is material to state that these enlightened views were put into official circulation in 1819, four years after the Prussian

people, at the cost of much blood and treasure, had given independence to the monarchy, on the condition of obtaining representative institutions for themselves. But the people were now to be taught that the principles of such institutions were above their comprehension, and all discussion in relation to such principles was to be discountenanced, for our sage and liberal chancellor further says—‘Still less is it to be suffered that *arrogant authors* should *presume to praise such constitutional experiments* (of whose value time only can judge) as the perfection of wisdom and happiness, and thus to beget confusion in the heads of the ‘people.’ The ‘perfection of wisdom’ was to be sought rather in such institutions as should tend to nurture in the people the faith that neither kings nor their ministers can ever do wrong, for this chief of the functionaries says—‘The censors have to ‘take care that all *monarchs, governments*, as well as their *ministers*, ‘be spoken of with proper respect.’ What is meant by ‘proper respect,’ is explained afterwards in the course of the instructions addressed to the different governments—instructions varied somewhat in each case, and all only too well adapted to convert the functionarism of the state into a huge artifice, ever working to preclude political intelligence from the people, and to perpetuate the grossest political deceptions in its room. ‘With regard to the United States,’ says our political mentor, ‘no ‘exception will be taken to historical, geographical, and statistical observations relating to them; but care ought to be taken ‘not to give an incitement to emigration by any unnecessary ‘commendation of the pretended happiness enjoyed in that country, nor by any great boasting of the wisdom of the American ‘government.’ It was this mingled fear of emigration and of liberal principles, we may suppose, that prompted the Prussian minister to condemn ‘all excessive praising of the king of Sweden,’ ‘whom an evil-disposed party would fain elevate above all ‘monarchs who possess their thrones by right of inheritance.’ The government that could descend to such a system as is brought out in these few sentences, we leave to the judgment which our readers will not fail to pass upon it.

Twice in the height of its reputation the strength of the Prussian monarchy was revealed, to the astonishment of Europe, as strength in appearance only. In 1806 it was prostrated in a single day by the battle of Jena. In 1850 it was saved only by an unconditional submission to the dictates of Austria, attempted by the intervention of that arbiter of the fate of Austria, and, we regret now to say, of Europe—Russia. But diseased as is the Prussian organization, it is tenacious of life. Now, indeed, it

can hardly be said that the dynastic selfishness is the most formidable obstacle in the way either of the liberty or unity of the German states. The functionary selfishness, though it has grown out of the dynastic selfishness, has at length overgrown its parent. There is too much reason to believe, that had Frederic William shown any strong and steady leaning to the side of popular institutions, an effort would have been made by the bureaucracy and the army to have raised the prince of Prussia to the throne in his stead. In fact, the rumour of the king's resignation was more than once set afloat, at very critical junctures, by the party who were ready to have done their best towards bringing about such an event in the case of exigency. When the first storm of the revolution had passed, the military spirit was soon rekindled by daily skirmishes with the people, by a dragonade in Posen, and by the war with Sleswic-Holstein; and the functionaries, alarmed for their status and emoluments, rushed to their seats on the right, and in the centre, in the chambers at Berlin and Frankfort. To the influence of these men, some ready to adhere to the monarchy on any terms, rather than see their selfish interest impaired; others holding by a moderate constitutionalism, and averse to the amount of change necessary to the regeneration of their country, we have to attribute the failure of the attempt made at Frankfort towards a reconstruction of Germany. It is in its tendency to diffuse this timid and sordid temper, to lodge it in every family, and almost in every bosom, that we see the worst vice of a monarchy like that of Prussia.

We have shown in a previous paper the incompatibility of the Austrian monarchy with anything like the principles of a free government.\* But as Austria has recovered its position, in some degree by availing itself of the anti-German spirit of a portion of its subjects, it may be well to show how the fate of Germany is bound up with that of her eastern neighbours, whatever they may be as to race, or as to their present condition. Germany has much to hope and fear from this source. Under Metternich, the different races of Austria, of whom the Hungarians, the Germans, and the various tribes of the Slavonians formed the three principal constituents, had indulged their mutual jealousies and hatreds to a degree which only waited for a spark to burst into a flame.† Had these three peoples, at the outbreak of the revolution, been

\* Vol. xi. pp. 230, *et seq.*

† Of the thirty-four millions under the sway of Austria, nearly one-half are Slavonians, not more than six millions are Germans. In Russia the Slavonians number fifty-three millions. In Europe altogether, including six millions in Turkey, they are estimated at more than seventy-eight millions. Among these the attachment to race is everywhere strong.

free from the jealousies and ambitions of race, and been less influenced by their monarchical and doctrinaire prepossessions, the case would have been comparatively simple. Hungary would have constituted a state to itself: the German part of Austria would have joined itself with Germany; and both being strong through the alliance of their common interest, would have forced the Slaves scattered between them to have taken sides with the one or the other. But as it was, each of them not only strove to preserve the Austrian monarchy, but each had become persuaded that its particular objects might be best secured through the medium of that central power. The Austrian representatives assembled at Vienna consisted of Slaves and Germans, the Italians and Hungarians being self-excluded, and the Slavonian members were much more numerous than the Germans. The court made its uses of the Slavonians so long as it had need of them. They regarded the fighting of the Austrian generals as meant to subdue for ever their great rivals the Germans, the Hungarians, and the Italians; and they were allowed for a time to cherish the dream that all this would be found to be subservient to the long foretold ascendancy of the Slavonic peoples—the children of Swatopluck. Much praise was bestowed upon the Slaves, and much calumny was heaped upon their rivals, by the court of Vienna; but the sword of Austria becoming once more ascendant, the Slaves and their rivals were speedily reduced to the same level. The fact, however, that the majority of the Vienna parliament consisted of Slavonic deputies, prepared to sustain the house of Hapsburgh from such motives, is enough to show the sort of political improvement which the world had a right to expect from that quarter.

During the same interval, circumstances made the Germans the natural allies of the Hungarians. Both clung to the principles of constitutionalism; but of a constitutionalism which would greatly have altered the position of the house of Hapsburgh in its relation to the peoples subject to it. The Hungarians had come to entertain the thought of urging that the monarchy should be removed to Pest; the Germans, for very plausible reasons, would have retained it in Vienna. But the Viennese did not see sufficiently, that being the centre of the Austrian monarchy could mean nothing in their case but their being the seat of a repressive power, the natural tendencies of which would be to expose them to the jealousies and disaffections of at least three-fourths of the races subject to their authority; while their relations to the central power of Germany, and to the Frankfort parliament, would be specially obnoxious to the

Slavonians and Italians, and in a degree also to the Hungarians. In short, these attempts to adapt an artificial constitutionalism, which merged the distinctions of countries and races, and to use for this end an artificial monarchy which had before merged them for its own purposes, was the great error, and what has followed is not only natural, but was all but inevitable. To save what were regarded as the rights of sovereigns, the constitutionalists of Germany hazarded everything, and have lost everything; and have done much to render their constitutionalism offensive, by exhibiting it as only another form of the arbitrary and unnatural. For to perpetuate all the states of Austria in their relation to the Austrian monarchy, and all the states of Prussia in their relation to the Prussian monarchy, and then to institute a great central power for all Germany over both these powers, whether to strengthen or to absorb them—what could this be in the eyes of intelligent men but to give more complexity, and a better prospect of duration, to all the essential mischiefs of German servitude? When the German people next try their hands on subjects of this nature, we have no doubt they will come to their work prepared to do more wisely.

The only clear-sighted politicians throughout the revolutionary struggle, with the exception of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, were the Poles—for the simple reason that their position shut them up to the course which time is demonstrating as the only one that can give emancipation to Europe. The Poles, in all the part they have taken in the insurrections of Europe, with the exception of a small party of doctrinaires, headed by Prince Czartorisky, have pursued only one course—their steady and avowed object being the destruction of the Austrian monarchy. It was on this point that they disagreed with the Slavonian Congress at Prague, and separating their cause from that of the Tzcheks and Croats, joined the Hungarians. In reading the articles of the leading Polish journals during the struggle, it is astonishing to see the prophetic clearness with which they point to the probable issue of the movement, even so early as October, 1848; while other parties, amidst the whirl of their passions, or the fascination of their theories, were losing all trace as to the real connexion of affairs. In the month in which the *Slawische Centralblätter* (Oct. 13,) commented on the fall of Vienna in such language as the following—‘The avenging Nemesis has crushed whosoever has ventured to lift up his hand against Slavic liberty,’—the *Gazeta Polska*, the central paper of the Poles, expressed itself, even before the fate of Vienna was decided, in much wiser terms:—‘The Viennese,’ says this journal, ‘are mistaken in holding up as they do the banner of Radicalism with one hand,

‘and the unity of the Austrian empire with the other. The  
‘two things are in absolute antagonism, and can never be made  
‘to unite. But not less mistaken are the Austrian Slaves in en-  
‘deavouring to retain that tottering fabric in their interest. Woe  
‘to Austria! We predict this, whether Vienna be conqueror or  
‘conquered. Victory on the part of the Viennese, will be followed  
‘by a war in Bohemia, a war with the South-slaves, and perhaps  
‘even with the Tyrolese; by a second revolution in Venice and  
‘Lombardy—in short, by a civil war, and that war a war of race  
‘over the whole empire. Such an opportunity no nation earnest  
‘in the strife for liberty should allow to pass. Victory on the  
‘part of the emperor will be followed by a war with the Magyars,  
‘by an ascendancy of the Slaves, and a temporary re-action. But  
‘the more violent the latter shall be, the more determined and  
‘powerful will be the revolution called forth by it. In all this,  
‘it is a singular part that is played by the Slaves. They step  
‘forward as supporters of the throne,—as champions for the  
‘rights of the emperor. Jellachich hastens with his Croats to  
‘Vienna; the Lipa Slowanska, and the students of Prague, call  
‘upon the Bohemians to march against Vienna; the Tzchee-  
‘deputies (Slavonians) leave their seats, and declare the diet  
‘illegal and revolutionary. Do the Croats act thus because they  
‘have a great affection for absolutism? Do the Lipa Slowanska  
‘and the Tzchee-deputies act thus because of their strong anti-  
‘democratic convictions? Certainly not—inasmuch as abso-  
‘lutism has been to this moment the cause of all their misfor-  
‘tunes and wrongs. We cannot agree with them—we cannot  
‘praise them; but in place of blindly condemning them, we must  
‘try to understand their position. They see only the one side  
‘of the *solidarité*—the point between Vienna and Frankfort; and  
‘Frankfort is for Bohemia precisely what it is for us Poles in the  
‘grand-duchy of Posen—the destruction of nationality, the  
‘triumph of Wuttke, and such people, who lay claim to Prague  
‘as one of the oldest German towns. At this moment, the Tzchees  
‘see in the Austrian emperor, not their own absolute master, but  
‘the enemy of the Magyars and the enemy of Frankfort, and  
‘they are allied to him by the same ties of interest. To retain  
‘possession of Hungary he must subdue the Magyars, and to  
‘subdue the Magyars, must be to deliver such Slavonians as are  
‘subject to the Magyar power, to organise the three southern  
‘Slavonian kingdoms, to render them independent of the Magyar  
‘dominion, and to secure an equality of rights to those Slovaks  
‘whom the Magyars have so long held in subjection. Let the  
‘saving of the imperial power be the work of the Slavonians,  
‘against the will of the Germans, and that power can no longer

‘rest on a German basis, but must rest on that to which it has now betaken itself—viz., the Slavonian. Such is the calculation of the Slavonians—but simple as it appears, it may deceive them. Having once become the instruments of a foreign will, they will find it no easy matter to emancipate themselves from that power. If absolutism should triumph, and should gather new force by the war, it will soon turn that force against the men, whom it knows only as uncertain friends for the present, and as certain enemies for the future. It will prosecute its own schemes, without the least care about the interests of those who, assisting them for awhile, were only aiming through that medium to serve their own purposes. Austria is German by its origin, and is now much too old to change its nature, and become an ally of the Slavonians.’

Our readers will feel that this is sagacious and powerful writing, especially when they call to mind that it was published early in October, 1848, before Windischgrätz had captured Vienna. The passage shows that both the Poles and the Magyars have a vital interest in the unity of Germany, provided it can be brought about by a wiser course than that pursued at Frankfort, which, if it had been successful, would have ended in setting up a colossal central power, that would have laid its unnatural and heavy yoke on something like half the princes and peoples of Europe. By dissolving Austria and Prussia, and combining the German provinces included in those monarchies in one Great Confederation, Hungary would have been left to settle her own affairs, after the manner most congenial to her. The Magyars, who had done so much in the direction of freedom and equality before the revolution of February, would have done more in the new circumstances which followed, and would probably have retained a constitutional monarchy, which we can regard as being quite as much in its place in Hungary, England, and it may be in Poland, as it would be out of place in Germany, France, or Italy. With regard to the Poles, the portion of their territory included in Prussia and Austria being set free, and it being the interest both of the Magyar and German states that Russia should not be allowed to take possession of them, the natural consequence would have been a reconstruction of Poland. The following passage from the *Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung*, of January 27, 1848, may assist our readers in judging how far a change even thus great may ere long present itself. ‘The position in which the Hungarian nobility stand to the court of Vienna is precisely the position in which the nobility of Russian Poland, including the provinces of Sarmatia, Ukraina, and Little Russia, acquired as early as

‘the last century, stand to the Tsar. In the north-east there exists a widely-spread conspiracy, reaching from the Austrian frontiers until you approach Moscow on one side, and Odessa on the other, and in which a great part of the nobles of this extensive territory are involved. The democratic spirit of Western Europe, without changing its real nature, has in the East put on an aristocratic garb. Those Russian malcontents look on the Tsar as a usurper of German origin—as a foreign tyrant whose yoke must be shaken off. They are dreaming of constitutions, of the division of powers, of guarantees for what they hold to be their rights. Their eyes are now directed upon Hungary and Kossuth. If Kossuth be victorious, they will rise, and then, in all probability, the potentate of the north will have some difficulty in putting them down, since in the Russian army itself this spirit, silent as it may now seem, has made considerable progress. Nicholas knows and fears the net which is thus cast about him. It does not admit of being torn asunder by any of the ordinary means of power, for this simple reason, that however formidable, it is a conspiracy which consists not in definite stipulations, so much as in a general sentiment—a compressed spark of hatred, ready to break out at the first fitting season. It is intangible as the air. Nicholas is not ignorant that he stands on a crater, and that his own safety depends on the success of the Austrian arms in Hungary.’ Suppose England to have prevented the success of the Austrian arms in Hungary, by preventing the Russian invasion of that country, what would have been the condition of the European family of nations on this 1st of November, 1851? Whatever answer may be given to that question, the above passage shows clearly enough the great motive for the part taken by the Russian cabinet against popular liberty, not only in Hungary, but throughout Europe. This also will explain, not only why the Hungarian revolution should have been aided by the Poles, but how it came to pass that in Piedmont, Sicily, Baden—in all places where the old order of absolutism was attacked, Polish generals are found in the van. The saying of Rousseau, though nearly a century old, still embodies a terrible truth—‘Poland is swallowed, but not digested!’

We have now arrived at the last and strongest hold of absolutism—European Diplomacy. By this agency, the present artificial system has been called into existence, and this agency is now acting as a most formidable phalanx for the defence of it. Opposed to it is the rising spirit of humanity over all these European lands, demanding rights for man as such, for nationalities as such—demanding this sometimes awkwardly and inar-



ticularly, but not the less earnestly, not the less in the manner which may be taken as a prophecy that the time will come in which the proudest will be made to acknowledge it.

The different cabinets of Europe have a deep interest in the present dismembered state of Germany. A glance at the diplomatic history of Europe since the year 1815, will suffice to show that by the forcible dismemberment of Poland, Germany, and Italy, all the continental powers have been brought into such a state as to feel at every turn the influence of Russia, so as to be compelled to subserve her interests.

The great object of the Russian policy is the quiet and safe occupation of Constantinople. Gaining that point, not only the Austrian empire and Asia Minor would be in its power, but the Mediterranean and Persia. The German and Hungarian parts of Austria form a comparatively feeble enclosure between the Slavonians of the north, including the Tzchees and Slowacks, and those of the south, including the Illyrians, Croats, and Servians. The latter are not only of the same general race, but of the same tribe and religion, with the greater part of the inhabitants of Turkey. Were Russia to come into possession of that country, it would be her policy, as in all such cases, to excite the national and the religious fanaticism of the peasantry—each of whom has a portrait of the Tsar and of St. Nicholas in his room—to such an extent, as to cause a war of extermination against the other two races; which would issue in the interference of Russia, and the final incorporation of Austria as a part of her domain. In this manner, Russian diplomacy spreads its network from the centre of Europe to the centre of Asia. Many authentic documents, well known to men who take an interest in general politics, place it beyond doubt that such are the designs of Russia. The degree in which they menace the commercial interests of this country need not be pointed out. To have to stipulate at St. Petersburg for the conditions on which we might cross the Isthmus of Suez, would be somewhat humiliating.

The Russian policy in pursuit of this object has ever been, not only to generate strife between government and government, but between peoples bordering upon each other, and even between people in the same territory; the intention being to produce such entanglement and weakness, as may afford plea or occasion for executing its own plans of encroachment. In this manner, the Russians have advanced step by step since the commencement of the present century, in spite of remonstrances, and even threats, from other governments—from our own among the rest. To such remonstrances, as proceeding from ourselves, Count Nesselrode has always answered, and no doubt always will answer, in the

language of a most friendly and ready submission to everything reasonable, but without any thought of cutting the hook in a single instance so as to lose hold on his coveted prey.

On the fall of Napoleon, the war period was succeeded by the diplomatic period, and from that time the Russian cabinet began to spread its intrigues through Italy, in such a manner as to give the Austrians, the French, and the English enough to do to sustain their respective influences there. Austria especially might well complain of what she has suffered from this cause. Russia has given its secret aid to conspiracies and disaffections of all sorts, both among Italians and Germans, that the resources of the governments affected by them might be consumed in the precautions deemed necessary to provide against them. Not, of course, that the Russian cabinet has any sympathy with professions of liberalism, either by small princes, or by oppressed peoples; or that the Carbonari of Italy, or their brother conspirators, the *Burschenschaft* of Germany, were people of the sort that Nicholas would be disposed to favour as his own subjects. But it might be the tendency of any or of all these agencies to weaken his neighbours, and his own strength would grow by that weakness. While, for this high-minded purpose, governments were to be set against governments, and the disaffections between the ruling and the ruled were to be fanned into a flame, all Germany was to be kept in a state of morbid fear and hatred against France, so as occasionally to force both nations into costly preparations for war. With a refinement in artifice worthy of Machiavelli, the selfishness of the German princes, the peculiarities of the German character, the vanities of different nations and communities, all were wrought upon, partly by securing the services of their most talented authors, and partly by means of documents addressed directly to the different governments, setting forth with great skill the dangers said to be looming in the distance from the democratic spirit of France and England. One document of this description has been recently published, and a passage from it will suggest what we wish our readers to apprehend:—‘ We ‘ may take into consideration,’ says this authority, ‘ the case of ‘ Germany, as subdued in a war against France and England. In ‘ this most mournful event, the German governments whose pos- ‘ sessions are on the left and right bank of the Rhine would find ‘ themselves compelled to make common cause with France ‘ against Eastern Germany, aiding to force the latter to a disas- ‘ trous peace, which would probably indemnify France, by sur- ‘ rendering to her the whole left bank of the Rhine, and by ced- ‘ ing much, especially great commercial advantages, to England. ‘ But however melancholy such a reverse of things would be to

‘Germany, this kind of loss would not admit of comparison with the fearful consequences which the triumph of French and English constitutional principles would bring along with it, in respect to the German confederation and the separate states of the union.’ Then follows a picture, dark and terrible in its colouring, of the horrors that must ensue from this possible ascendancy of the French or the English constitutionalism.

It must not be supposed that the object of the Russian diplomatist in discoursing after this manner is to prepare the way for any direct attack on the territories of Germany or Austria. His intention is, that these powers may become so alarmed as to find too much to do at home to allow of their placing any impediment in the way of his own plans in another direction—the direction of Constantinople. The first movement of Russia in that direction was on the territory of Bessarabia, which gave her possession of the mouths of the Danube. This was done when the exhaustion of the Napoleon war was in process, leaving Austria incapable of resistance, and England with little disposition to quarrel with an ally on whose services much was depending. The commerce of the greatest of European rivers thus passed into the hands of Russia, to the great injury both of Austria and Turkey. It was not until 1838 that the eyes of English statesmen began to be opened to the real importance of the Oriental question. The conflicts which then began between the Sultans of Persia and Turkey on the one side, and their insurgent vassals on the other, brought to light the connexion between the state of things in those regions and our own interests, so as to prepare Lord Palmerston for entering into the real bearings of the case. Since that time, his lordship has kept watch incessantly at the gates of the Bosphorus.

But being well aware that it is exceedingly difficult to be always on the watch, and that as circumstances did once combine Russia, Austria, and France against England, so it may be again, our government has been aiming, during the last ten or fifteen years, to secure such friendly relations with some power or powers on the continent, as might relieve it in some degree from the necessity of this rigorous outlook. If, however, the character and relations of the chief continental states be such as we have described, it is manifestly absurd to expect that the diplomatic skill at our disposal will be found a match for that exercised by Russia, the odds of circumstances being so much against us. We have come, also, with deep reluctance, to the conclusion, that it is not merely futile, but cruel, to extend encouragement to popular principles in Prussia, Austria, or Italy, except we are prepared to approve of changes, and to aid in the promotion of changes, that must be fatal to the dynastic tyrannies which have so long ruled

in those countries. The struggle to come will not be ~~one~~ between the comparative merits of the three forms of political rule, Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy, but rather between three races, the Romanic, the German, and the Slavonian. In what manner these several races will emancipate themselves, and what forms of government they will severally adopt when emancipated, time only can reveal. This change may come more speedily, or it may occupy many generations. It may be worked into existence through much disorder and bloodshed, or it may result—as we sincerely hope it will—from more humane influences, as a more rapid intercommunication, a freer commerce, and a constantly-widening intelligence. Or, as is most probable, it may come, not from one of these causes, but from a mixture of both. We have ourselves become grey-headed in our worship of constitutionalism, and we reverence it still as the best thing for England; but we say it deliberately, and with deep sorrow, that we see no hope for the liberties of Europe so long as the Austrian and Prussian monarchies are allowed to exist. The removal of two families from their supremacy would suffice to allow the people of Europe to drop into their natural positions and relationships, and would place the several races, and the sections of those races, at liberty to work out their own development and progress, in the manner most congenial to their nature, history, and circumstances. To remain as they are, is to be nothing better than the prizes played for by the skill of cabinets, or fought for by those who fight only for booty. Once free, and allowed to care for their own after their own manner, there might be governments of various forms, emanating from the public will, in Frankfort or Pesth, in Warsaw or Rome, and each be wholly free from jealousy of the other. No man acquainted with the working of popular institutions in this country can have become familiar with the chief cities and states of the continent, without finding the conviction forced upon him, that there must have been something very unnatural at work to have left a people of so much intelligence—in great part of very high intelligence—without almost a vestige of self-government. Almost instinctively, one feels prompted, if possible, to tear away the imposture that has sufficed to perpetuate so much wrong. These men are fully alive to the advantages which arise from the peaceful intercourse of nations, and are much less disposed to look to the sword as the instrument of progress, than to the political education that would be realized by the people, if once brought into the working of free and native institutions. In a distribution of territory according to races, there are districts, like the Grand-Duchy of Posen, where the population is mixed, so as to render it

uncertain to which of their neighbours—the Poles or the Germans—they may with most fitness and advantage ally themselves. But since the principle of this new organization, towards which all the recent and costly movements of peoples, even in their very failures, are tending, is not so much territorial as national, not designed to say who should be the possessors of certain tracts of country, so much as to secure to individuals and nations the right to act for themselves in relation to their own resources, their own institutions, and their own development and progress,—this higher question of race being ceded, the lower one of mere territory would soon adjust itself. These observations apply to the final settlement of the Slavic districts which lie between the Poles, Germans, and Hungarians, on the one hand, and between some of these and the Turks on the other. It may be safely left to them to determine to which of these communities they will ally themselves, or to resolve to act for themselves through the medium of institutions, better adapted to their character and circumstances than anything likely to come to them from Poland, Germany, or Hungary. States thus severally independent—independent on a natural basis—might still, as the result of their common civilization, of their common commercial interest, and for their common defence, have their common centre or centres of unity, as in the case of the old Greek cities who were thus bound by the Achaean League, in the case of the United Provinces of Europe, and of the United States in America.

We do not pretend to the merit of having been the first to fall upon the idea of such a process of re-adjustment and regeneration in the affairs of Europe. Having been much in the way of knowing what the people of the continent think about their own affairs, and having read much about them, as we call the whole to mind, the course we have explained, as that by which Providence may still be found to regenerate this grand portion of the earth, assigning to its peoples a progress the glory of which will be greater than that of anything that has preceded, may, we think, be taken as an expression given to the ideas and feelings that are labouring for utterance almost everywhere, especially among the more wronged and energetic nations. In such a new order of things, the National parties and the Cosmopolitan parties might cordially unite, as in the great step necessary to all solid hope of advancement. To the cosmopolitan we would say—that God's diversified earth ensures a diversified humanity, and that all unions of men on a large scale must be the union of the different—the unlike. Were the earth reduced, not merely to the likeness of Burnet's *ivory ball*, but

to an ivory *flat*, we might then calculate on some day seeing a humanity without diversity and without separateness—but would that change be for the better?

We look over the surface of a large portion of Europe, and calling to mind its ancient glories, we are naturally led to ask—and is there no hope? The Mediterranean—the sea which was once, as its name imports, encircled by nearly all that was known as the civilized world—the noble countries that still border upon its waters, how like an exhausted soil that has been worked until it will yield no more fruit do they seem? And is there no new process of political and moral husbandry that may be brought successfully to bear upon them? We dare not suppose that. Europe, is not like Asia, shut up to one form of development—to one round of social existence. Her history has not been thus. Come into new culture and into new fruitfulness she will, and we are only solicitous to discern, if possible, what this new culture will be, that we may do something, however small, towards speeding the flow in that direction. Every day the struggle is verging itself more and more into the narrow compass of three words—‘*MONARCHIES versus NATIONALITIES.*’

So long as the present monarchies exist they must be great military monarchies. The sovereign will not surrender his command of the huge forces at his disposal. His plea about the national safety on the one side, will be placed over against all that may be said about dangers to the national liberty on the other. But retaining this power, he retains the power wherewith it will be easy to ‘bring back every thing’ at one time, that may have been ceded at another. Monarchy so conditioned, may yield for the moment to external pressure; but it is in its nature that it should rebound at the first favourable juncture—and even that it should create such junctures if they should seem to be slow in coming. We say again, that the maxim—*NO FAITH WITH SUBJECTS*—has been preached so unblushingly before all Europe that it cannot be forgotten. Hence the alternative now in the distance has come to be—either a military tyranny more degrading and terrible than European civilization has yet known; or such a return to nationality as shall give to the peoples of Europe the ultimate power, not merely in respect to *legislation*, but in respect to the *executive*—such power as will, in effect, secure that the military force sustained at the public cost, shall not be exercised in ways contrary to the public will. To these conditions the present leading sovereigns will not submit; and inasmuch as these monarchs will never consent to exist in this state of weakness, and inasmuch as the peoples dare not again trust them with their

former powers, the nature of the war that has become inevitable must be patent to every man.

What part our own country is to take in relation to these probable changes is a question of some moment, but one very difficult to answer. The English people will no doubt sympathize with the right thing; but our men of wealth, and those who regard it as their great function to watch over the interest of such, must not be expected to be so magnanimous. It is something to know that the mischief which may proceed from such parties is mainly negative. They cannot prevent the natural course of things; it may be perilous even to attempt it; and to accept of treason itself as no treason, when once it becomes successful, will be quite in accordance with the maxims of the low selfishness by which the conduct of such men is but too commonly regulated. We could wish to see the English government acquit itself wisely and generously in relation to these broad questions; but it has done so little in this way through the past, that we fear much concerning it for the future.

We are not inobservant of the talk of many of our 'Peace Society' friends. But in our grave judgment the tendencies of not a little of that talk are anything but wise, anything but *humane*. We have a deep horror of war—of the war which destroys by the sword. But we have a deeper horror still of the war that destroys by the many thousand forms of lingering death that are ever taking place beneath the dark wings of the demon of absolutism. To die in the battle-field may be terrible—to die in the night, and loneliness, and foulness of the dungeon is a thousand-fold more terrible. We lament that thousands should perish as seamen or soldiers; but we lament with a sadder grief that millions should be dwarfed in mind, corrupted in heart, thrust down from their place as men, to be used up as so much mere material—and all that a certain family may rule, or that some chance possessor of power may continue to possess it. Absolutism is the Upas tree of mind. It inverts every principle of morals. It knows nothing of religion except as an engine of state. Man ceases to be man as subject to its pressure. We have no wish to see the world at the bidding of such masters. The cost must be great that should not be freely incurred to place it in far other hands. To bear with absolutism, wherever it can be put down, is to be false to humanity and to God.

ART. II. *Pleasures, Objects, and Advantages of Literature.* A Discourse, by REV. ROBERT ARIS WILLMOTT. London: Bosworth, Regent-street. 1851.

A DISPOSITION to regard literature with little favour has not unfrequently manifested itself among persons of strict religious principles. Mere human learning, as it has been disparagingly termed—that is, all learning that is not comprehended, explicitly or implicitly, within the limits of a restricted theology—has been held to be alike in its tendency and nature, deadening to those higher aspirations of the soul, whose existence and condition indicate and measure the vitality of man's spiritual being. And the reconciling its culture with the attainment of that purity set before him as the great purpose of mortal life, has, by those who cherish these views, been deemed very difficult, if not absolutely impossible.

We do not mean to say that these sentiments are common to all Christian people. Far from it. But that both in ancient and modern times, and in the most diverse circumstances, their existence may be detected among them. No school or party, either within or without our established church, can claim entire exemption from their influence. Romanism has fostered them: protestantism has no infallible safeguard against them. Nor have they been confined to ignorant persons, whose self-esteem often leads them to undervalue that which they cannot understand, and whose self-deception may have caused them to mistake the ground of their condemnation of it. Men capable of appreciating them have at various times, and in greater or less degree, joined with these in affirming the irreligious tendency of secular studies.

That earnest prelate, to whom our Saxon ancestors were indebted for their Christian enlightening, and who was not destitute of the learning proper to his profession, had, as we are told, an aversion for 'profane' literature. With what malicious pleasure would Gibbon, had it been possible for him, have confirmed all that has been adduced in proof of such deficiency. And in this aversion Gregory was not singular among the governors of the church. A similar one is attributed to other names, admirable in our own as well as in continental history. In the early days of the Reformation we find it charged, as though one of the necessary consequences of that movement, upon some of its adherents: those Romanists who did so appa-



rently forgetting that themselves had also been implicated in this disregard for other than theological learning. In later times, and in our own country, traces of an inclination to regard literary culture, save in a limited degree, as the reverse of favourable to the maintenance of devotional feeling, are perceptible to the student of the religious history of the period. To cite instances is not needful. Some might provoke a smile. Adam Clarke's career of learning was nearly cut short by the anathema pronounced upon his Latin and Greek by a brother minister, whose pious motives were, however, not a little alloyed by that pride of ignorance to which the pride of knowledge is as nothing. While, on the other hand, in a recent publication, emanating from what is called the high church party, we read, that among the circumstances that had tended to impair Coleridge's capacity for the due appreciation of catholic truth, must be included 'his profession of literature,' and his 'having edited a newspaper!' Various, indeed, has been its expression; but the feeling has been the same: that literary pursuits, as such, were adverse to piety.

The division of learning into sacred and profane, convenient for enabling us to treat separately of its two branches, may have contributed to strengthen this prejudice against the latter, in the minds of the ignorant, as suggesting difference not only of subject, but of nature, relatively to morals. The word profane has to them now a very ugly meaning; and on that account we prefer to substitute secular for it, seeing that, even at the hazard of being misapprehended by some, we must have two names for what are two things; harmonious though they be, as springing from one source, and concluding in one end. And though the self-conceited ignorance that affects to despise, simply because it does not possess, may not deserve much favour at our hands, as it is indeed altogether foreign to that view of the subject which we are now considering; yet modest ignorance, (there is such a thing,) that slights, not superciliously, but simply from misapprehension, much as a child might slight a bank note in comparison of a handful of silver, is entitled to any such little help as even the change of a word might possibly render to it in this matter.

Objections to literature upon religious grounds are, however, but one expression of a more inclusive principle: one that, proceeding upon an assumption, avowed or unconscious, it may be either, of an essential and ineradicable antagonism between the spiritual interests of man, and all that is connected with his temporal condition only, would write the same sentence of condemnation upon all the latter. An assumption that has in all times, pagan, primitive, papal, and protestant, led to the conclusion, legitimate if it be true, that seclusion from all concerns of

human interest, from everything having reference to that physical frame, that intellect, and those social relations which God himself created for His creatures, as truly as He created his spiritual powers for communion with Himself, was the alone means of maintaining that communion, without which the soul must fall into darkness and ruin.

We respect the motives of those who take this ascetic view of our position in the world, whether it be in relation to its active pursuits, or to those which occupy the mental powers alone. We believe that we do not err in supposing it to originate in a trembling apprehension of aught that may dim the sacred flame, kindled—alas that it should be so—difficultly upon the altar of man's cold heart. And this commands our warmest sympathy, while we deem their peculiar expression of it not only a mistaken one, but one utterly irreligious, alike in its consequences, and in that which we are persuaded is its real origin. Believing, as we do, that man in his threefold character of a physical, intelligent, and spiritual being, was purposely so constituted by His creator, we cannot but conclude that the due use of all his powers, according to their original design, indicated by their capacities, is of divine sanction, and indeed obligation. And further, that these extend to all those human circumstances and relations in which also he has been divinely placed; in such sort as that the duties arising out of them become to him religious duties. So far, therefore, from a spiritually-minded man subserving religion by abstaining from pursuits that exercise the mental faculties, if he have a capacity for them, or from taking such a share in the conduct of the ordinary business of life, public or private, as in the order of society may fall to him; we deem that in so doing he inflicts an injury, firstly upon himself, by disobeying an intimation of Divine Providence, and, secondly, upon society, by doing what in him lies to consign the administration of its affairs, and the guiding of its intellect, to hands that are, above all others, least fitted for such onerous service: those of men who have no regard for God in the government of His own world and creatures.

With reference to that part of the subject with which we are more immediately concerned, we must say that it appears to us all but inexplicable that the active employment of the powers of the mind, upon every possible subject of human knowledge, should be esteemed contrary to the will of Him who framed them with all their varied and exquisite capabilities: that it should be deemed of the nature of sacrilege to apply them to those purposes for which their very nature points out that He designed them. And that it should be thought deadening to the soul's

purest aspirations for human beings to occupy themselves with the still increasing wonders of the divine work: for all with which we can be occupied proceeds from Infinite Wisdom—there is no other creator. Nor does a glance at the various divisions of 'mere human learning' suggest any lurking evil, which eludes notice when we view it as a whole.

History is 'the record of God's providence getting Himself honour out of man's sin.' Civil polity has to do with those relations, social and national, which have been divinely appointed for man: he did not invent them. Science investigates and applies those laws of nature, and properties of the external world, according to which all things have been ruled from the beginning; save when strange suspension witnessed of the constant and sovereign presence with His works, of Him who first impressed upon them those properties, and decreed their continuance according to those laws. Art, æsthetically considered, is but the reproduction and recombination of images of the mind, and forms of natural beauty, whose original is beyond all earthly claim. Philosophy is concerned with the structure of the intellect, with its operations, with man's relation to the material world in which he is placed; and, unenlightened by revelation, with that attempt to discover the relation of deity to both, which a necessity of his very being seems to have imposed upon him: the history of ancient philosophy is one of the most pathetic chapters in the story of the human race. Other departments of human knowledge have their main value in being subsidiary to these, necessary perhaps for their extensive prosecution—as the whole range of philological studies, and others. While even its less important ones, forming that lighter literature which it were needless to particularize, addresses itself to powers and faculties which, as real existencies inseparable from our mental nature, we are bound to suppose good in themselves; and whose due and moderate use give rest, refreshment, and animation to the mind, which has been constructed—it is not for us cavillingly to ask why—so as to require these, just as our physical frame does: both being by these means re-invigorated for more important service. What is there in any of these things from which the most scrupulous ought to turn?

That they should at any time, and in any degree, have been looked upon as incompatible with the allegiance which man, (as a spiritual being within the economy that arose out of his infringement of the law under which he was first placed,) owes to his Maker, seems to argue a perverted view, not only of that economy itself, but of his other relations to deity; which, though transcended by these, are not abrogated by them. They may be

subordinate ones, still they are subsidiary, and imperative in their requirements. If, indeed, it does not indicate the existence of a lurking doubt as to whether He really was the framer of this admirable earth, and the yet more excellent creatures that people its beauty. Or, admitting that He had formed it, whether a stronger than He had not wrested the government from Him, leaving Him at best but a divided ownership of it. This idea we know wrought its way deep into the heart of the elder world. It appears an all but inevitable deduction of the understanding, unaided by revelation, from the facts with which experience furnishes it. And though the conclusion was not a true one, that great truth which men recognise, each in his own heart, of a contest between good and evil, sufficed for such an internal testimony to it, as to give it vitality and energy. The miserable tendency of our fallen nature to pervert all objects of sense into occasions and instruments of evil, easily led those who had assumed this divided ownership, to assign them as the special property of the power which was antagonistic to all goodness. Hence they were believed to be in themselves evil: this was of their very nature, and inseparable from them. In an early period of the Church's existence was this heathen philosophy mixed up with Christian doctrine. Its first fruits was simple asceticism. But in time, the doctrine itself was introduced, whence, in those portions of it whose faith had been thus corrupted, it was taught, that the highest spiritual purity could only be attained by a seclusion as complete as was consistent with existing upon this earth, from all its concerns and interests; and in undeviating mortification of even the most innocent desires, which had the gratification of the senses for their object. The body as well as the world being composed of *matter*, in which, according to this scheme, evil inhered, both were, in themselves, utterly and irreclaimably evil, and must be dealt with as such. And it is this principle, standing as it does in direct antagonism to that teaching whose inspired affirmation concerning this world is, that 'every creature of God is *good*,' which we are compelled to regard as the hidden, little suspected source of those peculiar ascetic views concerning the relation of Christian people to human concerns, upon which we have commented. The practice resulting from them is undeniably its embodiment. There could not be one more complete. Such a principle satisfactorily accounts for the phenomena. We know no other that does. We are therefore warranted in the conclusion; which we make without one thought otherwise than of respect for the sincere piety of those who have, in all unconsciousness, fallen into the error themselves, and taught it to others.

Errors in the church have not infrequently arisen from a lingering taint of the old heathen philosophy. Nor can we wonder that it should be so, seeing that, erroneous in their results as must ever be the workings of man's spirit, apart from a Divine illumination, in reference to the deep truths that concern his nature and being, they must yet give some kind of witness to those truths, wrought out as they are from personal, though vague consciousness. The original glory has not all departed; and, like troubled night-visions, traces of it, distorted and dishallowed, presented themselves to the eager and solitary seeker after truth. Reminiscences there were of the fall of man; of an evil principle having found its way into his heart, ceaselessly warring against the original law of his nature; of an impersonation of all evil, whose whole powers were gathered up to agonistic strife with the Supreme Goodness; this earth the battle-field. The moulding that these, to the elder world, shapeless forms received, would be according to individual and national temperament, and all those other circumstances of individual, social, and national life, which are known to exercise an influence on the philosophy and expression of the religious creed of differing nations, though the details of the process cannot always be traced. Those in whom intellectual vigour or religious feeling predominated, communicating the spirit of their philosophies and religions to others, in whom these qualities had less original force; to receive further moulding and modifying, according to the peculiar characteristics of their recipients.

In urging our own views in opposition to those which, as we think, give up human cares and interests into the hands of other than their lawful owner, we are far from being forgetful of the truth, that by a perverted nature good things may be abused. We freely concede that intellectual exercises and secular business, which we wish religious people to attend to as religious duties, seeing they have to do with things and persons which God has created, may have the effect of deteriorating their moral nature. But we have to learn that such a result is a necessary one. Nor is it clear to us that isolation and mental inactivity afford any infallible protection from injury to the spiritual life. The obliquity of man's moral nature may enable him to pervert the most innocent objects, nay, even his strictly religious offices, into an occasion of moral evil. But the just inference from that is, that he is evil, not that they are. 'Touch not, taste not, handle not,' may be an excellent rule for safety. Doubtless it was originally urged on that plea. But it is not the noblest one for a creature endowed with intelligence and powers of action. It reminds us of that folding of the talent in a napkin, which

was vindicated on the score of the strict account to which its owner would be called if he misused it. But we know what was said to him in return. It was not, thou *good* servant!

There is, we are persuaded, a nobler, truer view of man's position relatively to those purely human interests, affections, and objects of knowledge, in contact with which he finds himself, not by his own will or agency, nor yet by the direction of a blind Chance. One more consonant to that divine teaching which alone is authoritative to human beings, whether its utterances concern this world, or that of which we now 'know darkly,' than this, Manichæan, one; which, directly, or indirectly, affirms an antagonism between God, and His own works: leading men in their misguided zeal to propitiate deity, to esteem slightly all things connected with that mundane economy in the midst of which He has thought fit to place them; and to deny, not the depravity of it, which is their Christian duty, but their human nature itself, which He has hallowed, alike by creating and assuming, by original and persistent benediction. Man was created for God's earth, as well as for God's heaven. His humanity is divinely appointed him. The appropriate objects of that humanity no less so: for good, and not for evil. 'In Him,' it is written, 'we live, and move, and have our being.' It is permitted to man, nay, it is enjoined, to lead his whole life under the shadow of this mighty truth. The evil which he has been seeking to avoid, lies not in external things, but in himself. Let but his will and affections be rectified according to their original constitution, and that designed for him by a subsequent economy whose object is, not the extinction, but the regulation of his humanity, and then his powers of mind and human affections may safely spread themselves over that wide range, which He who has ordained subject and object for each other, who has created us human, as well as spiritual beings, has ordained for them: not with trembling horror of every movement of either mind or body bringing him into contact with snares and dangers purposely set for him, but with an animating conviction of its being most in accordance with the mind and will of Him who has given those powers and affections; not to be superstitiously crippled and laid aside, but to be diligently, reverentially, and cheerfully employed, in a better sense than the one to which that noble rule of action has been perverted, '*ad majorem Dei gloriam!*' Without this purification of his spirit, there is no safety for fallen humanity, either in cloisters, or in an entire life, passed in protesting abstinence, greater or less, from all but strictly religious acts. With it, all human pursuits will be followed with healthy energy; and under

its influence they will be restored to their true position, that assigned to them in the original constitution of the universe, and to which the Christian scheme is designed to restore them—one of harmonious subordination, not antagonism, to those spiritual interests, which are the highest, though not the sole reason, of man's earthly existence.

The Pleasures, Objects, and Advantages of Literature, is a somewhat comprehensive title for the modest little volume, concerning whose theme we have made these preliminary remarks; allusive only to that whose adequate treatment would claim much larger space. Mr. Willmott, however, does not attempt to fill up the outline which he has drawn: a few graceful touches serving to suggest, rather than complete his picture. He is a lover of elegant literature; and in a series of essays, short, but exceedingly pleasing, both from their pointed style, and the genial tone that pervades them, gives us the result of his meditations on a variety of subjects connected with it. Books, their writers, circumstances attendant upon their composition, the mood in which they should be read; taste, criticism, poetry, fiction, history, philosophy, pass in review before him; and each in its turn, receives such treatment as may be expected from one who thoroughly enjoys his work, and goes about it in that quiet, tranquil spirit which seems to indicate more of the literary mind and feeling of the last century than of the present. His turn of thought is a retrospective one. Not only is this apparent in his matter and manner. A passing allusion to the 'classical criticism and biography of the eighteenth century,' seems also symptomatic of it. And his publisher has further introduced him to us, in the appropriate costume of the period to which his mind belongs.

Without professing to undervalue ourselves of the nineteenth century; we believe that, like our great-grandfathers, we have our good points; we must own to a considerable enjoyment of this peculiar cast of mind. There is a sort of sober, autumnal grace about it. And it stands out in agreeable contrast with the peculiarities of our own age, whose tendencies are to an excess of haste; to live two days in one; not so much in amount of usefulness, as in mere business. A temperament that can sympathise with the 'sequestered spirit of meditative enjoyment recognised in much of our early fancy and learning,' is in antithesis to this, and affords a useful corrective both of it and of that other inclination which we, perhaps in common with all former ages, evince, to sever ourselves, as to our mental life, from those who have more immediately preceded us. An isolation as unfavourable to intellectual vigour and moral expansion, as is that other isolation of which we have been writing to those

interests for whose sake it has been practised. The mind that would attain its completeness, must live in all time. Yet must it specially beware of contemning that in which it has its own immediate existence. Whoso falls into this error, cannot enter into the full value of the past.

Literature under its less severe aspect has the greatest charm for our accomplished country clergyman. 'It is only Wisdom, with the girdle of Beauty, that belongs to our subject.' 'Science is not embraced in the pleasures of literature. Refined readers and noble authors are made without it.' And hereupon, with a sort of mild maliciousness, he quotes Fenelon's 'Diabolism of Euclid,' by way of eking out the condemnation which he, and Dean Swift, and Bossuet, and Bishop Burnet, have thought fit to pronounce upon mathematics, which stands as the representative of its unfortunate class. We know not of what university Mr. Willmott may be; but we conclude that the banks of the Cam were never paced by his devious feet. If they were,—we dare not say what our conclusion would be. But whether he ever contended with the great geometer of Alexandria, and came off 'second best,' or not, we must be allowed to think that the view which he takes of mathematics, relatively to their educational or disciplinary purpose, is any but a correct one. Speaking in general terms, we suppose to include logic, which has had its separate slight a little earlier, he says:—'Such studies can only be useful to a full mind: if they find it empty, they leave it in the same state.' Passing over that by the very name which he has given to them—disciplinary—he excludes, or at least does not profess to include, the idea of putting anything into the mind, it may be said that the object of disciplinal studies is not only to teach the right use of stores of knowledge already collected, but more specifically, to teach the mind how to use its powers, so as to be not only intelligently operative, but intelligently receptive also. And that it may not yet have got much to work upon, is surely a very small objection to the teaching it how to work. One great object of education, as its name imports, is to teach us how to apply our mental powers; not merely or chiefly to 'fill' the mind with facts and ideas. And the value of mathematics, and similar studies in relation to this object, consists in their training the mind to those habits of close and consecutive reasoning, the absence of which so often strikes us in the ordinary intercourse of life. It is to the want of thorough disciplinary study of this nature, in the education usually received by the middle classes, that we must attribute the very common habit of confounding—to use a hacknied phrase—the *post hoc*, with the *propter hoc*, so irritating to all who have been accustomed



to discern a difference between the two; and which from the hasty and erroneous judgments that it must involve them in, cannot fail of having a most pernicious effect on those important interests wherein men in our age and country are necessarily concerned. 'Tenterden steeple is the cause of Goodwin Sands,' is the type of a logic that is sadly too prevalent. And that must be so we fear till some improvement be made in the character of the instruction ordinarily afforded to that large and important class claimed by mercantile pursuits, just at the time when they are beginning to be voluntary agents in the work of their own education. Some notion of the laws of reasoning should be afforded them. We do not say that the study of mathematics is the only means of doing so; though we do think they might be made to answer the purpose. Mr. Willmott's poetical temperament disqualifies him, we suspect, for sympathising with these crabbed studies, which we incline to consider the fittest foundation, or framework, for more elegant ones. In his essay on 'Philosophy and its Delights,' that department of it that aims at systematizing the anatomy and workings of the mind, receives no more favourable notice than does this, concerning which we should have had something more to say had space permitted. Metaphysical researches, he tells us, 'offer few lasting rewards. Exploring expeditions into the mind generally bring back 'fabulous news of the interior.' It may be so. We perhaps put no more faith in the results of these exploring expeditions than he does. Yet seeing that in all ages men have been irresistibly impelled to make them, their history becomes part of the history of the human mind; and that can never fail of being deeply interesting to all who partake of humanity. 'Know thyself,' has been written upon man's inmost heart; and ceaselessly, however erroneously, must he seek to obey the command as to his intellectual, as well as spiritual nature. Eager research, prying into every, even the meanest object of creation, with passionate desire to ascertain both the laws and conditions of its existence, cannot leave the noblest of all uninvestigated. It may be baffled. Nay, the subtle analysis often defeats its own purpose. But still the attempt will and must be made again and again. Applied mental science is more attractive to our author. Yet, indeterminate as has been their results, there are minds to whom these researches have had all the fascination of poetry; and as they do not, for the love of them, think lightly or inappreciatingly of the more graceful characteristics of *his* intellectual conformation, he is entreated, in return, to have charity even for the metaphysician. It may be that a taste for such pursuits, inconclusive as they must be, indicates rather a love of the

curious, than of the useful. And if so, to be hedged round with 'ultimate facts,' to find at every turning, 'no road this way,' after the manner of a certain school, may be beneficial rather than otherwise. Yet 'where they agree,' if not useful as to results obtained, they may perchance be so in their effect upon the mind itself, disciplining it to acute discrimination, patient thought, and fixed attention on objects somewhat difficult to bring within the right mental focus, still more difficult to retain there. Mr. Willmott will perhaps excuse them as a species of mental gymnastics.

Taste, criticism, history, poetry, fiction, the drama, and the interior of the literary workshop, offer to him more congenial themes. To them we will follow him.

How to read, seems naturally to come before what to read :—

'A good reader,' he says, 'is nearly as rare as a good writer. People bring their prejudices, whether friendly or adverse. They are lamp and spectacles, lighting and magnifying the page. It was a pleasant sarcasm of Selden, that the alchemist discovered his art in Virgil's golden bough, and the optician his science in the annals of Tacitus . . . . It is not enough for a reader to be unprejudiced. He should remember that a book is to be studied as a picture is hung. Not only must a bad light be avoided, but a good one obtained. This Taste supplies. It puts a history, a tale, or a poem, in a just point of view, and there examines the execution.'

He who regards not the object and character of a book, does a like injustice to its writer. While upon works of genius no decision must be pronounced without frequent perusal.

'Whoever has spent many days in the company of choice pictures will remember the surprises that often reward him. When the sun strikes an evening scene by Both, or Berghem, in a particular direction, the change is swift and dazzling. Every touch of the pencil begins to live. Buried figures arise; purple robes look as if they had just been dyed; cattle start up from dusky corners; trunks of trees flicker with gold; leaves flutter in light; and a soft, shadowy gust—sun and breeze together—plays over the grass. But the charm is fleeting, as it is vivid. In a few minutes the sun sinks lower, or a cloud catches it: the scene melts—the figures grow dark, and the whole landscape faints and dies into coldness and gloom.

'Life has its gay and hopeful hours, which lend to the book a lustre, not less delightful than the accidents of sunshine shed upon the picture. Every mind is sometimes dull. The magician of the morning may be the beggar of the afternoon. Now, the sky of thought is black and cheerless; presently it will be painted with beauty, or glowing with stars. Taste varies with temper and health. There are minutes when the song of Fletcher is not sweeter than Pomfret's. The reader must watch for the sunbeam. Elia puts this difficulty in a pleasant form, and shows us that our sympathy with a writer is affected by the

time, or the mood in which we become acquainted with him:—‘In the five or six impatient minutes before the dinner is quite ready, who would think of taking up the ‘Faëry Queen’ for a stop-gap, or a volume of Bishop Andrews’ sermons? Milton almost requires a solemn service to be played before you enter upon him.’ Only a zealot in political economy begins Adam Smith before breakfast; and he must be fast growing benumbed in metaphysics who wishes Cudworth to come in with the dessert.’

And yet we have known people take the ‘Paradise Lost’ for their after-dinner reading; and should scarcely ourselves object to see Cudworth at any time.

Perhaps Ariosto selected an unpropitious hour when he presented his *Orlando* to the Cardinal D’Este, and was startled by the inquiry of his eminence, ‘Whence he had gathered such a heap of fooleries?’ The cardinal must either have been very hungry, or very dyspeptic. To meet with a reader in such mood is bad enough for the unfortunate author; but worse still must be his fate if he should fall into the hands of a reviewer suffering the same evils of our common humanity. For we, too, are mortal. It suggests an additional range of responsibilities beyond those which we have been accustomed to regard as sufficiently formidable. We once fell in with an amusing dictatable, compiled for the benefit of book-writers; but who shall administer ‘tea and dry toast,’ and other salubrities, to the critics? Yet, is it too true, that fine sensibilities, and powers of thought, all the most intellectual and emotional parts of our nature, are under dictatorship of a most unromantic kind. Our head and our heart may do credit each to the other, and yet the inharmonious condition of another organ may effectually nullify the excellence of both. Lobster salad may crush a new philosophical speculation; and a bad dinner may blight a poet.

‘A classification of books to suit all hours and weathers might be amusing. Ariosto spans a wet afternoon like a rainbow. North winds and sleet agree with Junius. The visionary tombs of Dante glimmer into awfuller perspective by moonlight. Crabbe is never so pleasing as on the hot shingle, when we can look up from his verses at the sleepy sea, and count the

‘crimson weeds, which spreading slow,  
Or lie like pictures on the sand below :  
With all those bright-red pebbles, that the sun  
Through the small waves so softly shines upon.

‘Some books come in with lamps, and curtains, and fresh logs. An evening in late autumn when there is no moon, and the boughs toss like foam raking its way down a pebbly shore, is just the time for *Undine*. A voyage is read with deepest interest in winter, while the hail dashes against the window. Southey speaks of this delight.

. . . . . The sobs of the storm are musical chimes for a ghost-story, or one of those fearful tales with which the blind fiddler in *Red-gauntlet* made 'the auld carlines shake on the settle, and the bits of bairns skirl on their minnies out frae their beds.'

'Shakspeare is always most welcome at the chimney-corner; so is Goldsmith. Who does not wish Dr. Primrose to call in the evening, and Olivia to preside at the urn? Elia affirms that there is no such thing as reading or writing but by a candle; he is confident that Milton composed the morning hymn of Eden with a clear fire burning in the room; and in Taylor's gorgeous description of sunrise, he found the smell of the lamp quite overpowering.'

But under what circumstances soever the book be read, 'no fruit will be gathered unless the thoughts are steadily given up 'to the perusal.' We may hereupon give a short formula for the benefit of those who complain of bad memories: for retention the pre-requisite is *at-tention*. It is the certainty that the want of the one is caused by the want of the other, that makes us particularly impatient of that excuse, held so sufficing alike by child and senior—'I forgot!' 'Attention,' says Mr. Willmott, 'is not often the talent of early life.' But if not acquired then, it rarely is afterwards.

'Criticism,' writes our essayist, 'is taste put into action. A true criticism is the elegant expression of a just judgment. It includes taste, of which it is the exponent and supplement. The frame of genius with its intricate construction and mysterious economy is the subject of its study. The finest nerve of sensation may not be overlooked. But criticism must never be sharpened into anatomy. . . . The life of the imagination, as of the body, disappears when we pursue it.'

Good advice this for ourselves. A remark of Alison's, which Mr. Willmott quotes previously, expresses, though with far too little qualification, our own feeling on this subject. Instead of saying with him, that 'the exercise of criticism *always destroys*,' we should phrase it, *often endangers* 'our sensibility to beauty.' Were we to admit it in his form, we should admit our own unfitness for our office. Yet how much beauty has criticism been the means of discovering! Mr. Willmott does not, however, impress us with a high opinion of his own critical acumen, when he tells us, in illustration of the inventive power of criticism, that 'it infers the lowly station of Homer, from internal evidence. *He tells us what a thing cost.* Some pages of the *Iliad* are a priced catalogue.' The doing this is no peculiarity of poverty. It is just as much the besetting sin of the *nouveaux riches*. If we knew nothing of Homer from any other source, we might with equal justice infer that he belonged to this latter

class. He concludes his discourses upon criticism by thus expressing his superior sympathy with the last century as compared with the present one.

‘This discourse scarcely presumes to speak of criticism as it now lives and flourishes. . . . If there be in it little of the splenetic heart of a former century, there is abundance of untimely fruit and confident foreheads. Its defects are twofold—a want of modesty, and a want of knowledge. A remedy for the former is to be found in the removal of the latter. The truest critic, like the deepest philosopher, will produce his opinions as doubts. Only the astrologer and empiric never fail.

‘A thoughtful person is struck by the despotic teaching of the modern school. The decisions of the eighteenth century are reversed; the authority of the judges is ignored. Addison’s chair is filled by Hazlitt; a German mist intercepts Hurd. Our classical writers daily recede further from the public eye. Milton is visited like a monument. The scholarly hand alone brushes the dust from Dryden. The result is unhappy. Critics and readers, by a sort of necessity, refer every production of the mind to a modern standard. The age weighs itself. One dwarf is measured by another. The fanciful lyrist looks tall when Pindar is put out of sight. This is like boarding up Westminster Abbey, and all the cathedrals, and then deciding on the merits of a church by comparing it with the newest Gothic design that, sent too soon to the road-side, implores of every passer-by the charity of a steeple.’

We admit it—with a difference. Criticism that may be thus severely yet truly characterized, does present itself in our modern literature. There is a school that appears not indisposed to take for the motto of its critical labours, ‘We think our fathers fools.’ But it is scarcely fair to select writers of secondary merit and influence as the exponents of any particular literary period. That more brilliant one to which Mr. Willmott turns so regretful a gaze, would not bear judgment passed upon it after this fashion. We know not whether he himself has ever received ungentle treatment from critical hands or not. An allusion in his preface seems to look that way. If it be so, we may, without offence, presume that personal feeling has, unconsciously, sharpened the expression of this sweeping condemnation of the present generation.

His Essay on the Drama must claim our next notice. The love of dramatic representations seems an innate one. The savage shares it with the man of civilized life. The products of the imagination are variously modified by temperament and circumstance; but under one form or other the faculty manifests itself throughout our humanity. The earliest sports of children show its influence strikingly. They revel in fictitious circum-

stances in which themselves are the actors, for they have scarcely yet learned to abstract their own relation to it, from the world of things and events around them. The next step is to people these with fictitious characters. Here is the germ of the novel. What interminable ones children will pour out. But quietly evolved monologue and dialogue are felt insufficiently expressive of the emotions of the young fictionists. Some action naturally accompanies them; a few 'properties' are added, probably of the scantiest, for their faith is large, and the spectators not sensitive in the matter of discrepancies,—the tiniest child might play 'Wall,' independent even of 'lime' and 'roughcast'—and we have the drama.

'Dryden defined a play to be a just and lively image of human nature, representing its passions, and humours, and the changes of fortune to which it is subject, for the delight and instruction of mankind. Hurd expands the view. Man is so constructed, that whatever his condition may be—whether pleasurable or painful—the imagination is continually presenting to the mind numberless varieties of pictures, conformable to his situation. These images are shaped and tinged by the circumstances of birth, feeling, and employment. The exhibition of them is the poetry, and a just representation is the art of dramatic writing. Supposing this outline to be earnestly filled up, the stage would become a school of virtue, and tragedy, in the words of Percy, be a supplement to the pulpit.

'And this, according to his light, was the character of the Greek dramatist. He instructed and entertained. His page was solemnized by wisdom. . . . The choice of subject, not more than its treatment, gave an educational tone to old tragedy. The writer selected the grandest features of national story. It is found that a spectator is affected by the rank and remoteness of the sufferer. Belisarius asking for an obolus, is more touching than a blind sailor who lost his sight before the mast. Hurd puts this feeling with force:—'The fall of a cottage by the accident of time and weather is almost unheeded, while the ruins of a tower which the neighbourhood hath gazed at for ages with admiration, strikes all observers with concern.'

'The drama is the book of the people. In all countries, the circumstances of a life, however rudely displayed, possess an incomparable attraction. The storyteller is the play-wright of Constantinople. The adventures of an ancient Javanese prince will hold a native assembly from evening until daylight. Yet the properties consist only of a transparent screen, with a large lamp behind it, and a hundred painted puppets, twelve inches high, cut out of buffalo-hide. The poetry is a monotonous recitative, and the action is confined to throwing the shadow of each successive figure upon the curtain. A dramatic poet wields the sceptre of the masses; he reaches the national heart through all its organs of sensation. Eye and ear are his ministers. A brave exploit is riveted in the audience. A fine saying grows into

an argument. When a moral purpose animates the author, he works it through the play. The commonest burlesque submits to the oversight of conscience.'

It is the frequent absence of this 'moral purpose,' or the injudicious, not to say immoral, means by which it has been sought to be worked out, which has led to the pronouncing almost an interdict upon the acted drama, by persons not only of differing nations, but of the most opposite sentiments. The *Histrio-Mastyx* was no mere expression of puritanism. Rome re-affirmed her share of its anathemas, little more than a century ago, in refusing the rites of christian sepulture to the remains of an actress. That its accessories should be exceptionable is, of course, an accident; but it is one by which it has been so frequently accompanied, that they may be pardoned who have fallen into the error of believing it of its substance.

Mr. Willmott's remarks upon the lighter species of dramatic entertainment merit transferring almost entire to our pages.

'The preacher tells us that laughter is mad, and the Proverb of the Wise Man adds a warning, that the end of mirth is heaviness. There was a deep moral in the Athenian law which interdicted a judge of the Areopagus from writing a comedy. *The habit of looking at things on the ludicrous side is always hurtful to the moral feelings.* The pleasure is faint and vanishing, and leaves behind it an apprehension of disgrace.'

We commend the short sentence which we have italicized, to those in our own ranks who make it their business to stimulate, while they cater for, a morbid appetite for this sort of thing.

'Wit quickly loses its flame. But humour, which is the pensiveness of wit, enjoys a longer and a wider life. After one brilliant explosion, the repartee is worthless. The shrunk firework offends the eye; but the quiet suggestiveness of Mr. Shandy is interesting as ever; the details of the great army in Flanders will last as long as the passage of Hannibal. The pleasure of Shakspeare's comedies arises from their humour. His smile is serious. Johnson commended tragi-comedy, as giving a true reflection of those grave and trifling incidents which compose the scenes of experience. Joy and grief are never far apart. In the same street the shutters of one house are closed; while the curtains of the next are brushed by the shadows of the dance. A wedding party returns from church, and a funeral winds to its door. The smiles and the sadnesses of life are the tragi-comedy of Shakspeare. Gaiety and sighs brighten and dim the mirror he holds. In this respect he differs from his contemporary, Ben Jonson, in whom is enjoyed in its perfection the comedy of erudition.

'If the reader descends from the reign of Elizabeth and James into the time of the second Charles, his gratifications of mirth are purchased by a wounded conscience. Comedy has no whole place in its body.

Greek farce was riotous and insolent; yet fancy—like a summer breeze from a green farm—sometimes refreshes the hot stage. Aristophanes paints town-life with a suburb of gardens. A blade of grass never grew in the theatre of Farquhar and his kindred. Wide was their scholarship in wit:—

‘They sauntered Europe round,  
And gathered every vice on Christian ground.’

‘They cast nets over the old world and the new. No venomous epigram, or sparkling idiom of sin, escaped the throw. Every line glitters and stings. Upon the whole, the pleasures of the drama—tragic and comic—are larger than its advantages. In the bold figure of Cowley, it must be washed in the Jordan to recover its health. A deep purpose of religion alone can make it useful to a nation. Taste may purify it, but the disease continues. It is only the waters of Damascus to the leper. Of English poets, belonging to our golden age, none but Shakspeare come before us undefiled. His vigour of constitution threw off the ranker contagion. With Fletcher’s vice, and Decker’s coarseness, he would have been the fearfulest spectacle the world has beheld of genius retaining its power, and bereft of its light. The temple of our poetry, bowed in his sacrilegious arms, might have remained a melancholy monument of supernatural strength, and sightless despair.’

Fiction, as embodied in the romance and novel, we have very agreeably treated. The universality of some of its favourite subjects first meets us. Some of its uses, peculiar to the olden time, are next touched upon. Then its different forms. First, the heroic romance, such as turned the head of ‘Signor Don Quixote;’ succeeded by its ‘reduced and feeble copy,’ the Romance of Chivalry. This was ‘the incredible in water colours.’ Presently:—

‘Fiction put on another shape, and received the name, without the inheritance of Minerva. Mediæval exaggerations were clothed in modern dresses. Giants living in impregnable castles, gave way to heroes of praternatural stature in their sentiments, who raved through four volumes,—sometimes five,—for dark ladies of impossible beauty. What a geography was theirs! Puck found himself out-run. The chronicler of the sayings and doings of the Black Penitents put a girdle round the world in considerably less than forty minutes. Time and space were mere circumstances. Kingdoms fraternised. Constantinople abutted on Moorfields; and Julius Cæsar conquered Mexico with Cortes. Probability was despised. Everything came to pass when it was wanted; and the healthiest people died the moment they were in the way.

‘The incidents of these tales resembled drop-curtains in small theatres. The effect was terrible. The vicar’s daughter watching a fine sunset from the churchyard was ruthlessly carried off by banditti, who stepped out of a Salvator on purpose. Perhaps the scene was laid in a mountain-country, and then, about the middle of the first volume,



a sentimental youth was entranced during a moonlight walk by unearthly strains of music proceeding from a lady in thin muslin, who stood with her harp upon a pinnacle of frozen snow, where the wild goat, in these prosaic days, would not find a footing. These extravagancies melted before the dazzling creations of Scott, and a fourth class of fiction delighted the world.'

We have no purpose here to attempt to illustrate or eulogize the *genius* of the great novelist; but we must remark, that one service rendered by Walter Scott to this class of literature, has perhaps not been adequately estimated; and that is, his having contributed to purify it. Even the moral and semi-religious novels of the last century can now scarcely be allowed to lie upon our tables. There has been recently, we say it with pain, a tendency in some quarters to the commission of sins against taste, similar to theirs, but we fear without the palliation of that moral purpose which our older writers, strangely enough, thought to accomplish by it. Whether this be the natural out-pouring of bitter waters from a bitter fountain, or whether it be specially and deliberately prepared to meet the requirements of those who have been nourished on what Mr. Willmott terms 'the politer wickedness of the French lady who calls herself a man,' we know not. But we do heartily desire that we may meet no more of it. In allusion to offences of this sort, on the part of some of our celebrated novelists of an earlier period, Mr. Willmott justly remarks: 'To say that they ... have their sting drawn by the moral, is like telling us to live tranquilly over a cellar of combustibles, because an engine with abundance of water is at the end of the street.'

Our next extract will not be particularly grateful to some of our most popular writers of fiction:—

'But the hastiest observer cannot fail to remark that in gay, as well as in graver efforts, our century is the era of revised editions. Richardson, Smollett, and their contemporaries, come out in clever abridgments, adapted to the changes of taste, and under various titles. Old friends revisit us with new faces. Amelia has watched the dying embers for a dozen husbands since Fielding left her; and uncle Toby's mellow tones have startled us down a college staircase, and through the railings of counting-houses in the city. Gentlemen and heroines from whom we parted years ago, with slight respect for their attainments or morals, have now taken a scientific or serious turn. Lovelace is absorbed in entomology, and Lady Bellaston is a rubber of brasses.'

Perhaps the last appearance of the modern novel writer is in the character of the preacher; with an aim beyond that of morals only, which we have been wont to consider as the boundary of his legitimate influence. The design, of course, is to represent so vividly those necessary truths of man's spiritual existence,

which transcend mere morals, as to lay hold on the conscience, which has hitherto been insensible to the exertions of the pulpit. So far the intent is good; and, in some instances, the skill of the writer has enabled him (we want an epicene pronoun here) to work out the idea in a manner greatly superior to that in which a particularly disagreeable and fortunately small class of books—the old religious novel—was wont to shape its ends. But it may be doubted whether the very people for whose especial benefit this style of composition is intended, will not skip all the sermonizing, or, if it be so interwoven with the texture of the book as not to be easily separable from the story, throw it aside altogether. Morals, we know, may be illustrated and recommended most effectually in compositions of this nature. As one of the most excellent of its class, we may name Miss Edgeworth's 'Helen.' We know nothing better adapted to arrest that tendency to slight deviations from veracity, to which many are inclined, and which some are disposed to excuse. We might, also, allude to another recent phase of fiction, that of the psychological novel, with a *tinge* of the religious element, as one that, in very able hands, is capable of much effect.

We do not, however, hold it essential that works of fiction should have a direct moral purpose to serve. The mind requires relaxation and amusement; hours of weariness and pain, and of that mental languor which is the result of long-continued overstrain of the mental faculties, have to be beguiled. And if these can be accomplished innocently, by sketches of life and manners varied by pleasing incident, such as might be met with in the real world, and which would then please and interest us; by the products of pure imagination, or by the play of fancy, we imagine that no unworthy end has been realized. Mr. Willmott apparently differs from us in this. And we have no quarrel with him for so doing. We hope we may take it as evidence that he does not often require such solace.

In considering the objects of prose fiction, he deems that its usefulness is in proportion to the predominance of its poetical or romantic element, and cites instances in support of his opinion. It has been urged against works of this class, that they exhibit such a disregard of harmony between the means and the end, as is entirely opposed to the maintaining those sober views of the relation between the two, which are essential for the practical purposes of life. The objection is pleasantly and wisely dealt with. One of the most absurd of its kind, in the rich-uncle-from-India style, is given in brief, and then:—

'Suppose this adventure, in all its absurdity, to be really written and read, who is likely to be injured by it? Is it worth a moralist's

trouble to work himself into a frenzy, and say that his 'indignation is excited at the immoral tendency of such lessons to young readers, who are thus taught to undervalue and reject all sober regular plans for compassing an object, and to muse on improbabilities till they become foolish enough to expect them.'

'In the first place, it may be denied that one young man in a million ever built his hopes of prosperity or love upon recollections of visionary relatives in Benares. Even real uncles are forgotten when they never return; and, secondly, it is not to be assumed that the remote contingencies of life ought to be rejected as hurtful. The improbabilities of experience are many, the impossibilities few. The rich kinsman may not arrive from India to make two hearts happy; but circumstances do fall out in a way altogether contrary to expectation; helping friends rise up quite as strangely as apparitions of Nabobs from the jungle; and the dearest chains of affection are sometimes riveted by means scarcely less astonishing, and certainly not more anticipated than the magical clique of the dreamer. Instead, therefore, of starting from a romantic danger, I am inclined, under proper limitation, to welcome a romantic advantage. It is something to keep the spirits up in so long and harassing a journey; and even the pack-horse goes better with its bells.'

'Fiction, like the drama, speaks to our hearts by exhibitions. Mr. Allworthy was acting a sermon upon charity, when the gentle pressure of the strange infant's hand on one of his fingers, outpleaded in a moment the indignant proposal of Mrs. Deborah to put it in a warm basket,—as the night was rainy—and lay it at the churchwarden's door; Corporal Trim's illustration of death, by the falling hat in the kitchen, strikes the fancy more than a climax of Sherlock; and the 'Vicar of Wakefield' in the prison is a whole library of theology made vocal.'

There is one essential for the enjoyment of novel reading: that it should be taken in extreme moderation. The young ladies and young gentlemen who devour whole circulating libraries, and yet cannot get amusement enough out of it, will do well to 'make a note' of this.

Mr. Willmott writes of poetry like a genuine lover of it. But we can only refer to those essays, as we want to have a word on history, which—

'Presents the pleasantest features of poetry and fiction; the majesty of the epic; the moving accidents of the drama; the surprises and moral of the romance.' . . . The historian has one advantage over the poet. He is not obliged to look abroad for shining illustrations, or corresponding scenes of action. His images are ready; his field of combat is enclosed. He wants only so much vivacity as will supply colour and life to the description. Read the meeting of Cyrus and Artaxerxes in Xenophon. A white cloud spots the horizon; presently it grows bigger, and is discovered to be the dust raised by an enormous

army. As the cloud advances, its lower edge of mist is seen to glitter in the sun; spear, and helm, and shield shoot forth and disappear, and soon the ranks of horse and foot, with the armed chariots, grow distinctly visible. This is the splendour of the epic; it is Homer in prose.'

'For an instance of the dramatic in history the reader may go to Dalrymple. Dundee, wandering about Lochabar with a few miserable followers, is roused by news of an English army in full march to the Pass of Killcranky. His hopes revive. He collects his scattered bands and falls upon the enemy, filing out of the stern gateway into the highlands. In fourteen minutes infantry and cavalry are broken. Dundee, foremost in pursuit as in attack, outstrips his people; he stops, and waves his hand to quicken their speed; while he is pointing *eagerly to the Pass, a musket-ball pierces his armour. He rides from the field, but, soon dropping from his horse, is laid under the shade of trees that stood near; when he has recovered from the faintness, he desires his attendants to lift him up, and, turning his eyes to the field of combat, inquires, 'How things went?' Being told that all is well, he replies, with calm satisfaction, 'Then I am well,' and expires.'*

Here—

'Every circumstance heightens the catastrophe. His bed is the wild heather, shut in by a mountain bastion, of which the gloom is broken by frequent flashes of random guns. The Pass stretches in dreary twilight before us. The sound is in our ears of a dark river foaming among splintered rocks,—ever tumbling down, and losing itself in thick trees, while the eagle utters a lonely scream over the carnage, and sails away into the rolling vapours.'

This is picturesque writing. Mr. Willmott occasionally falls into the error of expressing himself in a manner too uniformly curt and pointed. A just intermixture of sentences of brief energy, in which the idea is, as it were, darted at the reader, and those in which it is more deliberately conveyed, the medium of thought being converted into a separate, independent source of pleasure, forms the most pleasing style. We do not like our music to be all staccato passages: the flowing melody must intervene to give these their full value.

History is considered in its pleasurable, moral, and educational character. In this latter, we may speak of it as perhaps one of the most richly instructive studies to which the attention can be directed: one from which the largest amount of such knowledge as may be brought to bear upon practical life, may be reaped by the intelligent and thoughtful student. The nature of man is, in all ages, the same. There is no signal variety, save in adventitious circumstances, in the cycle of human events. Those who borrow no light from the past, will not see clearly into the future. In the present, they must walk with

uncertain step. With regard to political life, a subject of much interest to us all just now, it appears to us that, without a competent knowledge of the past, derived from history, it is all but impossible for a man, whatever other qualifications he may possess, to form any intelligent opinion on the various political questions submitted to him. Without it, he must be in entire ignorance of how often those combinations of political events, which to him appear new, have already presented themselves in national life, and been treated, perhaps, in vain, or with but temporary benefit, by that very remedy, or class of remedies, which he is now assured, and believes because he is pertinaciously assured, to be specific in the case. He must be at the mercy of others, be content to take his opinions ready made; or, what is worse still, in his unfurnished condition, make what must be called hap-hazard opinions for himself. It is, however, to be added that, without some mental discipline, such as we have before alluded to—some acquaintance with the *art* of thinking, which has to be patiently learned—we are no more intuitive reasoners than we are intuitive politicians—he will be utterly unable rightly to deduce from his historical reading those lessons of instruction which it so abundantly yields to the logically-trained mind. For their complete education and application, a discriminating, weighing, and reasoning intellect is essential. And this, unlike ‘reading and writing,’ does not ‘come by nature.’

There are some passages, good both as to manner and matter, in the essay on biography; but we have not space for any of them. Nor from another interesting one on the literature of the pulpit: a fruitful subject, did he pursue it at length, to so thoroughly sympathizing a reader of old sermons as Mr. Wilmott is. Latimer's strong, homely diction; Donne's ‘manifold style;’ the crabbed, yet learned composition of Andrewes, something like a bad translation of a difficult foreign tongue, wanting in the auxiliary parts of speech; Taylor's architecturally piled-up sentences; the copiousness of Barrow; and the exertions of a host of others, whom we may not stay to characterize, would all by turn attract and charm him who deems that ‘in every Christian land the learned mind has poured its choicest gifts into theology.’ One well-known name among our English divines furnishes him a subject for the following beautiful sketch of the scholar's life. Bishop Hall, like his contemporary, Milton—

‘was up in summer with the bird that first rises, and in winter often before the sound of any bell. His first thoughts were given to Him who made the cloud for rest, and the sunshine for toil. While his

body was being clothed he set in order the labours of the day, and entering his study besought a blessing for them upon his knees. His words are:—‘ Sometimes I put myself to school to one of those ancients whom the church hath honoured with the name of Fathers; sometimes to those later doctors who want nothing but age to make them classical; always to God’s Book.’ The season of family devotion was now come, and this duty heartily fulfilled, he returned to his private reading. One while, as he tells us, his eyes were busied, and then his hands, or contemplation took the burden from both; textual divinity employed one hour, controversy another, history a third; and in short intervals of pensive talk with his thoughts, he wound up the scattered threads of learned research for future use. Thus he wore out the calm morning and afternoon, making music with changes.

‘ At length a monitor interrupted him. His weak body grew weary. Before, and after meals, he let himself loose from scholarship. Then company, discourse, and amusement were welcome. These prepared him for a simple repast, from which he rose capable of more, though not desirous. No book followed his late trencher. The discoveries and thoughts of the day were diligently recollected, with all the doings of hand and mouth since morning. As the night drew near he shut up his mind, comparing himself to a tradesman who takes in his wares and closes his windows in the evening. He said that the student was miserable who lies down, like a camel, under a full burden. And so, calling his family together, he ended the day with God, and laid him down to sleep, took his rest, and rose up again, for He sustained him.’

Mr. Willmott suggests that truly noble man, Robert Southey, for a companion-picture: dwelling on the happy Christian spirit that animated him in his unwearied career of duty. ‘ He followeth not with us,’ has for eighteen centuries been the ground of mutual ostracism, the plea for denial, or grudging recognition of personal virtues. Yet the wide gulf touching things political and things polemic, that stands between him and the majority of those who are accustomed to dwell upon our pages, will not, we feel assured, prevent their joining in that fine-spirited eulogy, both on his genius and his personal excellences, which those whose lives have been passed in literary antagonism to his have already pronounced over his tomb. The cold depreciatory estimate, the grudging recognition, have been reserved for others who, entering into his labours, have not deemed it unmeet to employ pages to which some of his best powers were dedicated, as the vehicle for their ungenerous treatment of his memory. The genial love of the true scholar for the quiet companions of his solitude has perhaps rarely been more exquisitely expressed than in that beautiful little poem of Southey’s, originally designed for his colloquies, beginning—

‘ My days among the dead are passed,  
 Around me I behold,  
 Where'er these casual eyes I cast,  
 The mighty minds of old :  
 My never-failing friends are they,  
 With whom I converse day by day.’

A poem recently illustrated by a most astounding criticism pronounced upon it by Wordsworth, who objected to the poetical phrase, ‘casual eyes,’ on the ludicrously prosaic ground of its being the glance, not the eyes, that was ‘casual’! The emendation suggested was in perfect keeping with the objection—‘Where'er these *eyes I round me cast* ;’ an expression to whose deliberate truth certainly no exception could be taken. Mr. Cuthbert Southey gives the finishing touch to this rich little narration, by regretting that his father had not had the opportunity of profiting by the poet's strictures! Such a criticism belongs to the class of the severely literal. It reminds us of a similar one passed by an ancient gentlewoman upon Mrs. Hemans's pleasing little poem, *The Dial of Flowers*; in which the line, ‘Like a pearl in an ocean shell,’ was, on the authority of her critical judgment, restored to what she deemed its true reading—‘Like a pearl in an *oyster-shell* ;’ pearls being, as everybody, knew, except, perhaps, unfortunate Mrs. Hemans, ordinarily produced by that amiable fish. ‘Great Homer nods!’ But what a pity to chronicle it.

The Accountableness of Authors is touched upon in a serious vein. None can be too much so for such a subject. It is one on which, we doubt not, all implicated in it have, at times, mused with feelings of even painful intensity. A manuscript letter of Anna Maria Porter's that came under our notice some years ago, showed the writer to have been penetrated with it. A Parting Word closes the volume. And with it we bid Mr. Willmott a very cordial farewell.

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ART. III. *Die Christliche Lehre von der Sünde*. Dargestellt von JULIUS MÜLLER. Dritte, vermehrte, und verbesserte Ausgabe. Breslau. 1849.

THE subject of *evil* can never cease profoundly to occupy the human mind. Apart from its solemn practical bearings on human life and destiny, there is an irresistible fascination in it as a mere problem for the intellect, which must ever draw inquiry, however bootless that inquiry, in its ultimate aim, should prove. Fresh students will still, with fresh hopes and undaunted courage, betake themselves to a question, which can never lose its interest

however its difficulty may baffle and repulse the keenest scrutiny. Nor is it to be supposed for a moment of little consequence what particular course human inquiry pursues on this point; for however fruitless may be its efforts in one direction, it will yet in other respects bear most important results. It is not too much to say, indeed, that as we *think* of evil, so, upon the whole, shall we think of Christianity and of life in general. This is a fact, we believe, to which all Church history bears testimony. Wherever, in any age, we find a negative Christianity prevailing, we shall find it resting upon negative conceptions of moral evil. A rationalistic theology and a Pelagian anthropology have ever gone together; and, on the other hand, a profound theology has ever taken its root in and grown upon a profound view of human nature.

It is therefore, we think, among the happiest signs of recent German theology, that it is striving after, as a task of the highest worth, a thorough and adequate comprehension of the doctrine of evil. Under the reign of Rationalism the genuine Christian conception of this doctrine had almost entirely disappeared; and when the earnest and thoughtful men who have arisen during the last forty years in the German Church, began to contemplate the work of reconstruction before them, it was soon found that they must begin from the very foundation, and lay anew the edifice of Christian truth in the deep realities of man's moral being. It was felt to be necessary to establish again in its full comprehensiveness the doctrine of sin against all existing misconceptions and perversions of it. Olshausen had already, in his 'Commentary on the Romans,' expressly pointed out this as a work of urgent necessity, 'if the latest theology would attain to a complete appropriation of the substance of the Gospel.' Tholuck, in his little work 'Die Lehre von der Sünder und vom Versöhner,' had spoken to the same necessity, and contributed somewhat, although in a manner professedly popular and unscientific, towards its fulfilment. It was not, however, till the first portion of the treatise before us appeared in 1839, that this vital task, in relation to the reconstruction of German theology, can be said to have been actually attempted. Dr. Müller is the first who has not only risen to the conception, but the execution of the work; and if in any respect he can be said to have failed, it is not certainly from want of fulness and elaboration in the scientific form in which he has presented his labours. His treatise is comprised in two octavos of nearly 600 closely printed pages each. This it is, at least, in its last and most perfect form, in the third, enlarged, and improved edition before us. Its first appearance in 1839 was, as we have just implied,



in a more modest and imperfect shape. It then only embraced the subject so far as discussed in the first of the present volumes, and bore the title, 'Vom Wesen und Grunde der Sünde.' It assumed its more comprehensive bulk and title in 1844, and in 1849 the present edition appeared. Amid the political and social, and it may be added, ecclesiastical distractions of his country, the author busied himself with a task which might seem foreign to the interests then so loudly claiming attention, but which in reality had in many of its aspects an emphatic and significant relation to them.

The work before us is undoubtedly to be considered the most weighty and important contribution to the cause of dogmatic theology which Germany has recently produced. It unites in a high degree depth and comprehensiveness with practical earnestness and clearness. It is profound even to the contentment of a German mind, yet rarely obscure or uninformative. The author evinces his thorough metaphysical training—his aptness in that mere mental gymnastic which so distinguishes his countrymen, not by the blank and meaningless paradoxes into which he leads his reader perforce a pitiless logic, but by the pervading presence of a shining and disciplined intellect, and the rare mastery of a large and skilful argumentative grasp. We can trace throughout the hand of one perfectly competent to deal with the latest and most monstrous results of German speculation. He has evidently entered into their meaning, weighed them in the balance of a liberal yet searching appreciation, and found them wanting. It is never, therefore, any mere far-off and impalpable shadow that he contends with, but an actual and living power of error which he knows. In this relation, his work is especially satisfactory. But he cannot be said to have neglected any aspect or learning of his subject. He has in no sense taken it up as so much mere theological task-work by which to gain a reputation; but it has plainly been with him long a favourite sphere of reflection, the 'haunt and main region' of his spirit during many years of silent and meditative preparation. He has felt its surpassing interest, its grand significance, its solemn importance. He has seen such a work to be above all that needed by his country's theology, and addressed himself to it in the spirit of grave earnestness and patient thoughtfulness befitting it. He tells us in his preface, that 'ever since he had sat at the feet of his beloved and honoured teacher Neander, he had been penetrated with the immovable conviction that Christianity in its higher and essential meaning is entirely practical; that its whole substance relates to the great opposition of sin and redemption; and that the latter, its special essence, is only to be

‘understood through a fundamental apprehension of the former. ‘If any where, therefore, it is here,’ he adds, that ‘Christian theology struggles *pro aris et focis*, when it wards off either deistic or ‘pantheistic efforts to evacuate this doctrine of its true meaning.’ It is, in fact, probably owing to this very sense of the peculiar importance of his work, and to the maturity of reflection he has consequently expended on it, that its chief defect is owing—viz., an undue prolixity. His mind, we suppose, has dwelt so long upon it, that there is scarce a collateral topic of any interest which has not started up prominently before him, and into the side-discussions thus arising he not unfrequently allows himself to wander beyond just limits. He is mindful everywhere to defend his argument not merely against the main lines of objection to which it might be liable, but the special views of this and that opponent are apt to seduce him into specialties of reply which detain the reader, without casting any clearer meaning on the subject. This, however, is so inveterate a German practice that we could scarcely expect these volumes to be free of it. German theologians at least have yet to learn that continued labour, by leading to higher and more comprehensive views of a subject, should tend rather to the condensation than the amplification of the mere *form* of its treatment.

We have scarcely anything to communicate as to the personal history of Dr. Müller, but the reader may be anxious to know what particulars are within our reach. He was born, we believe, in the first year of this century. His early studies were prosecuted at Breslau and Göttingen, and were directed to the subject of law. In 1821, however, he betook himself to the study of theology, and repairing to Berlin, connected himself with Neander and Tholuck, to the influence of the former of whom especially, we have seen, he attributed the profound Christian convictions which he has ever since cherished. He subsequently became pastor of Schönbrunn, and for seven years occupied the unostentatious position of a country clergyman. In 1831, he received a call to Göttingen as university preacher: and here he also first began to teach theology. In 1835 he was transferred to Marburg, the university of his native district, as ordinary professor of theology. And finally, in 1839, he was promoted to the university of Halle, where his lectures are said to divide the interest of the students with those of Tholuck, and in connexion with which he has mainly acquired his theological reputation. Besides the work before us, he has published a well-known monograph on Strauss’s ‘Life of Jesus,’ which first appeared in the ‘*Studien und Kritiken*.’\* He is also the author of ‘Ser-

\* It is translated among the papers in Dr. Beard’s ‘Voices of the Church,’ in reply to Strauss.

mons on 'the Christian Life—its struggles and completion,' which have gone through several editions, and are said to be (for we have not seen them) among the very best specimens of German preaching.

Dr. Müller's doctrinal position, as is already clear from our brief notice, and as we had occasion in a former paper to indicate, is, along with Tholuck, at the most advanced point of the scientific school of German theology. He looks back with reverence to Schleiermacher as the initiator of a new religious era for his country, but he has, at the same time, progressed far beyond the mere dogmata of his great teacher; and, in fact, there is nothing more searching or satisfactory in the volumes before us, than the manner in which he has exposed the weakness and inconsistency of many of Schleiermacher's views. We are disposed, upon the whole, to regard him as among the most purely christian-minded, and most thorough'y qualified, of the modern divines of Germany. In the present work he has approved himself to be the very man for his age. It is impossible to overestimate the beneficial influence which it is calculated to exercise upon the youthful theological mind of his country; and we are mistaken if it does not also, in some respects, speak in very significant tones to ourselves.

It is somewhat under this persuasion that we now propose to make it the subject of a brief notice—brief, at least, in relation to its own voluminousness. An exhaustive criticism of its whole range of inquiry would far exceed our limits, and would besides lead us into many collateral and purely German fields of thought, which could scarcely be supposed to interest any wide circle of our readers. We shall mainly confine ourselves, therefore, to a review of it in so far as it appears to us to bear with some interest and instruction upon our own present theological position; and in this way we shall scarcely travel beyond the topics embraced in the first volume.

The treatise is divided into five books. The first treats of the 'Reality of Sin;' the second, of the 'Chief Theories of its Origin,' which have been propounded. These constitute the first volume. The third book is entitled 'The Possibility of Sin,' and treats at great length of the relation of sin to the freedom of the human will. The fourth and fifth books consider respectively 'The general diffusion of Sin,' and its 'Development in the Individual.' This mere enumeration will suffice to show the comprehensive plan of the work, but it can give no idea of the vast variety of relative topics discussed with a minuteness and fulness, which, if they sometimes tire, yet rarely fail to reward the reader, by stirring within him the pregnant seeds of thought.

There is everywhere throughout the treatise the light of an earnest and deeply meditative mind, and it would not become us to omit mentioning, since we have ventured so plainly to intimate its occasional tediousness, that the secular reader will find its pages relieved here and there by interesting allusions to the views of Goethe and other German litterateurs, and even by some very happy quotations from the former.

Dr. Müller opens, we have seen, with an inquiry into the 'reality of sin,' and there is perhaps no part of his work so full of genuine philosophy and practical interest as this. He has with undoubted right given this inquiry the precedence. We must know the phenomenon we are investigating—*what it is*—before we make any attempt to trace its origin. We can never hope to fix the birth of that of which we do not know the nature. Here, as everywhere, it is a thoroughly vicious system to begin with *a priori* definitions—to lay down an assumed rationale of the phenomenon, and then seek, as we shall necessarily do, to reduce the *fact* to our preconception of it. Error, unless by mere chance, must be the termination of such a course; and theology as well as philosophy has suffered not a little from this mode of procedure. We must first, if we would reach the truth, grasp the *fact as it exists*, rise from step to step in our investigation of it, till we have fully seized it and embraced all the measure of its *reality*, and then we shall be able to advance to ulterior inquiries regarding it, or what will come to the same thing, shall understand that we need not attempt to make any such advance. And yet how seldom has this course been pursued in relation to the present subject. How much has the dark mystery of the ultimate problem of the *origin of evil* fixed attention, and how little has the *phenomenon of evil itself* been examined, at least with any pretension to psychological accuracy. We know not, indeed, where to look, in the whole range of our moral science, for any thoroughly penetrative and comprehensive analysis of the great *moral fact of sin*. Philosophy, so little venturous with us, has here strangely disdained the humble walk of induction, and essayed the lofty flight of theory. It has failed to question the mysterious inmate of every bosom as to its actual character, and at once ventured to question as to its 'whence' and 'whither.' This, however, as in every case, has been a fruitless system of interrogation. The answers have been most vague and contradictory; and the defect, we may say, of every one of them, when we come to examine them in the light of an actual inquiry into the phenomenon itself, is just of the same kind—*viz.*, an *imperfect* apprehension of this phenomenon. They may account very well for their own view of it, but then *their* view is found

not only not to be the whole truth, but often directly opposed to it. The theorist has gone astray in a wrong chase from the beginning, and is found at last, if not unsuccessful in his own estimation, yet really without the true object of pursuit.

It is absolutely necessary, then, if we would not rest for ever in utter confusion as to the end of our inquiry, to ascertain, in the first place, *what it is* after which we seek. What is sin? It will be time enough to ask whence it comes when we know what it is. Or, perhaps, when we really know what it is, we shall, at the same time, understand that we know in *its existence* all that we can ever know of *its origin*. The primary and essential inquiry, therefore, in every point of view, is that to which Dr. Müller has given the precedence. We need not say, that there are those who deny the reality of sin altogether. Such denial has been common in every age, and is rife enough at present around us. One can scarcely take up a volume of a certain class of writings, among the most significant and not the least numerous of our day, without meeting with something tantamount to this denial. And it must be borne in mind, that it is of the very nature of such a truth (we *suppose* it, in the meantime, to be a truth) to admit of denial. As belonging to the sphere of morality, it cannot logically substantiate itself against gainsayers. It would cease to be what it is, to leave for us any moral meaning or interest, *if it could*. We are not to be astonished then, at the outset, if the very existence of *sin* has been denied. This is only what might be expected. It is obviously, however, of the last importance in what way we are to determine the truth in reference to it. How are we to verify the fact of sin? If it is a fact, it must admit of verification although it may not be able to repel denial.\* The valid appeal, it is clear, can here lie to *Consciousness* alone. *Whether* sin is? and *what* it is, *Consciousness* must answer. The determination of sin in its existence and true character is really, therefore, a question of psychology, which, as truly defined by Sir William Hamilton, 'is only a *developed consciousness*.'

It has, we think, been productive of not a little mischief both to philosophy and theology, that they have hitherto so little ap-

\* It is of importance that the reader clearly understand us here. All moral truth, we have said, as such, is capable of denial. It is in its very nature, as primarily related to the *will*, to be so, and is thus radically and for ever distinguished from logical or mathematical truth. This capability, which sin shares with every other moral fact, of being denied, does not at all, however, affect its capability of legitimate proof. Although from its nature *indemonstrable*, it yet admits just as validly of verification as any other truth lying beyond the same sphere of demonstration. Nay, as a fact of direct inward assurance, we believe it to be especially capable of such verification. The facts of our moral consciousness, however they may be gainsayed, attest with a peculiar force their existence, and are and must be for ever their own sufficient evidence.

prehended this truth. Nothing apparently has been offered farther from the thought of the former, than to endeavour to interpret fairly and honestly the book of human nature. It has come to the study of it with its own favourite preconception, whether sensational, or ideal, or eclectic, and read the writing only in its light. It has thus seldom failed to miss a half, or at least a side, of the truth, no less important than that which it has gained. Nor has theology, perhaps, been much wiser in its procedure. It has but seldom stooped at all to the comprehensive study of the human soul. It has for the most part been content to dogmatize with a high hand on its own ground. The result has been—now so long a matter of notoriety—that a very singular and apparently irreconcilable antagonism has grown up between them. One can scarcely recognise the same humanity in their respective hands. Nothing, we are sure, can be more provoking to a thoroughly ingenuous student, desirous of knowing *the truth*, and not merely this or that theology or philosophy, than this conflict and confusion of opposite systems. ‘To look on this picture and on that,’ he might think that it was no longer the same subject that was concerned. Now, how is this? Humanity cannot be thus opposed to itself. It cannot be one thing to philosophy, and another and quite a different thing to theology. It presents, of course, diverse aspects of contemplation to the two. Philosophy has specially to do with one class of its phenomena, and theology with another. But both classes of phenomena equally inhere in the same concrete substantive,—man,—and their respective specialities must, therefore, merge at length in one truth. They cannot ultimately present any points of hostility, whatever may be their diversity, or even seeming contrariety of manifestation. Manifold, human nature undoubtedly is, and it is the business of philosophy to seize and comprehend one view of it more particularly, and of theology to seize and comprehend another; but unless human nature is not only manifold, but also contradictory, which would make either philosophy or theology impossible, both views must ultimately harmonize. If they do not, either the philosophy must be false, or the theology must be false. They cannot both mirror truly the same human nature.\*

The great reason of all this discordance between philosophy and theology we believe to be, the inadequate study of the *human consciousness* on the part of both. They have neither of them been sufficiently humble, reverent, patient, or searching, in their

\* We use the term theology obviously in the commonly-received comprehensive sense in which it is current among us, as embracing, not only a science of God and his relations to man, but also of man and his relations to God—as embracing, in short, what the Germans call *anthropology*, as well as what they more especially consider to be *theology*.

inductions. Dogmatism has been too dear to them. How can we otherwise explain the fact, that there is not a system which specially arrogates to itself the title of philosophy, that clearly and honestly recognises the idea of *sin*. Each system arranges its integral powers, and casts up its account of humanity, and there is no mention of that which, if it be at all, must be one of the most significant elements of humanity, not only in itself, but as affecting, from its nature, every other power and faculty. Does the philosopher say he has nothing to do with sin? It is entirely a religious conception, and belongs to the province of the theologian. How utterly absurd is this! As if sin, if it be at all, (for as to the *fact*, we are still reasoning hypothetically,) can be disjoined from humanity, and yet humanity remain. As if there can be any true science of a subject, while one of the most characteristic qualities of that subject is ignored. And as to the theologian, again, how little has he generally concerned himself with sin as a *psychological* fact. How little has he sought to fix it in the depths of the human consciousness, and to draw it forth in all the powerful *reality* in which it there discloses itself. How rough, and abstract, and dogmatic, have been often his expositions of it, with a summary appeal to biblical texts, interpreted according to his own preconceptions. He has thought it sufficient to transfer his *own generalization* of Scriptural expressions wholesale to human nature, and to denounce as a heretic whoever has refused to receive them. Now, it will not be supposed for a moment that we undervalue the authority of Scripture on this point, or suppose that this authority has not a valid and all-important application to it. All we would imply is, that in the ultimate question as to the actual existence of sin, the appeal is not validly made to this authority, for, in the first place, whoever is found to deny the fact of sin, will be found, *à fortiori*, to deny the truth of Scripture, and we are consequently involved in a preliminary proof of the latter, in order to bring it to bear with any authoritative effect upon the former; and, secondly and especially, because the statements of Scripture, whatever they are, are only there as resting on the basis of human nature. They do not make man sinful; they only express his sinfulness, which is no less a fact, although they had never been uttered. However Judaism and Christianity may have served to bring into clear and full recognition the fact of sin, they did not introduce it. It was in human nature as well before as after. Coleridge is, therefore, quite right, when he maintains that sin is something which not only concerns the Christian religion, but all religions as well, and which is presupposed in all, so far as they retain any trace of a personal God. And for this simple reason, that if it is at all, it

is an inherent quality of human nature, asserting itself under all circumstances, revealing itself in the development of every human spirit as one of its deepest and most pervading characteristics.

It must be surely, therefore, alike the task of philosophy and theology to render a full account of this fact of human nature, to embrace it in all the integrity of its self-revelation in consciousness. If the former cannot in any sense go beyond this fact to its remedy, it must yet reach it. It must deposit it. Else how can it profess to be an adequate interpreter of that, of which this is one of the most important facts? How can it profess to read that divine meaning, of which this is one of the most significant hints? And has it not been so often utterly blind and deaf to this meaning, and so often stood forth the foe instead of the ally of Christianity, just because it has not attended to this hint? It has closed its eyes lest at any time it should see it, and its ears lest at any time it should hear it; and gone on in its own way till it has wandered into abstractions, which not only limit, but absolutely contradict humanity, and give the direct lie to all *reality*. If philosophy would not, therefore, revolve for ever in the same cycle of barren achievement, or rather mischievous delusion, it must begin on a more thorough and comprehensive basis. It must observe more widely. It must embrace not only a part, but the whole circle of the soul's experience. It must rest, in short, however much higher it may aim, on an adequate psychology. If the latter is not the whole of philosophy, which we do not maintain, there can yet be no valid philosophy which does not set out from a just and adequate psychology, and there can be no such psychology which does not involve the element of sin. If it cannot go beyond it, as we have said, it must yet comprehend it. As a fact of human nature, it must give an account of it. Lying deep in the fold of the human consciousness, and pointing mysteriously at once backwards and forwards, it must be among the last efforts of psychology to draw forth this great fact, and place it in the full light of scientific contemplation. And what is thus among the last tasks of psychology, ought just to be the initiative step of theology. There they may meet and harmonize. Theology proceeds with the problem which psychology has merely indicated. The human science foreshadows the divine. And, again, the Divine science lays its foundation deep in the Human; and the more perfectly it does so,—the more thoroughly it interprets and satisfies the facts of human nature, the more consistent and obviously truthful will it appear. It will stand forth self-evidenced. Christian Truth will not seem, as it has often seemed in its mode of representation, something quite apart from and foreign to Humanity, but only the



*natural*' (although *supernaturally communicated*) complement of its acknowledged necessities.

It will be seen, then, how highly we value a sound psychology in relation to Christian Apology. As a matter of fact, indeed, it is found, and eminently so at present, that the pregnant origin of infidelity is a defective philosophy, whether it grovel among mere materialities, or soar into a region of unreal spiritualism. And so long as this philosophy is cherished, it is useless to talk of external evidences. So long as the human consciousness is believed to contain no testimony, but the reverse, to the truths of Scripture, no mere outward testimony will ever avail to establish that truth. We must substantiate against the unbeliever the genuine facts of consciousness. We must vindicate the cause of a catholic psychology, the deepest roots of which ally themselves to Christianity, and grow into it. We must especially verify on this psychological basis the great fact of sin, showing that, so far from its disappearing in the light of reflection, it only the more clearly and strongly asserts itself the more such a light is brought to bear upon it. The full perception of this fact, if it cannot guide us *onward* to the correlative fact of redemption, will yet be found significantly to point *towards* it, and completely to adapt itself to it.

This is evidently the view of Dr. Müller, and it has been his main object, therefore, throughout the first part of his work, to substantiate sin *psychologically*—as a self-revealed fact of the moral consciousness. He has, indeed, always, as he advances, placed alongside, with due force, the biblical statements. He has always sought in Scripture the corroboration of his psychological inductions, and never failed to find it. For this is just one of the strongest proofs of the divinity of Scripture, that its popular expressions convey the highest truth, on this as on every moral subject.\* His first task, however, is the interrogation of consciousness. What is sin, as self-revealed therein? He begins with its most general, and advances to its most specific and complete form.

The primary manifestation of sin in consciousness he rightly finds to be 'transgressions of law.' Evil initially reveals itself as a revolt against a higher principle of our being. It emerges

\* We are anxious not to be misunderstood. It may appear to some that we have been dangerously subordinating the authority of the Bible to that of the human consciousness. But it is to be borne in mind, that the fact which we are investigating is *primarily* one, not of scriptural revelation, but of human nature. It is, indeed, also the subject of Divine revelation in scripture; and whether we could ever have understood the fact in its full character without this revelation, may be doubted. We believe we could not. But of *this there can be no doubt*, that its full character is given in human nature. Revelation may have brightened our intuition of it: but it cannot have added to the *fact itself*.

first of all in human nature as a mere element of disturbance and opposition. So soon as man attains to consciousness, he finds within him a law claiming unconditionally his obedience. He perceives this law at first *intuitively*, by 'a sort of higher rational instinct,' as Dr. Müller says, but with no less certainty of its reality, than when he may have afterwards recognised it in a scientific form as a necessarily inherent condition of his being. It is impossible to conceive of creatures save under law. The very *idea* of a creature is that of a *conditioned existence*. It is impossible to conceive of moral creatures save under moral law. The will—the centre of our moral being—implies in its conception, a *norm* or *rule*. There could be no *duty* where there is no *sense of right* regulating its exercise. This sense of right, revealed to man with the first dawn of moral consciousness, and in the perception of which, in fact, moral consciousness just consists, is what is commonly called the moral law. It is nothing else than the *good* in relation to the will. This Dr. Müller justly maintains against Kant, who, it is known, regards the moral law as a mere unexplained or categorical imperative, and would deduce from it the idea of *good*, instead of referring it to this idea, and supposing it to originate and rest in it as its essence.

The moral law extends to the whole sphere of our active existence. As it is unconditional in its demands, so is it universal in its range within the circle of our voluntary nature. Schleiermacher has indeed strangely maintained that the law only concerns immediately the outward act, and not the inward disposition. Our author has, however, ably vindicated against him the direct bearing of the law on our motives as well as our conduct. It were indeed, most extraordinary to disjoin the law from what must appear to us, from its very nature, to be its peculiar sphere—the inner consciousness. Here it spontaneously develops itself, and here it must assuredly, if anywhere, exert its power as a controlling and directing principle. Our author has also, at considerable length, combated the Romish doctrine of supererogation as originating in a deficient application of the moral law to our voluntary activity. Above the province of ordinary virtue and holiness, to which Bellarmine and other Romish doctors conceive the law alone to apply, there is, they say, a higher province whither the law does not extend its claims, in which the Christian, peculiarly penetrated with divine love and zeal, may work works no longer of duty, but of merit, of supererogation. But how entirely this doctrine is opposed at once to Scripture, and to the testimony of the moral consciousness, *which can never by any effort get beyond the limit of moral obligation*, we need not say.

A further question of interest engages, at length, the attention of Dr. Müller in this chapter—Whether evil consists only in opposition to the law, or also in nonconformity to it? He espouses it may seem to our readers somewhat singular, the former of these alternatives, in opposition to the universal canon of our reformed theology—*omne minus bonum habet rationem mali*. To maintain that all nonconformity to the law is evil, appears to him to exclude the idea of development in sinless beings. For every past and lower stage of this development, which is necessarily only a reaching after a *higher good*, would thus have to be treated as sin. But some confusion has here certainly crept into the argument of our author. If we suppose the law to demand the highest *possible good*—absolute perfection—it were no doubt true that everything that falls short of this demand would be sinful, and sinless development would be inconceivable. But the law cannot demand more than the highest *good relative to the creature*, with his necessarily limited endowments. It must be a law adapted to his being, and not standing at an infinite reach above it—the law, in fact, of his being. Whatever falls short of this law, we must consider sin. In whatever respect man fails to fulfil the moral *conditions* of his being, he is a sinner. Whenever, on the other hand, he rises to the full measure of these conditions, he becomes sinless—relatively perfect. The law loses for him its significancy—for his life, henceforth, is just its demand realized. His moral activity, and his moral obligation or duty correspond, become identical. But there is surely nothing impossible in the supposition of an indefinite progress being still before him. The horizon of the good may indefinitely expand to him, and towards it he will still aim. But he will just be as sinless at the first as at any subsequent stage of this progress—sinlessness consisting, not in the mere mass of being, but in the perfect proportion between being and its moral conditions. It is obvious, then, that the difference between the old view and Dr. Müller's, originates in a different apprehension of what constitutes conformity to the law. With him, apparently, perfect conformity to the law is something beyond all creative effort. The law is still, in its divine and perfect majesty, *above* the creature, and in this view, of course, nonconformity to it cannot be sin, else sin would be a *necessity* of the creature, in other words, would not be sin. In the other, and as we think, more correct view, provision is supposed in the very nature of the law as *that of our being*, for a perfect adjustment of our life to it, and whatever, therefore, falls short of this adjustment is rightly considered sin. It may be doubted, however, whether in the last analysis of sin there is any necessity for this twofold conception of it. An element of

resistance to the law of foregone transgression of it, however deeply hidden and disguised, will, we are inclined to believe, be found to be the *spring* of all nonconformity to it.

Our author's views on this point have led him to reject an inference, which, upon the whole, we are disposed to accept, so far as we can know anything of the subject—viz., that it is only to the fact of sin we owe the *knowledge* of the law. In unfallen natures there is probably no consciousness of law, save as their highest practical motive. Their spiritual activity is identical, not merely in fact, but in idea, with their duty. It is only sin which has disjoined the two in conception. This is the conclusion, the author admits, of some of the deepest thinkers of his country, as Baader and Steffens; and it bears with it, we think, a high degree of probability.

It will be seen, in some degree, from our brief summary, how widely-branching and discursive is the field of discussion which our author traverses in the treatment of his subject. We shall scarcely be expected to follow him even so summarily as we proceed. The point in our previous remarks, upon which alone we are at present anxious to fix the reader's attention, is the *fact* of evil being primarily revealed in consciousness, as *transgression of law*. Consciousness testifies to a law within us, claiming unconditionally our moral obedience, and the initial moment of sin in our experience is the violation of this law. It is of no consequence for us to inquire, in the meantime, whether our sense of the law precedes our sense of its violation, or follows it. We believe, in fact, that the two perceptions are just opposite poles of the same moment of experience. We know the *good* in and through the *evil*, and the *evil* in and through the *good*. The divine law of our being asserts itself,—rises in severe and perfect harmony against its infraction. All that we now care for, however, is the verification of the fact that evil is this infraction.

But, so far, we can scarcely be said to have attained the idea of *sin*. We have found an element of *disorder* in humanity. The evil has invaded the good. The law has been violated. But is this all? Is the good its own author? Is man his own law-giver? Or does consciousness in the very fact of a law at the same time testify to a different and higher power, from whom this law receives its sanction? This latter, we need not say, is among the fundamental conclusions of theism. The law within us implies a lawgiver without and above us. The sense of right in every heart suggests immediately the sense of a righteous God who placed it there. This simple and irrefragable induction—if, indeed, it can be said to be an induction, and not, rather, throughout an intuition—gives us God as the author of the *good*,

and reveals *evil* as no longer merely *its infraction*, but as, moreover, *disobedience* against its author. It is in this relation to God that evil first becomes *sin*. In these few remarks we have anticipated the conclusion of Dr. Müller's second chapter. We have drawn, agreeably to the more simple forms of our moral reasoning, the inference which he reaches after an elaborate statement. As his mode of reasoning, however, may serve to throw some further light upon the subject, and furnishes besides a very fair specimen of his metaphysical powers, we shall give it a little more attention.

He opens the chapter with a detailed reply to Kant's defence of the 'autonomy of the will.' The law is its own authority, Kant maintains, and we are not warranted in going beyond it to an external authority. But this view, apart from the direct objections originating in the import of consciousness, Dr. Müller justly urges, involves a contradiction. For it is of the very conception of law to be superior to the being who feels its obligation. It stands *over* him and commands him—a truth which none has more eloquently expounded than Kant himself. But how can this be if man, according to his supposition, is his own moral lawgiver? How can he, at the same time, be the subject and the sovereign? Or does Kant seem to recognise a simple solution of this contradiction in the dualism of man's rational and sensual nature; so that, in so far as he possesses the former, he prescribes the law, and in so far as he possesses the latter he is subject to it. This involves consequences still more outrageous than those it would obviate. For then were our higher nature, in which, above all, we find the peculiar elements of moral obligation, not properly the region of *duty* at all. Or, were it finally alleged that the reason gives the law, in so far as it is a cognitive faculty—and is subject to it, in so far as it is a voluntary or practical power, this would imply an original disruption in the very heart of man's nature, and so bring back the contradiction only in a more radical form. Man, therefore, cannot be his own lawgiver. He must seek out of himself the derivation of the moral authority which he owns; and Dr. Müller pursues his argument somewhat in the following manner. 'Personality,' he says, 'consists of two moments—self-consciousness and self-determination.' If we bring the former more narrowly into view, we perceive it to be necessarily limited. Man cannot become conscious of himself, without at the same time becoming conscious of another. He cannot refer to himself, without at the same time referring to another. Let him try, however, exclusively to embrace his own individuality, and there is another beside him in the very attempt to do so. There can be nothing accidental in this limitation of our

self-consciousness; for not only is it always present in experience, but we cannot even think it away if we would.

‘It follows, therefore, with strict necessity, that the human self-consciousness has not the ground or principle of its existence in itself, but in *another*.’ ‘But this other cannot be Nature. It cannot give what itself has not. It cannot produce what is, *toto genere*, different from it—just as certainly as, in the territory of nature, the law holds good that like only comes from like. From unconsciousness, therefore, self-consciousness cannot arise: nature cannot introduce this new beginning over itself. *Personal Power* can alone do it—the creative Principle of new beginnings, which, absolutely elevated above nature, sets the whole development in motion, and preserves it therein. The general existence of self-consciousness, therefore, necessarily presupposes the existence of an absolutely original and unconditioned self-consciousness. . . .’—p. 103.

‘In the depths of our self-consciousness, the God-consciousness reveals itself as its concealed background. The descending into our inner being is at the same time an ascending to God. Every deeper self-reflection pierces the rind of the mere world-consciousness which separates us from the innermost truth of our being, and leads us upwards to Him in whom we live, and move, and have our being. We know nothing of any finite object in an absolutely original manner, for finite objects are derivative according to their very nature, and so is, also, our knowledge of them. God alone we are conscious of in an absolutely original and immediate manner.’—p. 104.

As little is the second moment of personality—self-determination—unlimited. The moral law is, on the contrary, as we have already seen, the original limit in which it is bound by a holy necessity. As we cannot become truly conscious of ourselves without at the same time becoming conscious of God, so we cannot penetrate to the ground of our self-determination without finding *conscience there* as the regulator of our wills. On this side, too, therefore, of our personality, we are carried forward to something higher and more real, into which the mere formal conception of the law, as a limit for our self-determination, directly merges.

‘As these two fundamental elements of human personality stand in indissoluble unity with one another, it is not to be supposed that the Principles through which they are limited can be mutually indifferent. Experience testifies to their intimate mutual relation. Every excitement of the God-consciousness is in the pious an immediate impulse for the conscience, and every warning which proceeds from the latter no less quickens the former. Whoever explains the God-consciousness in the human soul as a mere illusion, will be found at length to treat the moral law as merely a product of good-natured weakness, or of cunning calculation. The degeneracy or death of religion among a

people is always united with the deepest corruption of the moral life; and none ever quenches the voice of his conscience, without at the same time perverting, either in unbelief or superstition, his religious consciousness. . . . Man first becomes conscious of the higher unity of his moral and religious life when he recognises God as the author of the moral law, and the Surety of its validity—when he perceives the moral law to be an *order* by which the Divine will rules his life. . .’—pp. 105-6.

‘God is thus the single immediate subject of our moral obligation—the ground of all other obligation. Every duty has relation to Him; that which truly binds us in our conscience is the Divine will. The keeping of the law *essentially* consists in obedience to the living God, from whom, and in whom, and to whom we are. The relation of the rational creature to God is, where it exists truly, the first and innermost relation of our being, from which all moral life proceeds, and on which, throughout its entire development, it remains dependent—to which, as to its fast centre, it ever flows back from all its manifold destinations. And in this view we are conscious of the moral economy under which we live, not as *autonomy*, nor yet as *heteronomy*, but as *theonomy*.’—p. 107.

The conclusion, it will be seen, is just the same as that we have already stated. The moral law is found to be no mere formal or unexplained imperative, but to be a revelation of the Divine will in the finite spirit. This its higher meaning discloses itself on the further interrogation of consciousness. Evil, accordingly, also assumes a higher meaning, as no longer merely ‘transgression of law,’ but moreover ‘disobedience against God.’ The proper idea of *sin*, which is not merely moral disorder, but spiritual undutifulness, now emerges.

Dr. Müller next proceeds to inquire into the real or essential principle of sin. Its psychological manifestation we have seen to imply ‘transgression of law,’ and ‘disobedience against God;’ but what is the principle forming, so to speak, its essence, through which it is both of these. What is the unity which underlies all its manifestations. It is natural to suppose that it possesses some such central principle; and if it does, it is an obvious psychological task to determine it. Dr. Müller rightly concludes that this principle of evil, whatever it may be, will be best inferred from a prior consideration of what is the specific principle of the good. ‘As the negative implies the affirmative, and the antithesis the thesis, so,’ he says, ‘does the evil the good. It exists only in antagonism to the good, and as the lapse from it. As it has no self-consistency, so is its knowledge never primary and original, but always secondary and derivative. It is only possible to understand the evil and its root in man by previously understanding the good.’

After a lengthened and very interesting inquiry, in which he

conclusively shows the necessity of supposing the moral law to take its rise, not in the mere arbitrary will of God, as many theologians have maintained, but in the inherent moral perfection of His nature—he deduces the essential principle of this law, or of the good in relation to the will, to be *love to God*. This, which is the comprehensive form of its fulfilment, is at the same time its deepest motive. All genuine moral obedience springs from this as its origin: and he has very finely unfolded the ultimate identity with this, of the second canon of the law, as given in the words of our Saviour—viz., love to our neighbour. This does not imply a twofold principle in the law, but only a twofold application of the same principle; for the essential ground of the Christian duty to love our neighbour, lies in the fact, that our neighbour bears with us the image of God. In loving him, therefore, we at the same time love God; and, on the contrary, we cannot love God truly without also loving our brother: ‘for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?’ He that loveth not the image of God, how can he love God himself? God is not only, therefore, the highest subject of human love, but he is truly the absolute and all-embracing subject of this love, so that all other love is only holy and imperishable in so far as it takes up into it the love of God. All other sentiment is only thereby truly moral, that it roots itself in this. Other forms of virtue which belong essentially to the special type of our present development, will, we know, pass away; but this, we have the highest certainty, will not lose its meaning with the completion of our earthly life, but endure for ever. And in a profound and very significant passage, he thus dwells upon the nature of love:—

‘Love,’ he says, ‘is only possible where a being who may live entirely in himself does not choose to do so, but, on the contrary, steps out of himself to live in and for another. Love can, therefore, only realize itself in the sphere of personal beings, who have in themselves a self-sufficient centre of their own existence, and that only as the absolute abolition of an absolute separation; and just because this union of personal beings in love implies the purest and most perfect separation—the distinction of the *I* and the *thou*—does it manifest itself as the highest form of unity. What appears as love in the sphere of animal life,—where the inclination which unites two creatures together operates merely as instinct, and physical necessity—is not actual love, but only its pregnant type, standing in connexion with that wonderful gleam of a twilight aspect of personality and self-consciousness which everywhere reveals itself in this sphere. For not only here, but generally in nature, such indications present themselves. We may trace the presiding law of love up



from the metamorphoses of the smallest plants to the most general cosmical arrangements of the world. We see how all life and form spring out of the union and co-operation of distinct forces, a fact to which the fine myth of the theogony of Hesiod already bears witness, when it represents Eros, the healer of discord, as the world-forming principle. But what nature thus prophesies unconsciously, in virtue of the Divine order which has imposed on it this deep-meaning, is only first elevated to consciousness and full truth in the region of personal being as the fundamental law of the moral world.

‘Indeed even here, in its first beginnings, love has hidden itself. It is in another and apparently strange form that it first appears. For is not the awakening within us of the sense of justice in human intercourse, even where it demands from us self-denial—is not this just an entering of other personalities and their interests into the sphere of our own personality? The recognition of the moral necessity of limiting his individuality and its claims, and submitting to the order of a community, what is this but the first going out of the man from that selfish isolation in which he is wholly occupied with himself? The sharp limitation by which every personality is thus secured of its right is, without doubt, not the highest revelation of love. It takes its rise, however, from this principle. It is the tendency of the mere crude impulse of personality to assert itself without measure, but it here restrains itself through the equal admission of other personalities with itself. For how were a living community, as a mode of life and operation of the individual for a whole, possible, if he did not possess a special sphere of his personal rights and liberties as groundwork of a connecting activity. It is not merely the false hatred against all strict order, but often also an amiable enthusiasm, which demands at present, in the name of love, a dissolution of all distinctions and individualities in one abstract generality; but this conception of love is really further removed from its true character than that of a rigidly parting justice.\* Love is, therefore, in itself, the innermost principle of all moral order,—and the deep reverence for law, and obedience to a higher will—those holy powers which hold the life of man together, and appoint the definite and fast-fixed circle of his activity, are nothing else than *prefigured love*—and just as was the Old Testament economy in the history of the human race, so are these in the life of the individual, designed and adapted to be *παράγωγοι* for the kingdom of *revealed* love. It is only in the soil of a severe earnestness that love can strongly take root—only from the encompassing shell of self-limitation and subordination that true freedom can spring forth.

‘But love can only first become the formative principle of a higher life, when it stands forth fully revealed in its own character; and this it can only do when it rises to the consciousness of God as its absolute

\* Dr. Müller has here a note, which we give without comment. ‘It is thus summarily shown what madness it is to hope to further the kingdom of love among men, by the abolition of all individual property. It is the bitterest satire upon our much-praised modern culture, that numerous contemporaries still need to be instructed in these first rudiments of all moral knowledge.

subject, and of the essential relation of all other objects to Him. Then is it first found to be the heavenly magnet which has power to sustain human life, not only during transitory moments of enthusiastic impulse, but for ever to raise it above the dark depths into which the powers of the abyss, and the burden of its own heaviness, are unceasingly trying to plunge it.'—pp. 146-7-8-9.

As love to God is the radical principle of the good, so *selfishness* is found by Dr. Müller to be the radical principle of the evil. God is deposed from his rightful place in the human soul, and *Self* exalted in his stead. This is sin in its essence—the pervasive element which runs through all its manifestations. We cannot afford space to notice the arguments by which Dr. Müller, at great length, aims to establish this deduction and to obviate the objections to which it may be supposed liable. Our opinion is, that he has been successful, so far as success in any such inquiry is possible. It may, perhaps, be doubted whether all the manifold phenomena of moral evil can be traced by us to one rudimental source. There will still, perhaps, be some halt in our most discerning and exhaustive generalization on such a subject. But it appears to us to admit of no doubt, that selfishness is *the most* radically-pervading element of *sin*. Even in many of its modifications, of an apparently opposite character, this lurking element will at once be found lying deep and hidden, on a careful examination. Dr. Müller has, with great ingenuity and force, traced up a great variety of its special forms to this source. He has also well shown how it is through this inversion of our personality that sin acquires its positive character. 'The relation of the subject to itself instead of to God, being the point in which all the efforts and tendencies of sin centralize, sin thus becomes not merely disorder but a *perverted order*—not merely dissolution of unity but a false concentration of human existence, a perverted *totality*. It dissolves the true unity, in order to erect a false one in its place.' There are many more related points of great interest which he discusses in this chapter: but we must hurry onwards in our analysis. A further and most important aspect of sin remains for our consideration.

In our previous examination, we have found the characteristic revelation of sin, in consciousness, to be that of a fact opposed to the Divine will. Our psychological analysis has given us an element of contradiction to the *divine order* of our natures. We cannot rest with merely noting the fact of disorder *in us*, but we are necessarily carried beyond this fact, to its relation to the Author of the order which has been broken. But if we interrogate consciousness more closely, we shall perceive that it reveals sin yet more deeply than we have found, both in its relation to

ourselves and to God. It testifies not merely to the presence of sin *in us*, but also *by us*. It refers our disobedience against the Divine will directly to our own wills. This conscious self-reference of sin is what we call *guilt*. We have already seen, indeed, in our very first inquiries into the nature of sin, that the will is its special seat. But then, it might be so through the contact of some foreign impulse. That the will, however, is not merely the seat of sin, but the source of it through its own self-determination—this it is to which the sense of guilt testifies. Our personality, in its innermost centre, makes itself the cause of our sin. It asserts its own responsibility for it. ‘None can say, if my conscience reproaches my sin, it does not yet reproach me.’ The sinner feels himself to be causally involved in his sin, and himself condemns it. This element of condemnation is the second essential moment in the conception of guilt. The sinner not only feels himself to be the author of his sin, but he accuses himself as such. He feels himself, as such, to be unworthy of Divine communion. His deeper apprehension of his own implication in his sin, reveals to him a deeper sense of God’s opposition to it.

Is this a valid psychological deduction? Is guilt thus indubitably a *fact* of our moral consciousness? Is it something *real*, and not a mere illusion or superstition? Has it, in short, an objective as well as a subjective existence? Does it bear the light of scientific reflection, or does it disappear as a mere darksome and noxious vapour under the application of this light? This which is the last, is perhaps the most important, and certainly the most subtle, question which psychology has to settle in relation to sin? That it is such a fact as we have described, we believe a true psychology must determine. The more completely we analyse and comprehend the testimony of consciousness, the more completely does it tell *us* this. The more intensely we radiate its inner sphere with the light of a piercing insight, the more clearly do we see this dark and dammed spot cleaving to it. The more we exalt and enlarge our spiritual vision, with a more burning shame does the sense of guilt come home to us. There is nothing artificial, or even voluntary, in this sensation. ‘It has us, and not we it. It pursues us flying, and holds us rebelling.’ It surely can be no accident or illusion which thus clings to us. Time, which alters or destroys so many things, does not alter or destroy this. It is still there. Culture, which may have expanded our whole natures, and introduced us, as it were, into a new life, does not soften or polish down this. It still asserts itself, and, in fact, as we have said, just the more asserts itself the more self-conscious we become, and the higher

and the purer the range of contemplation into which we ascend. Were it a mere phantom of ignorance or of disease, it should vanish away when our minds become enlightened or our health grow strong; but just the more sane, and vigorous, and illumined we are, just the more palpably and vividly does this grim companion stand forth within us.

Or is it perhaps to be considered not wholly a delusion, but, as some will have it, a means appointed by God for leading man not to rest supinely in his state of sin, also of His appointment, but to struggle unceasingly towards the good or the undisturbed harmony and freedom of his existence?

‘What an outlet is this!’ (may we not well say, with Dr. Müller.) ‘A dark, demon-like power, which leaves the poor sinner first to become guilty, and then to experience all the bitterness of being so; which has ordained selfishness, and lies, and hatred itself as a necessary, perhaps continually vanishing, but never vanished, shadow of the good, which has burdened man with the responsibility of the same in his conscience, and added to the burden of sin the inner anguish of remorse.’ Truly does he add, that such a view ‘may not be inconceivable in systems of polytheism or pantheism, but is utterly inconsistent with the fundamental principles of Christian theism, denying, as it not only does, the truth and holiness of God, but placing, instead of his love, a despotic cruelty towards his creatures.’—p. 296.

That there may be those who, either from the force of a perverted culture, or the mere deadness and oppression of their spiritual nature, do not find in themselves any sense of guilt—cannot, according to what we formerly stated, be held as any valid disproof of this element of consciousness. There is no single fact of our moral being but may be denied. There is no truth of the spirit but may be gainsaid, temporarily, at least, if only *we will*. That we are not able to *demonstrate* the truth of guilt, is not only no evidence against its truth; but if it were capable of demonstration, it would cease to be guilt. The verification of such a spiritual fact lies in quite a different sphere. It is only by a reverent, and honest, and searching appeal to our own experience, and by a believing and comprehensive study of the general experience, that we can satisfy ourselves of such a fact. We cannot offer higher evidence to any. If they heed not this, neither would they be persuaded although one rose from the dead. We only claim for this deduction the same certainty as attaches to the others. Our moral consciousness testifies to it. The more we comprehend and grasp its meaning, the more we read it there. And do we look for evidence of its truth beyond ourselves—do we appeal not only to our own, but

to the general experience; we find all language and history—the unerring exponents of the general human consciousness—testify to it. There is no conception, perhaps, more thoroughly in-wrought into language and history than that of guilt. Does this speak throughout only of a nonentity? Is it a mere bugbear to which the human heart has ever borne such trembling testimony, and the human tongue given such trembling utterance? We cannot believe it. Human life were then a riddle, and human consciousness a dream.

But may it not be doubted if the sense of guilt is ever entirely obliterated in any? If in many it have little or no force, is there not yet a vague and dim presentiment of it in them, which is ever ready to start forth into consciousness and power? Dr. Müller has very well observed,—

‘It must be admitted that guilt is much greater and more widely spread than its consciousness in man. It sleeps in numbers, and it can only be awakened, not as a mere power of reproach for individual crimes, but as the witness of a thorough opposition to the holy laws of life, where the soul has freed itself from the trammels of moral stupidity and indifference. But even when there is wanting in the sinner a special consciousness of guilt, there is not wanting to him a certain feeling, which we must regard as the germ thereof. Although free from striking wickedness,—so long as he lives in the service of his selfish desires and interests, he is not truly at one with himself. A dark presentiment tells him that the sphere in which he lives is not his true home. And there come moments to him, when a solemn feeling of insecurity warns him of the ground undermined beneath his feet. The service of sin can never give freedom to the breast; but only bind it in a closer restraint. . . (p. 288.) And thus is the evil conscience the divine link which unites the created spirit, even in deep disorder, to its original. The vague sentiment of guilt, although misunderstood by man, so long as he possesses nothing higher, reveals the essential dependence of our spirit upon God, the *γένος τοῦ Θεοῦ*. The pain and anguish which its warnings excite, the inward unrest which sometimes seizes the slave of sin, are just evidences that he is not yet entirely free from God. As sin is the endeavour of the creature to tear himself asunder from God, so does this endeavour, which must ever objectively remain a vain one, continue subjectively unfulfilled while the consciousness of guilt is not utterly extinguished.’—p. 289.

It is not necessary for our present purpose to enter upon the inquiry, as to how the fact of guilt can be reconciled with the fact of man’s dependence upon God. Although we cannot intellectually comprehend the relation of these two facts, we may yet hold both of them. Indeed, as we shall afterwards explain, the problem must, in its very nature, remain insoluble; for in its possible solution one of its terms would already disappear, and

there would be no need for inquiry into it. If we could *understand* how human guilt relates itself to God, it would be no more *guilt*. Dr. Müller has expended a long chapter on the subject, but necessarily, as we conceive, without any satisfactory result. The inquiry, in fact, obviously merges into the general one respecting the origin of evil.

Dr. Müller's second book, as we formerly stated, is given to a discussion of the various theories which have been propounded on this subject. There is a remarkable power of discerning appreciation and keen-sighted analysis shown in this portion of his work. He enters with a spirit of thorough fairness and genial earnestness into the strong points of the different theories, and is never content to oppose them on mere side grounds, but brings his argument to bear upon them from the depths of his own comprehensive perception of their weakness. It is just the same feature of exhaustive mastery of his subject which characterizes the whole work; but only here it is perhaps more effectively and convincingly displayed. It is ever so much more easy to destroy than to create.

We shall only very briefly and imperfectly traverse the ground over which our author here passes. As they will serve, however, to illustrate more clearly the main drift of our present paper, the various theories of the origin of sin deserve from us a rapid notice. We shall accept our author's classification of them, which we believe to be even more than sufficiently comprehensive; but shall take the liberty of just inverting the order in which he has treated them. He would seem to have begun with that which has received most currency in Christian theology, and proceeded to that which is most opposed to all Christian conceptions. It will suit our purpose better to begin with that which is most incapable of Christian interpretation, and advance to that which has so clearly identified itself with the highest form of our theological orthodoxy. This, we may also say, we are somewhat inclined to consider the most natural and philosophic order of their examination. It begins with the most simple, and ends with the most complex. At least the gradation of simplicity is rather this way than the other way. We shall, as we have all along done, freely avail ourselves of Dr. Müller's arguments and illustrations.

The first theory which in this way claims our notice is that of Dualism. This is obviously the most rough and simple solution of the origin of evil. An alien and contradictory principle being found in human life, what more simple than to suppose it to take its rise in an ultimate eternally-subsistent power of evil? This is the natural deduction of infant speculation. And, accordingly, we find that this theory, although in a somewhat unconscious

form, has struck its roots deep in the early speculative attempts of our race. Beside the world-forming principle, whatever it was supposed to be, a dark and resisting chaos was always presupposed. And when, with the introduction of Christianity, speculation concerning the evil was brought for the first time to a pitch of lively consciousness, we see this theory reappearing in all the diverse forms of Gnosticism. It may be said in these to have mainly assumed two modes of development, the one partaking more largely of the Grecian, the other of the Oriental element of philosophy. According to the former, evil was conceived under the Platonic notion of the *ἕλν*, or the dead blank matter everywhere opposing and contaminating the divine operations. According to the latter, which found its most perfect representation in Parsecism, it was considered to be an active personal power, an eternal enemy of God—an Ahriman, or destructive agent, ever warring against Ormuzd, the good agent.

This theory, so prominently appearing in the earliest speculative attempts regarding the evil, may be said to have quite died out of the sphere of modern philosophy. If to a rigid scrutiny it may really be found hidden, and ready to start forth in some of the prevailing forms of Pantheism, (and it would be too much to say that the next turn of the wheel of speculation among our German neighbours may not give us something as extraordinary as this,) nothing can yet be more foreign from their professed spirit and kindness than its conception. It is the annihilating abstraction of the ALL which they exalt; but here, as everywhere, it may be found that extremes meet, and the bow of thought, so long bent to grasp the VOID OF UNITY, may revert more speedily than imagined to a Dualistic tendency.\* We need not say, however, that *it is* the fundamental contradiction which this theory presents to the demand of unity, so essential to our reason, which forms its ready-made objection. We must bring an ultimate and comprehending oneness into all things. We cannot rest short of this. On the speculative side, therefore, the theory is utterly untenable; while, in reference to its apprehension of sin, it is obviously no less deficient. It gives it self-subsistence and independence, while it is only conceivable as subsisting in and related to the good. It imputes it to an outward cause working with necessity, while it can only be in a will working with freedom. 'It thus,' as Neander has truly said in his history, 'saps at the root the idea of evil which it *would* most firmly maintain.'

The second theory before us, in the inverted order we are considering them, is that denominated by Dr. Müller the theory of

\* Dr. Müller has found some actual traces of a Dualistic tendency in some of the recent writings of the Hegelian school, in Duab's 'Judas Iscariot,' for example.

*contrast*, which we shall find directly allies itself with the speculations of Hegelian pantheism. Evil, like darkness and cold, is regarded as an indispensable contrast in human life. All individual reality is only the product of opposite forces working together. Pure light were in itself perfectly colourless, identical, in fact, with darkness. It is only the blending of the various shades of both which gives us actual light. The plant, were it a single power, could not grow. It is only the co-operation of opposite powers which promotes its development. So, in man, individuality—character is only the product of the opposing ethical moments of good and evil. Perfect purity—without flaw—without struggle, would be a mere empty and useless abstraction. All life and energy only arise from the mutual conflict of the positive and negative. In nature we have attraction and repulsion, positive and negative electricity; in ordinary life, pain and pleasure, rest and activity, health and sickness. Take away any of these relative moments, the other would disappear with it. Take away repulsion, there would be no more attraction. Let pain disappear, so would pleasure. Rest is no more rest if it does not spring from activity; and the joy of health is only known through sickness. Why should it be different in the sphere of morals. Here, too, there must be a polarity. Good can only be in contradistinction to the evil. It is only from their interaction that the moral life derives any character and energy. How utterly devoid of interest, how stale, flat, and unprofitable, were our life were sin entirely to disappear. Where would be all that now in history or romance gives a charm to it? Where would be the passions that now lend to poetry all its power, and to the arts all their witchery?

We have but very imperfectly summarised the lively and hearty exposition which Dr. Müller has given of this theory. It has obviously an attractive catholicity which will recommend it to many minds. He traces its origin in Christian literature to Lactantius, and we need not say that the echo of it will be found in many tones of philosophy. Some of our readers will also at once detect its analogy to certain popular views in our present literature. In what does much of the prevalent hero-worship root itself, but in this conception of the evil, as indispensable to the vital and energetic manifestation of human character?

Two considerations will suffice to show the utter misapplication of this theory to our subject. First of all, supposing it was *true* that moral energy could only spring from the co-action of the evil with the good—this would obviously destroy the essential nature of the evil. It would be no longer an element of disorder and contradiction in human life, but simply an element of co-



operation. It would no longer destroy, but conserve. It would no longer infringe, but enter as a necessary *integral* into the constitution of our higher being. The two ideas would lose their relative significance. The good, in contrast to the evil, would be no more good, but rather evil, and the evil good, for it is only the quickening impulse of the former gives the latter being. Without this, the good were no *being*, but a mere slumbering, torpid *possibility*. It lies in the last logical results of this theory, therefore, to enthrone the evil as the first principle. It does not depend upon the good, but the good, so far as it has any *reality*, depends upon the evil; or, at any rate, the concrete reality in which they unite is something in which the definite forms of both conceptions are swallowed up.

But *secondly*, we must deny that the special postulate of this theory possesses any validity. The good does not need to unite with the evil to attain self-consistency and vitality. On the contrary, life and activity are essential moments of the good in itself. It is no doubt dependent for its development in the creature, on the co-action of relative forces both bodily and mental; but its relation to the evil, so far from being in any sense one of co-operation, is one of pure hostility. So far from needing to be quickened by it, it repels the evil as simply destructive of its own proper and healthy activity. Its alleged help is its natural and irreconcilable enemy.

‘It were surely an utterly stupid conception of the good,’ as Dr. Müller has said, ‘which sees in it only weakness and stupidity, and attributes all energy and life to the evil. What sort of morality is that which, in order to become anything at all, must first mix with immoral elements? What sort of love, which must first hate before it can manifest any living force. Every corrupting entrance of the evil into the good is still so far evil and not good; so that even if we admit, as a matter of fact, that the evil in every such case struggles with the good, we must yet hold that the good stood in no need of it for its self-realization.’—p. 511.

The Hegelian theory of the origin of sin is considered by Dr. Müller to be simply a modification of this. Sin is viewed by Hegel as the simple residence of the spirit in nature. The spirit begins in nature, but in order to reach its true consciousness it must go out of nature. Only when it has done so, does it become truly spirit, and it is sin, therefore, for it to remain standing still in the sphere of nature. The animal without will or consciousness is neither good nor bad. Nature in itself is not evil, but only in so far as it invades the sphere of the spirit, and is made by the subjective arbitrariness alone essential. So far the Hegelian theory may seem to be rather analogous to that which

attributes the origin of sin to *sense*; but its strict analogy with the view under consideration is shown in this, that it is in the contrasted relation of nature and spirit that the essence of the good is supposed by Hegel to consist. It is not the simple dominance of the spirit over nature, but it is its ever-repeated separation from and reconciliation with nature. The *contrast* is indispensable. 'Man,' he says, 'is essentially spirit, but spirit is 'essentially this, to be for itself, to be free, to place itself opposite to nature, to withdraw itself out of its natural slough, to separate 'itself from nature, and first *in* and *through* this separation to 'reconcile itself with it, and not only with nature, but with its 'own essence and truth.' The absoluteness of the spirit is still therefore only a relativity. It still needs nature; the good still *rests* on the evil even in its conquest over it. The victor must dally with its victim, and evermore mimic its triumph over it. 'Man must eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, otherwise were he an animal and no man.' It is almost needless to point out how entirely the true character of sin disappears in this theory. We have found it to be a conscious element of disorder in the human spirit, but it is here a mere logical process of development through which the spirit *must* pass. Nay, it is an eternally indispensable law of self-consciousness; which thus evermore realizes itself only against the dark background of unconsciousness. Sin, it is obvious, in this view, loses all moral meaning; human life, all practical solemnity; and God himself—who is but the last expression for this continual flow of spirit and nature—consciousness and unconsciousness—ceases to have all reality.

The next theory to which our attention is invited is that of *sense*. In the simple fact, that man is not only spiritual but sensual, is supposed to lie the ready solution of the origin of evil. According to the statement of Scripture, 'the flesh lusteth 'against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, and these are 'contrary the one to the other.' What more likely than that in the conflict between these antagonist forces of man's being derangement should ensue. The impulses of sense are not indeed simply in themselves to be regarded as evil, but only in so far as, instead of retaining their own subordinate place as a basis of our earthly existence, they are found invading and overcoming the power of the spirit. But here an obvious and fatal objection occurs at the very first to this theory. How does *that* which, according to the theory itself, is the lower part of our nature, come to exert a supremacy over the higher? Whence the inversion of the *true order* of our being? It is plain that the mere statement of the fact is no explanation of it. This theory,

indeed, does not at all penetrate to the root of the matter. Even if we admit that sin is derived from sense, the question still is, how is sense so powerful? In order to find out this, we must still go back from the sense to the will which works in it. The former has no power to set itself in motion. It is only operative in so far as the will has yielded to its enticements and corrupted itself through them. All that can be said, and has been so largely said, of the influence of these enticements, of their constant presence with, and strong natural sway over man, yet furnishes no key to the explanation of their actual superiority. One sentence, as Dr. Müller truly says, is sufficient to refute everything of this sort with which the advocates of this theory have been accustomed to dress it out—viz., ‘*that nothing can be nearer or more powerfully related to the spirit than the spirit itself.*’ Supposing, indeed, a secret and original perversion whereby the spirit already inclines to the *sense*, it is conceivable how it should fall under its power; but then obviously the real question is whence this perversion, and not at all merely how it is evolved and manifested. We need scarcely mention, moreover, how entirely unexplained this theory leaves the whole category of spiritual sins—pride, revenge, hate, &c. Even if it did serve to account for the lower sensual manifestations of evil, it would furnish no key to all these deadliest forms of it which brood in the spirit itself, and drew from its innermost recesses all their peculiar intensity of malignity and destructiveness.

Popular as this theory may still be with a certain class of thinkers both in theology and philosophy, we do not conceive that it deserves any further notice at our hands. Plausible at first sight, we have only to look into it to see how utterly hollow and unsatisfactory it is. We cannot afford space to notice how completely Dr. Müller has shown that it derives no countenance from Scripture, however some of the statements of St. Paul torn from their context may seem to favour it. This indeed is a question, we should hope, set for ever at rest after the exhaustive criticisms of Müller in the present work, and of Neander in his ‘History of the Apostolic Age.’ It would require no ordinary critical hardihood and arrogance henceforth to claim St. Paul as an advocate for the theory of sense. We cannot any more allow ourselves even a passing glance at Dr. Müller’s thorough-going examination of the relation both of Kant and Schleiermacher to this theory.

The last, and in some respects the most important theory, which remains for our consideration, is that which traces sin to the metaphysical imperfection of human nature. This is the famous theory of Leibnitz in his ‘Theodicee.’ Its influence in

theology, indeed, we shall find dates from Augustine; but it has received from Leibnitz its most systematic treatment, and we shall examine it, therefore, mainly in his representation. Evil he considers to be a simple privation; to be in morals, in short, what cold and darkness are in physics—a pure negation. It is only the perfect or absolute that is positive: all imperfection proceeding from limitation is of a privative or negative character. But God alone is perfect. The creature in his very nature is limited. This limitation shows itself in man in the presence of error, beside truth in his understanding; of pain, beside pleasure in his senses—is it wonderful, then, that in his will this limitation should also manifest itself in the presence of evil beside the good. And in this way evil is seen to take its rise, not in an efficient cause, (*causa efficiens*), but only in a *causa deficiens*. God gives the creature his qualities only in so far as they are real or positive: the deficiency does not spring from His will, but from the nature of the thing. God is willing to bestow every perfection in the fullest possible degree, but the receptivity of the creature in its very conception is limited. This limited receptivity has its ultimate ground in the divine understanding, the region of eternal truth—the forms or ideas of the possible—the sole thing which God has not made, as he is not the author of his own understanding. In this way Leibnitz conceives that he obviates the reference of the evil to God. Every positive faculty of man is to be traced back to God, but the evil, as a mere privation, cannot be so traced. ‘What is good cometh from the strength of God, what is evil from the torpor of the creature.’

This theory Dr. Müller has shown is capable, in some degree, of two interpretations. It may be understood as either deriving sin *necessarily* out of the original imperfection of the creature, or as only placing the *possibility* of sin in this imperfection. While some of Leibnitz’s expressions (and this is not to be wondered at) would seem to favour the latter interpretation, there can yet be little doubt, we think, that it was in the former sense he himself meant it to be understood, as in this sense alone can it be said to have any title to be considered a theory of the *origin* of evil. It was his whole object ‘to justify the ways of God to man,’ and the secret of this justification he undoubtedly believed himself to have found in the conception of evil as necessarily inherent in the limitations of the creature. Evil is a direct and inevitable consequence of these limitations—*une suite des limitations précédentes, qui sont originairement dans sa créature*—so that in creating the world at all, God (so to speak) could not help the admixture of evil in it; inasmuch as it could not be absolutely perfect, it could not be free from evil. But the evil is the least

that could have been. The world is the 'best of all possible worlds.'

It must be already obvious in our statement how entirely unsatisfactory this theory is. It stands throughout in direct contradiction to the moral consciousness, and will be found logically to involve the most fatal consequences. First of all, sin cannot be conceived as the mere *ens privatum* this theory would represent it to be. It partakes, on the contrary, as we have seen, of an essentially positive character. It has no analogy to any of the other imperfections which attach to our nature. These never manifest themselves to us as elements of disturbance, but as simply the laws or *conditions* under which we live. But it is of the very primary essence of sin we have found that it reveals itself as an element of disorder and opposition within us. If inherent in the necessary imperfection of our being, then we are reduced to the strange conclusion, that out of the very limitations which go to constitute the conception of the creature, there arises a limitation which *contradicts* this conception. But, again, in the mere fact of making sin necessarily inherent in human imperfection, this theory, no less than those of *dualism* and of *contrast*, at once destroys all the moral meaning of sin,—uproots, in fact, its very idea; while it entirely fails, notwithstanding all its effort, to turn aside the ultimate reference of sin to God as its cause. For, granting its mediate origin to be the creaturely limitation, this creaturely limitation, whatever may be said, must still take its rise from God. There is only a *causa deficiens*, in so far as called into existence by the *causa efficiens*. Leibnitz' distinction of understanding and will in the Deity does not really avail to obviate this conclusion, unless the distinction is to be seized in an absolutely dualistic sense. For otherwise God, perceiving in the region of eternal truth that evil would necessarily spring out of man's nature, might have desisted from his creation.

And if *necessary* in its origin, sin, according to this theory, must be no less eternal in its duration; inasmuch as the creature can never be absolutely perfect, sin can never wholly disappear. It can still only be a vanishing *minimum*, as the creature approximates to the perfection of the Creator; and this is an idea which would seem even to have entered into the mind of Leibnitz in his famous representation of the human spirit as an asymptote of the Divine. Could we conceive the still vanishing limit entirely away, man would be no longer man, but God. It is clear, then, that this theory, pushed to its fair logical results, only escapes Pantheism by making sin eternal. Man only ceases to be a sinner by becoming God. Most singular and instructive coincidence with the latest outrages of German speculation!

showing the inevitable consequence, even in the hands of Christian men, of applying merely logical forms of conception to moral subjects. For it is here, as must have been before evident to our readers, that the radical and pervading defect of Leibnitz' theory lies. He confounds metaphysical with moral good; perfection of being with harmony of life. In the former respect, God alone is or can be perfect; in the latter there may be, so far as we know, any variety of relative perfection. Sinlessness, as we formerly observed, has no connexion with mere mass of being, but exists entirely in the harmonious proportion between being and the moral laws under which it exists. And in like manner sin has and can have no connexion with mere metaphysical limitation or defect of being, but exists entirely in the discordance between it and its proper moral conditions. The two conceptions of good as *being*, and good as *moral harmony*, are totally and essentially distinct, and nothing but the most hopeless and irretrievable error can arise from their confusion. In the one case it is *substance* with which we deal,—more or less; in the other it is *will*,—right or wrong. No circle of thought can ever unite these conceptions, which are absolutely contradistinguished. We do not say, indeed, that the metaphysical definitions of *being* and *non-being*, *affirmative* and *negative*, *possession* and *want*, have no relation to the investigation of sin, but only that they are totally misapplied when made to express its real and essential principle. And so long as philosophy or theology remains fast bound in such logical abstractions, neither can have any true apprehension of its character, and in attempting to define it, can only mistake it. In order to rise to such an apprehension, they must first have reached quite other conceptions of the creature, and of his relation to God—in other words, they must have grasped *personality* and *will*.

We have already mentioned the relation of Augustine to this theory. Some traces of it indeed are to be found even in the earlier Christian fathers; but it is from him, as we have stated, that its influence may be said to have descended through the whole of our modern theology. The *evil* is with him in its special corruption, *corruptio* or *privatio boni*,—the good being recognised in its metaphysical sense as *being*, *reality*, or, as he sometimes more precisely defines it, *bonum naturæ*; and the possibility of this corruption he places in the fact of man's creation out of nothing,—a thought which Archbishop King has reproduced in an almost dualistic sense in the following words:—'Nascitur eventura a Deo patre perfectissimo, eba *nihilo quasi matre*, quæ est ipsa imperfectio.' But while there would seem to be so far an exact identity between the views of Augustine and Leibnitz,

Dr. Müller has pointed out an important distinction in that of the former, which reveals itself on a closer inspection. Whereas the idea of privation is used by Leibnitz in a merely passive sense, Augustine usually assigns it an active meaning. With the philosopher the evil is a mere circumstance of deficiency essentially connected with the metaphysical imperfection of the creature; with the theologian, again, it is rather an encroaching activity. It is indeed a negative element, but somewhat in the same sense in which the fire consuming all within its reach may be said to be so. It is obvious how much more consistent this view is with the actual testimony of consciousness. And not only here, but in the pervading manner in which he has seized hold of the opposition between the good and evil in his writings, we need not say how far the profound intuition of Augustine has risen above his system—all too narrow for the fulness and depth of his own Christian experience. Still he has, with the other features of his system, communicated this to the great fabric of orthodoxy which has come down to us from him. The privative conception of evil is clearly to be traced in all the Reformation creeds, and has served significantly to influence the great stream of Protestant thought regarding it.\* It took its rise, we know, in the case of Augustine, from the necessity so strongly felt by him of opposing the Manichean view of evil as utterly inconsistent with the Divine unity and perfections; and it has no doubt perpetuated itself in the church as furnishing the solution of this great enigma *apparently* most reconcilable with these perfections. As theologians would theorize here as elsewhere, they have generally conceived this theory to be the most impregnable. And impregnable doubtless it is, so long as we fail to apprehend the radical distinction between metaphysical and moral good. But this its very logical compactness as a theory is its ruin as a truth. Its appeal to the intellect is an outrage upon the heart; and it might well be a warning to theological theorists in our day, when they see this very conception of evil so prominently pervading the writings of the ultra-infidel school of literature, both in our own country and America. In many of the expressions of Emerson, Leibnitz and even sometimes Augustine might be supposed to speak, so thoroughly has he reproduced their favourite idea of the evil being simply a deficiency of the good; only he has apprehended, while they did not, this idea in its strict logical consequence as cutting up by the root the consciousness of guilt, and in making sin a *necessity*, annihilating it as a *moral fact*.

\* It appears, perhaps, in its fullest recent development in the theology of Edwards, with the whole of whose cast of thought it closely allies itself. The similarity in many respects between the views of Edwards and Leibnitz has often been remarked.

The truth is, and it is to this conclusion that our brief criticism of the preceding theories has been directed, that the origin of sin is, and must ever continue to be, utterly inexplicable to the human mind. So soon as we begin to deduce it speculatively, we inevitably miss it. It escapes us in the very attempt. We have seen how completely it does so in all the theories we have considered. They adventure boldly on inquiry. They start a clue and trace it, and conceive that they have found the secret of evil, but when we look at the theoretical product we find it to be not only no measure of the *fact*, but, for the most part, a direct contradiction of it. Our author has wisely not attempted to follow in the same track. He propounds no theory of the origin of sin. He is content to endeavour the humbler task of explaining its *possibility*, to which the third book of his treatise is given at great length. But even in so far as he has entered minutely into this inquiry, it may be doubted if he has not quite as strikingly illustrated the entire misapplication of mere speculation to such a subject. His conjecture that sin is to be ascribed to our abuse of formal liberty\* in a prior state of existence, may serve to show how seducing the power of theory has been over him as well, and how little satisfactory its results are here as ever. We gain and can gain nothing from all such efforts of the intellect to grasp what surpasses its reach. The *possibility* of sin lies in the freedom of the human will, and *beyond this* we cannot go; or if we do go, we do not yet advance, but only plunge in confusion and darkness. All we can know of sin is as *empirically* revealed to us in our moral self-consciousness. We cannot too thoroughly or too deeply investigate its nature, so far as thus revealed. Such an investigation will reward us with fruitful and most important results. But to theorize about it is already to mistake it; for it is in its very essence as an act of the free will inexplicable; and could we lay it on the bed of theory, could we scientifically explain it, it would in that very consequence be no longer sin at all. 'It is a mystery, that is, a *fact which we see*, but cannot explain; and the doctrine a truth *which we apprehend*, but can *neither comprehend* nor communicate. And such, by the quality of the subject, (namely, a responsible will,) it must be, if it be a 'truth at all.'† Let us be content to abide by the *fact*, seizing it in all its comprehensiveness, but rigorously excluding every element of mere theory, as we would not introduce something subversive of its whole character.

As we have previously indicated, we think theologians have a

\* By *formal liberty* he means the capacity of right or wrong choice in contradiction to *real liberty*, in which the will and the law become absolutely harmonized and identical.

† Coleridge.



good deal to learn in this respect. They have not been content to accept the testimony of our moral intuitions, *educated and verified in the light of Scripture*, as an adequate basis of the doctrine of sin. They have preferred to reason concerning it on the exclusive ground of Scripture, and have in this way evolved a doctrine which, in some of its elements, our moral consciousness not only refuses to acknowledge, but obstinately rejects. In so far as they have done so, we believe they have not done well. We need not say that we accept *in toto* the testimony of Scripture on the subject of sin. But we conceive it, in every respect, to be only a reflection of the testimony of consciousness. It does not and cannot communicate to us any element of sin which is not also *in* our consciousness, and consistent with it. It does, indeed, largely quicken and educate our intuitions of sin, but it cannot supersede, much less overbear or contradict, these intuitions. *For every fact of our moral nature*, there can still be no higher evidence than our moral consciousness in its highest state of Christian development. Sin ceases to be sin—guilt vanishes as an unreal shadow, so soon as we *cannot* relate it to our conscious personality. We may make a *dogma* of it, but we cannot make a *truth* of it. It may serve an important purpose in building up a logically complete system, but it will do so at the expense of those sacred laws of our being which must ever assert themselves under all opposition, and which will know at length, as Neander truly says, ‘how to assert their rights against all such fine-spun theories.’ This zest for logical completeness has, we are inclined to think, been the bane of theologians. They have forgotten that logic can never *adequately* grasp the *truths of the spirit*. These all run back into a region which transcends the grasp of the mere intellect, and in reference to which we must *believe* and not *reason*. It is strange, yet undeniable, how often theologians have overlooked this fact, which *they* ought to have known so well; and how, in their rage for systematizing, they have in reality often joined issue with that mere logical formalism which ends in denying all personality, and interprets human life as a mere transitory wave of consciousness in the ever-rolling billow of non-entity. So despotic is the power of theory; and so unceasingly does the application of purely intellectual conceptions to moral subjects finally tend towards the same abyss.

There can be little doubt that, in order to reach onward to new conquests over the human mind, Christian theology must lay aside much of this mere logical framework in which its living truth is encased and cumbered. It is even now, we believe, struggling through these wrapping remnants of scholasticism into a freer and purer, because more spiritual atmosphere—a process of good of which we are disposed to see evidences even

in the saddest aberrations of religious opinion around us. The process of dissolution must take place before that of re-creation begins. But our faith is firm in this re-creation. The old truth will rise in fresh vigour from the ashes of its perishable systems, and will go forth clad in new and more perfect armour, 'conquering and to conquer.'

- ART. IV.—(1.) *Some Account of Domestic Architecture in England, from the Conquest to the End of the Thirteenth Century.* By T. HUDSON TURNER. 1851.
- (2.) *Household Expenses of the Countess of Leicester.* Roxburgh Club.
- (3.) *Documents and Authorities respecting the Ancient Collegiate Foundation attached to St. Paul's Cathedral.* Private impression.
- (4.) *Ancient Kalendars and Inventories of the Exchequer.* Edited by Sir F. PALGRAVE. 2 vols. 1838.
- (5.) *The Archaeological Journal.* 1845—1850.

THE history of domestic architecture in the middle ages has been strangely overlooked by antiquaries, even by those who have devoted the most time and research to the illustration of the every-day life of our forefathers. This is much to be regretted; for we scarcely need say how important a branch of the history of the people is that of the dwellings where they joyed and sorrowed, laboured, feasted, and kept holiday. The regret at this neglect is increased, too, when we remember, that while the ancient weapon, the ancient piece of furniture, even the ancient garment, has been often hoarded up, the dwelling, exposed to the wear and tear of centuries, and the constant alterations of successive occupants, soon loses its original form, even if it be still left standing; and thus the very scantiest materials now remain for the elucidation of this interesting subject. It is peculiarly unfortunate, too, that ancient sculptures, even ancient paintings, afford but little aid, while it is really vexatious to find so few illustrations of mediæval domestic architecture in that valuable storehouse of ancient illustration, the illuminated manuscript. Baffled in their attempts to attain anything like verisimilitude in architectural details, the illuminators content themselves with the most meagre accessories; and while the broidery on the robe, the chasing on the plate, even the folds of the table-cloth, are finished with the utmost minuteness, the whole of the back-ground often consists merely of a huge door with carved door-posts, or a curtain strangely surmounted by battlements; while if the painter be very am-

bitiously inclined, he piles a window, a tree, a hill, and another tree, one upon the other, in true Chinese defiance of perspective.

It is much to the credit of the two archæological societies lately instituted, that they have paid especial attention to the subject before us, and have sought to preserve our few remaining memorials, not only by causing accurate copies to be taken of them, but by encouraging inquiries as to remains which may be still in existence in more remote parts of the country. It is on this account that we always welcome their publications; but to Mr. Hudson Turner especial praise is due for the great industry and research with which he has pursued this subject, the results of which are contained in the first volume on our list.

Very little can be ascertained respecting the houses of our Saxon forefathers. That they were rude in construction, and simple in their arrangements, we have every reason to believe, both from the incidental testimony of poetry and legend, and from the fact that the Saxons never distinguished themselves as a 'building people.' The quarries which had supplied the Roman builders ceased to be worked in Saxon times; and although we think, with Mr. Turner, that the houses built by the Romans were most probably taken possession of as dwellings by their rude conquerors, still, where these had fallen into decay, or where a new 'hall' was required, the proprietor and his followers sought the woods to supply materials for its walls, and the river-side for its reedy covering. As its name implies, this dwelling was 'little more than a capacious apartment, which 'in the day-time was adapted to the patriarchal hospitality of 'the owner, and formed at night a sort of stable for his servants, 'to whose rude accommodation their master's was not much 'superior in the small adjoining chamber.' Such was the rude abode of the Saxon thegne, who engaged in the labours or sports of the field, enjoying that wild freedom, that 'joyous liberty,' of which even the old legal instrument so exultingly speaks, would probably have looked with contempt on the more comfortable dwellings of his descendants. For his bondsmen, the wattled hut was doubtless sufficient; but for the higher order of nobles, for the monastic establishments, for the king's court, a better kind of accommodation seems to have been required.

Of the specific character of these buildings we can gain but little information. We have, however, good ground for believing that, although rude painting and carving might decorate the chief apartments, and even its 'steep roof be with gold adorned,' still, the magnificence that characterized Charlemagne's stately

palace at Aix, with its sculptured porticos, and long galleries, and the lofty roofs glittering with their golden globes, was never witnessed in England; but there is every reason to believe that even the king's residence consisted rather of a large collection of separate buildings than of one symmetrical whole. That this was the case with conventual establishments we have evidence in the very curious description and ground-plan of the abbey of St. Gall, about the middle of the ninth century, which appeared in the *Archæological Journal* two or three years since. This most curious document places the Saxon convent (for this celebrated abbey was founded by Englishmen) vividly before our eyes. There is the towering abbey church in the midst, and the guest-house, abbot's house, scholars' house, and doctor's house around;\* then the refectory and dormitories, the 'scriptorium' of the monks, with the precious library; and then, more remote, the infirmary and domestic offices, while stables, forge, workshops, and a complete set of farm-offices, occupy the outer boundary. Just such a collection of small tenements, girdled by the low wall, and surrounded by pleasant gardens, was doubtless the convent to which Alcuin alludes with such fond recollections; and such, too, must have been the abbey of Whitby, when the worthy lady Hilda held rule there. Of the dwelling-houses in cities we have no record; but we think with Mr. Turner, that previously to the Conquest these were little more than 'low huts closely packed together.' The Saxon, until stimulated by Norman enterprise, looked with but languid interest upon commerce, and only by pressure of necessity seems to have quitted the country to become a dweller in the walled town. Indeed, the valuable privileges offered by the Conqueror, on condition of residence for a year and a day in his burghs, above all, that greatest, the precious boon of freedom to the fugitive bondsman, seems to us to have emphatically laid the foundation of the prosperity and importance of our cities.

Although, as yet, but little improvement took place in the dwelling-house, still, even from the commencement of the Conqueror's reign, a far superior style of architecture for churches was introduced, of which the first specimen was Westminster Abbey. While we think it very probable that *some* of the cathedrals might even earlier have emulated what the chronicler calls 'the Roman manner,' it seems to us evident, from the

\* The 'physic-garden' is close beside the doctor's house; and the following is the list of 'medicinal herbs' grown there, apparently in separate beds:—'Peppermint, rosemary, sage, rue, pennyroyal, fenugreek, cummin, water-cress, corn-flag, roses, loveage, fennel, tansy, *white lilies*, *kidney-beans*, and savory.' The kitchen-garden, curiously enough, grew coriander and poppy. From the large list of fruits, the horticultural skill of these monks appears to have been very creditable.

peculiar expressions of wonder with which contemporary writers describe this abbey, that the genuine Norman style had been hitherto unknown. Now, with Norman architects, and with plentiful materials at hand, we cannot but believe that the adjoining palace would partake of the same character, and thus afford a pattern for the mansion of the noble. That the Confessor's palace was built of stone, and presented an imposing appearance, we have the direct testimony of Malmsbury, and we think the excavations, which even while we are writing are going on upon its site, will throw some important light on the palace-architecture of this period.

The Conquest, probably, wrought but little change in the habits of the people, and as little in their dwellings. The castle, however, with its lofty towers and stern keep, belongs to the Norman period; for the opinion that Coninsburgh and Bamborough are examples of Saxon fortification is no longer held, and the utmost extent of Saxon skill in military defences is now believed to be the simple enclosure of an advantageous site by a wall, and where necessary, possibly by earthworks also; indeed, as Mr. Turner remarks—'Throughout the annals of the Saxon period, we find no instance recorded of the successful, or even protracted defence of a fortified place. The genius of that people seems to have been rather adapted to field warfare. When defeated, they took refuge in natural fastnesses; the woods and marshes of Somersetshire protected Alfred from the pursuit of the Danes, and the last stand of the Saxons against their Norman invaders was amid the fens of Ely and Cambridgeshire.' The first edifices erected in England by the Normans were therefore, doubtless, the castles, some of which still, though in ruin, frown in stern majesty upon us.

There seems little doubt but the dwelling of the Norman baron partook in some degree of the same character, although in one of the earliest remaining specimens, the building, judging from its noble hall, and conveniently-placed offices, appears better adapted 'for a feast than for a fray.' This is Oakham Castle (built circa 1180), and the hall, which is still remaining in almost its original state, is truly one of the most valuable specimens we possess. As no other apartments remain, the specimen, however, is of but little avail, save to show the size and noble style of decoration of an Anglo-Norman hall; but from the house at Southampton adjoining the town wall, and which appears to belong to a yet earlier period, we can gain a tolerable notion of the dwelling-house. In this we have a quadrangle of about fifty feet, with the principal rooms on the first floor, with circular-headed windows, and a chimney. This latter, to

us indispensably necessary, does not appear to have been thought of by our Saxon forefathers; but that from the period of the Conquest, chimneys were in common use, seems proved from the fact that in every remain of domestic architecture of the twelfth century—the house at Christ's Church, the hall of St. Mary's Guild, and the Jews' house at Lincoln, Moyses Hall at Bury St. Edmund's, Boothby-Paguel, in Lincolnshire, and Barnack, in Northamptonshire, not to mention others—they are always found. The best preserved specimen of this early date, is certainly 'the Jews' house at Lincoln,' and from this we are inclined to believe that considerable decoration was bestowed on the exterior of the dwelling-house. In this valuable remain the door-way is richly carved, and the mouldings round the windows are very elaborate. There is a look of true English comfort, too, about this old house, with the chimney carried up over the door-way, and the window close beside, from whence doubtless the Jew's fair daughter,—some Rebecca, we would fain imagine, rather than the cruel maiden of the apocryphal ballad,—gazed upon the passers by, who then thronged the streets of 'Merrie Lincoln.'

In all Mr. Turner's specimens, the roofs are of a much later date, and comparatively low; but from passing remarks of contemporary writers, as well as the few illuminations of this period, we have no doubt that the roof was very high-pitched, and doubtless contained, like many of the ancient houses in Normandy, two additional stories in the gable. This is the style of the houses in one of the most valuable pictorial illustrations of this period still remaining—the Bible with its Commentary in the Harleian Collection, No. 1527. Here, while the side walls—of the ordinary houses we mean,—such as the house of Mary, and that of Philip the Evangelist,—are rather low, the shingled roof springs to a height fully equal to that of the walls. In this curious record we find the door always very lofty, and the door-posts ornamented very similarly to those in the Bayeux Tapestry. There is also a wooden ornament at the apex of the gable. We may also remark that, like the specimens in the work before us, the lower windows are mostly square-headed, while the upper are circular-headed, and sometimes rather lofty. An excellent representation of the *fire-place* occurs in the picture of Martha and Mary. There is the fire upon the hearthstone, just within-side the circular-arched fireplace, from whence depends the *crook* with the huge porridge-pot attached to it. Martha is tending the stew with her hand uplifted in rather an objurgatory manner, while Mary sits quietly by.

Much unquestionable information as to dwelling-houses in the twelfth century will be obtained from that valuable record,

'The London Assize of 1189,' from whence Mr. Turner has taken large extracts, and the whole of which, in the original Latin, he has printed in his Appendix. This Assize was held in consequence of the frequent fires in the city, which took place owing to so many houses being built of wood, and roofed with straw or reeds. Still, that many houses even during the reign of Stephen were 'built of stone, and covered with thick tiles,' we have the testimony of the document itself. To encourage the more general adoption of stone for dwelling-houses, the following privileges were conceded:—

'When two neighbours shall have agreed to build between themselves a wall of stone, each shall give a foot and a half of his land, and so they shall construct at their joint cost a stone wall three feet thick, and sixteen feet in height, and if they agree, they shall make a gutter between them at their common expense to carry off the water from their houses. But if they should not agree, either of them may make a gutter to carry off the water dripping from his house on to his own land, except he can convey it into the high street.

'They may also, if they agree, raise the said wall as high as they please at their joint expense, and if it should happen that one should wish to raise the wall, and the other not, it shall be lawful for him who is willing to raise his own part as much as he please, and build upon it at his own cost; and he shall receive the falling water as is aforesaid.'

Now, in this passage we have sixteen feet of stone-work expressly directed to be made *three feet thick*. Surely so substantial a wall could not be intended merely to support the tiled, or shingled roof, but rather additional stories. And that additional stories were raised on this three-feet wall, we have proof, we think, in the subsequent concession, that he who might wish to raise the wall, may do so 'as much as he please, and build upon it.' Other characteristic clauses follow. This is curious—

'And if any one shall have windows looking toward the land of a neighbour, and although he, and his predecessors have been long possessed of the view of the aforesaid windows, nevertheless his neighbour may lawfully obstruct the view of these windows, by building opposite to them on his own ground, as he shall consider most expedient; except he who hath the windows can show *any writing* whereby his neighbour may not obstruct the view of these windows. Also, if any one should make a pavement in the high street, unjustly, to the nuisance of the city, and of his neighbour, that neighbour may lawfully hinder it by the bailiffs of the city.'

Although we willingly admit that the majority of London houses at this period were, with the exception of the sixteen

feet high party-wall, built of wood, still, that some more imposing structures graced the old streets, must, we think, be conceded. The fine stone vaulting under Gerard's hall, to which a later date than this century can scarcely be assigned, and other similar remains, prove that 'the barons of the city' occupied fitting dwellings. Besides, if Lincoln at the same period could boast, as we have seen, such really handsome houses, surely London, with her superior station, and superior advantages of water-carriage, and workmen, could scarcely be inferior. In some supplementary decrees that were enacted in 1212, we find that 'all wooden houses which are nearest to the stone houses in Cheap, whereby the stone houses may be in peril, shall be securely amended by view of the mayor and sheriffs, and good men of the city, or, without any exception to whomsoever they may belong, pulled down.' Now this would seem to prove that the houses in Cheap were of a very superior order—highly ornamented, we should think,—for although fire might damage, it could not destroy them. It seems, therefore, as though damage to the exterior was that which in this decree was so stringently guarded against. But in regard even to the 'wooden houses,' we have no need to suppose they were either rude, or low built. Timber houses of great beauty are still existing in the Flemish towns, and that much later, and in an age of highly decorated art, it was not deemed necessary to build even the royal residence of stone, we have proof in the palace of Nonsuch.

The upper, or first story, 'the solar,' was evidently intended for the best room, it was therefore most unlikely that a ruder style of workmanship should be employed for the 'solar,' than would be adopted for the domestic offices, or even for the cellar. And thus, in the curious illuminations already referred to, we often find the 'solar' window, or windows, of very handsome dimensions. That in country houses this principal room formed the top, and had the open timber roof, like many of the specimens before us, we can readily believe; but in towns it seems far more probable that there was a range of chambers above. Indeed, if we take the height of the roof at only the same as that of the stone party wall, we obtain a height of thirty-two feet; we are, therefore, inclined to believe, notwithstanding the incidental notice of Matthew Paris, that the London houses, although inferior in height to those of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, were yet two, or even three stories high.

The question whether houses were painted, or simply white-washed, has been frequently discussed of late; and from occasional allusions in old writers, and the constant example of houses



in illuminations, we are inclined to think that both wooden and plaster houses were certainly painted, and in very gay colours too. When we first turned our attention to illuminated manuscripts, in the course of an inquiry into the household usages of our forefathers, we were inclined to believe that the brilliant vermillion, and blue—sometimes green—bestowed on the walls and roofs of very homely looking houses, simply arose from the illuminator's love of fine colours. A closer inspection, however, led us to believe that the painter had merely copied what was before his eyes. We are aware that the custom of decorating dwelling houses with gay colours has been argued from the examples in the Bayeux tapestry, but that curious specimen of needlework cannot be depended on, since not only do the good steeds participate in the general gay colouring—one, being worked in bright blue, and another prancing on three green legs, while the fourth is red, with a yellow hoof—but king Edward, on his death-bed, is represented not only with blue and yellow drapery, but with a beard of the self-same colours. Now, in the illuminations, however rude, such extravagancies seldom occur, while in all, the houses are painted in bright colours; we therefore think this was undoubtedly the actual case. It is probable that some kinds of pattern were used, but more frequently we find the walls simply 'picked out' with a darker tint, giving them the appearance of long narrow bricks. The roof and walls are always of different colours, and these are chiefly red and blue.

During the earlier half of the thirteenth century, the turbulent reign of John, and the unsettled state of the kingdom during the minority of Henry III., prevented much attention being paid to domestic architecture. Ecclesiastical buildings, however, underwent many alterations and improvements; and, not to mention others, Salisbury Cathedral, and Westminster Abbey as it now stands, were built. London, too, must have been improving, for the new bridge, with its beautiful chapel, doubtless had suitable buildings surrounding it; and the superiors of many of the wealthier convents, too, purchased or built houses for their occasional residence here. Matthew Paris mentions one of these, built for the Abbot of St. Albans, which seems to have been of large size, and well supplied with domestic offices. It was during the latter half of this century, however, that we meet with the most numerous notices of improvements in domestic architecture.

The general taste for the arts which Henry III. certainly displayed, communicated itself to his courtiers, and we find many instances of manor-houses being built, in which the arrangements of the palace, especially the lofty hall, were imitated. While awarding due praise to Mr. Turner's careful research, and often

successful elucidation of passages in the contemporary rolls, we cannot but think he is mistaken in his opinion of the scanty private accommodation which even our kings and queens enjoyed at this period. Now in the curious and minute account which he has given of the house erected for Edward I. at Woolmer, in 1285, we have the description of what is certainly called 'a chamber,' but which is seventy-two feet long by twenty-eight wide. Now the very dimensions of this huge room seem to prove that it was to be divided; and the subsequent entries corroborate our opinion; for there are two chimneys, six windows, 'a small chapel,' and 'two wardrobes of masonry.' Was it not, therefore, likely that this long space was divided into two sitting rooms, each with its fire-place, and communicating, as we see was often the case in manor-houses of this period, with the chapel?—while the wardrobes, evidently partitioned off by stone, probably for preservation of their valuable contents, formed two smaller rooms? That the wardrobe was a separate apartment we find abundant evidence in later records, where business is mentioned as being transacted in 'the wardrobe.' Now, when we call to mind that carpenters—indeed, almost every kind of workmen—were attached to the king's suite, we can easily understand why no orders were given for dividing this large apartment, since it could be easily done by slight wooden partitions, on the arrival of the king and queen.

Hitherto we have contemplated the outsides only of the ancient house, but the preceding remarks lead us into the interior. That considerable ornament was bestowed upon the better class of houses, especially those of the nobility, even during the earlier part of the twelfth century, is proved by the incidental remark of William of Malmsbury where, alluding to Godfrey of Boulogne, he terms him 'that brilliant mirror of Christian nobility, in whom, as in a *splendid ceiling*, the lustre of every virtue was reflected.' The character of this decoration cannot, however, be ascertained, though, probably, as the dwelling to some extent followed the style of the church, the adornments did also; and we think this very likely, since in some illuminations we have observed the pillars parti-coloured, just as late researches have discovered in the Norman remains of our cathedrals. Necham, writing at the commencement of the thirteenth century, alludes to carving and painting on the walls, and also to hangings. These, indeed, seem to have been generally adopted even in Saxon times; but 'arras hangings' were unknown until the fourteenth century, and the hangings, too, were only used as drapery—for wainscoting seems to have been very extensively used for the walls during the thirteenth, and probably even the preceding century. This

wainscoting was always painted, and from the curious precepts relative to repairs of the various palaces during Henry's reign, a green ground, with gold stars—that still favourite oriental style of decoration—seems to have been the most usual pattern. Sometimes, however, a plain ground was finished with borders of a different colour, and on these sometimes were painted 'male and female heads.' These, we should think, were in medallions, and on a bright gold ground. In one instance 'circles' are expressly mentioned, in which are to be painted 'histories from the Old and New Testament.' In another precept, the queen's chamber is to be painted with 'a history,' while in her chamber at Westminster, the chimney (probably the space above the fire-place,) is to 'be painted with a figure of Winter, which, by its sad 'countenance, as by other miserable distortions of the body, may 'be deservedly likened to winter itself.' We should think this precept must have been dictated by the queen, who, a native of sunny Provence, dreaded the rigours of an English winter as greatly as she did the stern virtues of the Englishman. The space above the chimney seems mostly to have been thus decorated; in one case 'the months of the year' are to be painted there,—in another, 'the wheel of fortune.' From one precept we find that the ceiling, also, was to be highly ornamented, for it directs 'the roof of our demesne chamber,' (at Winchester,) 'to be painted with the Old and New Testament, and with gilt bosses.' At the same palace, an earlier precept directs, that 'four images shall be placed in the hall,' and also that '*a map of the world* should be painted there.' Would that this curious relic were still existing! At Ludgershall, part of the hall was to be painted in imitation of marble, and the history of Dives and Lazarus in the gable above; while at Clarendon, the four Evangelists, and the story of St. Margaret, were to adorn the king's upper chamber, and they were to be painted 'with good and exquisite colours.' Of such there was no lack at this time, and we have no doubt that they were used with oil—for the number and variety of recipes for preparing oil colours would astonish the reader. Judging from the few remains of mural and monumental paintings of this period, we advisedly say, that not only would the colours, but the execution do no discredit to the painter of the present day—our highest artists alone excepted.

Such expensive decorations could not be adopted save in houses belonging to the wealthiest classes; but that among the chief nobles, and the chief citizens, whose prosperity excited the bitterest anger of the king, painted walls and ornamented ceilings might be found, there is little doubt, more especially as there were certainly, at this period, a large number of English painters

fully qualified for such work. As Mr. Turner truly remarks, 'but two foreign artists are to be found in the records of Henry III.'s reign. John, of St. Omer, and Master William, the 'Florentine,' while—

'To those instances may be opposed a number of names undoubtedly English. The architects of Westminster Abbey were Otho, the goldsmith, and Edward, his son, who went by the names of Fitz Otho, and Edward of Westminster. Walpole supposed, from his name, that Otho was an Italian. It is believed, however, that he was an Englishman by birth, if not by descent. He was a goldsmith, and in those days, and in the particular craft, the son generally succeeded the father. \* \* To proceed with the list. John, of Gloucester, a mason and statuary; William, the monk of Westminster, who painted 'the gestes of Antioch' for Henry III.; Master Walter, the king's painter; William, of Gloucester, the goldsmith, who cast the brass figure for Catherine, the infant daughter of Henry III.; and Walter, of Colchester, whom Matthew Paris, himself a tolerable draftsman, terms 'pictor et sculptor incomparabilis,' were all Englishmen, and were generally employed by Henry; doubtless, many more names might be found on stricter search.'—(p. 90.)

There is no doubt of this, especially when we remember that in the sister art of illuminating, the English artists were first-rate. Indeed, it is astonishing to compare even the Italian missals of this period, with the English and French, so great is the superiority of the two latter.

Although woven tapestry hangings were not used until the following century, still hangings, either plain or worked with the needle, were in general use, although, as we have remarked, not to cover the walls—except, perhaps, that portion which extended along the upper end of the hall, and then it was termed a 'banquer'—but as curtains, which we sometimes find covering the doors, or used for a traverse, to separate a portion of the room. We have no precepts respecting these in the valuable collection appended to the work before us, but that they were of very expensive materials, and embroidered, we have little doubt. Hangings of this kind were numerous in the religious houses at this period, and early in the preceding century Abbot Richard had given to his abbey of St. Alban's, a set containing 'the whole history of St. Alban.' The succeeding abbot gave also two sets, the one containing 'the man who fell among thieves,' and the other, 'the Prodigal Son.' It is not unlikely that the royal hangings were worked with devices or armorial bearings, since these were seldom inserted in the stained-glass windows until a later period. The curious catalogue of furniture, plate, and jewellery, belonging to Isabel of France, although of a later date, may afford some

illustrations of royal state, especially as the furniture of the palace was most likely considered as an heir-loom. Here we find hangings of the richest materials, with armorial bearings, while that for her private chamber is of 'tawney silk, furred with minever.' There are many silk curtains embroidered in gold and silver, and carpets wrought in gold and silver stars, and with silken 'popinjays.' Fully equal splendour, doubtless, characterized the apartments of Elinor of Provence.

But it is a more interesting inquiry to endeavour to ascertain how our forefathers of the middle classes were lodged. Now, from the sources to which we have before referred, we think we shall find that in towns, the lowest story, or ground-floor,—perhaps a little sunk below the level of the street,—was occupied by the store-rooms and domestic offices. Above, was the best room, perhaps more than one, but the whole floor bore the name of 'the solar;' and we are inclined to think that above, in the narrowest part of the gable, sleeping-chambers were placed. In the country, for the grange or farm, there is little doubt that a second story was never, and even a first story but seldom, built, for ground was no object; but in towns, especially flourishing towns, it seems difficult to imagine why, during the thirteenth century, a second and third story should not be required as much as in the succeeding centuries, when 'hygh tymbered houses' are alluded\* to as the most characteristic mark of the thriving town. Such was, we think, the general style of the London houses; but the stone houses in Cheap, and those 'fair stone houses' too, built by the merchants of the Vintry in this reign, probably resembled the conventual buildings,—that is, they formed three sides of a quadrangle,—like some of the houses in Mr. Turner's illustrations, and, doubtless, had their spacious and lofty hall and domestic offices on a proportionate scale. We are the more inclined to believe this, since we find that many houses built by the London traders became, in the following century, the residence of nobles; indeed, from some of the valuations of these houses, we are assured they must have been large buildings. Thus, the mansion of John Lovekyn, (lord mayor in 1348,) in Upper Thames street, just above the bridge, was valued at ten marks, eleven shillings, and fourpence per annum, a sum equal to above £100 per annum, present currency.

That chimneys were in use in almost all houses, excepting the very meanest, there is no doubt, and the absence of all reference to them in the curious 'Assize of 1189', has been ingeniously conjectured by Mr. Turner to have arisen from the probability that they were placed in the front or back wall, as is seen in the Jew's

\* *Vide* Piers Ploughman.

house at Lincoln, and in several other remains. The form of the chimney-place continued much the same, and the fire, as for centuries after, was made on the hearthstone. Our cleanly housewives, who seem to have been as fond of the whitewasher's brush as the natives of Raratonga, clamoured greatly at the beginning of the following century, when coal first came into use, and only by slow degrees did the '*charbon de mer*' supersede the less smoky wood fire.

The question when glass was first used for private houses, has been much canvassed, and by some writers, the scarcity of window-glass has been inferred from the fact of the acknowledged scarcity of glass vessels of any kind. Now it should have been borne in mind that these two branches of the glass-trade were quite distinct. Constantinople, and at a later period, Venice, supplied the latter, while the former was obtained from Flanders, and also from Normandy. Both these countries were in such close connexion with England, that it is difficult to imagine that in towns on the eastern and southern coast, houses would be deficient in glass windows, when the same vessels which brought the cloth of Flanders, and the wines of France, could as easily supply that luxury. The price, too, even at this period, was not, as Mr. Turner remarks, very high, for it was threepence halfpenny a square foot, including the cost of glazing, a sum equal to about four shillings and fourpence modern currency. Now, when we find even common men at this period, indeed, half a century earlier, valuing their mantles at between three and four pounds modern currency, and burgesses wearing rings of one mark, value ten pounds,\* and their wives arraying themselves in silk and 'syndon' at forty and fifty shillings a yard, can we believe that the luxury of glazed windows, for the 'solar chamber' at least, would be grudged by the thriving traders of Boston and Lincoln, or the haughty citizens of London? Why, even the price of that costly luxury, a Thames salmon, or a couple of pounds of almonds, always purchased against Lent, would more than half fill one of the long narrow windows with glass.

In the king's palaces, and probably in the houses of the nobility, stained, or rather *painted*, glass was used; but it does not appear to have been so extensively employed, even there, as in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when the walls became more than half window, and the 'sunny oriel' where the King of Hungary's fair daughter sat, was—

'Closed well with ryal glasse,  
And fulfilled with ymagerie  
Every wyndow bye and bye;'

\* Vide Rolls of the King's Court.

for the narrowness of the windows in the early gothic, would not admit of being darkened even by the amethyst, ruby, and topaz tints of that richest style of decoration.

While we rather differ from Mr. Turner in respect to the early use of glass in towns, we quite agree with him that, in the country manor-houses, it was not improbably unknown until the following century. We have no doubt that the difficulty of land-carriage of so brittle a material, as well as the scarcity of glaziers, was the cause of that singular 'writ of Richard the Second, empowering one Nicholas Hoppewell to take as much glass as he could find in the counties of Norfolk, Northampton, Leicester, and Lincoln, for the repair of the windows of the chapel at 'Stamford,' and also to impress glaziers. The date of this document is 1386, a period when, as we learn from Chaucer, glass was in such general use, that his poetic mind conceived the beautiful idea of that crystal palace, which only this year our eyes have beheld. Among the occasional traits of luxury which might scarcely be expected in the thirteenth century, one may be here mentioned—it is the use of *double* glass windows. These the king directs to be made 'at each gable of the king's high chamber, so that when the inner windows are closed, these glass windows may be seen on the outside.'

For flooring of rooms, tiles do not seem to have been employed until the middle of the thirteenth century, and then they were not the decorated kind used so largely during the previous century in ecclesiastical buildings, but plain. The lowest story of houses, and indeed the halls, except 'the dais,' were, however, unfloored, 'the natural soil being well rammed down, over which litter was strewn.' The upper rooms, of course, were boarded. Except in royal apartments, or perhaps the small room or 'bower,' of some dainty ladye, carpets were unknown; but even when thus used they appear to have been small, though of richest materials. Rows of green rushes—not simply 'strewed,' as most writers imagine, but slightly woven together at the head, so as to form a deep fringe, and laid in rows across the floor, formed the beautiful ground covering, even down to the seventeenth century—alike of the solar chamber of the burgess, and the palace hall of the king. We have said the 'beautiful' ground covering, for we shall not easily forget the harmonious and picturesque effect of this simple carpet, when we saw it laid down some years ago on the floor of one of our most interesting relics of old London. Their elastic softness, and brilliant colour, render 'green rushes' as elegant a covering for a large room as can well be desired; and when looking lately round on that gorgeous combination of carving and gilding, and those brightest

and richest colourings so profusely spread over the walls and the windows of the present House of Lords, we could not but think how greatly the effect would have been heightened, if, instead of that heavy purple carpet, the soft green of the rush-strewn floor, as in the day of our Plantagenets, had offered repose to the eye. On festal occasions, the green carpet was decorated with flowers, and when 'merrie June' arrived, the old romancer tells us—

‘Maydens gin strewe theyre boweres  
Wythe red rose and the lyly flowere;’

for flowers were a passion among our early forefathers.

The list of household furniture during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries might be soon made, for it was scanty indeed. That large class called ‘cabinet goods’ were wholly unknown, and the carpenter supplied the tables—then merely long boards placed on tressels, and the benches and joint-stools. The windows at this period were always made with seats in them; and it is curious to observe how this partiality for window-seats continued through the era of stone houses, of lath and plaster-houses, of the clumsy red brick houses, even to the days of our grandfathers, who, though well provided with huge settees and mahogany chairs, and cross-stitch-worked stools, still considered the window-seat indispensable to the parlour and dining-room. But our earlier forefathers, if unsupplied with mahogany and rosewood furniture, did not sit on bare benches, nor eat their meals, ‘back-wood fashion,’ on an unplanned board. The benches were always covered, mostly cushioned, and the table, even in ‘uplande’ villages, displayed its ample folds of snowy napery. Indeed, the indispensability of a tablecloth seems to have been universally recognised among our forefathers. In the curious and suggestive ‘Rolls of the King’s Court,’ we find napery in the possession of quite the inferior classes; in the Subsidy-Roll too of the twenty-ninth of Edward I., for the city of Colchester, we find tablecloths of the tradesmen there valued at from ten to fifteen shillings each, present money; while in inventories and wills of a rather later period we meet with household linen, evidently of a superior kind, in great abundance. Now, arguing from analogy, can we believe that our forefathers were so deficient in domestic comfort, or so negligent of personal cleanliness, as some writers seem to imagine, when tablecloths, and even napkins, were in ordinary use? Thus, too, however rude might be the general style of furniture, the bed was as comfortable, and as well supplied with appendages—counterpanes and ‘linen sheets’ being found, even among the poorest householders—as the modern Arabian, or four-post. Few notions have been



more ridiculous than the common one, that a *feather* bed was a luxury almost unknown to our forefathers—a notion which not only the most cursory glance at the homeliest Saxon illumination would disprove, but the mere exercise of common sense. While abundant flocks of wild geese haunted every fen, and stores of tame geese fed on every common,—when the goose was the appropriated dish for both Michaelmas and Martinmas days, and the feather of the grey goose winged the shaft of the bowman—is it possible that our forefathers contented themselves with straw beds and a log for their pillow? That feather beds are not distinctly mentioned in records, we think may be accounted for by their not being purchaseable articles. They were doubtless of home manufacture, like the common cloth, both woollen and linen, of this period; and we are greatly inclined to believe that all such articles were exempted from taxation—we have, therefore, no notice of them in the Rolls, any more than of the benches and tables, or the cups and trenchers.

It would be a curious task to enumerate the variety of articles for which even the poorest send to a shop in the present day, but which, during the middle ages, were made at home. Candles, both wax and tallow, were of home manufacture to a very late period—the superior kind of wax, termed ‘Paris candles,’ being the only kind purchaseable—and so were baskets and boxes. Soap, and the ley used instead, were also made at home; and therefore, although the charge in household accounts, either for soap or washing, may appear very small, we need not conclude that the dainty ladies of the thirteenth century emulated the Saxon saints of the sixth, in their horror of clean linen. Wood ashes boiled were, however, more generally used than soap; and even down to the seventeenth century, we find that in London, linen was sent to the river-side to be washed. This custom doubtless arose from the difficulty of procuring soft water in sufficient quantities, although, even in 1236, water was brought from Tyburn in leaden pipes, six inches in diameter, to the conduit in Westcheap. We may here remark, that in London, much attention seems to have been paid to domestic comfort and decency. ‘Indeed,’ as Mr. Turner remarks, ‘if a complete collection were made of all the sanitary regulations and provisions issued in the times of Henry and Edward the First, it would be found that we have not made any great advance on the notions then prevalent respecting public nuisances.’

To return to the furniture of our forefathers. We have seen that they were well provided with feather beds—indeed, in the illuminations, the occupier seems half-buried in down, while the head is comfortably supported by bolsters and pillows. These

latter are shaped like a cushion, with tassels at the corners, and very frequently appear ornamented with needlework. Nearly every representation of a bed which we have seen, is surmounted by a kind of half-tester, from whence remarkably long and full curtains depend. These, among the wealthier classes, were often silk, sometimes richly embroidered. There was much embroidery produced during this, as well as the preceding century, and the English embroideresses still fully maintained the foremost rank; but although the costliest work executed was for ecclesiastical purposes, much was certainly demanded for dresses and hangings. Our remarks are founded chiefly on the testimony of illuminations, which would scarcely have represented so many articles as adorned with various patterns, unless embroidery was in general use. The trade of an embroideress seems to have been a lucrative one; and from the testimony of legend writers, who supply us with many a minute trait which might otherwise be lost, we find them dwelling in the principal towns, and employing young girls—probably apprentices. The Rolls supply us with the names of some who were honoured to work for royalty. There was Mabel of Bury, employed by Henry the Third; Catherine Lincoln, probably employed by his son—a splendid ecclesiastical vestment of whose work, ‘adorned with large pearls,’ sold, after her death, for a sum far exceeding a thousand pounds; and there was also Rose de Bureford of London. Much ‘fine needlework’ was executed in the convent, and much also by high-born ladies, for ‘to sewe sylke-worke in bowre’ was deemed fitting recreation for kings’ daughters. In the close rolls of Henry III., we find many entries of ‘sewing silk’ purchased for that hapless prisoner, ‘the damsel of Brittany,’ and also for the daughters of the king of Scotland. In the interesting ‘Household Expenses of the Countess of Leicester,’ we find ‘sewing silk’ bought, and the price is 2s. per ounce, a sum equal to 30s. present money; there are also ‘three ounces of coloured thread.’ Few remains of ancient needlework of so early a period exist, but these are beautifully executed, and the patterns very elegant. Ere leaving this subject, we may remark that, except for ‘fine needlework,’ the needle was not viewed as a female implement, for all garments, whether linen or woollen, were made by men, while the distaff and the shuttle occupied the time of the women which was not devoted to household labour. Male weavers certainly existed from a very early period, but there was a large class of female weavers also, down to the fifteenth century.

But however scanty might be the furniture, the plate, even at this early period, was certainly more plentiful than might be

believed. The same feeling which led the burgess, even of the small country town, to wear his gold ring, and his silver brooch, (vide subsidy rolls of 29th Edward I.,) placed the silver cup, or the mazer adorned with silver, on his 'cupborde,' and the silver spoons; while the inhabitant of the wealthier towns boasted his saucers, and porringers, cups and covers, and even large dishes, of the same precious metal. We have not, hitherto, discovered any inventory of a merchant's goods of quite so early a period; but when, in the curious inquiry relating to the robbery of Edward the First's exchequer, we find that not only jewelled clasps and brooches, but silver dishes fifteen pounds weight, could be offered for sale without suspicion, both at London and Northampton, we at once perceive that the citizens, whom Henry tauntingly charged as possessing 'the wealth of Octavian,' must have been accustomed, like Dogberry, 'to have everything handsome about them.' The inventories of two merchants, one of Bristol, and the other of London, early in the following century, exhibit an astonishing display of wealth in this form. Robert de Gyen's plate consists of cups, bowls, dishes of various sizes, spoons, pitchers, and a splendid salt and cover; while the London merchant's comprises a complete service, excepting plates, where 'six great chargers,' six cups and covers, beakers, basons, a huge 'spice plate,' and three dozen porringers, form but a part. The enormous quantity of plate in the houses of the nobility seems almost incredible. In the will of Elizabeth de Burgh, who died at a very advanced age in the fourteenth century, cups and silver bells, but especially porringers, are left by the half dozen to so many legatees, that they amount to some scores; while the list of plate provided for the wedding-outfit of Edward the First's daughters, is absolutely wearying.

In the midst of this luxury, the wooden trencher, save on the royal table, seems to have kept its place, and in more than one instance we have met with sarcastic allusions to 'eating off silver.' In one of the curious political songs of the thirteenth century, it is very naïvely remarked, in allusion to the ill-paid tallies, that it would better become the monarch 'to eat off wood and pay in silver, than to eat off silver and pay in wood.' Silver plates were, however, abundant at court; for the inventory of Isabel of France, which doubtless comprises much plate which had belonged to her predecessors, returns one hundred and fifteen plates; they must, however, have been rather small, for their average weight is only about sixteen ounces. Plate, at this period, was frequently gilt and enamelled, especially cups and beakers, and the beauty of some of those which were shown at the 'Exhibition of Mediæval Art' last year, the reader will

doubtless remember. There was certainly much artistic skill displayed during the thirteenth century, and the very commonest vessels seem to have partaken of the general taste. Very graceful forms were sought for the more ornamental plate; and the salt, the cup and cover, and the spice-plate, were moulded and chased with an elegance unknown to later days. Gems of high value often adorned these; and Matthew Paris mentions, among the presents to Elinor of Provence from her sister, 'a peacock of gold and silver, with the train adorned with sapphires and pearls,' and which was intended for a ewer. Cups of agate and jasper were highly valued too, but it is probable that the *glass* cup was most highly prized. Henry the Third had but one; and it is from this circumstance that Mr. Turner seems to argue the scarcity of window-glass. But not only were the manufactories of the latter so much nearer, but the facilities for packing it were far greater than for glass vessels, difficult of carriage at all times, but especially so when we remember the peculiar brittleness of Venice glass, which, owing to the large admixture of lead, gained an additional brilliancy, but at the expense of a far greater degree of frangibility.

To descend to the kitchen seems a descent indeed, from the enamelled and jewelled plate of the royal table, but here we shall gain some pleasant insight into the every-day life of our forefathers. In most instances we think the kitchen was built outside the house, as was mostly the case in London, down to the time of Elizabeth, and in very few instances, we should think, there was a chimney. The huge wood fire was made on the large hearthstone, and before it revolved the spit, turned by the kitchen-boy, and over it depended the crock with its hooks, from whence hung the pot, in respectable families always of brass, and often of immense size, where the porridge for the daily breakfast, and often for dinner also, was prepared. It would be pleasant to be able to refer to some Dr. Kitchener to learn what this porridge was. It was certainly not of oatmeal in London and the southern counties, nor was it of wheat, since that was termed 'furmety,'—indeed, wheat was too expensive, but it rather seems to have been a meat-broth, and probably thickened with peas.\* A very old recipe for 'plum-porridge,' so dear to our forefathers on festival-days—represents it as a strong beef gravy-soup, to which raisins and spices were added. We may here remark that spices, even of the farthest East, were all well known at this period, and obtainable in the chief cities;

\* The many allusions in old proverbs to 'peas-porridge,' and the extensive use of salt pork, especially during the winter months, makes it very probable that the contents of the porridge-pot was mostly peas-soup.

indeed, sugar itself, brought from Alexandria, was sold in the streets of London, as we learn from the curious entries in 'Travelling Expenses in the Thirteenth Century,'\* where purchases of it frequently occur, and also of some preparation which is called 'ginger counfeyt.' Our forefathers, as we learn from Stow's carefully-preserved lists, were well supplied both with fish and fowl, and although the taste which could banquet on 'porpoise' seems coarse, still the more delicate kinds of fish—whittings, mullet, and smelts, were in high estimation. The prices were high,—for 'a salmon at Christmas,' Stow tells us, cost five shillings, which, judging it at the ordinary size, would be equal (present currency) to about three shillings the pound. Such estimates may at first sight appear trifling, but from the prices of food, the relative prosperity of a city or nation may be accurately inferred, and the great prosperity of the English cities during this century is emphatically proved, by the variety and high price of provisions. We may here notice an incidental proof of this prosperity, in the many sayings which indicate the eating of 'brown bread' as a sign of abject poverty, and we may also remark, that except in country places bread was never made at home, even from Saxon times. Our forefathers seem to have been very dainty in their bread, which was made in various ornamental forms. From a very interesting portion of Mr. Turner's book, in which he corrects the generally-received opinion as to the scarcity of fruits and vegetables, we find that most vegetables now in use, except the cucumber, and, of course, the potato, were well known to our forefathers, and doubtless took their place in the porridge-pot. Fruit was extensively cultivated, and not alone by the conventual orders; for there is an instance of a nobleman's garden (the Earl of Lincoln's, in Holborn,) producing, in 1296, so large a supply of fruit, that in addition to the quantity required by an extensive household, the surplus, consisting of apples, pears, walnuts, and cherries, was sold for a sum equal to 135*l.* present currency.† The following extracts throw much light on the state of English horticulture at this period.

'Quinces and medlars are frequently mentioned in the royal household accounts of the thirteenth century—indeed so often, that there is no reason to doubt that they were extensively cultivated in England. Quinces are named in the fruiterers' accounts of the year 1292, and were sold at the rate of four shillings a hundred. Peaches were

\* *Vide* 'Retrospective Review,' 2nd Series, Parts 2 and 3.

† The only flowers mentioned in this garden are roses, and of these a quantity was sold for a sum equal to almost 2*l.* 10*s.* It would be curious to ascertain *when* these roses were sold,—whether at Whitsuntide, when 'chaplets of roses' were worn, or whether they were used for rose-water, then in great request, both as a scent, and to flavour sweet dishes.

enumerated as garden stock by Necham in the twelfth century, and slips of peach trees were planted in the royal garden at Westminster, in the fourth year of Edward I., 1276. We have not found any notices of the nectarine or apricot earlier than the fifteenth century. The almond is mentioned by Necham, but we may reasonably assume that it was cultivated chiefly as an ornamental tree, and that the large quantities of this nut eaten during Lent in ancient times, were imported from the south of Europe. Plums are seldom named in early accounts. The cherry was well known at the time of the Conquest, and at every subsequent time. In the twenty-third year of Henry III. there is an order to buy cherry-trees for the royal garden at Westminster, and in 1277, Giles de Audenard purchased 'plants of vines, cherry-trees, willows, roses, and certain other things for the same place.' . . . The mulberry, or More tree as it was called, appears to have been grown in England from a very remote period; it is included in Necham's list of desirable fruits. The earliest notice of the gooseberry which I have found is of the fourth year of Edward I., when plants of this genus were purchased for the king's garden at Westminster. Strawberries and raspberries rarely occur in early accounts, owing probably to the fact that they were not cultivated in gardens, and known only as wild fruits. Some kind of drink, however, was made both from the raspberry and mulberry. . . . Of nuts, the sorts common in this country, from an early period, appear to have been the chestnut and hazel nut. The 'large nuts' mentioned as growing in the garden of the Earl of Lincoln, in Holborn, were probably walnuts, for although the exact period of the introduction of that variety is not known, it was generally cultivated as early as the middle of the fifteenth century, and the wood of the tree known by the name of 'masere,' whence probably the name given to those wooden bowls, so much prized in mediæval times, and called 'mazers.'—(pp. 143-4.)

The supply of apples seems to have been large, but no mention is made of many varieties; the pearmain was known in the twelfth century, and a commoner apple seems to have borne the name of costard—a very frequent name in later times, and whence is derived the term 'costermonger.' Of pears there were many varieties. There were the 'rewl,' or 'St. Regle,' the 'pesse Pucelle,' the 'Caillou,' the 'Martin,' the 'gold-knapes,' and others; but far beyond all these was the fame of the 'Wardon pear,' the fine baking pear of our forefathers, and whose name in connexion with the pie is universally known. No huge pasty of venison, or wild fowl, was the 'Wardon pie,' as so many an antiquary has believed; but it was a pie made of the fine pears cultivated by the Cistercian monks, (those great horticulturists of the middle ages,) of Wardon, in Bedfordshire, who were so proud of this produce of their garden, that 'three Wardon pears or, two and one,' became the arms of the abbey. And for many

centuries did the 'Wardon pear' keep its station, equal, if not superior, to the favourite quince, while the old cookery books, down to the close of the seventeenth century, give their elaborate recipes how they are to be prepared with 'store of sugar, ginger, cinnamon, cloves, and a quart of red wine,' and placed in the huge pewter dish, and enclosed with a crust which took 'one peck of flour and six pounds of butter.' Honey in those early times supplied the place of sugar, and it seems to have been obtained in very large quantities. Our forefathers certainly possessed 'a sweet tooth,'—and all the more delicate drinks of the middle ages were very sweet.

The mention of pewter reminds us, that although the chief utensils in our forefathers' kitchens were brass, pewter was in use much earlier than has generally been supposed. In the curious will of William de Tolleshunt, almoner of St. Paul's, dated 1328—in a collection of documents relating to St. Paul's Cathedral School, privately printed by a public-spirited lady—we have one of the best inventories of the utensils of an ancient kitchen which we have hitherto met with. In this he enumerates 'the large mazer bowl,' the 'three best brass basins,' the 'three best brass deep dishes,' the 'cauldron,'—(doubtless, the 'brass pot' which figured on the hearth of every householder,)—'one hand-mill for grinding corn,' a mortar and pestle, dishes with stands, and the saltcellars, but 'chiefly the six pewter dishes, with all the saltcellars, and the iron frying-pan.' The remaining kitchen furniture was doubtless the wooden trenchers, the carving knives, the pots of coarse earthenware, large vessels of leather or wood, used for fetching beer or water, and pipkins and porringers of rude pottery. These last seem to have been very cheap, and in their shapes exactly resemble those of the present day. Indeed, we may remark, so little variation has taken place in the shape of these common utensils, that the pewter gill measure is of precisely the same form as the pitcher that figures on the table in Saxon illuminations.

It has usually been considered that our forefathers cut their meat with the knife which they carried at their girdle. Although this was probably the case with the lower classes, it certainly was not so with the higher—probably not even with the middle classes; for in illuminations wherever we find the well-spread table, we find the knife and the spoon too. Forks were certainly not wholly unknown, for there is an entry among Edward the First's effects, of 'six silver forks, and one of gold.' In the inventory of Isabel of France we also find 'six silver gilt forks;' they were, however, very small, weighing little more than an ounce each,—it is probable, therefore, we think, that they might

have been used for sweetmeats. Just before we have an entry of 'four spoons, silver gilt, set with gems,' and these are also very small—might not these, together with the enamelled plates termed 'fruit plates,' have belonged to a small 'dessert service'?

Whatever might have been the every-day style of living among our forefathers, on festival occasions, and especially in cities, they certainly never patronized 'Lenten fare.' Even during Lent they seem to have solaced themselves as much as might be with delicacies, which being 'sweet,' were not placed in the index of prohibited things. Figs, raisins, almonds, and sometimes dates, were among the dainties which enabled them to endure 'black Lent:' and even in the thirteenth century the quantity of these foreign fruits consumed in London alone seems astonishing. In the households of the higher orders the quantities consumed were very great. In the Countess of Leicester's household expenses we find 'a hundred pounds of rice, ten of pepper, six of 'cinnamon, ten of ginger, ten of *sugar*, a frail of raisins, and a 'hundred and fifty pounds of almonds,' provided for Palm Sunday alone. And merrily was Easter, 'that joyfullest season of Paschaltide,' kept; and gladly did they return to 'butcher's meat:' for from the same curious document we learn, that 'two oxen, four sheep, and three calves,' were provided for the household, together with an abundant supply of fowls, and two thousand eggs.

With the great demand, as we have seen, for foreign produce, we cannot be surprised at the general wealth and prosperity of the traders in our great cities, especially the 'pepperers,' subsequently termed the grocers, who were then almost the sole importers of the produce of southern Europe. An inquiry into the trade and commerce of this period, especially in connexion with our great fairs—a most interesting subject, and which has never been fully gone into—would, however, lead us too far, we must therefore confine ourselves to the retail trade in cities. This, we are inclined to think, was more extensive than many writers on this subject, and especially Mr. Turner, seem to imagine. In the various lists of 'pontage' and 'murage' stores, during this century, we find articles in use which seem to argue a greater degree of comfort, even of luxury, than we might have expected to find in second and third rate towns. Dues for spices, foreign fruits, and various silk goods, for instance, repeatedly meet us; and in the before-quoted 'Subsidy-Roll,' of the 29th of Edward I. we find both John Edwards and William Gray, two burgesses of Colchester, having 'gloves, silk purses, girdles, silk, sindon,' and the like, *in merceriâ suâ*. The quantity in both instances, judging from the valuation, was doubtless very small,



but the wonder is, that in the thirteenth century two tradesmen, in a city then by no means flourishing, should have found it worth their while to have kept these articles at all.

In the cities, and certainly in London, the members of the respective guilds dwelt close together, and this custom continued to a comparatively recent date. Perishable articles appear to have been sold in open market, and only the dealers in more durable stock, or more valuable commodities, kept shops. These, however, were widely different from those of the present day, being merely projecting sheds in front of the dwelling, indeed exactly resembling, save in being made of wood instead of canvas, the booths at a country fair. And yet, on the rude counter along the front, the mercers displayed their most precious 'silk merceries,' and the goldsmiths their unrivalled drinking cups, and salts and spice plates;—no wonder that the proprietor and his 'prentices tall,' walked constantly up and down in front, keeping guard over, as well as calling the attention of the passer-by to his precious store.

There was no provision in these early days for the injurious 'all work and no play' system; and the closely confined, overworked young men in our shops and warehouses, might look back with regret on these old times, when the shop was shut ere sunset, and the pleasant fields invited those who had toiled during the day to go forth and refresh themselves. And early hours did our forefathers keep, for the last meal was taken long before curfew tide—indeed, from the early time assigned for the supper, we think the old saying, 'after supper walk a mile,' originated. There must have been a tolerably efficient police in our cities, for while we find plenty of complaints of 'strong thieves' on the highway, house-robbery, even shop-robbery, does not seem to have been frequent. And thus, when the tall houses in Cheap and Ludgate, in later times, displayed fair ranges of glass case-ments, the shops, even of the chief traders, still kept their booth-like appearance almost down to the seventeenth century; and the stock, utterly unguarded save by the 'prentices, was displayed on a mere shelving board.

Very few readers are, however, aware how late was the era of 'shop improvements.' Only a few years since, one shop on Ludgate-hill stood the sole representative of the past, and this was Rundell and Bridge's. The reader will probably remember that dingy, heavy-looking house, with its overhanging doorway, and two small windows with thick frames enclosing the commonest glass, and the clumsy well-worn counter, so strangely contrasting with the precious store of plate and jewellery upon it. Why, the 'fittings up' would have disgraced a third-rate pawn-broker's in Shoreditch. Yet this was the type of every shop in

Cheapside and on Ludgate-hill, (then the Regent-street of London,) only some ninety years ago, in those thriving times, when 'keep your shop and your shop will keep you,' was the motto of the young tradesman, who looked forward with certainty, after twenty or thirty years of quiet industry and progressive success, to retire to his 'country house,' with its summer-house on the wall, and its bowling-green. But even the genuine 'schoppe' of the thirteenth century, the mere wooden booth, might be seen, and in London, at a still later period. Well does an octogenarian beside us remember Sweeting's-alley a mere row of wooden booths, though under the very shadow of the Royal Exchange; and where she was taken, when a little child, to be fitted with gloves. And what was 'the shop' where the first gentlemen in London were accustomed to purchase these articles? A mere wooden pent-house, windowless, and, save when shut up for the night, doorless; and behind the wooden counter stood the proprietor, a 'substantial citizen' and liveryman, wearing his hat, and in cold weather well wrapt up, leisurely displaying his goods, while a broad bench against the wall was the sole accommodation for his customers. How pertinaciously did old ways and old customs linger among our grandfathers; and how would they—almost as greatly as their predecessors of the middle ages—look with amazement on the plate-glass windows, the mahogany counters, the splendid gas-fittings of the shop of the nineteenth century.

There are one or two other points in Mr. Turner's interesting volume which we intended to discuss, but which we can only glance at. The first is, the low amount at which he estimates the population of London in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Now, late inquiries have led us to the conclusion, that our metropolis was more populous then, than at much later periods. As far as we can discover, London, within the walls, in the thirteenth century, contained the same streets, bearing almost the same names, as it did in the reign of Elizabeth. Then as to London without the walls:—the western suburb, populous before the Conquest, had become so densely peopled that the ward of Far-rington Without was then formed. To the north, we find Cripplegate, containing the same streets as in later times; and houses and shops, as we learn from the valuable 'Documents and Authorities,' thickly built along 'Aldrede's-gate-street,' also; while that Long-lane and Cloth-fair, indeed all that vicinity, were inhabited, we have Stow's express testimony, and his accuracy on such points is, we think, unimpeachable. Now within these limits the population was tolerably closely packed, for households were certainly more numerous in the middle-ages, when

coarse food and clothing cost but little, and money payments were almost nominal, than at later periods. Indeed, we think it will be found that the number of female domestic servants was large, while the 'prentices, the workmen in the various crafts, the labourers engaged by the waterside, the lay brothers and sisters belonging to the various conventual establishments, besides the royal and noble households dwelling there, must have contributed to swell the general amount far beyond what Mr. Turner imagines. The prominent political station, too, which London maintained, even from the days of Stephen, must have been in some measure founded on its populousness. In a contest to be decided by 'the strong hand,' the city which could send forth the goodliest number of stout, well-armed men, would of necessity be appealed to; and thus, from the time when John summoned 'the barons of London' to join in expelling his brother's hated chancellor, down to the *mise* of Lewes, the aid of the citizens was primarily sought. We may also remark here, that subsequently we have little doubt that the population of London decreased. The famine and pestilence of Edward II.'s reign, the deadly plague in 1348, the subsequent disturbances and insurrections, followed in the fifteenth century by the blighting wars of the Roses, all contributed to prevent the metropolis becoming as populous as heretofore.

The general characteristics of the country in the thirteenth century, and the modes of conveyance of goods, especially of travelling—of which Mr. Turner affords us some curious illustrations—are necessary to complete the general picture before us; but the subject, connected as it is with many interesting questions relative to the internal trade of this period, especially the great fairs, is too extensive to be at present entered upon. We must therefore conclude here, offering our thanks to Mr. Turner and his coadjutors in the various societies, who, with such praiseworthy diligence, have collected so large an amount of illustration, based not upon conjecture or theory, but upon the incontrovertible testimony of contemporary remains.

ART. V. *The Twofold Protest. A Letter from the Duke of Argyll to the Bishop of Oxford.* Octavo, pp. 34. Moxon. 1851.

THE recent measures of the papacy in relation to this country, have been of the sort which are often found to achieve much more than was designed to be accomplished by them. They have been of the kind which affect great principles, which force men on the consideration of such principles, and which, in consequence, not unfrequently spread disturbance greatly beyond the foresight even of the most far-seeing. It must be obvious that where much exists that has no resting-place on sound principle, whatever tends to shut men up to a close and severe scrutiny of principle, must be fraught with the elements of change,—it may be with the kind of change which scares the wits of some men so terribly when expressed by the term *revolution*.

By no party in these nations was the principle of the modest proceeding which handed us all over to the pastoral keeping of Dr. Wiseman and his coadjutors more closely examined than by the English Nonconformists. They were not, indeed, of one mind on the subject. But even the minority, which, as we think, missed its way, did so rather from an excessive scrupulosity than from heedlessness. We are not of those who would charge them with being willing to pat even a Jesuit Propaganda on the back, if they might only thereby vent their spleen against a proud hierarchy nearer home. We believe, rather, that they both saw and felt the offensiveness of the course which that propaganda had taken; and that if they hesitated to take any step towards imposing a legal restraint upon such arrogance, it was mainly from a jealous concern for those liberties which have come to us from better men, and which, for the sake of better men, should be guarded as far as possible from the very semblance of an infraction. But the great majority of nonconformists, as is well known, took the ground of a 'twofold protest.' Their language to our statesmen in substance was—'We feel bound to protest against the sort of thing that has been done, whether done in the name of authorities in Rome, or of authorities in Westminster. We readily grant that territorial rights in this realm of England are all subject to the authorities in Westminster; but to distribute territory *ecclesiastically* into dioceses and parishes, does not belong, according to the genius of Christianity, even to that authority, still less to an authority which is alien, and in no sense to be admitted as territorial within the limits of these kingdoms. We wish to see the supremacy of the civil power

‘among us sustained in its integrity for all civil purposes, and we wish the civil power to interfere, even with reference to ecclesiastical questions, to the extent necessary for preserving to itself that integrity, but we do not wish to see its interference with such questions extended beyond that point. Concerning this papal rescript we say—put it down, put down all things like it, come whence they may, and cost what it may; and this we say as Englishmen, prepared to discountenance and suppress whatever is done, in word or act, to set up a territorial authority in this country independent of and superior to that one authority of these lands, to which all matters territorial are justly ‘subordinate.’ This was the language of myriads of right-minded men among us a short time since; and there is nothing in the insolence of papistical insurgency, whether Irish or English, that has since been manifested, that should be allowed, as we think, to alter the feeling and purpose thus expressed, except it be to deepen the one, and to strengthen the other.

The protest of the Bishop of Oxford and his clergy, described by the bishop as ‘twofold,’ and accepted by the Duke of Argyll as such, is in fact ‘threefold.’ The claim set up in behalf of the Anglican clergy in this document is not merely *institutional* and *doctrinal*—it is also *territorial*. They are said to be the true successors of the apostles as a *priesthood*; they have the true doctrine as religious *teachers*; and, what is more, they have cognizance as being *THE* priests and *THE* instructors for ‘*this LAND*.’ But the duke is disposed to ask some troublesome questions concerning this assumption. First, on what does it *rest*? Second, to what does it *lead*? After a somewhat severe scrutiny his grace arrives at the conclusion that this assumption is essentially popish, and that its only natural issue is in popery. So that the bishop, in place of erecting a bastion to discharge its battery against Romanism, has constructed a bridge to lead men into it as their desired resting-place and citadel. This is the purport of the duke’s argument, and an able and conclusive argument we deem it. The bishop’s protest, with the distinctions of type inserted by the duke, is as follows:—

‘We, Samuel, by divine permission, Lord Bishop of the Diocese of Oxford, with the undersigned Priests and Deacons, being assembled, under the protection of Almighty God, in our Cathedral City of Oxford, on the 22nd day of November, in the year of our Lord 1850, do hereby, in presence of God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and before the *WHOLE CHURCH*, make this our solemn protest and declaration.

‘Whereas we have seen or heard that the Bishop of Rome has pretended to divide the ancient Church and realm of England into cer-

tain new dioceses, and to appoint over them certain Bishops, to whom he, the said Bishop of Rome, pretends to commit the cure and government of the souls of ALL CHRISTIAN PEOPLE THEREIN DWELLING, contrary to the rights of THIS CHURCH, and the ancient laws of this realm: Now we, the said Bishop, Priests, and Deacons, whose names are hereunto subscribed, do utterly protest against any such invasion of this Church and realm, and we do declare that the CHURCH recognised by law in THIS LAND is the *ancient Apostolic Church* THEREOF, possessing the *ancient faith*, true sacraments, and a lawful ministry; and that her Bishops and Clergy are THE Bishops and Clergy THEREOF by unbroken descent from the HOLY APOSTLES; and that the missionaries of the BISHOP OF ROME WITHIN THIS LAND, *who are stirring to withdraw the people from the communion of the English Church*, are intrusive and schismatical, and we protest before God and His CHURCH against these schismatical claims and proceedings: AS ALSO, against their doctrines and teaching, as being, on many points of faith and practice, contrary to God's Word, and the teaching of the UNIVERSAL CHURCH (?), all which are more especially declared in the ARTICLES of the said CHURCH OF ENGLAND. And we do hereby declare that we believe that this our protest would be approved, and the schismatic acts and corrupt doctrines, and idolatrous practices maintained by the BISHOP OF ROME, would be condemned by the judgment of the UNIVERSAL CHURCH, if it were possible that such judgment should be now by any means collected. And we declare that the CHURCH OF ENGLAND did at the REFORMATION make, and hath now for three hundred years continued, this protest against the claim of the said BISHOP OF ROME to exercise jurisdiction over the CHURCH UNIVERSAL, and over this CHURCH OF ENGLAND in particular; and also against the false doctrine of the said CHURCH OF ROME, and that we do now renew and continue the said protests. And we do hereby solemnly warn all CHRISTIAN people *committed to our charge* that they yield no obedience to the so-called BISHOPS now thrust into our land, under pain of incurring all the guilt of wilful schism.'

That is, we, the Anglican clergy, have our priesthood from the apostles, and our doctrine from the apostles, and on these grounds, by a fundamental law of the Church, it pertains to us, exclusive of all other, to be rulers in the dioceses of this English land, and priests in its parishes. This is the meaning of the statement, if there be in it any meaning worth stating. Now, the duke complains of the logic of this pretension, as thus put, as being anything but clear or satisfactory. The argument from the true priesthood, he contends, if good at all, is good alone. So the argument from the true doctrine, if good at all, is good alone. The one cannot be in any degree helpful to the other, if, as is indisputable in this case, the two may exist apart,—that is, if certain men may be possessed of the true priesthood without the true doctrine, and certain other men may be possessed of the true doctrine without the true priesthood. In this view, the points of the

twofold protest, instead of being assistant to each other, do really neutralize each other, and the conclusion, instead of being a proof, does not amount to evidence. But we must allow our author to speak for himself on this point.

‘ If it be true, that within the area of their own ground the authority of the English priesthood is, by divine right, exclusive of every other, then schism is established against all who do not obey them, whether their doctrines be true or false. But if, on the other hand, that sin does depend in any degree on the truth or untruth of their doctrines and teaching, then a Divine territorial and exclusive authority cannot be allowed, or have anything to do with the question.

‘ Either of these two arguments taken singly, is, at least, intelligible; but it is difficult to see how you can imagine that you gain anything by soldering the two together. What are the two, worded without disguise? The first would run thus:—‘ Over our own dioceses our authority is Divine, by virtue of an exclusive commission; all, therefore, who separate from us are guilty of the sin of schism.’ Now, each of these assertions, if proved, may sustain its conclusion. But how can you put them together so as to contribute to each other’s proof? Can you say, ‘ Our authority is Divine and exclusive, because our doctrines and teaching are true; and our doctrines and teaching are true, because our authority is Divine.’ This, of course, is a vicious circle. You must argue, then, to your conclusion from the one basis to the other,—but not from both, nor from between the two.’—pp. 6, 7.

Having thus put hopelessly asunder what the bishop had with so much elaborate interlacing joined together, the duke proceeds to test the principle resting on this false or confused basis by its results. The arguments from the possession of the true priesthood, to the possession of an exclusive right to act as bishops in the spaces called bishoprics, and as priests in the spaces called parishes, according to fundamental law, if it be a valid argument, must be so irrespective of the argument from purity of doctrine or not, and irrespective of sanction from the civil power or not. The following passage shows what must follow from the argument from priesthood if taken alone, and what follows, if taken, as it must be, along with the argument from purity of doctrine.

‘ If any amount of difference of opinion, as to the truth or untruth of the teaching of a geographical priesthood, will justify separation under another Christian ministry, then it ceases to be true that there can be but one bishop, or one priest, over any given area in which such differences exist; there then *may* obviously be as many bishops, or as many priests, as there may be different bodies of men differing from each other’s teaching in what they deem sufficiently essential points to justify separation. But if, on the other hand, you will adhere to the law that there can be but one rightful priest over the people of any given area—such as a diocese or a parish—and as we

know that there may be and are the widest differences as to the truth and untruth taught by this priesthood, then it follows that the authority you assert on its behalf is one rightfully irrespective of such opinions.

‘So much for the consequences of the assumed ‘law’ in the abstract.

‘Now let us look at it as applied to the particular case of the Romish priesthood. It is with especial reference to them that we have had such frequent announcements of this ‘fundamental law of the universal church.’ Now the differences of doctrine between the Romish communion and the protestant English church, are, to say the least, considerable. Some of the doctrines taught, and practices pursued with the greatest assiduity, by the Romish body, are pronounced by your church to be ‘blasphemous fables.’ Here, then, we have a practical measure of the extent to which, under the ‘fundamental law,’ the authority of a territorial priesthood is to over-ride differences in religious faith. A Romanist living within the bounds of your Oxford diocese may and must hold you to be heretical on many primary doctrines of the Christian faith. From your hands he could not receive what he conceives to be the ‘sacraments of the church.’ Nevertheless, under the aforesaid ‘law,’ so long as living on your spiritual acres, you are asserted to be his only rightful bishop.

But farther, let us now apply the ‘fundamental law’ to an inverse case. The Continent of Europe is, for the most part, parcelled out into dioceses as old as, or older than, your own. They are occupied by priests who have the same claim, and through the same channel, to unbroken ‘succession from the holy apostles.’ Those priests are there in the habit of teaching fables which your church considers ‘blasphemous,’ and practices which, in your protest, you have called idolatrous. Well, but there are men, natives of the countries in which those dioceses exist, who hold the same opinion with yourself as to the teaching of that priesthood. They cannot, on their own principles, partake of its sacraments—they cannot join in its worship; nevertheless, under the Anglican ‘fundamental law,’ they are still rightfully subject to its authority.

‘Under that law, then, it is clear that men holding similar opinions to those of high Anglicanism, and belonging to countries lying under a Roman priesthood, must either join that communion or else live without lawful communion or ordinances of any kind.’—pp. 8—11.

Thus, on the priestly theory, the institutional utterly destroys the moral, the theological, the spiritual—over-rides everything. On the other hand, the question of doctrine being once admitted, must, in the same manner, over-ride all the pretension of priesthood, reducing that to nothing. The Romanist has felt this difficulty many centuries ago, and has made his provision against it. He insists, that in his church there is both the true priesthood and the true doctrine, and that an infallible guidance has been vouchsafed to the church of Rome, that within her pale the



two may always go together. Our thoughtful Anglicans are deeply sensible to the want of this element in their system. The whole party have gone too far not to be in danger of going farther. As the duke has shown, they betray their fears in this direction, in nearly all their attempts to state their theory. It is never given directly and openly; on the contrary, there is a caution and sensitiveness observable in their nice choice of words, and in the careful weaving of their language, which suggests that they see certain consequences in the distance, about which the less that is said, or even thought, the better.

But this will not do. Men who fear to look the results of their principles in the face must not expect that their opponents will be impeded by any such timidity. Nor must they expect to see their friends always halt where they may themselves have halted. Some will be bolder, or more consistent, and having adopted a principle will follow wherever it may lead. If church authority be the doctrine expounded as such by Bishop Wilberforce, then we hold that the presumption is very strong that it is to be found, not in the Anglican church, but in the older and more general church—the church of Rome. We quote the language of the duke on this point, and urge that it be not only *read* but *pondered*.

‘I do not wish to dwell, in this Letter, on those more profound tendencies to Romish doctrine which I believe to be inseparable from the ecclesiastical principles laid down in your protest. They touch on matters of too solemn interest, and of too difficult treatment, to be discussed here. It is enough to indicate how strong they are, and how deep they lie. It is not simply that whatever errors may arise in such a Church are stereotyped by authority, so that each one becomes the basis of a new and more gross corruption; but it is, that the Romish system of priesthood stands mentally and morally in close connexion with the Romish system of belief. It is, indeed, conceivable that such a priesthood might start with teaching a very pure and spiritual faith; but it is hardly conceivable that such teaching should be long retained. It is impossible that such mechanical ideas of the structure and government of Christ’s Church should not necessarily involve ideas equally mechanical of the nature and requirements of His religion. If there be such an outward, visible presence in the world, to which such powers are given, numerous and eager calls will be made upon its assistance and protection. Men will be delighted to find that they may walk by sight and not by faith—that is to say, by trust in men and things which they can see and follow, rather than by faith in things which are invisible, and by conscious apprehension of their influence. Thus the people will be well pleased to magnify the office of the priest, and the priesthood will be ready to return the comforts which that office enables them to dispense. A bargain, as it were, is thus struck between them, from which both parties appear to

gain. This is the very base line from which the Church of Rome has conducted its operations,—this is the very essence of the condition of mind out of which the whole system of Romanism, in its worst features, was but a natural and inevitable growth. It is impossible that a reformed faith should be maintained in its most vital principles, under the combined influences thus brought to bear both upon the priest and people. It is *not* by accident that we have seen that faith crumbling in so many minds around us. It is all very well to reproach the ‘Romanisers,’ and to say to this and that of their conclusions—‘we cannot go so far;’ but the question is, which section of the party is the truest and most consistent interpreter of its own principles. To believe in such a priesthood as your Church theory would set up, and not to cast upon it the main burden of the Christian life, would not merely be a difficult exercise of self-restraint, but would seem a wilful waste of powers which could only have been given for the purpose of being so employed. To toil through the heavy sands of a desert upon foot, with a beast of burden walking by our side, would not seem so difficult or so needless, as to fight the good—but as it is always represented—the difficult fight of faith in things which are unseen and spiritual, when such a priesthood is at hand to offer us, instead, a trust in its own consecrating power over things which we can see, and touch, and handle. You cannot enshrine your priestly office in such a temple, and then shut out the multitude who will crowd in to worship: neither can you prevent this worship from becoming as misdirected as the aim of its desires—as material as the objects of its trust. I am presuming on the existence of a *wish* to resist this tendency; but the truth is, I have no right to do so: not only are there many who would not be scared from their ‘church principles’ by the fear of such result, but there are already some who see it and accept it as the only means of placing those principles beyond the reach of danger. Doctrines which I am unable to distinguish from those of the church of Rome—on the very points on which your church formulæ have most emphatically condemned her teaching—are now sometimes taught, not as a consequence of similar views of priesthood, but as the best and most effective mode of establishing those views firmly. The reasoning is simply this—and I deviate but little from forms in which it has been actually expressed—‘Let us not teach church principles too directly, lest we should appear in the invidious light of advocating the mere privileges of a class. We shall attain the end better by first persuading the people that their own spiritual interests are dependent upon our position and authority; let us impress upon them certain views of the nature and effect of the sacraments, which we only can dispense; let us teach them to believe that our consecration effects, in the material elements used in the Christian ordinances, an essential change, although not a change extending to mere outward bulk and figure; let us teach them that this change is such, that a supernatural presence follows upon consecration; and that participation in the spiritual benefits of the Christian faith depends on the sacraments so constituted and so

administered. When you have taught the people all this, your church principles will have secured a good foundation: you can then proceed to show how the authority of the priesthood is a necessary condition to the validity of the sacraments; and those who are interested in securing the last, will be equally interested in establishing the first. When you have arrived at this conclusion, therefore, your priestly claims are safe—they may be left to make<sup>e</sup> their own way.

‘I do not, my dear Lord, attribute these doctrines to you. I believe you would repudiate them. But they are being adopted—nay, openly expressed, by others. They have clearly a deep and real harmony—a connexion historical, and logical, and moral—with the ecclesiastical principles which you appear to sanction in part of your Protest.’

It is even so. Romanism is the natural complement of high Anglicanism. The one is wanting in cohesiveness, in consistency, in its proper fulness, without the other. Nothing can be weaker than the notion, that the best security against Romanism is to approach as nearly to it as possible, without formally and entirely adopting it. We should say thus much if experiment in this direction had never been made—we need say nothing of what has followed from the making of it. We are aware that the old Protestant ground, which makes doctrine the test of the true church, and private judgment the determinator of doctrine, may be taken indiscreetly, and that a state of things differing much from a religious uniformity or a religious unity may ensue. But this attempt to frighten us into bondage by exaggerating the excesses incident to freedom, is a piece of strategy much too antique to be imposed upon us. We prefer the variety which springs from life, to the absence of it which betokens death. The law of progress becomes strong from the action of opposites. One thing is certain—the secessions to Rome have not been from among the bodies of Christians taking the old Protestant ground of defence; but almost entirely from the ranks of men who have appeared to judge that the best mode of protecting themselves against the poison dispensed at Rome, is to swallow it to all but its last grain.

But we have said that the Oxford protest should have been described as *three-fold*, not merely as ‘*twofold*.’ It is not difficult to conjecture why this was not done. The sense of insecurity perceptible in every part of the document, is especially conspicuous in reference to this third point, though belonging quite as much to the essence of the case as the other two.

Nothing can be more plain than that the relation of our Anglican bishops to their dioceses, and of our Anglican priests to their parishes, is not from any inherent authority in them, or in their system, but purely from the civil power. It is simply to

the law of this land that they are indebted for every vestige of territorial authority of which they are possessed. Bishop Wilberforce may admit this, or he may deny it. To admit it is of necessity to surrender all right founded on the true priesthood, or the true doctrine. To deny it, would be to place himself in the very position which he denounces with so much vehemence as taken by Dr. Wiseman and his coadjutors. To assign spiritual reasons—whether reasons about priesthood or doctrine—for assuming territorial authority and designation, would be to do precisely what the Romanists have done:—and to found all right to this territorialism upon an act of the state, would be to resign everything most characteristic of Anglicanism, and to admit a naked, out-and-out Erastianism in its place. In the former case we see the church over-ride the state; in the latter we see the state over-ride the church. Either alternative is unnatural—false—monstrous. It is in vain that the bishop struggles to escape from this dilemma, by mixing priesthood, doctrine, and law all together. If his lordship's position has become his by any one of these three reasons, it has become his by that one to the exclusion of the other two. These three reasons are not only distinct reasons—they are of a contrary nature, so that his lordship cannot be bishop of Oxford by the one, without ceasing to be such at all by the other two.

The noble author of the pamphlet under consideration, insists that the bishop should not shrink from looking at his principles in connexion with all their fair logical consequences. Now, with all possible respect, we submit that this should be done, not merely with regard to the principle relating to priesthood, or the principle relating to doctrine, but to another principle which the duke touches with almost as much caution as the bishop—viz., the principle relating to the authority of the state in matters of religion. For every adherent to the principle of a national establishment of religion, must in effect say, that, on the matter of religion, the question of priesthood is as nothing, the question of doctrine as nothing,—that the question of law, of merely secular law, from a purely secular authority, is everything. Few men among us would say anything like this in words: fewer still would profess themselves willing to act in accordance with such a principle. But this is, nevertheless, the principle of church establishments, when fairly carried out. It should subordinate religious questions of all kinds to the one ultimate authority—the authority of the magistrate—of the state. The duke would not carry this principle so far. But if the authority of the bishop in his diocese, and of the priest in his parish, be from the civil power at all, it should be held as coming from *that power alone*,

and as being *exclusive of all other*. To regard it as coming from that source, *and* from the claims of priesthood or of doctrine, is to confound things that differ, and to commit the error in reasoning of which the duke complains so loudly in the case of the bishop; while to admit the church establishment principle, and to cede along with it a toleration to sects, is, in our judgment, to be shy of that principle in its logical consequences, and 'to take 'refuge from the extreme ultimate results' of it 'in what are called 'charitable admissions.' 'Now this,' further to use the duke's own language, 'may be all very good-natured, and kind, and so 'forth, but as regards the *principle* under discussion—it is only by 'pushing such principles to their last logical results, that their 'truth and safety can be tested. Such principles we must be 'prepared to follow to their last results; and if those results be 'manifestly absurd, or in violation of other principles more certain or equally sacred, it must be high time to retrace our steps, 'and take a safer guide.' This is admirable: thus tested, we find the Oxford protest confused, misconceived, fallacious throughout. But we could wish to see this test extended further. The principle which leaves the question as to what the religion of a land shall be, to be determined by the civil authority in that land, if good at all, must be good as carried 'to its last logical result'—and that result would be the denial even of toleration to all religions save the one so recognised. Feeling, as among ourselves, the difficulties involved in such consistency, the civil authority may become so 'good-natured, kind, and all that,' as to say—we will tolerate your religion, but we will not forego our right to tax you in support of our own, and we will be careful to exclude you from any share in the social status that we assign to our own. Can the principle be sound on which men dare not act more than by *halves*, and which even then involves such gross violations of *natural rights* under *religious pretences*?

We repeat, it is with all possible respect that we touch on this halting point in the reasoning of the able pamphlet before us; and in concluding these very brief observations on a subject worthy of a much wider treatment, we do so with a feeling of deep obligation to the Duke of Argyll for the manly—the truly noble course which he is disposed to take among us upon questions of this high import.

- ART. VI.—(1.) *Histoire des Origines du Gouvernement Représentatif en Europe.* Par M. GUIZOT. 2 vols. W. Jeffs.  
 (2.) *Histoire de la Restauration.* Par A. DE LAMARTINE. 2 vols. W. Jeffs.  
 (3.) *History of the Restoration.* By A. DE LAMARTINE. 1 vol. Vizitelly & Co.  
 (4.) *Histoire de la Vie de Mary Stuart.* Par M. MIGNET. 2 vols. W. Jeffs.  
 (5.) *Mignet's History of Mary Queen of Scots.* 2 vols. Bentley.  
 (6.) *Histoire de la Convention Nationale.* Par M. DE BARANTE. 2 vols. W. Jeffs.

MAN's twofold nature is reflected in History. He is 'of earth,' but his thoughts are with the stars. Mean and petty his wants and his desires; yet they serve a soul exalted with grand and glorious aims, with immortal longings, with thoughts which sweep the heavens, and 'wander through eternity.' A pigmy standing on the outward crust of this small planet, his far-reaching spirit stretches outwards and upwards to the Infinite, and there alone finds rest. History is a reflex of this double life. Every epoch has two aspects,—one calm, broad, and solemn—looking towards Eternity; the other, agitated, petty, vehement, and confused—looking towards Time. Through the one shines the pure and steady light of principles; through the other we get glimpses of the vexed drama of human passion. The one reveals to us the movement of Humanity, slow, solemn, and majestic, like all the great evolutions of creation, in whose life centuries reckon but as days; the other shows us the hurrying agitation and capricious impulses of human beings, whose free activity is unconsciously producing the great movement. If we consider nothing but the whirl and confusion of the present, its hopeless aspect of chaos will justify despondency. We must rise higher, if we would breathe more freely. Here, in the factory, we apprehend nothing. The brain is dizzy at the swift-moving shuttles, the dinning roar of myriad looms, the babel of workmen's voices. Let us remove to such a distance that we may observe the grand results which issue from this turmoil; let us look backwards and forwards. History must cure us of scepticism, by fixing our regards upon what is eternal. 'C'est un vaste drame où chaque peuple a son rôle, et dont il faut connaître les événements généraux pour avoir l'intelligence des scènes particulières qui s'y rapportent.'

History, therefore, in its highest form, is not the chronicle of

events—not the gazette of camps and courts, of diplomatic intrigues or royal misfortunes—it is the *Life of Humanity as evolved by human beings*. Any lower conception than this is partial, and as unworthy of a philosopher, as would be a conception of human life from which the soul is banished. Guizot truly says, in his biography of Thomas May:—

‘ Events do not present themselves in their completeness, nor in their full realization, to the eyes of those living subsequently to the epoch in which they occurred. Men of an after-age look for and regard that only which still interests themselves, whatever has influenced their own destiny, whatever corresponds to their particular impressions, notions, and wants. The Long Parliament, and all the parties which it engendered, notwithstanding the original justice of their cause, became violent, deceitful, unjust, tyrannical. England suffered during its continuance all the evils of civil war and sectarian rule; these sufferings were followed by reactions, which, in their turn, produced new reactions; for fifty years public confidence and hope passed alternately from kings to parliaments, and from parliaments to kings, wandering from one name to another; from system to system, from power to power, finding nowhere any settlement or repose. All this is now past and forgotten, and all that remains of the Revolution of 1640, is the general principles which it proclaimed, and the salutary results which it secured for the country; these are the associations that win for it the continued attachment and remembrance of the English people; no one now cares to weigh scrupulously the merits of particular acts, nor to ascertain what deductions are to be made for individual sins.’

History is, so to speak, the Geology of Humanity. Its records are the annals of the growth and development of Humanity through the ages. The various forms of civilization which it tells us of, immature efforts to attain the true social state, developing up to a certain point, and then falling, because incapable of further progress, may be considered as the analogues of the various types of the animal creation which preluded to the culminant creature Man. Thus it is that the historian who only knows the Present, and does not derive it from the whole Past, is no wiser than the geologist who hopes, by breaking away fragments from the outcropping strata, to solve all the questions of geological genesis.

If there be any truth in this view—if the study of History be, as we aver, the study of Humanity, then it follows that in proportion as writers neglect the Eternal for the Temporal—Science for the Drama—the evolution of principles for the incidents of individual life, in so far they fulfil a lower office, and claim a lower recompence of esteem. No one has reached the high standard required; no one has understood like a philosopher, and painted like an artist, the section of Humanity selected. Rarely has it

been attempted, and all the attempts have failed, because the true Philosophy of History is still to be established. The Past is not clearly understood, how then can it be painted accurately? While, therefore, it is admitted that all historical efforts can for the present only be approximative, it may be useful and not uninteresting to ask how historical science stands in France; and we are invited to this inquiry by the recent publications of four of France's illustrious writers, Guizot, Lamartine, Barante, and Mignet.

Guizot we have already characterized in brief and general terms,\* and may therefore proceed at once to examine the invaluable work, *Origines du Gouvernement Représentatif en Europe*, just issued. Of it, as of all his writings, it must be said, that whatever drawbacks and deficiencies may be noted in it, the style is uniformly dignified, befitting the gravity of History, and showing a serious conception of the task. Without being the most interesting, we think it the most faultless of his works. His very deficiencies do not affect him here. His qualities have scope. In tracing the rise and progress of the representative system, he was not called upon to withdraw the curtain from the drama of life; restricted to merely political considerations, he sets them forth in a style of masterly clearness. Not the least attractive pages are those wherein he speaks of History in general as a study and as an art. Here is a passage from which it is evident that although he may not himself possess the requisite faculty for the *dramatic* treatment of History, he sees the necessity of its union with the philosophic treatment.

‘According to their political state, and the degree of their civilization, do the Peoples consider history under various aspects, and look to it for various kinds of interest. In the early ages of society, whilst all is new and attractive to the youthful imagination of man, he demands poetical interest; the memories of the past form the groundwork of brilliant and simple narratives, fitted to charm an eager and easily satisfied curiosity. If in such a community, where social existence is in full vigour, and the human mind is in a state of excitement, Herodotus reads to the Greeks assembled at Olympia his patriotic narratives, and the discoveries of his voyages, the Greeks delight in them as in songs of Homer. If civilization is but little advanced—if men live more isolated—if ‘country,’ in the concrete, at least, exists but slightly for them, we find simple chronicles intermingled with fables and legends, but always marked with that naïf and poetical character which, in such a condition of existence, the human mind requires in all things. Such are the European chronicles from the tenth to the

\* British Quarterly Review for May, 1851. Art. *Modern French Literature*.



fifteenth century. If, later, civilization becomes developed in a country without the co-eval establishment of liberty, without an energetic and extensive political existence, when the period of enlightenment, of riches, and of leisure, does arrive, men look for philosophical interest in history; it no longer belongs to the field of poetry; it loses its simplicity; no longer wears its former real and living physiognomy; individual characters take up less space, and no longer appear under living forms; the mention of names becomes more rare; the narrative of events, and the description of men, are more its pretext than its subject; all becomes generalized; readers demand a *résumé* of the developments of civilization, a sort of theory of the Peoples and of events; history becomes a series of dissertations on the progress of the human race, and the historian seems only to call up the skeleton of the past, in order to hang upon it general ideas and philosophic reflections. This occurred in the last century; the English historians of that period, Robertson, Gibbon, and Hume, have represented history under that aspect; most of the German writers still follow the same system. The philosophy of history predominates; history, properly so called, is not to be found in them.

‘But if advanced civilization, and a great development of the human intellect coincide, in a nation, with an animated and keen political existence; if the struggle for liberty, by exciting the mind, provoke energy of character; if the activity of public life is added to the general claims of thought, history appears in another light; it becomes, so to speak, practical. No longer is it required to charm easily excited imaginations by its narratives, nor to satisfy by its meditations, active intellects reduced to exercise themselves upon generalities. But men await from it experience analogous to the wants they feel, the life they live; they desire to understand the real nature and hidden springs of institutions; to enter into the movements of parties, to follow them in their combinations, to study the secret of the influence of the masses, and the action of individuals; men and things must resuscitate before them, no longer merely as an interest or diversion, but as a revelation of how rights, liberties, and power are to be acquired, exercised, and defended; how to combine opinions, interests, passions, the necessities of circumstances, all the elements of active political life. That is what history becomes for free nations; it is from that point of view that Thucydides wrote the history of the Peloponnesus; Lord Clarendon and Bishop Burnet, that of the English Revolution.’

So much for his conception. Now for his own treatment. The opening paragraph is a good specimen of the sustained dignity of his style, and finely expresses what all historical students must frequently have thought, both as to the importance and the ever-renewed interest of their science:—

‘Such is the immensity of human affairs, that far from becoming antiquated and exhausted beneath the hand of Time, they seem to grow

younger and to be renewed periodically, in order to appear under aspects before unknown. Not only has each century its study; but to each century the same studies are like an almost unworked mine, a still unknown world in which discoveries spring up at every step. It is in the study of history that this truth manifests itself most especially. The events of which history treats neither lose nor gain as time passes over them; all that has been seen in those events, all that ever will be seen in them, has lain contained in them since the day on which they occurred; but their whole extent is never fully penetrated; they have, so to speak, innumerable secrets, which escape slowly from them, according as man is in a position to comprehend them. And as man and all around him change, as the point of view from whence he contemplates events and the feelings he brings to that contemplation vary incessantly, it may be said that the past changes with the present: hitherto unperceived facts start up amidst well known ones; other ideas, other feelings are excited by the same names, the same narratives; and thus man learns, that in the infinite space open to his researches, all remains new and inexhaustible to his ever-active yet ever-limited intelligence.

‘This result of the greatness of events, and weakness of the human mind, never shows itself so positively as at the termination of one of those extraordinary crises which displace man altogether, so to speak, and open another horizon before him. Such revolutions, it is true, are not brought about suddenly. The world conceives and bears them in its womb long before they see the light. But the moment comes when, thirsting for effectual accomplishment, they seize upon all that exists, transform it, and place all things in a new light. If, after a shock like this, man looks back at the history of past ages, he recognises it with difficulty. He now sees what he never saw before; what he saw is no longer such as he had seen it; facts appear to him under an unknown aspect, and speak to him another language. Whether he considers their causes, their nature, or their consequences, on all sides fresh perspectives open upon him. The spectacle is the same; but it is another spectator viewing it from another standing point; to his eyes, all is changed.’

But, it may be asked—nay, often has been asked—is not this vacillation of view the condemnation of History? Wherefore shall we study that which is so shift? Granting that you can ever ascertain the truth respecting the Past, what can the Past teach us? It is itself a period of confusion, darkness, ignorance: shall we demand light of it? No, we must look forwards instead of backwards.

This antagonism against the Past is unwise, but it is nothing new. It has been felt in all periods of ‘movement.’ In one of the ephemeral parliaments which fluttered for a moment under the domination of Cromwell, the foolish republicans proposed to burn all the archives in the Tower, and to destroy every monu-

ment which remained to speak of old England. 'En reniant 'ainsi ses aïeux,' says Guizot, 'cette génération oubliait que 'bientôt elle allait les rejoindre dans la tombe et qu'à son tour elle 'laisserait des enfans.' It forgot more than that. It forgot that the Past is not simply important to us because it fought our battles, cleared the ground for us, and left us the heritage of its accumulated experience—but still more because it reveals to us, in imperfect glimpses, that Humanity of whose life we partake—that vast chain of Existence which encompasseth us and all men, past, present, and to come, in one real vital brotherhood—a life which moves slowly, surely onwards, to grand predestined ends, without crushing or cramping the free will and energetic responsibility of each individual unit.

With what a new dignity and what majestic interest does this conception invest History? It shows us that Providence, to use Guizot's language, does not treat generations so unjustly as to disinherit some for the benefit of others. Glory and happiness may not be equally distributed through the centuries; but there is no age that has not legitimate claims on the respect of its descendants; none that has not made its great effort in the mighty struggle of good and evil, truth and error, liberty and oppression. Not only has each century had its own peculiar burden to sustain, but that which it has gained it has transmitted to successors,—

'Et quasi cursores vitæ lampada tradunt.'

We gather the fruits. It is but a small price to pay if in return we preserve their memory in honour. Glory! Happiness!—great words—great things! but neither to all men nor to all nations are these possible; and if we honour but them, neglecting obscure energy, truth, and abnegation, we run great risk of drying up the source of glory and happiness. If, therefore, we are truly serious in our devotion to Humanity, we shall feel a deep touching respect even for its 'darkest age'—we shall feel somewhat as we do when our fathers take us on their loving knees, and tell us of the days when they were young, wilful, foolish, and erring!

Let us beware, however, of exaggeration. Let no admiration of the Past divert us from the Present. History is a noble study, fruitful in far-reaching lessons; but it is liable to abuse, as all use is with inconsiderate man. Of late years, scornful attacks upon the Past have driven men into reactionary fervour. Here, as everywhere, impiety has resuscitated superstition. The Utopias dreamed of by some reformers for the Future, have been chal-

lenged by Utopias dreamed of in the Past. (The remark is Guizot's.) We have seen Puseyism and Young Englandism playing with historical philosophy. We have seen the decried Middle Ages rehabilitated. Feudalism has assumed ideal forms. Reaction has had its partisans and its fops—its serious thinkers, and its white-waistcoats. These blind bigots of the Past set themselves against the plain unequivocal fiat of Humanity—they wish to roll back the great panorama of the centuries—they wish to efface history, and to replace society precisely in that condition *from which* it has energetically freed itself. They do not see that feudalism fell from inherent incapacity:—

‘Denn alles das entsteht  
Ist werth dass es zu Grunde geht.’

It were as wise to endeavour to restore a coal-mine to its pristine condition of pine forest, as to endeavour to restore society to feudalism. These men have studied but superficially the history they appeal to, or they would know how decisively it condemns them. Julian, the apostate, was a type of this party. He, too, had his retrograde philosophy which nourished itself upon the Past. He thought that the Myths of Paganism were capable of answering all those moral needs which Christianity came to answer; and he insisted that his subjects should accept them, believe them, live by them. It never occurred to him that, if the garments still fitted men, they would not have been cast aside; and that, if men *had* outgrown them, it was evidence of the garments being no longer suitable. It was in vain he proclaimed the Christians ἀσεβεις and ἀθεοι, because they would not believe in the antique gods—those gods ‘under whom millions had been happy.’ Christianity was not to be set aside by royal edicts; it answered to the moral needs; the antique gods were broken in their temples, and the nations gathered round the new Teacher.

But we are suffering ourselves to be seduced from Guizot's work. All students are acquainted with the celebrated lectures, delivered by him at the Sorbonne during the last few years of the Empire, and the early part of the Restoration. They have long enriched our shelves, under the titles of *Histoire générale de la Civilisation en Europe*, and *Histoire de la Civilisation en France*; and are now completed by the publication of the present work, which formed the lectures of 1820 to 1822, and has never before been published, except in the imperfect *comptes rendus* of a journal. It comprises the whole story of the rise and progress of representative government. The first volume contains a series of twenty-six lectures, wherein the origin of representative institutions is unfolded, and their course indicated during the period

from the fifth to the eleventh century, among the Anglo-Saxons in Great Britain, among the Franks in Gaul, and among the Visigoths in Spain. The second volume consists of five-and-twenty lectures devoted to the history of the various essays of representative government in England, from the Conquest till the reign of the Tudors.

Guizot has erudition commensurate with the vastness of this scheme, and his work should be read in conjunction with the admirable 'Constitutional History' of our own Hallam. To the lessons of history, he adds those of politics. It is not mere luxury of erudition which allures him through the perplexed labyrinth of facts and systems; he is lured by the hope of reading in the Past some consolation for the Future; and, curiously enough, his lectures seem as *à propos* to the present time as they were in 1820. They are more so. The principles of representative government have become clearer and more widely diffused, and, concurrently with this diffusion, there has arisen a philosophic doubt of the existence of government at all. That history unfolds a gradual disintegration of government, through the various phases of absolute monarchy, constitutional monarchy, and popular government, (with a prospect of despotism democratised in the sovereign people!) seems to us clear enough; and we cannot help regarding the most recent discussions, in France especially, as very significant of some ulterior change in the rule of society. When such men as Proudhon and Herbert Spencer can proclaim non-government as the goal to which we are tending—when such men as Emile Girardin, Rittinghausen, Considérant, and others, are aiming at what they call *direct legislation*—when Anatole Leray proclaims the sovereignty of Reason—and when several of the more advanced liberals scout the notion of 'universal suffrage' as incompetent to settle anything—then, we say, as there is never smoke without fire, the conviction grows up that representative government may not after all be the great desideratum of the age—the perfection of the representative system may not be the highest effort of political action. But be this as it may, the importance of the study remains. Whether government be destined to undergo some change as vital and extensive as that which society has undergone in passing from a military to an industrial régime—co-ordinated with industrial tendencies, as hitherto it has been with military tendencies—or whether it be destined to settle down into a simple realization of the representative principle—in either case the history of representation must be deeply interesting. For we may conclude with John Stuart Mill 'that the reasons for having a representative government, and the reasons for having a government at all, are to a very great extent identical.' If government is to pro-

tect the weak from the strong, the peaceful from the violent, representation is to protect the governed from the oppression of the governors. Representation may not collect the *wisdom* of the nation, but it collects the *will* of the nation. Quitting all such philosophic considerations, and confining ourselves to the purely historic view, the mere extent and influence of representation, as one of the phases through which European polity has manifested itself, gives it a serious attraction.

‘There is no occasion,’ says Guizot, ‘for us to ask what has been the political tendency of European civilization. A system which is evidently everywhere connected with the same principles, derived from the same wants, and tends to the same results, is manifested throughout Europe. Almost everywhere a representative government is demanded, accorded, established. This fact is assuredly no accident, no passing mania. It has its roots in the political Past, and its motives in the Present.’ It is this system of which he has undertaken to narrate the rise and progress. He does not agree with Montesquieu that we are to look for its origin to the forests of Germany. But it is evident, he thinks, that since the foundation of modern Europe the system has been imminent. It was the offspring of no theory, of no conspiracy; it resulted from the general wants and permanent tendencies of society. In times of trouble, sovereigns invoked its aid. In times of prosperity, in the ripening leisures of peace, the progress of civilization has always brought nations to it. Its rudest essays have left deep remembrances. These essays he records for our instruction.

The political history of Europe he divides into four great epochs, during which society was governed by forms and principles essentially different. The Germans in over-running the Roman territory brought with them their one great heritage—liberty, independence; but they brought none of those institutions which regulate its action, and guarantee its integrity in a social condition. Individuals were free; society had to be constituted. After the invasion and territorial settlement, there arose between conquerors and conquered an imperfect social organization; but it was a long and tedious process. The disparity between the races must have rendered every effort at union unusually difficult, to say nothing of the feelings animating conquerors and conquered. Individuals by whom liberty was then conceived only as the independence of isolation, struggled to preserve that anti-social characteristic. The strong succeeded, and became powerful. The weak fell under their dominion. Kings at first simple warrior chieftains, afterwards the great territorial proprietors, endeavoured to consolidate and extend their power; but by their side stood the haughty,

powerful barons, who would not suffer any great extension of the royal power. Thus we see the influences which then disputed for predominance, were—the antique liberty of the forest, the first essays of Monarchy, and the elements of Feudalism. This anarchical condition was prolonged till the eleventh century. Feudalism had triumphed. Central power scarcely existed, whether in kings or assemblies. The sovereignty was scattered. Liberty was distributed among the powerful.

The second epoch is that of feudalism, which is too well known to need characterization here. We simply note that its essential points were the reduction of the masses to servitude, the federal hierarchy of the barons, and the weakness of the monarch. This epoch extends to the thirteenth century. The third epoch is that of monarchy absolute. The feudal aristocracy is attacked from above and from below by the extension of royalty and by the rise of the bourgeoisie, the gradual importance of the industrial element making itself felt. Thus sovereignty became centralized and liberty popularized; national unity and monarchial unity grew together. Kings had used the people to destroy the power of the nobles; they now trembled at the power of the people. Hence monarchy ceased to be absolute, and became more or less constitutional. The ‘divine right of kings’ was replaced by the ‘divine right of parliaments,’ which is now getting replaced by the ‘divine right of the people,’ to be set aside in turn by the ‘divine right of reason and justice!’

Of this fourth epoch—the representative epoch—England of course exhibits the most complete picture, the most successful working of the system, and therefore has Guizot confined himself to England for this part of his history. Our present purpose is to indicate the scope of his inquiries rather than to follow him through the details; we cannot, therefore, pause to exhibit his unrivalled method of massing facts so as to carry with them the conclusion he aims at. It may be interesting, however, to follow him in his explanation of the *rationale* of representation.

We must dive into the heart of the question. It will not do to content ourselves with external resemblances. We must not suppose that the elements of the representative system existed wherever elections and assemblies existed. We must not, with Montesquieu, exclaim, *Ce beau système est sorti des bois*; looking only at appearances and forgetting the true principle and tendencies of this form of government. As Guizot remarks, the classification of governments, according to their external forms, is superficial and false. Such, for example, is ‘monarchy the government of an individual, aristocracy the government of several, democracy the government of all.’ This classification

leaves the great question untouched—the question, namely, ‘What is the source of the sovereign power, and what is its limit?’ In the answer lies the principle of government.

‘Where are we to look for this principle? Is it a conventional arrangement by man? Does it precede the existence of society?’

‘Society and government, these two facts imply one another; society without government is no more possible than government without society. The idea of society implies necessarily the idea of rule, of universal law, that is, of government.

‘What is that first social law?’

‘I hasten to mention it; it is justice, reason, a rule of which every man has the germ within himself. If he only yields to force, man does not truly submit to the law; there is no society, no government. If, in his dealings with his fellow creatures, man no longer obeys force only, but a law, then society and government exist. The abandonment of force, obedience to law, such is the fundamental principle of society and government. Without these two conditions, neither society nor government, properly so called, do exist. . . . No government ever totally disregarded this supreme law, none ever proclaimed force or caprice the sole law of society. In seeking the principle of government, we have found the principle of social right to be the first source of all legitimate sovereignty. It is in this law of laws, in this rule of every government, that the principle of government is contained.

‘Now come these two great questions: How is the law formed, and how is it applied? In this lies the distinctive character of the various forms of government; in this they differ.

‘The belief that the primitive and absolute right of law-making, that is to say, the right of sovereignty, belongs to some portion of society, whether this right be vested in one man, in many, or in all, has prevailed until recent times—a belief always contradicted by facts and unable to bear the test of reason. The right of determining and enforcing a rule is the right to absolute power, the force which possesses essentially that power possesses absolute power, namely, the right to tyrannize. Take the three principal forms of government—monarchy, aristocracy, democracy; and see whether any one of them in which the right of sovereignty was held by one, by many, or by all, was free from tyranny.

Such, however, is the force of truth, that error cannot reign absolutely and alone. At the very time when men appeared to believe, and did theoretically believe, that the primitive and absolute right to rule belonged to some one, whether monarch, senate, or people, they struggled against that principle. At all times men have endeavoured to limit the power which they acknowledged to be perfectly legitimate. Never has force, even when invested with the right of sovereignty, been admitted to the full development of that right. In Turkey the janissaries sometimes served, sometimes abrogated, the absolute power of the sultan. In democracies, where the right of sovereignty is vested



in popular assemblies, there is an incessant endeavour to oppose conditions, obstacles, and limits to that sovereignty. In all governments absolute in principle there has been some kind of protest against the principle. Whence comes this universal protest? Looking only at the surface, one might be tempted to say that it is only a struggle of powers. No doubt that forms one element, but there is something beyond, and something greater. There is the instinct of justice and reason which dwells in every human breast. Men do not oppose tyranny, whether that of one or of many, only because they have the power to do so, but because they feel the right to be on their side. It is the consciousness of right and wrong, that is, of a rule independent of human will, a consciousness often dim but always powerful, which sooner or later rouses men to resist tyranny under whatever name or form it presents itself. It is therefore the voice of the human race which proclaims that the right of sovereignty vested in men, whether in one, in many, or in all, is an iniquitous lie.

‘If the right of sovereignty cannot be vested in any one man or number of men, where is it then, and what is its principle?’

‘In his inner existence, in his dealings with himself, so to speak, as well as in his external life and his dealings with his fellow creatures, the man who feels himself free and capable of action always perceives a natural law which impels that action. He acknowledges a something which is not his own will, and which must regulate his will. He feels himself compelled by reason or morality to do certain things; he sees or he feels that there are certain things which he may or may not do. That something is the law superior to man and made for him, the Divine law. The real law of man is not the work of man; he receives it, he does not create it. Even when submitting to it, it is not his, but is beyond and superior to him.’

On this idea of truth and justice reposes the system of representation, which attributing to none the sovereignty of right, calls upon all to discover the law of truth and justice—the *impersonal sovereignty* which rules society. No one always entirely perceives and wills the right law, but all concur in the search after it, and in its establishment. All power is a power *de facto*, which, to become power *de jure*, must act according to reason, justice, truth. No man, no assembly of men, perfectly knows and thoroughly practises reason, justice, truth; but they have the faculty of discovering them, and can be made more and more amenable to them in conduct. Political combinations, therefore, ought to tend towards extricating from society all the truth, justice, reason it contains, to apply them to government.

This conclusion is inevitable; but the reader of any sagacity, provided he be aware of Guizot's attitude and political opinions, will see whither it points in Guizot's system; and although in this work he nowhere expressly draws the inference, he suffers it to be felt as a warning against democracy. We will engage in

no controversy on the point. We concur in all he says against the popular fallacy about the right of majorities—a merely anarchial and destructive dogma—indeed, we suppose most thoughtful minds must have arrived at the same conviction; but the conclusion we draw therefrom is *not* that democracy is impossible, but that it needs a higher guidance than that of any turbulent assembly, a higher faith than the faith in ‘votes.’ The majority, *as* majority, can have no *right*, it can only have *force*. As Guizot says, in the idea of a majority there are two very different elements: that of an accredited opinion, and that of a preponderant force. As force, it can have no more right than that of a despot; as opinion, it can claim no infallibility. All experience shows that. If, therefore, the truth is not to be measured by the number of voters, and if truth is to be the law of society, it follows that some other test must be secured; and this lands us in social *science*, which for the present we cannot touch. A passage, and a noble one, from Guizot will suffice to indicate his recognition of Humanity as superior to Man, and to point out the necessity for some such science:—

‘No, it is not true that man is his own absolute master—that his will is his only legitimate law, and that at no moment, and on no account, any one has a right over him without his own consent.

‘When philosophers have considered man in himself alone, apart from his fellow-creatures, in the sole relation of his physical with his moral existence, none ever ventured to say that man’s will should be his only legitimate law, or, what comes to the same thing, that every action should be just and reasonable inasmuch as it was voluntary. All have acknowledged that over the will of the individual soars a certain law, by turns called reason, morality, or virtue, and of which he cannot be regardless without making an absurd or culpable use of his liberty. In all systems, whatever the principle on which the laws of morality and reason are based, whether on interest, sentiment, human conventions, or duty, all, both spiritualists and materialists, sceptics and dogmatists, admit that there are reasonable and unreasonable, just and unjust, actions, and that if the individual remains free to act according or in contradiction to reason, this freedom does not constitute a right, and does not make an act in itself absurd or criminal, cease to be so because it was voluntary.

Moreover; at the moment when the individual about to act endeavours by the use of his intelligence to enlighten his freedom, he perceives the law which truth lays down for him; he perceives at the same time he did not make that law, and that it does not lie in his will to disregard or change it. His will remains free to obey or disobey his reason; but his reason, in its turn, remains independent of his will, and necessarily judges the insubmissive will according to the law which it has perceived.

‘In other words, man has no absolute power over himself by virtue

of his will. As a reasonable and moral being, he is a subject, the subject of laws which he does not make, and which really compel him, although as a free being he has the power of refusing to them, not his concurrence, but his obedience.'

The second volume will most attract the English reader by its luminous characterization of the leading principles of English polity. To the thirteenth and fourteenth lectures we would draw special attention, as exhibiting the sources of the English constitution, and pointing out why England pursued a course unlike that of all other European states.

Elsewhere in Europe the conquest is that of wandering tribes subduing the enervated Roman population; the conquerors are without political organization, the conquered are living amidst the ruins of decrepit civilization. Hence prolonged disorder, ignorance, impossibility of general organization—the reign of Force. The Norman Conquest presents a different aspect. There we see a barbarian people, which has already been established for some two centuries, conquering another barbarian people which has an existence of six centuries. Hence a greater resemblance between the two peoples: they owned the same origin, believed in the same faith, had similar manners and customs, were at pretty much the same stage of civilization, and were animated by the same warlike spirit. Thus, on the same soil two nations stood face to face—the conquerors and the conquered; with no quiet submission on the part of the Saxons, who struggled constantly to preserve their liberties, and in this struggle the race kept up its dignity, although individuals suffered greatly. Always warlike, the oppressed Saxon energetically resisted the tyranny of his oppressors, and by strange combination of events, called upon now to support the Norman barons against the king, and now to support the king against the barons, he finally emancipated himself from the position of victim to that of equal.

The two peoples had, moreover, similar political institutions. In France, Italy, Spain, the Roman populations had, properly speaking, no institutions. The Saxon institutions were never stifled by those of the Norman: they became amalgamated, and finally changed their character. Absolute power, such as flourished on the Continent, never took root in England. There was frequently oppression as a matter of fact; never as a matter of right; tyranny was never legalized.\*

Further, the two peoples had the same religion. On the Continent, the barbarian conqueror adopted the religion of the

\* It may be well to recal in passing, that 'the divine right of kings' was a late introduction. James I. learned it from the continental monarchs, and was the first who proclaimed his absolutism—'Kings are justly called gods. They have

more civilized population. As Grecian culture intellectually subjugated the Roman conqueror, so now Roman culture subdued the Barbarian, Christianity was adopted by the fierce warriors, and almost everywhere the clergy was Roman! In England it was both Norman and Saxon. The consequences were immense. The clergy, instead of following the kings, took its place among the territorial aristocracy, and among the nation. 'Aussi l'ordre politique a presque constamment prédominé en Angleterre sur l'ordre religieux; et depuis la conquête Normande le pouvoir politique du clergé, toujours contesté, a toujours été déclinant.'

From the struggle between the two peoples, Guizot shows us how the differences which separate England from the Continent, in political development, gradually arose. But we must content ourselves with having indicated this point, and refer to the volumes for satisfactory fulness of proof. Were this article devoted to Guizot alone, we could indulge in more copious extract and comment; but his work forms only one illustration of our subject, and we must now pass on to the second upon our list.

Lamartine stands a strong contrast to Guizot, and brings out his merits into striking relief. Of the twofold aspect which History assumes, these two writers may not improperly stand as types—the grander, more general, and more permanent aspect, attracts Guizot—the smaller, more individual, and more dramatic attracts Lamartine; abstract dissertation is the pitfall of the one—gossip and pamphleteering personality that of the other. Guizot too often loses sight of the human agencies and human interests—Lamartine sees nothing but political dramas, and the 'moral' which each drama points: he is essentially a Rhetorician, employing History as a Pamphlet. We have already condemned both methods in their exclusiveness. But if we consider Guizot incomplete, that criticism in no way diminishes our respect for the seriousness and dignity with which he has accomplished his task; given such a purpose as that which he has set before him, and nothing but praise can be awarded to the lofty manner in which he has performed it. The reverse must be said of Lamartine. His purpose is petty; his execution in many respects objectionable.

The reader who has sympathized with the conception of history this article has endeavoured to set forth, may guess how we regard all such mercenary pamphlets as this 'History of the Restora-

the power to make and unmake their subjects, of raising up and casting down, of life and death—and yet accountable to God only.' Charles I. learned in Spain the practice of this theory; and his capital error lay in the endeavour to make it a practice in England.

tion.' The epithet is not too strong. All Lamartine's literary activity since '48 has borne the same sordid stigma. He has discounted his genius; he has made a public sale of his life—the women who loved him, his reputation, truth, art, all sold for a few thousand francs! He is striving to compete with Alexander Dumas in the rapidity and multiplicity of his publications. While editing a daily paper, writing a monthly political review, issuing a new edition of his works with notes, and writing a new literature for the people in the shape of novels—all at the same time—he undertakes to write a History of the Restoration in eight volumes! Undertakes? Nay more, he writes it! Here are the two first, trying to look like Thucydides and Tacitus. The work of years, if done *honestly*; but *that* word was not mentioned in the 'agreement,' therefore the work may be done in a few weeks! The rapidity of its composition may raise the astonishment of simple minds, but to Genius, pressed for money and not oppressed by literary conscience, what is easier than the composition of a work, all the labour of which lies so pleasantly within reach in the pages of Lubis and Vaulabelle? If Dumas can run through history at a hand-gallop while waiting for the proofs of half-a-dozen romances, why may not Lamartine, reposing from the duties of editor, publicist, and romancist, dash off a few volumes on the Restoration? The story is written legibly for him; he has only to robe it in his own spangled style, work up a few tirades, throw in some of the anecdotes which gossip and scandal have tossed to and fro, and season the whole with such reflections as will make it *palpitant d'actualité*. He knows that his name has still the charm of celebrity, and calls up associations of beauty, melancholy, and reverie, in all who have any poetic culture—he knows that the crowd will run after his books as the Roman crowd flocked to hear Statius recite his poems:

'Curritur ad vocem jucundam et carmen amicæ  
'Thebaidos;'

he knows that his style has a glitter and a charm which will cover its defects. Thus assured, he sets to work.

We would fain not be unjust to this book, for we contemplate Lamartine's recent career 'more in sorrow than in anger'; and even this 'History of the Restoration' has its admirable qualities. But the critic who is undazzled by its superficial merits, and who looks seriously at the work, cannot help saying that it is contemptible in spirit and trashy in execution. What! is History to pass out of the Temple of the Muses into the turbulent boulevards? Must the Empire and the Restoration be called up before our eyes that we may refuse to re-elect Louis Napoleon! No one expects the historian to be impartial; he *must* incline towards the side of his own party; but we *do* expect him to keep

above the small agitations of his day, and leave to journalists and pamphleteers the task of assailing the president.

The book is amusing enough, and has some excellent pages; but it must be read with something of the careless haste in which it was written; *then* the copious and sustained magnificence of diction will produce its effect. To a slower reader serious faults will appear; the excessive inaccuracy both of thought and expression will destroy half his pleasure, and without being fastidious he may reasonably object to the barbarisms and affectations which abound in these pages. In the opening paragraph we are told that Napoleon's genius was *posthumous*,—'*son génie était un génie posthume*;' and are amazed to find that Lamartine means exactly the *reverse*, for he says that Napoleon was clear-sighted as to the past, blind to the future. A little further on we are told that 'he assumed the *pose* of destiny': what *does* this mean? Here is another passage from the same description, which we commend to the attention of 'fine writers':—'*Son front semblait s'être élargi sous la nudité de ses cheveux noirs effilés, à demi tombés sous la moiteur d'une pensée continue. On eut dit que sa tête naturellement petite s'était agrandie pour laisser plus librement rouler entre ses tempes les rouages et les combinaisons d'une âme dont CHAQUE PENSÉE ÉTAIT UN EMPIRE! La carte du globe semblait s'être incrustée sur la mappemonde de cette tête.*' Apart from the frippery of this, what nonsense it is! Imagine any man attempting to *describe* another by saying that the map of the world seemed to be encrusted on his head! It suggests unpleasant ideas of ringworm,—that's all.

His description of Marie Louise has been largely quoted. Some critics evidently regard it with envious admiration; and epicures in style may relish such refinements as '*l'attitude affaïssée*' and '*langoureuse de ces Germaines qui semblent avoir besoin de s'appuyer sur le cœur d'un homme*;' and perhaps they understand a '*poitrine pleine de soupirs et de fécondité*,' which is no doubt descriptive, if one only knew what it meant; but why should her admirably sculptured arms fall with a graceful languor as if they were 'wearied with the weight of her destiny'? It is very fine to *say* so, but does any one think they *were* wearied with her destiny? The amusing part of this is, that he gravely winds up the description with—'*This is a true portrait of Marie Louise. I wrote it in her presence ten years afterwards.*'

We might cull pages of such flowers of rhetoric; but are almost ashamed at what we have done; to use Johnson's energetic language, it is 'wasting criticism on unresisting imbecility, on faults too gross for observation, too obvious for detection.'

'Non ragioniam di lor  
Ma guarda e passa!'

As a sample of his style where it is good, we might select his dramatic and attaching story of the judicial murder of the Duc d'Enghien.

That Lamartine is harsh to Napoleon we believe; his antipathy to the nephew having probably deepened some of the colours on his palette; but in the main he rightly judges the political nullity of the emperor, and the instability of the government he attempted to form. The excessive tyranny under which France lived during the empire, Lamartine has vividly and truthfully represented. The nation was thoroughly wearied of Napoleon; sated with glory, it found that glory only brought with it an increase of oppression. To hear the throbbing drums and read the lying gazettes—to talk of the 'conquest of the universe' and *la grande armée*, were but mediocre satisfactions to those who had to *pay* with purse and person for all this glory, and who were not allowed to speak or think as they pleased. France was weary of him: posterity will unreservedly condemn his policy. Lamartine thus sums up his review of Napoleon's reign:—

'Every reign, however, must have a propelling spirit; and he accordingly sought one. Of all those principles, on which the founder of an empire might firmly establish his institutions, such as liberty, equality, progress, intelligence, conscience, election, reasoning, discussion, religion, or public virtue, he chose the most personal and the most immoral of all—glory, or renown. Not caring to convince, to enlighten, to ameliorate, or to improve the morals of his country, he said to himself: 'I shall dazzle it, and by the splendour I reflect upon it I shall fascinate the noblest and the most easily seduced of all its instincts—national glory, or vanity. I shall found my power or my dynasty on a spell. Every nation is not possessed of virtue, but all have pride. The pride of France shall constitute my right.'

'This principle of glory instantly superinduces that of conquest; conquest commands war: and war produces dethronements and the overthrow of nations. Napoleon's reign was nothing but a campaign,—his empire a field of battle as extensive as all Europe. He concentrated the rights of people and of kings in his sword,—all morality in the number and strength of his armies. Nothing which threatened him was innocent; nothing which placed an obstacle in his way was sacred; nothing which preceded him in date was worthy of respect. From himself alone he wished Europe to date its epoch.

'He swept away the Republic with the tread of his soldiers. He trampled on the throne of the Bourbons in exile. Like a murderer, in the darkness of the night, he seized upon the bravest and most confiding of the military princes of this race, the Duc d'Enghien, in a foreign country. He slew him in the ditch of Vincennes by a singular presentiment of crime, which showed him, in this youth, the only armed competitor of the throne against him, or against his race. He conquered Italy, which had been again lost, Germany, Prussia,

Holland (reconquered after Pichegru), Spain, Naples, kingdoms, and republics. He threatened England, and caressed Russia, in order to lull her to sleep. He carved out the continent, made a new distribution of nations, and raised up thrones for all his family. He expended ten generations of France, to establish a royal or imperial dynasty for each of the sons or daughters of his mother. His fame, which grew incessantly in noise and splendour, imparted to France and to Europe that vertigo of glory which hides the immorality and the abyss of such a reign. He created the attraction, and was followed even to the delirium, of the Russian campaign. He floated in a whirlwind of events so vast and so rapid than even three years of errors did not occasion his fall. Glory, which had elevated him, sustained him over the vacuity of all the other principles which he had despised. Spain devoured his armies; Russia served as a sepulchre to 700,000 men; Dresden and Leipsic swallowed up the rest. Germany, exasperated, deserted his cause. The whole of Europe hemmed him in, and pursued him from the Rhine to the Pyrenees, with a mighty tide of people. France, exhausted and disaffected, saw him combat and sink, without raising an arm in his cause. Yet, when he had nothing against the whole world but a handful of soldiers he did not fall. Everything was annihilated around his throne; but his glory remained, still soaring above his head. \* \* \* He at length capitulated, or rather France capitulated without him, and he travelled alone, across his conquered country and his ravaged provinces, the route to his first exile, his only cortège the resentments and the murmurs of his country. What remains behind him of his long reign? for this is the criterion by which God and men judge the political genius of founders. All truth is fruitful, all falsehood barren. In policy, whatever does not create has no existence. Life is judged by what survives it. He left freedom chained, equality compromised by posthumous institutions, feudalism parodied, without power to exist, human conscience re-sold, philosophy proscribed, prejudices encouraged, the human mind diminished, instruction materialized and concentrated in the pure sciences alone, schools converted into barracks, literature degraded by censorship or humbled by baseness, national representation perverted, election abolished, the arts enslaved, commerce destroyed, credit annihilated, navigation suppressed, international hatred revived, the people oppressed, or enrolled in the army, paying in blood or taxes the ambition of an unequalled soldier, but covering with the great name of France the contradictions of the age, the miseries and degradation of the country. This is the founder! This is the man!—a man instead of a revolution!—a man instead of an epoch!—a man instead of a country!—a man instead of a nation!

The translation of this History has been made by Madame de Lamartine (an Englishwoman), and reflects the original both in its faults and beauties, as well, perhaps, as translation can.

We have selected Lamartine because in him the lowest con-



ception of History is best seen. Other Frenchmen—Louis Blanc, Michelet, Cassagnac, Capefigue—have turned History from its loftier aim, and animated it with the passions and prejudices of the day, but (except Capefigue, who is a shameless charlatan) these men have all shown some of the higher qualities; they are men of research, of eager erudition, of philosophic pretensions: although they fasten on the passing and dramatic aspects, they do not forget that History is the story of Humanity, as well as the record of days. We cannot accept their philosophy, but we are bound to recognise their having one. Much of their generalization seems to us at once absurd and futile; while the national tendency to epigram and antithesis leads them into the habit of coercing history into formulas, which may startle and amuse, but can only pervert inquiry. We remember Michelet, in one of his lectures, laying down this formula:—‘Gentlemen, ‘there are two nations—the Jews and the French: and these ‘nations have two books! The book of the Jews, messieurs, is ‘the Bible! The book of the French is the Revolution!’

But we turn from these to the graver Mignet, whose *Life of Mary Queen of Scots* invites careful inspection. It is a solid composition, built up from abundant materials, and in no single chapter exhibiting any of that looseness of texture incidental to the book-maker’s procedure. Not only has he carefully studied this subject in all its intricacies, consulting every known authority and published document, but he has also consulted with great benefit the Spanish MSS. in the archives of Simancas and elsewhere. As an accession to our mass of historical facts, the work deserves a place in our libraries; and we cannot help contrasting its conscientious workmanlike style with the rampant rhetoric of Lamartine; its careful scrutiny of evidence, with his careless reproduction of idle rumour or personal scandal. Criticism may have its reservations with respect to the execution of this biography as a work of art; but it has only praise to give to the serious and conscientious spirit in which it has been executed.

Perhaps the most delicate portion of the historian’s task is the vigilant defence of his moral judgment against the insidious surprises of Romance; delicate, because accompanying this vigilance there must be equal care lest it lead him into the opposite error of totally excluding sentiment and moral sympathy. We would rather he should err on the side of misplaced sympathy, than on that of no sympathy. History is not a game of chess, wherein strategy is everything. The very recognition of it as the story of Humanity, brings into light the *necessity* there is for its calling forth our emotions as well as our intellect. It

must appeal to our veneration, love, sympathy, indignation. We cannot look upon its heroes as lifeless, soulless figures. We must love them or hate them as men. But in saying this, we indicate the delicate nature of historical judgments; in giving full scope to the emotions, how are we to restrict their influence within due limits? The most casual survey of history will show how tyrannously the emotions have coerced judgment—how the romance of history has blinded justice—how nations have been duped by their own sympathies. What do we mean by calling Charles I. a blessed martyr, knowing all the while that he was a martyr to his own untruth? and why do we forget, in the misfortunes of this Charles Stuart, the collective misery of the English People? Simply because he was a king, and his end appalling, like the fifth act of a tragedy! Why is Ravallac held up to execration, and Charlotte Corday to admiration? In each case the crime was the same—assassination; the motive was the same—to rid France of an enemy. But Ravallac slew a *king*—Charlotte Corday slew the squalid, hateful Marat. In the one case, sympathy is with the illustrious victim; in the other, with the beautiful criminal. But before the bar of moral judgment, *both* these assassins are guilty, or both are guiltless.

The romance of history is striking in the story of Mary Queen of Scots. Who does not think of her with tenderness, with pity, with a sort of love? She did, indeed, aid in the murder of her husband, and marry his murderer; but she was so beautiful! so young! so charming! so unhappy! and her death was so solemn and pathetic! She was a false queen, and false wife; but so gay! so lovely! and wrote such pretty verses! Even Mignet, who, with high judicial rigour, suffers all the facts to be established—who proves her to be untruthful, reckless, hypocritical, criminal—yet, when he is not dwelling on these damning evidences, speaks of her with tenderness; and in summing up, is completely under the spell of her fascinations, treating her as an object of romantic interest! We note this as a defect in his work. If he believed her innocent, and wrote to prove the truth of his belief, we could accept his partisanship. But to prove her guilt, and then call upon us for our sympathy! We note further, as a defect of another kind, that he has merely ‘sketched in’ his scenery, so to speak, instead of carefully painting it; he has given us memoranda, in lieu of vividly representing the condition of society at that period. By so doing, he has missed one of the finest opportunities ever presented to an historical artist. The condition of Scotland—its lawless, violent spirit, and its anarchial feudalism—contrasted with the more polished culture of France, in which Mary’s early years were passed, are not forgotten by Mignet, but in his work they

are, as we said, given more in the shape of memoranda than of pictures.

The contrast is very pictorial. One sees the young and pleasure-loving woman, bred up in the gaieties and moral laxities of the French court, suddenly called upon to quit frivolities and commence the stern rule of a turbulent people. Hear Mignet:—

‘The mental and personal attractions of Mary Stuart were early developed. She was tall and beautiful. Her eyes beamed with intelligence, and sparkled with animation. She had the most elegantly-shaped hands in the world. Her voice was sweet, her appearance noble and graceful, and her conversation brilliant. She early displayed those rare charms which were destined to make her an object of universal admiration, and which rendered even her infancy seductive. She had been brought up with the daughters of Catherine de Medici, and under the superintendence of the learned Margaret of France, the sister of Henry II., the protectress of Michel de l’Hôpital, and who subsequently married the Duke of Savoy. The court in the midst of which Mary Stuart had grown up, was then the most magnificent, the most elegant, the most joyous, and, we must add, one of the most lax, in Europe. Still retaining certain military customs of the middle ages, and at the same time conforming to the intellectual usages of the time of the *renaissance*, it was half chivalric and half literary,—mingling tournaments with studies, hunting with erudition, mental achievements with bodily exercises, the ancient and rough games of skill and strength with the novel and delicate pleasures of the arts. Nothing could equal the splendour and vivacity which Francis I. had introduced into his court, by attracting thither all the principal nobility of France, by educating as pages therein young gentlemen from all the provinces, by adorning it with nearly two hundred ladies belonging to the greatest families in the kingdom, and by establishing it sometimes in the splendid palaces of Fontainebleau and St. Germain, which he had either built or beautified, on the banks of the Seine, and sometimes in the spacious castles of Blois and Amboise, which his predecessors had inhabited, on the banks of the Loire. A careful imitator of his father’s example, Henry II. kept up the same magnificence at his court, which was presided over with as much grace as activity by the subtle Italian, Catherine de Medici; whose character had been formed by Francis I., who had admitted her into the *petite bande de ses dames favorites*, with whom he used to hunt the stag, and frequently sport with alone in his pleasure-houses! The men were constantly in the company of the women; the Queen and her ladies were present at all the games and amusements of Henry II. and his gentlemen, and accompanied them in the chase. The king, on his part, together with the noblemen of his retinue, used to pass several hours every morning and evening in the apartments of Catherine de Medici. ‘There,’ says Brantôme, there were a host of human goddesses, some more beautiful than the others;

every lord and gentleman conversed with her whom he loved the best; whilst the king talked to the queen, his sister, the dauphiness (Mary Stuart), and the princesses, together with those lords and princes who were seated nearest to him. As the kings themselves had avowed mistresses, they were desirous that their subjects should follow their example. 'And if they did not do so,' says Brantôme, 'they considered them coxcombs and fools.' Francis I. had taken as his mistresses, alternately, the Countess de Chateaubriand and the Duchess d'Etampes; and Henry II. was the chivalrous and devoted servant of the Grand Senechal of Normandy, Diana of Poitiers. But besides their well-known amours, they had other intrigues; and Francis I., in his unblushing licentiousness, prided himself on training the ladies who arrived at his court. His second in this work of debauchery and corruption was Mary Stuart's uncle, the opulent and libertine Cardinal of Lorraine. It was in this school of elegance and depravity, which produced kings so witty and vicious, and princesses so amiable and dissipated, that Mary Stuart received her education. During her childhood, she only derived benefit from it, although she could not fail to perceive what was evil, and afterwards to imitate it; for what we see, is sure eventually to influence what we do. But then she profited simply by the charms and instruction diffused throughout this agreeable and literary court, in which the king's daughters devoted themselves to the study of languages, and cultivated a taste for the arts, and every prince had his poet:—Francis I., Marot; Henry II., Saint-Gelais; Charles IX., Ronsard; Henry III., Desportes.'

Mignet shows how the Court of France first taught Mary the fatal and foolish duplicity which afterwards ruined her. She '*débutait dans la vie et dans la royauté, par un acte de faiblesse et de trahison*;' a bad beginning truly! and when her husband the dauphin died, she found herself helpless in France, unloved in her own kingdom. Her marriage had weakened royalty in Scotland, and reunited the turbulent nobility. The Reformation had thus become triumphant. When Mary returned to Scotland she returned as a stranger. The poor cold country, the rude and violent people, the absence of that splendour and that grace to which she had been accustomed in France, and which responded to her own instincts of elegance and gaiety—all made her feel like a stranger in her own kingdom. She wept bitterly on leaving France; she wept on seeing Scotland. And the night of her arrival at Edinburgh, the loyal citizens serenaded her with sombre psalms and melancholy music, as if to make her feel that she was in a land where the religion itself was an insult to her!

Mignet has touched this in passing; but he has not made the most of it, nor of the position of the religious parties at that time. Knox, of course, is a conspicuous figure, and stands out in sturdy contrast:—

'Mary desired to see Knox, and, perhaps, hoped to mollify him, and attach him to herself. In an interview which she had with him, she discussed the duties of the Christian and the subject. She pointed out to him that, in his book against female government, he excited nations to rebel against their rulers; and she advised him to treat with greater charity those who differed from him in matters of religious belief. 'If, madam,' said Knox, 'to rebuke idolatry, and to persuade the people to worship God according to his Word, be to raise subjects against their princes, I cannot stand excused, for so have I acted; but if the true knowledge of God, and his right worship, lead all good subjects (as they assuredly do) to obey the prince from their heart, then who can reprehend me?' He then professed his willingness to live in all contentment under her Majesty's government, so long as the blood of the saints was not shed; and he maintained that, in religion, subjects were bound to follow, not the will of the prince, but the commands of their Creator. 'If,' said he, 'all men in the days of the Apostles should have been compelled to follow the religion of the Roman emperors, where would have been the Christian faith?' The queen, drawing a judicious distinction between conscientious dissent and rebellious insurrection, replied, 'But these men did not resist.' 'And yet,' answered Knox, 'they who obey not the commandment may virtually be said to resist.' 'Nay,' rejoined Mary, 'they did not resist with the sword.' 'That,' said Knox, 'was simply because they had not the power.' At this candid and bold declaration, that power conferred the right of insurrection, and that weakness was the only reason for submission to princes, Mary Stuart exclaimed in astonishment, 'What! do you maintain that subjects, having power, may resist their princes?' The fanatical reformer, who considered that the state should be subordinate to religion, did not hesitate to adopt these consequences of his theory. 'Most assuredly, madam,' he replied, 'if princes exceed their bounds.' Then comparing sovereigns, who, in their blind zeal, would persecute the children of God, to a father who, struck with madness, should attempt to slay his own children, whose duty it would be to bind and disarm him, Knox continued—'Therefore, to take the sword from them, to bind their hands, and to cast them into prison till they be brought to a more sober mind, is no disobedience against princes, but just obedience, because it agreeth with the word of God.' Mary was utterly amazed. A doctrine so subversive of all authority, which made subjects judges of the obedience which they owed to their rulers, and which authorized them to revolt at the instigation of their spiritual leaders, filled her with alarm. She pictured to herself the terrible future which was reserved for her, a catholic queen, in the midst of these haughty and insubordinate protestants, with their stern and fanatical ministers. She had no strength to answer, for she felt reply was useless. She fell into a melancholy silence, and 'stood as it were amazed, for more than a quarter of an hour.'

But we must quit this portion of the subject for that of Mary's

more personal history. Up to this point she seems mainly the victim of untoward circumstances. She has a difficult game to play and does not play it well. But her conduct with regard to Chastelard, Rizzio, and Darnley, brings out the intrinsic worthlessness of her nature. With regard to Chastelard it may be said that she was only imprudent—and her imprudence reminds one forcibly of that which lost Marie Antoinette in the estimation of her people. That she behaved unbecomingly both as queen and woman there can be no doubt—as Knox says, it was ‘more lyke to the bordell than to the comelyness of honest women.’ It is, indeed, enough to excuse Chastelard’s presumption when we hear that ‘the queen wold ly upoun Chattelet’s shoulder, and sometymes privly she wold steal a kiss of his necke.’ But we will hear Mignet:—

‘Surrounded by a number of young ladies belonging to some of the noblest families in the kingdom, she devoted her leisure hours to music and dancing, or sought relaxation from the cares of business in falconry, or the composition of French verses with those who were as fond of poetry as herself. The earnestness with which she engaged in these amusements, considered unholy and profane by the Presbyterian ministers, had exposed her to their severe reprehensions. Many times had Knox mounted his pulpit to inveigh against the prolonged festivities of that joyous court, destined ere long to become so desolate and sad! ‘Princes,’ said he, ‘are more exercised in fiddling and flinging, than in reading or of hearing God’s most blessed Word. Fiddlers and flatterers, who commonly corrupt the youth, are more precious in their eyes than men of wisdom and gravity, who, by wholesome admonition, might beat down in them some part of that vanity and pride, whereunto all are born, but in princes take deep root and strength by wicked education.’ Dancing was denounced as bitterly as music by this rigid censor, who did not fail to refer in his remarks upon it to the tragical history of Herodias and John the Baptist.

‘Unhappily for the amiable and light-hearted Mary, excessive familiarity exposed her at this time to indiscreet attacks. The respect due to the queen was forgotten in the great liberty allowed by the woman. One Captain Hepburn ventured to behave towards her with brutal indelicacy, and escaped punishment only by flight. His example did not, however, serve as a warning to the unfortunate Chastelard. He was a gentleman of Dauphiny, descended on his mother’s side from the Chevalier Bayard, highly accomplished, a good musician, and an agreeable poet. He formed one of the suite of M. de Damville, when that nobleman came into Scotland with Mary Stuart, of whom he was deeply enamoured. He had addressed verses to her, to which Mary had replied by others, and he had allowed himself to fall under the influence of an imprudent passion.’

Suffice it here to say, that he lost his head as the punishment of freedoms which such conduct would hardly fail to call forth.

The story of Rizzio is so well known that we need only allude to it, and pass on. Whether Mary was merely imprudent, or whether she really loved him, does not distinctly appear; and in all such doubtful cases it is well to take the generous side, and give the accused the benefit of the doubt. We have long made up our minds as to Mary's guilt in the Darnley murder. That guilt is so great, it kills within us anything like sympathy for the beautiful queen. If we are to become 'interested' in Madame Laffarge, we may become so in Mary, Queen of Scots; but if adultery, hypocrisy, and murder, are to rouse moral indignation, then we say Mary Stuart must be smitten from the pedestal on which Romance has placed her.

Harsh words these; but the facts are harsh. Beauty, youth, grace, sprightliness, accomplishments,—we admit them all, we admire them all,—but they will not efface guilt, they will not wipe out the stains of blood. That Mary Stuart was very charming we are quite assured; does not her spell continue still, stretching through the centuries? But the charm must not be accepted for more than it is. Place Mary Stuart in the Court of France, to live a life of facile and graceful pleasures, and she will be the 'observed of all observers,' the idol of all hearts.

‘If to her lot some trifling errors fall,  
Look in her face and you'll forget them all.’

Such influence has beauty, youth, gaiety! But let her be removed from the French court, and thrown into the struggle of life—to be, to do, and to suffer—then, alas! these charming qualities will no longer suffice.

Darnley she loved, in her capricious, vehement, sensual way; then tired of him, despised him, and after the murder of Rizzio, very justifiably *hated* him. Nothing can be more intelligible than the process of this passion, and as the unhappy wife, Mary is an object of pity; but she loses all hold on our sympathy by her subsequent conduct. Hating Darnley, she easily falls in love with the audacious, violent, enterprising Bothwell. He is also married; but for his poor wife—is not divorce practicable? and for Darnley—a quiet midnight murder removes him! Thus Bothwell arranges it. But was Mary cognizant of his plans? Did she aid in the murder? We have said that on this point we have no doubts. The reader will, however, desire to see it established, and with Mignet's aid we will endeavour to do so.

‘She still retained feelings of distrust and animosity towards Darnley, whom she now accused of conspiring against her life. According to statements attributed to William Hiegate and William Walcar, two servants of the archbishop of Glasgow, but which they

denied when they were interrogated and confronted, the king had resolved to seize the person of the young prince, his son, to have him crowned without delay, and to govern in his name. Out of fear of this chimerical plot, the queen removed the prince royal from Stirling to Edinburgh. . . . . The day after she had expressed herself with such suspicious severity of Darnley, she set out for Glasgow, to lavish marks of the strongest affection upon him whom she judged so unfavourably, and detested so thoroughly. Darnley, who was still an invalid, was greatly surprised at this unexpected visit. He knew that Mary Stuart had recently spoken of him in very harsh terms, and he had received some vague warnings of the Craigmillar conspiracy. He did not conceal his apprehensions from the queen, but told her that he had learned from the Laird of Minto, that she had refused to sign a paper which had been presented to her, authorizing his seizure, and if he resisted, his assassination. He added, that he would never think that she, who was his own proper flesh, would do him any hurt; and then, with more vanity than confidence, he declared that if any others should intend to injure him, he would sell his life dear, unless they took him sleeping. Mary in her turn reminded him of his intention to retire to the Continent, and of the project attributed to him by Hiegate and Walcar. He affirmed that he had never been serious in his threats of departure, and denied the second charge with vehemence. After having reproached him with his fears and suspicions, and evinced more gentleness and less aversion towards him than usual, Mary had no difficulty in regaining all her former influence over him.'

Mignet confesses that, blinded by passion, and obedient to the ferocious will of her lover, Mary Stuart systematically cajoled Darnley, duped him into confidence that she might successfully betray him. Was this so? Her own letters are fatally explicit. Writing to Bothwell, of Darnley, she says, that he never was more subdued and gentle, and if she knew not from experience that his heart was soft as wax, and hers as hard as diamond, she would have been ready to take pity on him. '*Si je n'eusse appris par l'experience combien il avait le cœur mol comme cire et le mien estre dur comme diamant, peu s'en eust fallu que je n'eusse pitié de luy. Toutefois ne craignez rien !*' She further writes:—

'*In brief, he will not come with me unless upon this condition, that I will promise to use in common with him a single table and the same bed as before; and that I shall not leave him so often; and that if I will do this, he will do all I wish, and will follow me.*' Carried away by the violence of her love, she told Bothwell that she would obey him in all things; and begged him not to conceive a bad opinion of her; 'because,' she continues, 'you yourself are the occasion of it. I would never act against him to gratify my own private revenge.' She did not conceal the object she had in view—an object which was



attained two months after the murder of Darnley, by Bothwell's divorce from Lady Jane Gordon, and marriage to herself.'

Propos of Lady Jane Gordon, a shocking phrase escapes her; one which, to our minds, carries more of implied wickedness than all the rest. She reminds Bothwell that for him she fears neither honour, *conscience*, danger, nor the loss of her own greatness (a sufficiently plain avowal one would think), and warns him against the *feigned tears* of his wife—tears not to be placed in the balance against her devotion—'against the deeds I do to reach her place.' 'Ne regardez point à celle de laquelle les feintes larmes ne vous doivent estre de si grand poids que les fidèles travaux que je souffre afin que je puisse mériter de parvenir en son lieu!'

This is surely enough to prove her complicity? Mignet says:—

'The original plan of conducting the king to Craigmillar had been abandoned, because he had evinced great repugnance for the place. But he had consented to remain at Kirk of Field until his health should be completely restored. \* \* \* This house had formerly belonged to the prebendaries of the Kirk of Field, and was not at all adapted for the reception of a king and queen. Small, confined, and ill-furnished, it consisted only of two stories, one of which contained a cellar and another room, and the other a gallery which extended above the cellar, and a bed-chamber which corresponded with the room on the ground floor. Nelson, Darnley's servant, when he arrived at Kirk of Field, was about to prepare the Duke of Chatelherault's house for the reception of his master; but the queen prevented him, and directed him to Balfour's house, whither the necessary furniture was conveyed, and which Bothwell had evidently chosen that he might carry out his murderous intentions with greater facility. Darnley was established on the first floor, where his three servants, Taylor, Nelson, and Edward Simons, occupied the gallery, which served at once as a wardrobe and cabinet. The cellar on the ground floor was transformed into a kitchen, and the queen had a bed prepared for herself in the room immediately below that in which the king slept. She also directed that the door at the foot of the staircase, which communicated between the ground-floor and the upper rooms, should be removed. Thus installed, though very uncomfortably, by Darnley's side, she passed several nights under the same roof with him. Her assiduity, her attention, and the manifold proofs which she gave him of her affection, were all well calculated to dispel his fears. Whilst Mary Stuart seemed to have returned to her former affection for Darnley, Bothwell was occupied in making all due preparations for the murder. In addition to those accomplices of high rank, whose co-operation he had secured at Craigmillar, and on subsequent occasions, in order that he might carry out his design with

impunity, he had procured a number of subaltern assistants to put it into execution. His chamberlain Dalgleish, his tailor Wilson, his porter Powrie, Laird James of Ormiston and his brother Robert, and two men-at-arms, Hay of Tallo, and Hepburn of Bolton, whose courage and devotedness he had amply tested during his border warfare, were admitted into his confidence, and unhesitatingly became his instruments. He had false keys made, by means of which easy access could be gained into Balfour's house; and he sent to Dunbar for a barrel of gunpowder, which was to be placed underneath the king's apartment, and to destroy the house and its inmates by its explosion. The assistance of the Frenchman, Paris, whom he had placed in Mary Stuart's service, was indispensable to him for the purpose of ascertaining whether the false keys were exactly similar to those in use, and of placing the powder in the room occupied by the queen below Darnley's bed-chamber. . . . . He enabled Bothwell to compare the keys of the house with the false ones he had made, and promised to introduce Hay of Tallo, Hepburn, and Ormiston, into the queen's chamber on the evening appointed for the execution of the murder, that they might deposit the powder there whilst the queen was with Darnley. Bothwell had forbidden Paris to place the queen's bed immediately under that of the king, because he intended to have the powder strewed there. Paris did not attend to this; and when Mary Stuart came into the room in the evening, she herself ordered him to change the position of the bed. The night of Sunday the 9th of February was fixed for the execution of this horrible design. Mary Stuart's conduct, when the time for the murder drew near, is but too well calculated to confirm the accusations which result from the depositions of the witnesses, the confessions of the perpetrators, and her own letters. Nelson says that she caused a bed of new velvet to be removed from the king's apartment, and substituted an old one in its place. Paris declares that she also removed from her own chamber a rich coverlet of fur, which she was doubtless desirous not to leave there on the evening of the explosion. On the Sunday she came to spend the evening with the king, whom she had assured that she would remain in Balfour's house during the night. Whilst she was talking familiarly with him in the room upstairs, the preparations for his death were actively going on below. On the previous evening, Hepburn had brought the barrel containing the powder into the nether hall of the lodging occupied by Bothwell in Holyrood Abbey. Before evening, on Sunday, Bothwell had assembled all his accomplices in that same room, had concerted his plan with them, and had allotted to each the part he was to perform in the nocturnal tragedy. At about ten o'clock in the evening the sacks of powder were carried across the gardens, by Wilson, Powrie, and Dalgleish, as far as the foot of Blackfriars Wynd, where they were received by Hay of Tallo, Hepburn, and Ormiston, and conveyed into Balfour's house by the assistance of Paris. As soon as the powder had been strewed in heaps over the floor of the room, just beneath the king's bed, Ormiston went away, but Hepburn and Hay

of Tallo remained with their false keys in the queen's bed-chamber. When all was ready, Paris went up into the king's room, and the queen then recollected that she had promised to be present at a masquerade, given in Holyrood Palace, in honour of the marriage of her servant Bastian with Margaret Carwood, one of her favourite women. She therefore took farewell of the king, left the house with her suite, including Bothwell, and proceeded by torchlight to Holyrood. Darnley beheld her departure with grief and secret fear. The unhappy prince, as though foreboding the mortal danger by which he was threatened, sought consolation in the Bible, and read the fifty-fifth Psalm, which contained many passages adapted to his peculiar circumstances. After his devotion, he went to bed and fell asleep, Taylor, his young page, lying beside him in the same apartment.'

The crime is consummated: Darnley is no more. Here the moralist is forced to pronounce judgment; here the historian is coerced into severity; here even the biographer cannot escape from the damning evidence, but must declare his heroine guilty. Mignet—to do him justice—makes no attempt to shield her guilt under sophisms or palliations. He says:—

'What was the effect produced upon Mary Stuart by this terrible occurrence, which filled Edinburgh with indignation and mistrust? She appeared overwhelmed with sorrow, and fell into a state of silent dejection. She manifested none of that activity, anger, resolution, and courage which she had displayed after Rizzio's murder; but shut herself up in her room, and would communicate with her most faithful servants by the medium of Bothwell alone. Darnley's murderer was the only person admitted to her presence. Even were we not furnished with the most unquestionable proofs of her complicity by the confessions contained in her letters, the authenticity of which we have established elsewhere, as well as by the declarations made in presence of their judges and upon the scaffold, by the subaltern actors in this tragic drama, her conduct both before and after the murder would suffice to convince us that she was a party to the crime. Her journey to Glasgow, at a time when she was loudest in her expressions of distrust and hatred of Darnley; the marks of tenderness and hopes for reconciliation which she had displayed towards him, in order to induce him to come with her to Edinburgh; the selection of Balfour's house, which was convenient only for the commission of a crime, and wherein she consented to reside that he might not refuse to remain in it; the care with which, on the evening before the murder, she removed from it all the furniture of any value which it contained; the conveyance of the powder and introduction of the two principal assassins into her own room, where neither the powder could have been strewn nor the murderers concealed without her consent, as she might otherwise have come down stairs and discovered all; and finally, her departure from Balfour's house, where she had promised to pass the night, a few hours before Darnley was killed and the house blown into the air—

prove only too conclusively that she was acquainted with the whole plot.'

'But if her conduct previous to the commission of the crime thus deeply criminales Mary Stuart, what must we think of her proceedings after its perpetration? Her behaviour, both as a wife and a queen, render her guilt all the more flagrant, because, far from avenging the husband upon whom she had so recently lavished her hypocritical caresses, she rewarded his murderer, and eventually married him. It will now be our task to unveil the sad picture of her errors and her punishment. Horror-struck as she appeared to be, Mary Stuart left the task of communicating this catastrophe to the French court to her privy council, which was almost entirely composed of accomplices in the murder, and the secretary and guide of which was Lethington, one of its principal instigators.

\* \* \* \* \*

'After having endeavoured to conciliate the favourable opinion of the court of France, she at length decided, on Wednesday, the 12th of February, to offer, by proclamation, two thousand pounds reward to any who would come forward with information regarding the perpetrators of the crime. Scarcely was this made known, when public opinion gave utterance to its convictions, and a paper was fixed during the night on the door of the Tolbooth, or common prison, in which Bothwell, James Balfour, and David Chambers (another of Bothwell's intimates) were denounced as guilty of the king's slaughter. Voices, too, were heard in the streets of Edinburgh at dead of night, arraigning the same persons. A second placard charged the queen's servants with the crime, and mentioned the names of Signor Francis, Bastian, John de Bourdeaux, and Joseph, David Riccio's brother. The queen took no steps to secure the subaltern conspirators, and kept the greatest criminal of them all by her side.'

If after this the reader has any doubts of Mary's guilt, we despair of convincing him.

Our limits warn us not to pursue this examination of Mignet's work, but rather to glance at the last book on our list, the *Histoire de la Convention Nationale*, by Barante. We must recur to the general principles laid down in the opening of this article; they apply to Barante's work more obviously than to any of the others named. He is perfectly aware, and has admirably stated the twofold aspect of History: the one when it is the living drama of an epoch, the other when it is 'un chapitre de la grande histoire generale d'une nation ou même de l'humanité.' But although he sees that History presents this twofold aspect, he has evidently no faith in the ability of reigning philosophies to seize the grander and more philosophical aspect. When the writer has not the requisite impartiality—when he is under the yoke of his own prejudices and opinions (who is not?), his nar-

rative should be read with more suspicion than the passionate testimonies of contemporaries; facts assume an arbitrary signification; personages become fictions of the author; situations have a factitious colouring; and the whole picture is the conception of the artist, not the representation of reality. True, most true; the testimony of a contemporary is certain to be incomplete, prejudiced, narrowed to the horizon of the moment; but at any rate it is true to some extent: it is a spark of the actual fire; it gives us, if nothing else, an expression of the passion and the prejudice created by the epoch in one section of society. But although the systematic historian, if his system be false, may grossly pervert reality, yet we must remember that a system is indispensable to the historian. To take our view of an epoch from contemporaries is to close the eyes to what is eternal, to forego all attempt to read the story of Humanity, to sacrifice History to Journalism. Barante, in accordance with his well-known principle of composition, has written about the 'Convention' as much as possible in the language of its contemporaries. He has done great service by this work; we thank him heartily for it; but we cannot accept it for what it assuredly is not—a History. Pretending to be free from all trammels of system, (an universal pretension,) he undertakes to write in the simply *descriptive* style: *scribere ad narrandum non ad probandum*. Hence the introduction of the actual speeches of the orators:—"On n'a point voulu connaître les hommes par leurs fruits; peut-être consentira-t-on à les juger par leurs paroles!" Plausible and dexterous, but very unhistoric! Barante, who has no love for the Revolution or its heroes, hopes to render them odious by quoting the words which escaped them in the passion of debate; but reflection might have shown him that such a procedure was more than unfair, it was unwise; for if the revolutionists uttered 'wild and whirling words,' and we are to judge them by their words, it is equally certain that their speeches were filled with sentiments of lofty philanthropy, of religious enthusiasm, of passionate love for their country, and of intense yearning for justice—shall we also judge of them by *these* words?

So much for the method Barante has pursued. It has its advantages; the book is well worthy of the student's notice; but as a principle of historical composition, we repeat, the method is essentially vicious. The animus is undisguised. He confesses that it would not have been written but for the Revolution of 1848: a crisis he attributes to the false notions entertained by the movement party of the old Revolution and its heroes! The incapacity of M. Barante for anything like a philosophical interpretation of events is unsurpassed. His book has blunders

so gross that we are ashamed to rectify them. *Ex uno disce omnes* : he declares that the great European war was the work of the Republicans—on their heads must fall the blood, the odium, the misery of that long struggle. Now any child could tell him that the blame, if blame there be, must fall equally on the Royalists as on the Republicans. Had it not been for *their* fanatical vehemence opposing the fanatical vehemence of the Republicans, there would have been no European war. In the Revolutions of 1830, and more particularly of 1848, there was no such calamity; simply because there was no such effective *resistance* on the part of the Royalists.

Not as a philosopher, but as a painter, must we accept Barante. The opinions he sets forth are often childish; the portraits are painted with a partial hand; but the liveliness of the narrative, and the excellence of its distribution, together with the liberal use of the actual language of the actors, render it both an attractive and a valuable work. We should add that only two volumes are as yet published, and they bring the narrative down to the defection of Dumouriez.

We must bring this survey to a close. The subject was too vast to be fitly compassed within such limits as a journal could afford it; and we have therefore restricted ourselves to the great lines of the inquiry, leaving it to others interested in the subject to fill up the details, both of historical composition and of particular criticism, to the several works mentioned. We are somewhat of Pliny's opinion, that no history can be so bad as to be without interest; all the labours, even of the stupidest men, facilitate the labours of successors, and add to the great accumulated store from whence a true philosophy of History will one day be evolved.

ART. VII. *God in Christ*. Three Discourses, delivered at New Haven, Cambridge, and Andover. With a Preliminary Dissertation on Language. By HORACE BUSHNELL. London: John Chapman, 142, Strand. 1850.

THESE 'Discourses' are prefaced by a 'Dissertation on Language,' the great object of which seems to be, to cast discredit on language as a fitting vehicle of thought,—to show 'that it is probably incapable of such definite and determinate use as we have supposed it to be in our theological speculation.' Some effort is made, also, to ridicule logic as a worthless thing, more likely to lead to wrong conclusions than to right. But we may safely ignore this

whole 'Dissertation,' as Mr. Bushnell himself practically ignores it in the following discourses—using language as if it really *could* convey his own ideas, and employing logic as if it really *could* help in the establishment of truth. Putting what Mr. Bushnell has *said* about the impotence of language and logic on the one side, and what he has *attempted by the use of both* on the other, the legitimate inference is—that the inaptness of language, from its physical origin, to metaphysical subjects, pertains to it as used in relation to other people's metaphysics, never in any conceivable case as used in relation to Mr. Bushnell's; and so of the implement called logic. Both become everything that could be desired, as wielded by our author, and in exposition of *his* theology—but both become nothing, worse than nothing, in other hands, and as applied to *another* theology. Locke taught long since the sensational origin of our ideas, and, as a consequence, the physical origin of human language, but it has been left to our author to push the sensational theory to the farthest verge of absurdity. Mr. Bushnell's course of proceeding is so unique, that we scarcely know which to admire most, its relation to reason or to modesty.

After the 'Dissertation' comes the 'Introductory,' in which our author talks largely of his 'Discourses,' and of the effects which they are likely to produce. He admits, very quietly, that his views are contradictory; but then he can easily admit this without incurring the least dishonour, since 'there is no book in the world that contains so many repugnances' as the Bible, and since the Gospel of John is the 'most contradictory' production ever penned. This is somewhat free talk—more so than is to our taste.

At last, come the Discourses *ad Clerum*. Mr. Bushnell, it seems, has been greatly censured for them. But what are the doctrines he propounds? We forgot, Mr. Bushnell repudiates dogmas. He does not address himself to 'the reason, or logical understanding,' but rather to the feelings and the imagination: and the result is, the dreamy, mystical character of his whole book, in which there is scarcely anything definite, anything of which the mind can lay hold, anything to satisfy the lover of truth who wishes for some clear exposition of the principles of Divine revelation. It has never been our lot to look into a book of so much pretension, that has proved to be so unsatisfactory and tantalizing. Even after the 'Dissertation' and 'Introductory,' we are scarcely prepared for so much of the indefinite and misty. And what adds to one's annoyance, is, the circumstance, that the author goes on quietly talking about what obviously he does not understand any more than the reader; dogmatizing most dogmatically against dogmas and dogmatists, censuring the Unitarian and Trinitarian systems—systems which at least we can under-

stand, and substituting for them clouds of mysticism; and very quietly misrepresenting the views of the Trinity and of the person of Christ as held by the orthodox.

As, however, we have heard that the book before us has secured acceptance in some quarters, we shall proceed to take some notice of the dogmas propounded in it. And this word dogma reminds us of the last discourse of the three, which is wholly devoted to dogma; being entitled 'Dogma and Spirit.' The 'Dissertation' and 'Introductory' form the advance guard of Mr. Bushnell's work, while 'Dogma and Spirit' constitute the rear-guard; discourses one and two, on the 'Divinity' and 'Atonement' of Christ, being the main division, which it is the author's great concern to preserve from destruction by the strong guards which he has posted, like a wise general, front and rear. His object in this last discourse is to bring dogma into disgrace, and to set it in opposition to spirit. We have often thought, and we think so still, that the outcry against dogmas, now so fashionable, is one of the most senseless ever uttered. What is a dogma? Mr. Bushnell himself defines it as 'an opinion.' 'Two elements,' he says, 'enter into the notion of dogma—first, an opinion, which is 'some decision of natural judgment, or some merely theologic conclusion. Secondly, the propounding or holding of that opinion 'as a rule to the opinions, the faith, or the Christian experience, 'whether of ourselves or of others.'—(p. 275.) It is, in fact, another word for *doctrine*, as the latter word is usually understood. But taking Mr. Bushnell's definition as it stands, we ask him, is it wrong to form opinions, to come to definite conclusions, as the result of our study of God's works, or of God's word? Is it wrong, when we have found such opinions, or received such doctrines, believing them to be from God, to allow them to influence our modes of feeling and acting? or must we receive what we believe to be the truths of God, and yet not allow them to affect our emotions or our conduct? We need not dwell on the absurdity involved in Mr. B.'s words: holding opinions as the rule of our opinions—that may pass. But, according to Mr. B., when we have adopted the dogmas, that God is, that God is one, that God is just, and holy, and good, that man must be holy in order to hold communion with God; we must not allow these conceptions to rule us in relation to ourselves or to others. Nor, in fact, according to the anti-dogma men, must we receive them at all, but try to extract the 'spirit' from them by some mystico-chemical process, and then fling them away as the worthless residuum! If this is not the meaning of Mr. Bushnell and others, loud in their outcries against dogmas, what is it? If they only intended to decry false dogmas—dogmas dishonouring to God, and injurious



to the human soul, we should heartily accord with them. Or, if they meant to denounce the habit, alas! too common, of resting satisfied with theological opinions, however excellent, merely as opinions, without yielding the heart and conduct to their influence, and deeming the profession of such opinions a sufficient substitute for vital piety, here, again, they should have our hearty concurrence. Or if, further, it were their object to condemn the elevating of mere speculative and metaphysical notions into the place of the great centre truths of Christianity, into terms of communion in a church of Christ, here, again, we should most cheerfully and earnestly unite our voice with theirs to explode a practice so injurious. But none of these is their object. Their object rather seems to be, to produce a spirit of latitudinarianism in regard to religious opinions, that a very general feeling of scepticism on this subject may be quietly borne with.

And yet the very men who denounce 'dogma,' and exalt 'spirit,' as if there were no spirit in dogmas,—as if dogma and spirit were *necessarily* distinct, or opposed to each other, are the keenest in the world in defence of those dogmas on which they can each inscribe '*my own*.' This is, in fact, the great result at which they aim—viz., to explode all dogmas, except the darling ones which they can call their own. Now, if they said this openly and manfully,—if they would look us in the face and say, 'Gentlemen, your dogmas are all false; ours only are true; receive what we teach, if you are wise;' we might be amused at the modesty of such an announcement, but that would be at least intelligible. When, however, we hear their words of reprobation aimed against dogmas, and see their acts of fondness towards dogmas of their own, we cannot but feel indignant at conduct so inconsistent, or so dishonest, or both. Mr. B. has dogmas of his own, latitudinarian as he is, and for which he would stiffly contend with Newman, Emerson, or Theodore Parker, who, no doubt, would severely condemn him for being so enraptured with dogmas. And yet this dogmatic Mr. Bushnell denounces dogma as the root of all evil in the Church. The Apostles and first Christians had no dogmas! But the Church by a dire necessity fell into dogma and lost all her spirit—dogma still reigns, ruining everything spiritual; and until dogma is dead, and buried without hope of a resurrection, spiritual Christianity will never flourish on the earth. Away, then, with dogma for ever!—may it perish eternally!—except—the Bushnell-dogma.

Mr. B. would not, at once, destroy all creeds, confessions, and platforms—not yet, but gradually, and after a time. There is, however, one creed he would retain. No sight would appear to him more sublime and glorious than to see all the disciples of

Christ on earth—Unitarians, Trinitarians, Puseyites, Papists, Mormons, and the rest—standing up and repeating the ‘Apostles’ Creed’—‘their common property,’ omitting, however, the heretical dogma, ‘he descended into hell.’ Having attained this height of perfection, this state of unity, this mount of spiritual concord, Mr. Bushnell’s most earnest aspirations would be satisfied, and his loftiest imaginings abundantly realized.

One word more as to dogma and spirit. We hear many talk of extracting the spirit of Christianity and getting rid of dogma. But we have felt anxious to know how this is to be done. If you discard the doctrinal and historical truths of Christianity, whence is the spirit to be derived? There is a spirit in the truths, or dogmas, of the New Testament, and these are practically valuable on account of the spirit they possess and breathe. But would you destroy the dogmas to get the spirit? Or is it by such a destruction that the spirit can be elicited? The truths once cast away, we fear the spirit will soon evaporate. It cannot exist apart from its doctrinal, or, if you will, its dogmatic vehicle. Preservation of the doctrine seems then, after all, to be the wisest plan to secure the spirit—‘Thy words have I hid in my heart, that I might not sin against thee.’ ‘Let the word (doctrine) of Christ dwell in you richly.’ Let, then, the dogma, or doctrine, dwell in the heart, and not be held merely by the intellect,—let it be made the object of continual meditation, and it will impart the spirit abundantly to enlighten, purify, and enliven the soul. The spirit dwells in the truth alone; it has no other abode, and can have no other. Hold fast, then, the dogma, the true dogma, the truth, if you would possess the spirit. If, however, the truth of God is to be rejected under the reproach of being so much mere dogma, the consequences of such a conclusion should be weighed before it is acted upon.

Having now examined, cursorily, the first and the last portions of Mr. Bushnell’s work, we shall proceed to its centre parts—to the portions where lie those dogmas for the sake of which the whole book has been written, and in relation to which the ‘Dissertation,’ ‘Introductory,’ and last ‘Discourse’ are intended as a sort of apology.

The ‘Discourse on the Divinity of Christ’ is one of the most inconclusive things we have ever read. What, precisely, is Mr. Bushnell’s view as to the person of Christ we cannot divine. Probably this is imputable to our incompetence to follow the reasonings of an original thinker. To whatever it may be imputed, so it is. We can, however, comprehend some things which occur here. Mr. Bushnell tells the embryo clergy whom he addresses, that he ‘will make the argument as simple and clear’ as he is able,

but reminds them that the subject to be investigated '*is God's own nature.*' (p. 107.) If so, then, how can we be expected to follow him? 'Who can by searching find out God?' When Mr. B. thus plunges into the infinite, what can ordinary minds do, but shrink back abashed? Yet, strange to say, Mr. B. severely censures the orthodox for striving to search out, as he alleges, the '*interior nature of Christ,*' (p. 141,) while he declares, in another place, that he does not '*undertake to fathom the interior nature of God,*' because '*that is a matter too high*' for him, (p. 121.) Still, however, he insists, '*that assuming the strictest unity, and even simplicity, of God's nature, he [God] could not be efficiently or sufficiently revealed to us, without evolving a trinity of persons, such as we meet in the Scriptures,*' (p. 121.) Certainly Mr. B. must be able to '*investigate the divine nature,*' or he could not speak so coolly and certainly of '*God's nature,*' and of what may or may not be evolved from it. Of the power to make such discoveries we confess ourselves wholly destitute. But possessing ability so vast, how is it that Mr. B. does not evince ability to state correctly the views of the orthodox? Thus he says: '*Our orthodox teachers and churches, while professing three persons, also retain the verbal profession of one person. They suppose themselves really to hold that God is one person,*' (p. 116.) It is true that in other places he varies his phraseology, but the result, if not the object, of the whole is, to misrepresent, or at best, to present in a confused and contradictory form, the views of the orthodox respecting the doctrine of the Trinity. We are not sticklers for the technical language of the schools on this subject; but the language in which the orthodox state their view is this: that there are three persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—existing in the unity of the Godhead. They do not say that these three persons are one person, as Mr. B., that he may convict them of speaking foolishly and contradictorily, represents. Such a Trinity in the Godhead Mr. B., with a superabundance of words, rejects. The Trinity he holds is an '*INSTRUMENTAL TRINITY;*' and the persons '*INSTRUMENTAL PERSONS,*' (p. 159.) There may be more in them, he admits. But what he means by the '*instrumental,*' or the '*more,*' we confess our inability to make out. For having discarded the orthodox view of a Trinity of persons in the Godhead, he sometimes speaks of the Trinity in language which is suitable only on the supposition that he holds the very doctrine he rejects, and sometimes as if he held that there are three divine persons distinct from God, through whom God reveals himself to man. Hear his words—

'In and through these living persons, or impersonations, I find the

Infinite One brought down even to my own level of humanity, without any loss of his greatness, or reduction of his Majesty.' 'I perceive, too, that God may as well offer himself to me in these Persons, as through trees, or storms, or stars; that they involve as little contrariety and as few limitations.' 'If I think it more philosophical and simple to conceive God only as one person, that person will really be a finite conception, unwittingly, though very absurdly, taken as Infinite.' 'The ease of this philosophic unity is itself a great fault; for it is as if we had God's measure, and saw his boundaries. He is too clear to be infinite.' . . . . . 'Through a certain feeling of multiplicity and vagueness, we are able to realize God dynamically, as we could through no definite conception of him. Represented as three, God is yet one—the more magnificently one because he is three . . . .'

He adds—

'Whatever may be true of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, it is certainly not true that they are three distinct consciousnesses, wills, and understandings. Or, speaking in a way more positive, they are instrumentally three—three simply as related to our finite apprehension, and the communication of God's incommunicable nature.'—pp. 159, 160.

It is hard to make out what all this means; though Mr. B. must be supposed to have a meaning, and the inaptness of language that we might suppose unequal to such high themes in other hands, must be regarded as quite equal to the task thus assigned to it by our author. We have, however, still to ask, is there really a Trinity of persons, or subsistences, in the Unity of the Godhead? Is God really three in one sense, while he is in another sense one? Some sentences would lead us to believe that Mr. B. so thinks; as, for instance, where he places 'God in three persons' in opposition to the philosophic conception of God as 'one person.' Or, are the three persons *distinct* from God, and only *instruments* by which he reveals himself? Such, it would appear, is Mr. B.'s view, where he says, 'God may as well offer himself to me in these persons, as through trees, and storms, and stars.' Or is the Trinity of persons a mere *fiction*? So we might think Mr. B. holds, as he speaks of God '*represented* as three'—'three as related to our finite apprehension,' 'yet one.' Representatively three, really one; fictitiously three, genuinely one. But how can he be 'three as related to our finite apprehension,' if we apprehend him only as one? He is *three* as related to the finite apprehension of the Trinitarian; he is *one* as related to the finite apprehension of Unitarian. And thus we are the victims of a fictitious representation, while the Unitarian holds the sublime and simple truth.

And then, God has made use of a fictitious representation of himself, though his object in so doing is said to be to make known what he *is*, not what he is *not*. But knowing God by a fictitious representation of him is not knowing him in truth. The Unitarian, according to this view, knows him best. He holds that the Father alone is God; that Christ is in no true sense God, but only an exalted creature through whom God has revealed himself to man; and that the Holy Spirit is only a divine influence, not a personality at all.

But we are constrained to ask Mr. Bushnell, how he has come to know all this about God? God, he admits, 'offers himself to us in three persons,' and is 'represented as three,' yet he knows that he is not three really in his own nature, but only representatively, fictitiously, and in relation to our finite apprehension. How has he made his way into this secret? Is it because he set out resolved 'to investigate the divine nature'? We scarcely need say that pretence to such investigation we repudiate. We know nothing of the *modus existendi* of God—we accept the facts which God has been graciously pleased to reveal. On these facts we never presume to speculate. The Father is revealed as God; the Son is revealed as God; and the Holy Spirit is revealed as God. Had we nothing beyond this we should accept a Trinity of modes, offices, or relations, in which the same Divine Person has revealed himself—a view which has simplicity to recommend it. But while all the names, attributes, and works of Deity are ascribed severally to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, these are distinguished from each other by notes of distinction as if they were three personal agents. We must, then, hold them to be really, and not nominally, modally, or officially, three. And yet God is one. We hold, then, that there is a Trinity of personal substances, or call them by what names men may please, in the unity of the Godhead. *How* this is we know not, nor strive to know. But we must not quit this topic without observing, that whether the fault be in language and logic as applied to such subjects, or in the thinking of Mr. B. or of ourselves as so directed, we find that the effect of ascending so high in his company has only been to feel ourselves enveloped in mist and cloud.

We shall now endeavour to ascertain our author's views of the person of Christ. Mr. B. holds the 'pre-existence' of Christ, the 'miraculous birth' of Christ, the 'incarnation' also; and that Christ is 'in such a sense God, or God manifested, that the unknown term of his nature, that which we are most in doubt of, 'and of which we are least capable of any positive affirmation, is 'the human.' (p. 108.) Again, he says, 'we want Jesus as

divine, not as human.' (p. 109.) Further, he speaks of Christ as 'a subject, suffering being, whose highest and truest reality is 'that he is God.' (p. 121.) All this seems to be plain enough; and in all this, and much more, we concur, saving that we hold Christ's human nature to be a great reality, as well as his divine nature; and that we *do* want to know him as man as well as God. But let us hear what follows:—

'There is in God, taken as the Absolute Being, a capacity of self-expression, so to speak, which is peculiar, a generative power of form, a creative imagination, in which, or by the aid of which, he can produce himself outwardly, or represent himself in the finite. In this respect God is wholly unlike to us. Our imagination is passive, stored with forms, colours, and types of words from without, borrowed from the world we live in. But all such forms God has in himself, and this is the Logos,—the Word,—elsewhere called the Form of God. Now this Word, this Form of God, in which he sees himself, is with God, as John says, from the beginning. It is God mirrored before his own understanding, and to be mirrored in the fragments of the mirror before us. Conceive of him now as creating the world, or creating worlds from eternity. In so doing he only represents, expresses, or outwardly produces himself. He bodies out his own thoughts. What we call the Creation is, in another view, a revelation only, of God, his first revelation. And it is in this view that the Word, or Logos, elsewhere called Christ, or the Son of God, is represented as the Creator of the worlds. . . . God was expressed in the forms and relations of the finite. . . . The divine Word was here. One thing more is possible . . . viz., that as God has produced himself in all the other finite forms of being, so now he should appear in the human. . . . Indeed he has appeared in the human before, in the same way as he has in all the created objects of the world.'—pp. 129—131.

Such, then, are Mr. B.'s views of the person of Christ. Christ is divine; he is more really God than man; he is the power of self-representation in God; he is God mirrored before his own understanding; he is the outward form in which God sees himself; he is the finite in which God represents himself, as he has represented himself in all the other 'finite forms.'

Two conclusions are obvious from the language. First, that Jesus Christ is God, or God manifested in no other sense than are 'all the created objects in the world,' 'all the finite forms of being' in which 'God has produced himself,' or 'appeared.' The 'world,' then, or any other 'finite form' in which 'God outwardly produces himself,' is as really, if not so eminently, God manifested as Jesus Christ. Secondly, that the Son of God is not a personal agent. He is only the 'capacity of self-expression' pertaining to God, 'the form in which God sees himself'—an imaginative form, elsewhere called 'the power of self-repre-

sentation in God.' (p. 160.) How the Logos, the Son of God, can then, in any proper sense, be called God, we cannot see. But let us test Mr. B.'s view of the Logos, or Word, by substituting for it 'the power of self-representation in God;' thus: 'In the beginning was 'the power of self-representation in God;' 'and 'the power of self-representation in God' was with God; 'and 'the power of self-representation in God' was God . . . . 'All things were made by 'the power of self-representation in God,' &c. This may be the Gospel according to the pantheism of Hegel; we leave our readers to say if it be the Gospel according to the Christianity of John.

What adds to the strangeness of the dogmas thus propounded by Mr. B. is, that he rejects the ordinary view of the real humanity of Christ, as held by both Unitarians and Trinitarians, and the existence of the divine and human nature in his person, as held by the latter; while he censures both for presuming to 'investigate the mystery of the person of Jesus,' (p. 141,) although they profess simply to receive the facts stated respecting him, and although Mr. B. himself sets out with the design of investigating the 'nature of God!' To the objections that Christ is represented as obeying, praying, suffering, which as God are not predicable of him, Mr. B. replies, that we are not 'so much to consider these things as what they express.' (pp. 144—146, *passim*.) So that obedience, worship, suffering, are merely fictions, or forms of words, conveying ideas totally different from what they naturally and properly convey. But when the Trinitarian asserts that 'no sort of pang can touch the divine nature, and that only his human part can suffer,' Mr. B. replies with the greatest coolness, 'We cannot thus intrude into the interior of God's mysteries.' So that when we deny all pain and suffering of God, we are intruding into divine mysteries. Into such mysteries, however, Mr. B. has been privileged to enter, as he denies the existence of a distinct human nature in the person of Christ, and yet holds that he both suffered and died; unless, indeed, there was no real suffering or death in the case, but that both are employed 'as a vehicle for the expression of his [God's] own tenderness and grace.'

Now as to the reality and completeness of the humanity of Christ, any more than his true Deity, there can be no question by those who accept the clear and express statements of Scripture. He is 'THE MAN Christ Jesus;' he was born, increased in stature, hungered, sorrowed, was tempted, suffered and died on the cross. 'It behoved him to be made in all things like unto his brethren.' If the Scriptures do not teach his perfect humanity, they teach nothing. On the other hand, they teach that he 'was with God,

and was God, the true God, God over all, blessed for ever.' Both classes of declarations are as clear and decisive as need be; and the various evidence to establish the distinct truths taught by both, is overwhelming. The only difficulty lies in the *modus* of the union of both natures in the same person; but here is precisely the point respecting which nothing is revealed, respecting which all speculation is vain,—for until we can explain the *modus* of the union of soul and body, why should we speculate about a secret infinitely higher, and respecting which it is the part of sound wisdom to be content to remain in ignorance. We receive the facts, we speculate not about the *how* of them. We do not want to 'investigate psychologically or physiologically' 'the interior person of Jesus,' as Mr. B. asserts. We leave this to Mr. B., who presumes to 'investigate the divine nature,' and to assert things of that nature which God has never revealed. The discoursing of our author on this topic, as on the preceding, tends to obscure everything, to define and settle nothing. He comes to judgment with the air of a Daniel; he is perfectly clear that all who have gone before him have needed his assistance. We sincerely wish we could say that we feel ourselves the better for his attempt to serve us in our need.

We shall devote the remainder of this article to an examination of Mr. B.'s views of the Atonement, of which he treats in his second 'Discourse,' 'delivered before the Divinity School of Harvard University.' Mr. B. takes 'two distinct views of Christ and his work'—1. 'A subjective, speculative one, that contemplates the work of Christ in its ends, and views it as a power related to ends. 2. An objective ritualistic—one that sets him forth to faith instead of philosophy; and one without which, as an altar form for the soul, he would not be the power intended, or work the ends appointed. (pp. 169, 170.) This second view should rather be designated, according to Mr. B.'s exposition of it, a fictitious, imaginary one, about which the fancy may play, and from which the mind may learn to practise delusion upon itself.

Mr. B. proceeds to say, that the '*end*' of Christ's work is 'to renovate character,' but that another view sets him forth as 'a propitiation, a sacrifice, as bearing our sins,' &c., (p. 171.) This is true, only that it is not correctly stated. The great, ultimate end of the work of Christ was, we gratefully believe, to purify the human heart, to make man holy, to bring him into union with God; but its immediate design was to atone for sin, and thereby to secure a medium of access to God. The sacrifice of Christ was then subordinate and subsidiary to this great end. But a real vicarious sacrifice for sin Mr. B. repudiates. And



to do this the more effectually, he strives to set the advocates of this doctrine at variance with each other, by endeavouring to make out that their theories of atonement are conflicting and contradictory. Most of what he says for this purpose we shall not stay to deal with. He represents it as contradictory that 'Christ is conceived to offer himself to Jehovah's justice,' and that 'Jehovah is conceived himself to prepare the offering out of his own mercy,' whereas both views are affirmed in Scripture, and both held by all the advocates of a vicarious sacrifice as perfectly harmonious. (p. 173.) Again, he represents the orthodox as holding 'that Christ suffers evil as evil, or in direct and simple substitution for evil that was to be suffered by us; so that God 'accepts one evil in place of the other, and being satisfied in this manner, is able to justify and to pardon,' (p. 174,) which is altogether a misrepresentation. Again, he represents the orthodox as 'holding for literal truth, that the frown of God, or divine justice, rested on his [Christ's] soul.' (p. 175.) Which, making allowance for the loose phraseology employed by some, they do not hold. Again, he says, 'the orthodox view of the substitution of Christ for sinners, sets every transgressor right before the law, when as yet there is nothing right in his character' . . . so that 'he has it for his right to go free, whether he forsake his transgressions or not' (p. 177), a view which they repudiate, and which is in no fair or logical way a consequence of their doctrine. The sinner goes free when he believes—not till then. Mr. B. repudiates the idea of the innocent suffering for the guilty. 'No governmental reasons can justify even the admission of innocence into a participation of frowns and penal distributions.' (p. 179.) And yet 'Jesus Christ, the righteous'—not the innocent only, but 'the righteous'—'holy, harmless, undefiled,' suffered!—suffered, in some sense, as Mr. Bushnell admits, for sinners. Did he not, therefore, become subject to penal evil? and if not to penal evil due to himself, which we know he did not, then certainly to penal evil, or 'penal distributions,' due to others. The fact is there, and cannot be explained away. Yet Mr. Bushnell says, 'If consenting innocence say, 'Let the blow fall on me,' precisely there it is for a government to prove its justice, even to the point of sublimity, to reveal the essential, eternal, unmitigable distinction it holds between innocence and sin, by declaring that, as under law and its distributions, it is even impossible to suffer any commutation, any, the least, confusion of places.' (p. 179.) Now, only objecting to the word 'confusion,' for which we would substitute *change*, we simply aver, that under the righteous government of God, the holy Jesus did suffer—suffer for the sake and in the room of sinners. This fact,

however unacceptable it may be to Mr. Bushnell, is stated in a multitude of places in the Scriptures. 'It pleased the Lord to bruise him—he hath laid upon him the iniquity of us all.' Yet Mr. Bushnell says, 'If God could lay his frown for one moment 'upon the soul of innocence and virtue, he must be no such 'being as I have loved and worshipped.' (p. 179.) It may be so. We can, however, think it possible that the being not hitherto 'loved and worshipped' by Mr. Bushnell, may be the true God.

If Mr. B. were as candid as a lover of truth should be, he would first have examined our statement of the fact of the death of Christ—viz., that it was really vicarious or substitutionary—that he died in the stead of sinners, that, on the ground of his death, God might pardon all who believe. Such is the fact we allege. Our theories to explain that fact may be incorrect, as have been the theories of some; but while the fact of the vicarious nature of the death of Christ remains, the most triumphant refutation of human theories, or explanations, concerning it, goes for nothing—just as the refutation of the theories held in times gone by respecting our planetary system, did not, and could not, affect the great facts patent to all, to explain which those theories were broached. Mr. B., however, never grapples, nor attempts to grapple, with our statement of the fact. He assails, and misrepresents our theories. We believe, however, that the correct theory is this: That the death of Christ in the room of sinners, was necessary to express the repugnance of the Divine Nature to sin, and to show that it cannot be committed with impunity; to honour the law of God, which man had violated; to strengthen and uphold, in the view of all intelligent creatures, the moral government of God, which it was the tendency of sin to relax or destroy; and, as comprehending all these, to make it possible for God to be just, while the justifier of the ungodly, who believes in Jesus. Jesus was never, for a moment, the object of the Father's 'frown.' He could not be. Even in reference to his *decease*, which he was to accomplish at Jerusalem, the Father declared: 'This is my Beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.' In the very article of his death, then, 'bearing the sin of the world,' he was—pre-eminently was—the object of the Father's immutable love. But he bore wrath as manifested against sin. That he suffered—suffered intensely and mysteriously—is unquestionable. This, we contend, was either the result of personal guilt, or of guilt to which he stood related federally and by choice. We have our choice in this alternative, but the theory of Mr. Bushnell, by taking neither course, confounds everything, and explains nothing.

In Mr. Bushnell's system, the death of Christ, instead of being a necessary part of the economy of redemption, is only an *accidental* occurrence. To use his own illustration:—As a man who desires to carry food to a perishing family, wades through the snow of a stormy night, to accomplish his benevolent object, but exposes himself to cold and suffering only incidentally, and not as part of his design; 'so if Christ comes into the world, to teach, to cheer, to heal, to pour his sympathies into the bosom of all human sorrow, to assert the integrity of truth, and rebuke the wickedness of sin—in a word, to manifest the eternal life, and bring it into quickening union with the souls of our race, then to *suffer incidentally*, to die an ignominious and cruel death, rather than depart from his heavenly errand, is to make an expression of the heart of God which every human soul must feel.'—(p. 181.) In accordance with this statement, Mr. Bushnell considers the work of Christ as intended to consecrate or reconsecrate the 'desecrated law of God, and give it a more exact and eminent authority than it had before.'—(p. 198.) He did this 'by his teaching,' (p. 198,) 'by obedience,' 'by expense and painstaking,' 'by offering his life as a sacred contribution.' (p. 200.) Such, then, is the theory of Mr. Bushnell. Let us examine it briefly.

The death of Christ was not necessary, but only 'accidental.' It possesses only an 'artistic force.' 'He is not a sacrifice in any literal sense, we know.' (p. 213.) His death has a 'marvellous power,' but the whole effect must be 'contemplated under the laws of art.' 'The effect depends, artistically speaking, on the expressive power of the fact, that the Incarnate Word appearing in humanity, and having a ministry for the reconciliation of man to God, even goes to such a pitch of devotion, as to yield up his life to it, and allow the blood of his Mysterious Person to 'redde[n] our polluted earth.' (p. 215.) The great object for which Christ came into the world might then have been accomplished without his death. Is this the teaching of Scripture? On the contrary, is not his death the great centre-point of the scheme of truth there presented—the great source of the power of that truth—the fountain of life to our world? To what is the sinner to look, but to the 'Lamb of God, who taketh away the sin of the world?' Through what is the sinner 'reconciled to God,' but the 'death of his Son?' Is not Christ crucified the power of God and the wisdom of God? Is not Christ crucified the great theme of the Gospel? Is not the cross the great object of apostolic glorying? Was it not *necessary* that Christ should suffer? Is it not true that 'without shedding of blood there is no remission?' Was it not necessary that 'patterns of things in the heavens should be purified' with animal sacrifices, but the

'heavenly things themselves, with better sacrifices than these,' namely, the all-perfect sacrifice of Christ—implying, that without the shedding of the Saviour's blood heaven would be defiled by the approach of the sinner, man? The death of Christ, then, was necessary. It was a part of the eternal redemptorial plan. It was the main thing which Jesus entered the world to accomplish, in order to save man. 'He was verily foreordained before the foundation of the world,' as the Lamb of Sacrifice for human redemption, and as such, 'set forth in these last times.' And then, as to its efficacy being merely '*artistic*,' how opposed is this to all the teaching of the New Testament. His death, if we may believe the Scriptures, was substitutionary—his sacrifice vicarious. 'He died for us—the just for the unjust. He bore our sins in his own body on the tree. God laid on him the iniquities of us all. He was once offered to bear the sins of many. He gave himself a ransom for all to be testified in due time.' Such are the terms, clear and distinct, in which the substitutionary nature of his death is set forth—terms which defy the ingenuity of man to explain away. Such was the immediate object of his death, to atone for human guilt that God might pardon it. 'Him hath God set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood; that God might be just, and the justifier of him who believes in Jesus.' We want what God has provided for us, a vicarious sacrifice; on the ground of which God may pardon our sins, receive us into his favour, and send us his Holy Spirit to dwell in our hearts. This is better than any effect which may be produced by the 'laws of art.'

The man who suffers in the performance of a benevolent errand, presents no adequate parallel to the suffering of Christ in connexion with his mission to this world. Even there, indeed, a principle of substitution is in play, the innocent is suffering to benefit the guilty;—but every such man is himself subject to a penal administration, and even his virtues may be consistently made to take some suffering along with them—but Jesus was exposed to no penalty, and the intensity of his sorrow, nevertheless, presents the strongest evidence of a vicarious relation between his suffering and its intended result.

If by artistic force Mr. Bushnell really means moral force, then we regret that he should resort to such unnecessary departures from ordinary language for the purpose of expressing ordinary thoughts. But in this view, even, the advantage is not with his own theory, but rather with that to which he is so much opposed. We have in the death of Jesus, as a substitute for the guilty, an expression of all-surpassing love to man. 'Herein is love! not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to

'be the propitiation for our sins.' 'Scarcely for a righteous man will one die, yet peradventure for a good man some might even dare to die; but God commendeth his love towards us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us.'

The more we have forgiven by the cross, and the more costly that medium of forgiveness is, according to our apprehension of it, the greater must be its moral power—its power to move our affections in the way of return to God—in Mr. Bushnell's new-fangled phraseology, the greater must be its 'artistic force,' its power according 'to the laws of art.'

Mr. B., indeed, tells us that the great object accomplished by the Saviour's death is to give the law 'a more exact and imminent force than it had before.' In reply to which it is fair to allege, that whatever increases the force of law as such, without atoning for the transgression of the law, only enhances the difficulty of human salvation. But, according to Mr. Bushnell's theory, man's state, instead of being improved, is rendered more hopeless by the death of Christ. It has the same kind of effect precisely as a full, clear, and broad exposition of the law, in all its intense purity and sin-condemning tendency. And is this the cross of Christ which is the wisdom of God and the power of God to the salvation of the soul? Is this the work of Christ for human redemption?

But after all, Mr. B. has a sacrifice for sin, in the altar form for the sinner. Subjectively, he explodes all this; objectively, he establishes it—yet, perhaps, his objectivity is, after all, more subjective than the subjectivity itself—as far from the truth, and equally useless. He denies that, when the apostles speak of atonement, sacrifice, remission of sins by the blood of Christ, and the like, that they merely 'take up certain Jewish figures made ready to their hand.' It is all, on the contrary, he maintains, the result of divine 'predetermined arrangement.' 'It is the DIVINE FORM of Christianity.' It is a Divine ritual for the working of the world's mind.' (p. 236.) He asserts that 'the most earnest christian feelings of the apostles are collected round this objective representation—the vicarious sacrifice of Christ for the sins of the world' (237); that the old system of sacrifices, &c., had a 'relationship to the contents of the new' (237); that 'Christ is represented in terms of the old ritual before his passion' (238); and that 'there is a profound philosophic necessity, that a religion which is to be a power over mankind should have an objective character' (240)—all of which are propositions full of truth. Do you then think, gentle reader, after all Mr. B.'s destructive subjectivity, that by the power of his objectivity he builds up again what he has destroyed? Be not too credulous.

It is not so. Mr. B. only establishes in form what he destroys in substance. The something objective, so indispensable to a religion for man, is nothing. It is a mere fiction of the imagination—a simple mental illusion. It exists in words, or in false impressions made upon the mind. 'The ground of justification is subjectively prepared in us; but we must produce it outwardly.' Representing Christ as our sacrifice, sin-offering, atonement, or sprinkling of blood,—in all these terms we represent a work as done outwardly for us, which is really done in us.' (p. 232.) Much to the same effect might be quoted. And does Mr. B. imagine that thinking men will be content to accept this mere fiction of the brain as an objective reality? Does he suppose that any mind really sane, can accept mere forms without substance, mere pictures without realities, shadows that have no substance,—all as great objective truths on which their minds can rest, and from which their souls can derive comfort and consolation? Those who are so ignorant as to be capable of taking it all as objective reality, may be impressed by it; but as to ourselves, whom Mr. B. has let into the secret, it can have no other effect on us than to make us wonder how something done in us should be constantly represented as outward; or, how the design should be entertained of impressing the human mind by something objective—which is not objective, but an artistic fiction. Mr. B. refers to Jewish rites, and to their artistic effect; but here, all was really objective, and not fictitious and imaginary. The Jew had something without him to 'work his mind;' the Christian has not—he has sacrifice, atonement, sprinkling of blood, which are all imaginary, and without truth. And how fictitious this 'objective' of Mr. B. is, he makes abundantly evident when he declares, 'It is perfectly plain that he [the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews] has no conception of Christ as a literal sacrifice,' (250); and makes this assertion on the very place where Paul is asserting, in the most express terms, the removal of inferior sacrifices by the sacrifice of Christ,—the preparation of a body for the Messiah to be offered as a sacrifice, and the offering of it once for all—adding, 'for every high priest standeth daily ministering, and offering oftentimes the same sacrifices which can never take away sins; but this after he had offered one sacrifice for sin, for ever sat down on the right hand of God.' And yet Paul had no 'conception of a literal sacrifice'! And yet, again, although there is no literal or proper sacrifice, sacrifice is part of the *objective* in the Christian religion, for which there is a profound philosophic necessity in a religion which is to have power over mankind! Truly, Mr. B.'s idea of the objective is a strange thing. Truly the Christian religion, according to Mr.

B.'s version of it, may do for those whose imagination is developed at the expense of their understanding. But it is clear that those who 'rest their souls' on the 'objective and vicarious mercy' which Mr. B. sets forth, lean on that which really has no objective existence—which is only a name for something whose existence is purely subjective: it may be a medium of forgiveness in figure, but it does not give you the reality; and if it becomes a moral force at all, it is only by its being mistaken for what it is not. And it is the Divine Being who presents this vain object of confidence to the creature who absolutely needs an 'objective power' to sustain his soul! This is to us next to profane. Can God cheat his confiding creatures with names and appearances? Mr. B. might as well represent God and Christ as names for something wholly subjective, as write after this manner in reference to the design of Christ's death.

In conclusion, we do not mean, by anything we have said, to deny that Mr. Bushnell is a man of ability. Our regret is, that it should be ability so greatly overrated by its possessor as to have put him upon a track of adventure in speculation and authorship to which he is so manifestly unequal. Had his judgment been such as to have restricted the exercise of his talents to the sphere appropriate to them, he might have written usefully. But he has attempted too much, and the result is a failure—something worse than a failure. He has not only tried to do, by the use of language and logic, what he should not, upon his theory, have dreamt for a moment of attempting by such means—but in the prosecution of this inconsistent effort, he has ended with substituting in the place of the alleged refinements which he rejects on either hand as unintelligible, refinements of his own, that are still more exceptionable on that ground. The mountain has had its throes, and we are only sorry that we cannot congratulate our readers on the result.

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- ART. VIII.—(1.) *The Geological Observer*. By SIR HENRY T. DE LA BECHE, C.B., F.R.S., &c. London: 1851.
- (2.) *Memoirs of the Geological Survey of Great Britain and of the Museum of Practical Geology in London*. Vols. 1—2. Parts 1 and 2. London: 1846—1848.
- (3.) *Memoirs of the Geological Survey of the United Kingdom. Figures and Descriptions illustrative of British Organic Remains*. Decades 1, 2, and 3. London: 1850, 1851.

WHEN we examine the history of science, we cannot but be forcibly struck with the psychological phenomena which distinguish the several phases of human progress. Man is born an observing animal, and his powers, it would appear, are at once excited into action by the beautiful creation which is spread around, and the wonderful influences by which its beauty, its life, and order are sustained. But we do not find him at first asking Nature to reveal her mysteries; he invests her with a robe of clouds, and surveying the mirage of his own imagination shadowed upon the mist, he worships the ideality, and leaves the bright reality unsought.

Eventually, however, we find Humanity emerging from its dream, and by slow degrees educating itself by careful observation, founding a true science, and reading aright the great truths inscribed upon the pages of the Book of Nature.

The mythology of Greece teaches us some remarkable lessons, and particularly it instructs us as to the peculiar poetic constitution of the Hellenic mind. It displays to us,—in shadows it is true,—but in shadows of exquisite beauty and truth, an intense love of nature, and a fervent desire to know something of the mysteries which were hidden behind the veil of its external forms. They saw in the constitution of the amorphous rock, as well as in the living developments of organic creation, the operations of a series of causes subsidiary to a great universe-pervading Power, and they endeavoured to invest these *ideas* with functions and forms which might give them a kind of reality. Behind Nature they perceived, by a high refinement of metaphysical thought, something analogous to mind, producing remarkable phenomena, and a spiritual band of powers were thus created as gods of the mountains, the forests, the rivers, and the seas. There was a pure and holy beauty in these superstitions, and they kept those who contemplated the varied face of nature holy too; the mystery, which they believed lived beneath every leaf of the forest, and breathed in every chasm of the hills, exerted a



religious influence, since the presence of an elevated order was felt to be for ever in the vicinity of mortality.

The phases of this mythological philosophy are a curious study, but with these we have no further to deal than to appeal to their evidence, that through all ages man has continually fallen back upon the peaceful study of nature, when wearied with the toils and contentions of the world. Whether we examine the mythologies of the Indian priesthood, those of the Chaldean and Greek philosophers, or the peculiar modified forms of the Scandinavian myths, many of which still have being in the *folk-lore* of our own island, we shall discover that they have all arisen from the innate desire of man to interpret the Great Book of Nature.

Those ages during which the rustlings of the forest leaves—the ‘*soughings*’ of the south wind across the ocean—the sighing of the breezes through the valleys—or the roarings of the gale along the gorges of the mountains, were construed into spiritual voices, the popular philosophy was essentially poetical, and the more refined thinkers were those great poets who, like stars—

Beacon from the abodes where the Eternals are.

Whenever a mechanical philosophy has had an ascendancy in the mind, we find a certain coldness and darkness overspreading society, as though a portion of that light which gives joy to the face of man was under eclipse. There are some such periods well marked in the history of Roman civilization; and still more distinguishingly so in that long period of the middle ages during which the poor alchemical dreams of the Arabians were spreading their miserable selfishness over Europe.

The psychological phenomena of mankind are remarkable; the curious and good results which grow, often from a depraved condition, exhibit the operation of some inscrutable laws. The very lamentable delusions of Astrology, based on a modicum of truth, have grown into the science of Astronomy—the most perfect of all the sciences—which enables us to read the soul exalting story of those stars which, in multitudinous brightness, spangle the robe of the Eternal. The Alchemist, with his powder of projection, wasting his life over the fire of his furnace, that he might ‘interpenetrate’ iron with that ‘sulphureous principle’ which he was persuaded constituted the only difference between the ‘base metal’ and the gold he coveted, was the father of the chemist, who, becoming year by year more exact in his researches, is constantly adding to our store of knowledge, and enabling us to improve the condition of society. In like manner, the wild theories of the earth’s formation, which first had birth when, by the convictions arising from the close contemplation of lithological phenomena, man was led to the abandonment of mythic interpretations,

and the creation of a wild cosmogony, have slowly passed into an established science of observation, which aids us in penetrating the arcana of time, as does the telescope of the astronomer enable us to peer into the arcana of space.

Great Pan is dead; but the mountains are not voiceless; upon their stone tablets we may read, if we will but observe, the story of the earth's mutations, the history of creations which existed during those vast ages when the earth was undergoing the changes necessary to the realization of that garden in which was created a reasoning man.

The advance of inductive science has produced an exact deductive philosophy; and although we survey the wonders of nature no longer through the misty veil of imagination, the truths which are unfolded far surpass, in their strangeness, the wildest creations of fiction. The 'sermons in stones' are of soul-enthralling interest, and the study of geology, developing to us the mighty changes which the crust of this planet has undergone, so interesting, that it has become the most popular of sciences.

But from its very popularity it is constantly in danger; the temptations to speculation are almost irresistible, unless with well-trained minds, and hence it is, that from time to time the fears of timid men have been excited by the bold theories of parlour geologists, who have not sufficient energy to examine nature for themselves, and whose idleness induces them rather to frame a theory than to observe a fact.

It is far more difficult to observe correctly than most men imagine; to behold, Humboldt remarks, is not necessarily to observe, and the power of comparing and combining is only to be obtained by education. It is much to be regretted that habits of exact observation are not cultivated in our schools; to this deficiency may be traced much of the fallacious reasoning, the false philosophy, which prevails. The earliest geologists looked at the earth's surface in its great generalities, and rushed to romantic conclusions. The modern geologist examines it in detail, advances with cautious step, and, feeling that there has been no alteration in the great laws of nature, he infers that the present condition of the crust of our planet has been produced by similar causes to those which he examines in operation.

Many years since, the author of the work which is placed at the head of the present article, published a little treatise, 'How to observe in Geology,' in which he directed attention to all the principal points demanding it; pointed out the many sources of error which beset a superficial observer, and sought to teach a purely inductive system of geological observation. Having been himself an active field geologist, wandering, hammer in

hand, over the hills and through the valleys of our islands, and many parts of the continent, he was well fitted to direct the younger student; and that treatise was eminently successful. The present work, 'The Geological Observer,' although based on the former treatise, is much more extensive in its objects; and although still directing to the way in which geological phenomena should be observed, Sir Henry De la Beche also explains the various physical forces and mechanical powers which are brought into operation to produce the existing surface of the earth. That it may be well understood upon what system the modern geologist proceeds, we quote the opening paragraph of this treatise.

'As geological knowledge advances, the more evident does it become that we should first ascertain the various modifications and changes which now take place on the surface of the earth, carefully considering their causes, and then proceed to employ this knowledge, so far as it can be made applicable, in explanation of the facts seen in connexion with the geological accumulations of prior date. This done, we should proceed to view those not thus explained, with reference to the conditions and arrangements of matter which the form of our planet, the known distribution of its heat, the temperature of the surrounding space, and other obvious circumstances, may lead us to infer would be probable during the lapse of geological time.'

There are few geologists who have paid that attention to physical science which is necessary to ensure a correct interpretation of phenomena; hence we find in many geological works speculations which are entirely at variance with the real operations of physical causes. Not so the author of 'The Geological Observer.' It is evident from this and previous works that his correct knowledge of physics has enabled him to avoid many of the errors into which others have fallen; and it has materially aided him in translating the language which he has found inscribed upon the tablets of stone in which Nature has recorded the progress of her labours. To adduce a few instances, in which every consideration must be of purely a physical character, and thus to show the necessity of an intimate acquaintance with all those departments of research which may be comprehended under the general term of natural philosophy, let us briefly look at the favourite theory of geologists—that the earth is a slowly cooling mass, which once existed in a gaseous or nebulous state.

The hypothesis supposes this planet to have existed at so high a temperature, that the rocks, and the metals contained in them, and of course everything less dense than they, were, at all events, in a fluid state; and that from the radiation of heat an oxidized solid crust, surmounted by a gaseous envelope, was slowly formed—in the same way as the pellicle of ice is produced upon

the surface of water by the escape of its heat. The metallic vapours are supposed to be arrested by diminished temperature, and brought to a certain degree of consolidation 'at a certain height above the centre of the gaseous sphere or spheroid, and an inner spherical or spheroidal crust the result.' Under these conditions, it is thought 'the oxygen on the upper surface of the latter would combine more readily with the metals than on the under surface, from the difference of temperature. The oxides would tend sooner to consolidate above from the same cause, and to exclude the metals beneath from the action of the oxygen, which, from the high temperature of the interior, would be far more dense above than towards the interior, where, indeed, even supposing the metallic vapours to mix with the other substances as gases do, the oxygen would be of extraordinary density.'\*

There is certainly no hypothesis which more completely accounts for existing phenomena than that of the cooling sphere; but the consideration of it, the same author says, requires 'very complicated calculations respecting the action of gravity, heat, electricity, and chemical affinity, under such conditions.' The truth of this is most strikingly proved by the evidences afforded by recent investigations, which show that at certain high temperatures the laws of chemical affinity are entirely suspended, and the electrical relations of material substances changed. We have now unmistakable evidence, which shows that the physical forces, or elements, are in a constant state of antagonism; to produce existing conditions they are balanced against one another, and the slightest preponderance at either end of the beam is immediately followed by convulsive efforts to restore the disturbed equilibrium. It may appear, at first, that the hypothesis to which we have alluded has little to do with the observation of geological facts, but a brief consideration will show that it bears most strongly upon the interpretation of the visible external facts. It is not merely sufficient to note all the conditions under which the metalliferous formations exist, the peculiar manner in which igneous rocks are found to have protruded themselves through the superincumbent masses, rending and upheaving them by the enormous mechanical force which has been exerted. Having advanced to a knowledge that such are facts regarding the structure of the earth's external crust, the mind naturally advances to a consideration of the causes producing these effects.

Again, the important considerations which connect themselves

\* 'Researches in Theoretical Geology,' by H. T. De la Beche, F.R.S., &c., 1834. See also 'Geological Manual,' by the same author.

with the formation of mineral veins, depend at every step upon the operation of physical causes; and again, the action of water as a solvent of the oxidizing matter upon which it rests, and the subsequent phenomena of crystalline formation, which most intimately connect themselves with the investigations of rock phenomena, demand an intimate acquaintance with physics.

Numerous other examples could most readily be advanced, but these are sufficient to show that Geology requires the aid of her sister sciences to a greater extent than any other; for all the phenomena which claim observation are dependent upon physical or chemical causes; it is therefore most satisfactory to find a veteran in the field of geological research insisting upon the importance of the study of Physics.

Proceeding upon the supposition that there has been no violent changes in the operations under which the present form of the earth's surface has been produced, and that those forces which are at present in active operation were so from the beginning, Sir Henry De la Beche commences his work with an examination of those causes which are now producing changes in the relative conditions of land and water, and which we purpose to examine as an illustration of the exact character of modern geological research.

We must not forget that time is a most important element in the production of geological phenomena; nor must we cease to remember that to the Great Ruler of creation a thousand years is but as one day, and one day as a thousand years. Time is counted with all anxiousness by the poor mortal who knows that he must perform the allotted duties of life within the limits of threescore years and ten; but the great epochs of geological change are not reducible to such prescribed periods, and the grandeur of the phenomena is increased with the consideration that for myriads of ages those operations which we observe must continue, and that the results shown in the present surface of the earth prove that similar operations must have been in progress through periods almost countless to him who reckons his existence by a few brief years. The following quotation explains our meaning:—

‘The geological observer cannot long have been engaged in his investigations, before he will be struck with the tendency of rocks to decompose by the action of atmospheric influences upon them. He will soon perceive that this decomposition is both chemical and mechanical; that certain mineral bodies more readily give way before these influences than others; and that from altered conditions, as regards them, the same kinds of rock will more easily decompose in one situation than another.

‘It is in consequence of this decomposition that we have soils sup-

porting that growth of vegetation upon which animal life depends, as adjusted upon our planet; for soils are but the decomposed parts of sea or lake bottoms, and of igneous accumulations, with the remains of the vegetation which has grown on them, and of the animals which have lived upon the plants. From the configuration of the surface the decomposed portions of rocks, forming soils, may not always cover those from whence they were derived, for they may, and sometimes have been carried, mechanically suspended in water, to various distances, and there deposited, in such manner as to be mingled with the decomposed portions of other rocks, or wholly cover over the latter. Be this, however, as it may, the decomposed parts of rocks form the base of the soils, affording soluble mineral matter to the plants requiring it, and presenting a physical structure capable of producing growth.

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‘While rocks of a generally similar chemical composition, are found to decompose in a variable manner, according to the different aggregation of their component parts, it would readily be anticipated that any rocks formed of different materials, brought together as sands and gravel, and subsequently consolidated by some cementing substance, would be found to decompose irregularly and according to the different powers of their component parts to resist the chemical and mechanical influences to which they may be exposed.

‘The observer will soon perceive that, taken generally, the cementing matter of sandstones and conglomerates decomposes first, liberating the grains of sand and the pebbles which have originally remained such from their hardness, and they are thus ready to be again carried by moving waters to other situations, there to form the parts of new accumulations. The rapidity of decomposition in such cases necessarily varies according to the nature of the cementing substance. A calcareous cement, though hard, will more readily give way before the chemical influences acting on limestones than ordinary siliceous matter, though the matter may be less compact; while a siliceous cement, if porous, may be more easily removable by the combined action of frost and thaw.’

We have here some examples of one of the causes which must necessarily produce remarkable changes on the face of the earth. The atmospheric envelope of our planet holds one mighty element of change in the oxygen which it contains; and under the operation of *forces* resident within—or on the surfaces of the rocks themselves—and the combined action of the solar radiations, they are slowly, but surely broken down into a dust which may be borne away upon the winds.

That sun which gives life and beauty to the face of nature, pours forth the elements of change—the heat expanding every mass upon which the sunshine rests—and the actinic, or chemical power effecting chemical changes, would soon produce the dis-

integration of it, if it shone on in unceasing splendour. But it has been shown that inanimate matter possesses the power of restoring itself during the hours of darkness to that condition in which it was previously to the *destructive* operations of light. Still, under the meteorological changes which are ever taking place, the mountains are worn down—and their debris spread out in valleys.

The removal of parts of rocks by water is another subject fully discussed in this volume. It is impossible to follow the author through the wide range of examples which he gives. The solvent powers of water are examined, and it is shown that the solid matter found in spring and river water is derived from the rocks through which it rises, or over which it flows. The rains which fall charged with the gaseous matters, solvent in water, which are floating in the atmosphere, are constantly carrying off in solution portions of the surface on which it falls. Rivers, flowing onward, are ever wearing away the channels through which they flow, and we have numerous examples in which we find the solid rocks cut through to considerable depths by the abrasion of flowing water—this is still more strikingly shown in the action of rivers as they flow through sands, gravel, or clay.

‘There are few persons who have not noticed the manner in which rivers are disposed to take serpentine courses in level countries, a fact as easily observable amid the meadows of the flat portions of many vallies, of very limited dimensions; as among the vast bends of the Mississippi or any other of the great rivers flowing under similar conditions.’

The transport of detritus by rivers is a subject demanding every attention from the philosophical geologist—a fairly estimated approximation towards the truth forming most important data in the consideration of that great question—the wearing down of the present continents and the creation of new lands at the bottom of the existing oceans.

The action of the sea on coasts is another subject which has been well considered by Sir Henry de la Beche—and a few observations along our own shores will most satisfactorily prove the wearing away of the cliffs in some parts—and the increasing formation of banks from the accumulation of detritus in others.

On the subject of distribution and deposit the following quotation is very instructive:—

‘The distances to which the river waters sometimes flow seaward, transporting fine detrital matter, parting with it gradually, must, when the great rivers of the world become full and turbid, be often very considerable. Colonel Sabine has stated that at three hundred miles

distant from the mouth of the Amazons, discoloured water, supposed to come from that river, was found, with a specific gravity of 1.0304 floating above the sea water, of which the specific gravity was 1.0262, the depth of the lighter water being estimated at 126 feet. It would be well that observers should direct their attention to such facts, for their accumulation would tend much to show us the extent to which fine sedimentary matter may be thus borne beyond the action of tides and coast currents. As much matter may be thus distributed in chemical solution, valuable information might also be collected as to the kind and quantity of substances so held in solution.

From the varied depths near its shores, the Mediterranean affords us a good example of the deposits effected in seas which are commonly termed tideless. The great rivers which discharge themselves into it, such as the Nile, Po, and Rhone, now transport little sedimentary matter that is not finely comminuted, and of easy mechanical suspension. The Nile, which has been estimated to deliver a body of water annually into the Mediterranean about 250 times that which flows out of the Thames, beginning to rise in June, attaining its maximum height in August, and then falling until the next May, must thrust forward, from its periodical rise and fall, fine sedimentary matter with great regularity, tending thus to produce consecutive layers or beds of mud and clay of considerable uniform thickness and character, in those situations where modifying conditions do not interfere. Part of the fine matter brought down from the interior in mechanical suspension is deposited on the lower grounds traversed by the Nile; and it has been calculated that the surface of Upper Egypt has in this manner been raised more than six feet since the commencement of the Christian era. The fine matter not so deposited, passing with the river waters seaward, is necessarily borne furthest outwards when the greatest force of the river water prevails, namely, in August of each year.

‘The matter thus borne seaward may be kept more or less time mechanically suspended, according to the agitation of the surface by winds, but, as a whole, there must be an average area over which it is thrown down; the greatest distance of the deposit from the mouths of the Nile being attained in August, though the greatest thickness of a year’s deposit will be nearer the land. As the river mouths advance, these sheets of fine sediment would be expected to extend further seaward, overlapping each other.’

It is not possible for us to continue the examination of this very interesting subject in the way Sir Henry De la Beche has done, and we believe we may safely venture to say that the amount of curious and instructive information included within the 128 pages devoted especially to the consideration of this subject, is greater than is to be found in any other work in the English language.

To convey an idea of the enormous amount of matter which



has thus been removed from the surface of the earth, we would quote a passage or two from the paper 'On the Denudation of South Wales and the adjacent counties of England,' by Professor Ramsay, in the 'Memoirs of the Geological Survey:—

'During the progress of the geological survey of Great Britain, in South-western England and in South Wales, a number of sections have been constructed on a true scale of six inches to a mile; and on evidence afforded by them the following reasons are adduced—What first strikes the eye on examining certain of these sections, is the remarkable curvature and distortion to which the strata composing all the formations, from the top of the coal measures downwards, have been subjected. Following these breaks and curves, the same series of rocks are seen repeatedly to rise to the surface, sometimes in rapid, sometimes in wide-spread undulations. When, in accordance with the curves indicated by surface dips, vast masses of rock are carried in these sections deep down into the earth, far below our actual cognizance, it is yet impossible to doubt their underground continuity, when we find again and again the same set of beds diving downwards in one district; and (perhaps somewhat modified,) again out-cropping to the surface in remote parts of the country. The abuse of this fact, now familiar to every geologist, in earlier times led to the hypothesis of the original universal continuity of all strata over the entire circumference of the globe. But if the inference now drawn be legitimate, a little reflection will show, that in the case of curved and conformable strata, the same arguments that apply to the continuity of rocks below the surface, may often safely be employed to prove the original connexion of contorted strata, the upturned edges of which may frequently be far apart. Attention being given to the physical relations of all the rocks in any country, such restoration of masses of rock to the form they once possessed is within the limits of safe inference. And if, in the cases above noticed, this original continuity of distant masses, and their spreading over tracts where they have left not a trace, be once granted, then the vast amount of matter we shall be able to show has been removed from such tracts, may well make us cautious in disbelieving the probable or possible destruction of other masses, once resting above the rocks that compose the present surface, but of the former existence of which above that surface we have at first sight no direct evidence. Outlines, cape-like projections and anticlinals of various strata, so common on our maps of geological England, sufficiently illustrate the first proposition; and the frequent occurrence of vast thicknesses of strata disposed vertically or at high angles, afford perfect evidence that such strata were not originally discontinued at their present outcrop, since such supposition would involve the necessity of asserting, that the rocks in question were deposited in successive layers, forming together, at their extreme edge, a wall or highly inclined plane, often many thousand feet in height.'

The author of this memoir then proceeds to examine his

subject more in detail. We cannot follow him through all the points which are considered to give the necessary evidence of extensive denudation, but a selection from his statements of a few of the more striking results obtained is made to show the conditions of our land at some former geological period:—

‘If we restore the several strata of old red sandstone and carboniferous limestone in section, from Glastonbury Tor across the Mendip Hills to the banks of the Severn, we obtain at the highest point above the Mendips an additional mass of strata 4000 feet in height, and in the district to the north, near Bristol, one of 5000 feet. A glance at the geological map of Somersetshire will show, that owing to the dome-shaped curve of the strata at the eastern end of the carboniferous limestone, near Winford, it is probable that these rocks rise close towards the surface between Beach and Dundry Hills, the overlying coal measures accommodating themselves to this curve, and the whole being concealed by unconformable beds of new red marl, lias, and oolite. The total thickness of the Bristol coal field amounts to 6500 feet. If (as every evidence tends to show) it rises and falls with the limestone between the river Avon and the Mendips, then the same proofs that evince the destruction of so great a body of limestone from above the plateau of the Mendips and elsewhere in the neighbourhood, warrants the supposition that the mass of coal measures south of the Avon, may have been carried, in accordance with the dotted curves, across the Mendip range; and on such supposition, based on the present disposition of the carboniferous limestone of the country, depends the probable existence of coal-bearing strata beneath the alluvial flats of East Sedgemoor. Adding, therefore, to the height already given, the known thickness of these strata, we obtain an additional mass that has disappeared, of about 2500 feet in thickness. Still, even this is but a fragment of the lower coal measures, which has survived the general wreck of many a tearing denudation, saved, like some other coal fields, from utter destruction, by the happy accident of the unexposed position into which it was partly thrown by disturbances subsequent to its deposition.’

Professor Ramsay, continuing this examination, gives again the following remarkable example of denudation:—

‘One of the most evident and striking instances of the removal of a vast body of matter from the existing surface, is shown in the section from Cefu Crib, in Monmouthshire, across the forest of Dean to the banks of the Severn. In this section all the rocks are, as far as we know, quite conformable. In its restoration no allowance is made for the disappearance, by denudation, of any part of the coal measures from above that which still remains on the tops of Cefu Crib and Dean Forest; and be it remembered that Cefu Crib forms part of a coal-field which attains a total thickness of many thousands of feet; and that Dean Forest is but an outlier of that great coal-field. There is, there-

fore, scarcely room for a doubt that, to a certain extent, such denudation must have taken place. This section has been constructed with the utmost care, on the usual scale of six inches to a mile. Taking the measured thickness of the strata at the lowest possible estimate, and restoring the beds in accordance with observed surface dips, we obtain curves exhibiting elevations above, and depressions beneath, the level of the sea, of nearly equal value. The Silurian rocks diving beneath the surface at Usk, are considered to underlie the old red sandstone throughout the whole extent of the section, since they again rise at May Hill, and at Tite's Point, on the Severn, not far from the forest. Indeed, through the great tract of old red sandstone, between the Welsh Silurians and the Severn, the latter rocks rise to the surface wherever the rolls of the strata will allow of their appearance, so that they doubtless underlie all that great tract, and probably much of the newer unconformable strata still farther east, of which the new red sandstone forms the basis. We are thus justified in carrying the Silurian rocks beneath the Forest of Dean. In this manner, by taking in the whole subject of the strata of the section at one glance, it is evident that it is as easy to conceive the higher beds carried by the same cause so many thousand feet into the air, as it is to believe the lower beds diving to an equal depth beneath the level of the sea. A little on the east of the forest, this increased elevation amounts to six thousand feet; and from the forest, which averages in height about nine hundred feet above the sea, we have a gradual rise, for seventeen miles westerly, till it attains the height of ten thousand feet above the centre of the anticlinal axis near Usk. All this matter has been removed from above the present outline of country.'

In the 'Geological Observer' we find many valuable remarks, the result of the most attentive and pains-taking examination, on the influences of great accumulations of waters, as when they have during a flood been ponded back by mountain masses which have fallen across valleys,—which have, however, eventually been borne forward by the weight of the accumulating fluid, thus often producing the most disastrous consequences, and working out new channels through the valley for the future passage of streams. The following case is an example which may be quoted, as showing, in a striking manner, the results produced by these conditions, which are by no means uncommon in mountainous countries.

'Among the causes of debacle and change in drainage depressions, we should not omit the consideration of glaciers falling across valleys from adjacent heights, since the great debacle down the valley of the Rhone, in 1818, is still fresh in the memory of many who witnessed its transporting power, and who would scarcely otherwise have been disposed to credit the effects produced. After successive falls from the glacier of Getroz during several years, into a narrow part of the

Val de Bagnes, into the Vallais, the accumulation finally became such that the waters of the Dranse, which previously found their way amid the fallen blocks of ice, were ponded back, a lake was thus formed about half a league in length, and it was estimated to contain 800,000,000 cubic feet of water. By driving a gallery at a lower level in the icy barrier, this quantity was supposed to be reduced to 530,000,000 cubic feet—a mass of water which, effecting a passage between the ice and the rock on one side, was let off in about half an hour down the Val de Bagnes into the valley of the Rhone, and thus into the valley of Geneva, where, fortunately, by the spread of the waters, their destructive force was lost. Huge blocks of rock were moved by this debacle, and a great mass of matter swept away to lower levels.’

Such are the extraordinary changes which it is proved, by faithful observation, have taken place upon the surface of our own island, and on the continent, under the influence of causes still in action, and which appear, at first, to be quite insufficient for the production of such great effects. Let any one observe, however, the quantity of matter which is washed down from the mountains by every shower, the debris which is borne by the rivers to the sea after each flood, and the conviction will soon be forced upon the mind that, under these influences only, in the process of geological time the surface of the earth must become changed. In some places the dry land will disappear and the ocean advance upon it; while in others, islands or continents must arise from the ocean, formed by those accumulations produced by the degradation of the land.

The sediment in tidal seas, and the influence of the tides in determining the disposition of masses of matter, is ably discussed in ‘The Geological Observer,’ and a great number of very striking examples adduced. The chemical deposits in seas is another subject, the consideration of which Sir H. De la Beche enters on, which has not hitherto received that amount of attention which it merits.

Water is an almost universal solvent, and hence the rains which fall upon the surface and drain through the land, and the springs which rise through the rocks, take up a certain portion of those substances over which they pass. Here are numerous modifying influences with which we cannot at present deal, but it is certain that all river water holds in solution earthy and metallic salts, as may be easily proved by evaporating a measured quantity to dryness. The waters of the ocean necessarily hold in solution all those substances which are borne from the land by the rivers flowing into it. The complicated character of sea-water is shown by the following analysis by Schweiger of that of the English Channel:—

Water .....	964·74372
Chloride of Sodium .....	27·05948
„ Potassium .....	0·76552
„ Magnesium .....	3·66658
Bromide of Magnesium .....	0·2929
Sulphate of Magnesia .....	2·29578
„ Lime .....	1·40662
Carbonate of Lime .....	0·03301

with, in addition to these constituents, very distinct traces of iodine and ammonia. Dr. George Wilson has detected fluorine in nearly all the deposits of marine boilers which he has examined; and the French chemists have proved the existence in the oceanic waters of several of the metals—iron, copper, silver, and lead. When the chemist, instead of dealing with a few ounces, pursues his analytical investigations upon hundreds of gallons, he discovers substances which could never be detected in the lesser quantity.

From these substances held in solution, many formations similar to those now existing are no doubt in the progress of formation. The deposit of carbonate of lime from sea-water may give rise to the formation of immense tracts of limestone; and, under some electro-chemical conditions with which we are not yet sufficiently acquainted, the metals may be precipitated to form in the dark depths of the seas new mineral lodes, similar in their character to those which are at present yielding up their stores for the benefit of mankind.

Of late years very considerable attention has been given to the evidences of glacier action in various parts of these islands, and it has been shown that the removal of great masses of matter has been in all probability effected by their agency. This glacier action is shown principally in the markings still remaining upon the rocks of the ravines along which the glaciers have moved to a lower level, grinding and crushing as they slid onwards; which markings are precisely similar in their character to those produced at the present day by the movements of the glaciers of the Alps. And, again, it is inferred that the accumulation of erratic blocks, and the distribution of enormous masses of rock over valleys far distant from the mountains of which they originally formed a part, are a proof of such an agency as this. That ice in its movements, either in the condition of glaciers or as icebergs, effects the transportation of huge masses of rock is proved. The Pierre à Bot, above Neufchatel, is a great granite mass, containing above 40,000 cubic feet, and it is considered to have been transported twenty-two leagues from the crest of the Follaterres, on the north of Martigny: this was in all probability borne to this spot by some huge iceberg, at a period when this land was

covered by the ocean. The power of glaciers to transport huge boulders of granite has been thoroughly investigated by Professor James Forbes, whose admirable work, 'Travels through the Alps of Savoy,' should be consulted, and also the 'Etudes sur les Glaciers' by Professor Agassiz.

This necessarily leads to a consideration of those great changes of temperature which must have taken place over Europe, and our own islands. If we contemplate the period during which the formation of our vast coal fields was taking place, we find evidence of influences such as those which prevail within the tropics at the present day. The ferns, whose remains preponderate in the carboniferous strata, present that peculiar character which at once connects them with the plants of inter-tropical climes, growing under the influence of fervent heat in a humid atmosphere. The question is an involved one, but it has been ably handled by Dr. Joseph Hooker, in his admirable paper on the 'Vegetation of the Carboniferous Period as compared with that of the present day,' published in the 'Memoirs of the Geological Survey.' The following quotation from that memoir indicates the great difficulties which surround the subject:—

'Of the relations between the soil and the plants nourished by it, little more is recognisable than that the Sigillariæ have been particularly abundant on the under clay, which, judging from the absence of any other fossils but Sigillariæ roots (Stigmariæ), seems to have been either in itself unfriendly to vegetation, or so placed (perhaps from being submerged) as to be incapable of supporting any other. The latter is the most probable, because both Sigillariæ and their Stigmariæ roots occur in other soils besides under-clay, and are there accompanied by Calamites, Ferns, &c. The Coniferæ, again, are chiefly found in the sandstones; and their remains being exceedingly rare in the clays, shales, or iron-stones, it may be concluded that they never were associated with the Sigillariæ and other plants which abound in the coal seams; but that they flourished in the neighbourhood, and were at times transported to these localities. The quantity of moisture to which these plants were subjected must remain a question, so long as some authors insist upon the Sigillariæ being allied to plants now characteristic of deserts, and others, such as are the inhabitants of moist and insular climates. The singular succulent texture and extraordinary size of both the vascular and cellular tissue of many possibly indicate a great amount of humidity. The question of light and heat involves a yet more important consideration, some of the coal plants of the Arctic regions being considered identical with those of Britain. How these can have existed in that latitude under the now prevailing distribution of light and heat, has not been hitherto explained; they are too bulky for comparison with any vegetables inhabiting those regions at the present time, and of too lax a tissue to admit of a pro-

longed withdrawal of the stimulus of light, or of their being subjected to continued frosts.'

This period must have existed for a vast number of ages, since the coal measures of South Wales attained to a thickness of not less than 12,000 feet, and show us, in the alternations of under-clay, coal, slate, and sandstone, that there must have been repeated alterations in the relative conditions of land and water. A fern forest grew rapidly over some vast swamp: as rapidly, under the peculiar influences of intense solar radiation, it decayed, to be renewed by a fresh and still more rank vegetation;—after a season the floods covered the land, and the dead vegetable matter was buried under the deposits of a river flowing into a vast delta, or by sands thrown in over an estuary by the ocean. After being long submerged, the sandy surface eventually reaches the surface of the water; mud accumulates thereon, as we see it now in our tidal rivers, and upon that a new vegetation commences, and goes on increasing in luxuriance for ages, to be again buried beneath the waters, and subjected to all the conditions of the former. Thus, bed after bed of coal was formed, layer after layer of sandstone and slate deposited, until eventually some great physical change was produced, the result of which was, that the climate became too cold for the growth of the coal plants, and a new order of things prevailed.

The geographical changes which were necessary to produce such an alteration of temperature, as would alter the climate of these islands from a tropical to an arctic character, are indistinct. The most probable speculation on this subject is that of Professor Ramsay, in a memoir read before the Geological Society, entitled, 'On the Sequence of Events during the Pleistocene Period, as evinced by superficial accumulations and surface markings of North Wales.' In this he supposes the existence of a large tract of land which the Atlantic now covers, and Humboldt and Professor Forbes have shown the probability of the existence of such, and this land, by obstructing the warm oceanic current flowing from the equator towards the poles, reduced its temperature to that extent, that the line of perpetual snow was brought sufficiently low to involve the hills of Wales and Scotland, as it does now the Alps, and thus lead to the formation of glaciers, the operations of which are, as we have already indicated, sufficiently well marked upon many of our rocks. The distribution over our island of the animals of colder—the glacial—seas, as investigated by Professor Edward Forbes, serves also to establish the fact of the change in our climate from a tropical to an arctic one. The evidence of careful geological research appears, however, to prove that these changes were not the result of any sudden transitions.

There were no violent convulsions rending the very earth's foundations; but all was gradual—the operation of apparently small agencies spread over an infinite period of time.

This might appear to launch us into that 'vexed question,' which has again and again disturbed the progress of geological science—the duration of time involved in the consideration of the Mosaic account of the creation. We avoid this, however, contenting ourselves with the firm conviction, that though there may appear to be discrepancies between the record of inspiration and the record of nature, none such can really exist, and that the prosecution of science in a right spirit will gradually lead to the removal of every doubt, and show that truth can never be in contradiction with truth.

The modern geologist perceives that, under the operation of certain causes, acting in obedience to fixed laws, changes of the earth's surface are taking place; and from similar causes, he infers great changes have been previously produced. He now devotes his attention to the examination of ordinary phenomena; and the amount of curious information thus obtained, is laying the foundation for a system of a more correct series of deductions than we have hitherto obtained.

Amongst the numerous subjects embraced within this volume, beyond those already named, we find, the preservation of remains of existing life in mineral matter occupying considerable space; and much interesting information is given as to the distribution of marine life, the formation of coral reefs and islands.

Volcanos and their products, and all the phenomena connected with existing and extinct volcanos, form a most interesting chapter in connexion with an examination of the effects produced by earthquakes, as producing alterations in the arrangements of rocks; and the curious phenomena of the quiet rise and subsidence of land, and the general unstable character of the earth's surface.

A very complete examination of the conditions of existing rocks, their alteration by heat, their cleavage and joints, and the various arrangements of bedding which have been observed, occupies another extensive section.

Much very important information is given on the phenomena of mineral veins; a subject which has been investigated with great care by the author, over the several mining districts of this country. The evidences of electro-chemical action are particularly dwelt on, and as Sir Henry de la Beche remarks:—

'When the observer regards the infiltration of solutions into cavities of various kinds, whether such solutions be merely derived from the rocks adjacent to or surrounding them, or come from other sources,



the deposit of different mineral substances in such cavities, whether fissures or otherwise, under the conditions above mentioned, the selection, as it were, of certain rocks by them being one of those conditions, and the various modifications and changes which the arrangement of the different kinds of mineral matter found in such situations have sustained, he will probably be led to consider the general subject as one of no slight scientific interest; while, at the same time, the investigations into which he will have to enter, also possess no little importance from their direct bearing on the discovery and extraction of many substances so important to the progress of mankind.'

The other works whose titles we have given, have resulted from the combined labours of the officers of the Geological Survey of the United Kingdom, which is carried on under the general direction of Sir Henry de la Beche. Under his influence has the Museum of Practical Geology been established by the government, and here we find collected examples of the rock formations of the islands, and of their associated fossils, thus presenting to the public an easy method of studying the science. The practical applications of geology in its most extended sense are here illustrated, so that any one may trace the progress of manufacture from the raw material up to the most elaborate work which may be produced. The value of this institution is great, and its instructive character is highly appreciated by the public, as is strikingly manifested by the number of people who visit it on the first three days of every week, and the interest which they appear to take in its collections.

Another and a great advance has been recently made by the establishment of the Government School of Mines, in which practical instruction of the highest class is to be given to those engaged in mining or metallurgical operations. Lectures on geology, paleontology, chemistry, metallurgy, mining and mineralogy, and physics, in its practical applications, are to commence early in November, and a portion of the year is to be devoted to instruction in the field.

We cannot but regard the establishment of this school by our government as a step in the right direction, auguring well for the continued advance of education in the direction which promises to be of practical utility. The several professors to whom the charge of the School of Mines has been committed, under the direction of Sir Henry de la Beche, have been selected from the officers attached to the Museum of Practical Geology and the Geological Survey, and from the reputation which these gentlemen already enjoy, we feel satisfied that more qualified teachers could not have been selected.

We doubt not but the collections within the walls of the

Museum of Practical Geology will, by familiarising the public with geological and mineralogical phenomena, tend materially to increase the number of students of these sciences, and we feel satisfied that all such will find much valuable assistance in the Geological Observer.

As we have remarked, the character of geological science has materially changed, and from the most uncertain and speculative, it is becoming one of the exact sciences. In the Survey of the United Kingdom, as displayed in the published geological maps, we have most ample evidence of this. Every formation is measured, its inclination from the horizontal carefully ascertained, every dislocation or *fault* is traced and mapped, every mineral lode laid down from the most exact survey, and the outcrop of each bed of coal traced; thus giving us, as in a picture, the story of the structural arrangement of our islands, and marking the localities in which our mineral treasures are profitably obtained.

The study of geology is replete with interest, and the knowledge which we derive from an investigation of the crust of our planet is, if rightly contemplated, of the most soul-exalting character. The wonderful mutations which a geological survey develops to us, shows that through all time there has been the same beautiful adaptation of means to benevolent ends as that which marks the living creation. Whether we examine the Silurian rocks, holding the remains of the wonderful Trilobite, or the tertiary formations preserving the relics of gigantic mammalia, we cannot but observe with admiration the completeness of each organization, and the perfect adaptation to its conditions of existence. Looking back into the arcana of time, surveying the wonders of creations which have passed away, we cannot but admire the manifestations 'of general ORDER since the whole began.'

ART. IX. *The God of Revelation his own Interpreter. A Sermon preached in Hope Street Church, Liverpool, on Sunday morning June 15th, 1851.* By JAMES MARTINEAU. pp. 22. Chapman.

THE publication of this discourse is to us something of a mystery. In the concluding article of our last number we submitted to our readers the substance of a Unitarian sermon, as delivered not long before from an influential Unitarian pulpit. Our purpose, in the paragraph intended to be descriptive of that sermon, was simply to indicate the change that has come over the thinking of some

Unitarian preachers and writers in our time, concerning the authority of the Christian Scriptures in relation to Christianity. It was not in our thought that exception would be taken, in any quarter, to the accuracy of our statement—least of all, that the preacher, on the occasion adverted to, would hold us as having dealt otherwise than fairly by him. But to our surprise, in a few weeks after the appearance of our last number, advertisements headed ‘The British Quarterly Unitarian Sermon’ were made to confront us, not only in the columns of newspapers, in town and country, but in larger type from the very walls of the streets.

We can in all honesty say, that at first we did not feel the truth of the proverb—seeing is believing:—for we were obliged to look once and again before we could be quite satisfied that the terrible announcement thus glaring upon us was really what it seemed to be. We are at liberty to say, that our simple minded reviewer, on being thus assailed, began to question himself, as most honest men in such case would, as to the possibility of his having misapprehended some of the more subtle and refined portions of the discourse in question; and as to the possibility, in consequence, of his having failed in some measure in giving his report of it. Memory, even where it is a good one, may be sometimes at fault. Paragraphs read from a pulpit, of which no note is taken at a time, may not be jotted down in their substance afterwards so as to be wholly free from error. But nothing came from this attempt to recall the past, of which the conscience of the apparently accused party could take cognizance as evil. He could not charge himself with having set down ‘aught in malice,’ nor with having omitted anything material to a just impression of the case. We were thus compelled to wait until we should see the discourse, and thus become aware of the process of proof by which Mr. Martineau had made out that the preacher intended must have been himself; and be apprised, at the same time, as to the nature and extent of the delinquency for which we were ourselves to be put in this manner utterly and for ever to shame. The passage given by Mr. Martineau as containing our offence against him is as follows:—

‘We wish our readers to imagine for a moment that they see a man robed as a minister of religion, in the pulpit of an elegant ecclesiastical structure. The preacher begins by assuring a limited but well-dressed and fashionable auditory that it is one of the great mistakes of the modern church to suppose that, by placing ourselves in the age of the apostles, we place ourselves in connexion with Christianity in its purity. It is not so. On the contrary, it is hard to conceive of men more filled with prejudices, and with prejudices more hostile to the religion of Jesus, than were the men who are known to us as his earliest disciples.

Such, in fact, was the ceaseless blundering of those parties, both as to the letter and spirit of the system of which they professed themselves the special teachers, that we should no more think of looking to them, though bearing the name of Apostles, for a true presentation of the religion of Jesus, than to the towerings of a Hildebrand, or the visions of a Swedenborg. The preacher assures you, accordingly, that, in his judgment, Christianity has been preserved in the world, not so much by means of apostolic wisdom, as in defiance of apostolic weakness—in spite of the attempts of these misguided men to give to it everywhere a Jewish cast and spirit—in spite of their favourite notion about the end of the world, as to come in the time of that generation, and of their narrowness, intolerance, selfishness, asceticism, and much beside. Instead of learning implicitly from them, it behoves us to subject all their teaching to a suspicious and rigid scrutiny. In place of our being judged by their word, their word is to be judged by us. In place of sitting passively at their feet, our first duty is to separate between the fragments of truth they have transmitted to us, and the accumulations of error and absurdity of their own which they have mixed up with it. For such a task we are much more competent than they. The mists of Jewish misconception which rested so thickly about them have no place with us. We can see as they could not see. Even towards Jesus, our position differs widely from theirs. They boasted of being his servants, —i.e., in the language of that time, his slaves. As a consequence, it was a part of their weakness to call him Lord—a term which denotes the holder of the slave. We take no such ground. We have chosen Jesus; He does not choose us. He is the leader, it is our will to follow, and we follow Him willingly.’ . . .

On this extract Mr. Martineau expresses himself thus:—

‘When this passage was pointed out to me, two circumstances enabled me to identify the sermon described in it with one which I had preached on the 15th of June last. 1st, The conjunction of the names of Hildebrand and Swedenborg gave a specific mark which could scarcely be misconstrued. 2nd, It had been stated to me that Dr. Vaughan, the editor of the British Quarterly, was among my hearers on the 15th of June. He may therefore be presumed to be my reporter on the 1st of August. He assures his readers that his sketch is ‘no picture of the imagination.’ Whether it conforms to the conditions of scrupulous and faithful representation may be decided by any one whom curiosity or a sense of justice may impel to consult the following pages. The sermon is here presented precisely as it was preached, without even the correction of those verbal *incuriæ* which, however venial in speech, ought not, as a general rule, to be transferred to type. My readers are thus placed in the very same position which Dr. Vaughan occupied as a hearer; only I would hope that, with less of the excitement of injured prepossessions, they may better apprehend the scope and spirit of the discourse.

‘It will be admitted that an author has a fair right to choose his own

mode and time for presenting to the world what he desires to say. It is hard to have this right snatched out of one's hands by the angry impatience of polemical rumour. I must remind the reader that this is a compulsory publication; issued simply, by way of testimony, to rectify a mis-statement of fact, not as an argument or exposition, adequate to the maintenance of opinion. Addressed to those who hear me week by week, it formed but an element in the teaching of several years, and would be interpreted by many antecedent thoughts not present to the mind of a casual visitor. The qualifications and additions which would be proper in order to secure truth of impression to an external and unprepared audience, I am now precluded from introducing. It is perhaps too much to expect from theological eagerness that it should make allowance for this disadvantage. Be this as it may, I have no desire to shrink from my responsibilities as an expounder of divine truth; but, hiding nothing and pretending nothing, shall simply endeavour, through good or ill report, to have the answer of a clear conscience towards God.'

Our readers will bear in mind that in our paragraph on the 'Unitarian sermon' we gave no name of person or place. Mr. Martineau has had to put his items of evidence together to supply, in this respect, what we had omitted. Had he been content to leave this matter as we left it, few—very few we suppose—would have troubled themselves even to conjecture as to who the preacher intended might have been. We have many 'centres of opulence' besides Liverpool, and the Unitarian preachers in them are many. We wrote anonymously—we allowed Mr. Martineau to speak anonymously; but it has been his pleasure—to use an expression of his own—to 'snatch out of our hand' the 'right,' so to speak, and thus to force a question into the shape of a personality, which we had no wish to deal with in that form. For whatever may come of this, we must hold that we are not ourselves responsible. We deem it enough to say, that, in our judgment, what Mr. Martineau delivers from the pulpit to the public, ceases, when so delivered, to be private, and becomes public—at least to the extent in which *we* have availed ourselves of it.

But Mr. Martineau prints this sermon 'to rectify a mis-statement of fact.' The question accordingly is, does the passage cited from our *Review*, as compared with the sermon Mr. Martineau has printed, convict us of representing that gentleman as saying what he did not say—or even of presenting what we did say so as to convey a false impression? Now it will appear, we think, that the sum of our statement is, that Mr. Martineau did in substance say, that the apostles of Christ, in place of fully comprehending his religion, so as to be capable of giving it in its fulness and unmingled truth to men for all time to come, were

men who apprehended it but so imperfectly, and mistook it in many respects so grievously, that in place of looking to them as our only infallible guides, we should class them among guides singularly liable to err, and should expect to learn what Christianity is, not by approaching as nearly as may be to the age of the apostles, but, on the contrary, by receding from it to the furthest extent possible. Now, the question here is not one concerning the ingenious things Mr. Martineau may be prepared to urge in exposition or vindication of such a theory concerning the function of the apostles—but simply did he, or did he not, say the things thus attributed to him? Discoursing in his introduction on the manner in which the germs of human thought and purpose develop themselves in the course of the ages, so as to outstrip all foresight by the revelations they make of what was in them, Mr. Martineau says:—

‘To lose sight of this principle in estimating Christianity, and to insist on judging it, not by its matured character in Christendom, not by the *unconscious spirit* of its founders, but by their personal views and purposes, is to overlook the divine in it in order to fasten on the human; to seek the winged creature of the air in the throbbing chrysalis; and is like judging the place of the Hebrews in history by the court and the proverbs of Solomon, or the value of Puritanism by the sermon of a hill-preacher before the civil war. The primitive Christianity was certainly *different* from that of other ages; but there is no reason for believing that it was *better*. The representation often made of the early church as having only truth and feeling only love, and living in simple sanctity, is contradicted by every page of the Christian records. The Epistles are entirely occupied in driving back guilt and passion, or in correcting errors of belief; nor is it *always* possible to approve of the temper in which they perform the one task, or to assent to the methods by which they attempt the other. Principles and affections were indeed secreted in the heart of the first disciples which were to have a great future, and to become the highest truth of the world. But it was precisely of these that they rarely thought at all. The apostles themselves speak slightly of them, as baby’s food; and the great faith in God, the need of repentant purity of heart, with the trust in immortality,—the very doctrines which we should name as the permanent essence of Christian faith,—are expressly declared by them to be the childish rudiments of belief, on which the attention of the grown Christian will disdain to dwell.\* And what

\* ‘Wherefore leaving the first principles of the doctrine of Christ, let us go on unto perfection;—not laying again the foundation, of repentance from dead works, and of faith in God, of the doctrine of baptisms and of laying on of hands, and of the resurrection of the dead, and of the everlasting judgment.’—Heb. vi. 1, 2. Comp. v. 11—14. See also 1 Cor. iii. 1, 2. ‘And I, brethren, was not able to speak to you as to spiritual, but as to carnal,—as to babes in Christ: I fed you with milk, not with meat: for ye were not then able to bear it.’ On which De Wette

did they prefer to these sublime truths as the nutriment of their life and the pride of their wisdom? Allegories about Isaac and Ishmael, parallels between Christ and Melchisedec, new readings of history and prophecy to suit the events in Palestine, and a constant outlook for the end of all things.\* These were the grand topics on which their minds eagerly worked, and on which they laboured to construct a consistent theory. These give the form to their doctrine, the matter to their spirit. These are what you will get, if you go indiscriminately to their writings for a creed: and these are no more Christianity than the pretensions of Hildebrand or the visions of Swedenborg.’

The reader has, as we hope, read this passage attentively. It must be remembered that it is of the apostles that the preacher is speaking, when he tells us that they might give us the ‘throbbing chrysalis’ form of Christianity, but that they could not give it to us as the ‘winged creature’ it would be when matured; that they might give us a *different* Christianity from our own, but that it was not their mission to give us a *better*; that the ‘*highest truth*’ in Christianity, in place of being pre-eminently *their truth*, was truth ‘*of which they rarely thought at all*,’ that, in fact, they so far substituted imbecilities and errors of their own in the place of that truth, that to ‘go indiscriminately to their writings for a *creed*,’ would be to embrace as Christianity what is no more it ‘*than the pretensions of Hildebrand or the visions of Swedenborg*.’ Now, this is the style of sermon which is printed to show that we have mis-stated the doctrine of Mr. Martineau. Wherein have we so done? We have searched carefully for the alleged wrong, and have not only failed to discover it, but have ended with a feeling of amazement that any man should have regarded it as discoverable. Everything which follows the passage we have cited, only tends to expand into greater clearness and unmis-takeableness the general idea which it presents—viz., the idea that what we know of Christ and Christianity, we know, not so much by any direct teaching of the apostles, as ‘through unintended openings in the crust’ of their almost ceaseless misconceptions. We give another paragraph, and in the two nearly the whole sermon is included:—

‘The life of Christ in Palestine was a brief phenomenon, justly regarded by every disciple as the point of divinest brilliancy in the course of Providential affairs. At the time, and when it was in recent remembrance, little notice was taken of its intrinsic character and real

remarks: ‘γάλα, *Milk*, die Anfangsgründe, Heb. vi. 1.: τὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ λόγον, wozu gehört μετάνοια, πίστις εἰς θεόν, ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν, κρίμα αἰώνιον, &c.’ Kurze Erklärung der Briefe an die Corinthier: in loc.

\* Comp. Gal. iii. 15—20; iv. 21—31. Heb. v. 4—14; vii. Matt. xvi. 28. Luke ix. 27. 1 Thess. iv. 15; v. 23. 2 Thess. iii. 5. Phil. i. 6—11; iv. 5. 1 Cor. i. 7; iv. 5. James v. 7, 8. 1 Pet. iv. 7.

peculiarities; its moral perfectness, and spiritual beauty, is handed down to us by those who perceived it very imperfectly; and had he perceived it himself, the reality would have vanished in the perception. From that gracious life itself all eyes were turned away, in order to join it on to the Past which it finished, and to the Future which it began. 'How did it come out of the ages which it closed? What did it augur in those which it led on?' These were the *two questions* with which the first disciples, with the power of his soul sleeping silently at heart, *consciously and exclusively concerned themselves*: and *neither of these*, as time has shown, *were they able to answer right*. They connected him with the Past, by regarding him as the foretold of Prophets and the descendant of Kings—as the crowning gift for which alone the ages had prepared the way, and whose step of approach pressed its visible trace on the soil of ancient history. Yet is it now confessed that, when he came, he was *not* such an one as Isaiah saw or Daniel ever dreamt; that *no* prediction had spoken of him, *no* type suggested him; and that it is only his shadow, cast by the fond light of retrospective love, that lies upon the old Hebrew centuries. They connected him with the Future, by carrying forward to his account in years to come the visions which his stay, as they supposed, was too short to realize; by assigning to him a quick return, to finish what yet was unfulfilled. The suffering, the scorn, the rejection of men, the crown of thorns, were over and gone: the diadem, the clarion, the flash of glory, the troop of angels, were ready to burst upon the world, and might be looked for at midnight or at noon. Yet, though a sentinel gazed wherever a Christian prayed, all the watchmen died without the sight: the storm swept down the horizon of time, and for many a century the sky has now been clear. *The whole Messianic doctrine, by which the Apostles found their Master's Providential place, was in its very essence the fabric of a dream; a landscape traced upon the clouds by the creative eye of faith and disappointment.* To discuss whether Jesus was the Messiah, is even more unmeaning than the question whether John the Baptist were Elijah; for Elijah was at least a *person*, but Messiah was only a *conception*. It was from trying Jesus by this conception, and endeavouring to force him into its realization, that Judas was tempted to betray him. And it is by perversely applying the same test, and coercing his spirit into the Hebrew framework,—by compelling him to belong to a system instead of permitting him to be what he is in himself, that divines, with kiss of reverence scarcely less fatal, have delivered him bound to be defaced by priests and compared with rulers. Seeking Christianity in the creed of the *first age*, we have necessarily fallen in with this notion, that 'Jesus is the Messiah'; and have thus set up *the chief Judaic error as the chief Christian verity*. Among his countrymen this conception was natural and inevitable: it was the human condition on which alone they could recognise in him what was divine: it was the only key with which their culture supplied them for interpreting the mysterious impression which he made upon their hearts: it was their ideal formula



for perfect life: and when he was before them, the real and the ideal presence could not but coalesce. It must be obvious, however, to every thoughtful reader, how much the story and portraiture of Christ have been deformed by the tyranny of this haunting idea. It is plain that he himself dwelt little, if at all, upon his *official claims*: it was to be kept a secret what he was;—a precaution which could never be reported of him, if he had notoriously held and proclaimed himself to be the Messiah, and framed his course in conformity with that conception. The deficiency seems to have been felt by the Evangelists, and it is over-compensated by their zeal. Their principle of selection, in the biographic fragments they have left, appears to have been, to take what would best identify Jesus with the Messiah; and so, his inward struggles of soul are turned into an official victory over Satan; demons are brought upon the stage to give preternatural witness to his dignity; miracles of blessed healing are spoiled by thoughts and arguments of exorcism; and counterfeit meanings are put on the old Poets and Prophets to fit the unexpected shape of new events. A Messianic goal is evidently set up in the Disciple's mind, and Jesus is exhibited to us as *living towards it*, and ever nearing it. Yet beneath this artificial disguise, quite a different life gleams through; a life rather of shrinking and recoil from the very end he is set to reach; a life, not upon system at all; shaping itself forth by the efflorescence of an inward beauty rather than the solicitations of an outward aim; a life of the Spirit that bloweth where it listeth, wandering with the breath of sweet affections over the verdure of good hearts, and carrying the south wind of Pity to soften the fallow and bring blossoms from the clod. That divine life without a plan, that free movement from the determination of love and thought within, that inspired soliloquy in action, is the real soul of the entire religion: and it reaches us, alas! only in refracted lights, or through unintended openings in the crust of Messianic doctrine.'

The italics in this extract are ours:—and at this point we might leave our case. But as Mr. Martineau insists that 'an author has a fair right to choose his own mode and time for presenting to the world what he desires to say,' and complains of our conduct in this view, we must be excused if we proceed a step further. It is a fact that Mr. Martineau had given to the world the substance of the theory expounded in this sermon before any allusion was made to it by ourselves. In the 'Westminster and Foreign Quarterly' of July last, is an article on Mr. Greg's 'Creed of Christendom,' in which this view of apostolic Christianity is elaborately presented. We had read that article before the appearance of our last number, and it was, we presume, no secret from any one, that the author of that paper was Mr. Martineau—the gentleman who, not many weeks before, had made the same subject the topic of discourse from the pulpit. It is true, what is published in a critical journal may be published anonymously; but it is, nevertheless, 'given to the

world' when so published. We observe, also, that though it is not usual to attempt a removal of the veil of the anonymous from any man who may think he has 'a fair right to choose' such a mode of utterance, Mr. Martineau can hardly complain of our taking this course in his case, seeing that he has himself taken it in our own. In the following terms does Mr. Martineau set forth, in the journal mentioned, the dimness, cloud, and strong positive misconception which beset nearly everything supposed to be Christian as apprehended by Paul:—

'It may be quite true that the essential power of Christianity resides in the image of a God resembling Christ, and loving those who aspire to approach him through the same resemblance. *But we cannot find any traces of such a conception in the writings of Paul.* The 'faith' on which he exclusively insisted would be very incorrectly defined, we conceive, as a reverence of Christ's character as morally like God. If we may judge from the negative evidence of his letters, he appears to have had *no insight into the interior of his Master's earthly life, and no concern about it.* There is an entire absence of any moral picture of Jesus, who is presented in the apostolic writings as an object, not of retrospective veneration, but of expectant reliance; not of admiring trust for personal qualities realized in a past career, but of hope grounded on his official destiny in the future. One beauty of his character is indeed appealed to in the Pauline writings—viz., his humility and self-renunciation (Phil. ii. 5-11.) but even this is recognised, not on historical, but on theocratic grounds; it is illustrated, not by anything in his life, but by the fact of his death. . . . The religion of Christ has assuredly turned out a very different phenomenon from anything that was anticipated at its origin. It was announced as a Kingdom; as the King did not come, it became a Republic. It was conceived as a State, it grew up into a Faith. It was proclaimed as the world's end; it proved to be a fresh beginning. It was to consummate the Law and the Prophets; and it confounded both. It was to cover Pagan nations with shame and destruction; it embalmed their literature and was transformed by their philosophy. It was to deliver over the earth to the pure and severe Monotheism of the Hebrews; which, however, it so relaxed as to provoke Islam into existence to proclaim again the monarchy of God. Its subjects were to be gathered from the Jews and half-castes of the Eastern Synagogue: and its most signal glories have been among the Teutonic nations, and the then unsuspected continents of the West.'

Now, taking this passage in connexion with the passages previously given, is not the effect of the whole to say, that—of all the blind guides who ever undertook to expound a spiritual system, these 'founders' of Christianity—these apostles of our faith, were among the most blind; and that of all the false prophets who have ever affected to send forth light upon the future, these were among the most false? What they say of the future is all

but sure to be the contrary of what was to come; and what they see in the past is all but sure to be what they should not see, to the strange oversight of nearly all they should find there?

There is no reason,' says Mr. Martineau, 'for the common assumption that a religion must be purest in its infancy. It is no less surrounded then, than at each subsequent time, with human conditions, and transmitted through human faculties; and when delivered to the world, embodied in action or in speech, necessarily presents itself as a mixed product of Divine insight and of human thought—of the living present and the decaying past; a flash of heavenly fire on the outspread fuel upon the altar of tradition. So is it with the Scriptures of the New Testament: which are not the heavenly source, but the first earthly result and expression of Christianity, and which present the conditions as well as the indestructible life of the religion. Only by the course of time and providence can these be disengaged from one another, and the accidents of place and nature fall away.'

Thus, in the words of Mr. Martineau, it pertains 'to that *permauent inspiration*, those ever-living sources of truth within the 'soul,' which belong to humanity through all time, to separate by slow degrees between the local and the general, the temporary and the permanent, the erroneous and the truthful, as these are mixed crudely together in the Christianity of the apostles and of the New Testament. In its first stage Christianity must have been least perfect, in its latest stage it must be the most perfect.

We have said enough, we think, to show what the theory of Mr. Martineau is, as a *fact*; enough also to enable our readers to see how far we are open to the charge of 'a mis-statement of fact.' What ground there is for attributing our statement, in any degree, to 'injured prepossessions,' or to the 'angry impatience' of the polemic, and the like, we are at a loss to discover. Some of our readers may be disposed by this time to think that if such feeling has been in action at all in this matter, it has been in the case of Mr. Martineau himself, much more than elsewhere.

Concerning Mr. Martineau's theory as a matter of *opinion*—as belonging to the *true* or the *false*, we might say much.

According to a certain class of high churchmen, the only way by which you can hope to save some sort of protestantism, is by becoming all but a papist; and according to a certain class of unitarians, the only way by which you can hope to save some sort of Christianity, is by becoming all but an infidel. We have no faith in the soundness of this policy in either case. Its effect, in both connexions, is to lure towards the edge of the vortex, until escape, in the majority of instances, becomes impossible. To approach so nearly to Rome without being of it, comes to be felt as a palpable schism. In like manner, to approach so nearly

to deism without avowing it, comes to be regarded as a puling inconsistency. It may be said—be it so:—if truth leads to Romanism, let us become Romanists; if to deism, let us become deists. So say we—but we feel assured that it cannot be truth that leads to either of these results; and we wish to prevent men from being conducted thither by errors which take on the mask and garb of truth. Dr. Pusey retains only so much hold on protestantism as enables him the better to betray it. Mr. Martineau retains only so much hold on Christianity as gives him the same power. The professions made in both cases, beget a confidence that would not otherwise be exercised, and exposes the confiding to dangers that would not otherwise have befallen them. It is a process which takes with it all the *effects* of stratagem and ambush. We speak of the *effects* only in this case, inasmuch as what Mr. Martineau or Dr. Pusey may mean by the course to which they have committed themselves, is a matter on which it does not belong to us to pronounce a judgment. But though error in judgment and error in purpose be not identical, they are the same unhappily in their effects, and we feel it to be a small solace when we see men led into error, to be assured that those who have so led them, have so done with the best possible intentions. The gossamer web of philosophical refinements—rich it may be in the colours that hang upon it, but a gossamer web still—which suffices to prevent Mr. Martineau from passing the hair's-breadth line which separates between him and mere naturalism, would suffice for no such purpose with more than a man in a myriad. It is not in human nature, except in some very rare—and, we must add, in some very artificial cases—that it should proceed so far, and not go further. It will be seen from these observations, that, in our view, as Dr. Pusey's high Anglicanism has proved one of the best possible schools for making papists; so, on the same principle, we regard Mr. Martineau's ultra unitarianism as one of the best possible schools for making infidels.

We admit that this is plain speaking, and we can imagine that Mr. Martineau will be anything but pleased with it; but for the life of us we cannot avoid *thinking* after this manner; and we must say, that we are utterly at a loss to understand why any man should take on him the airs of the offended, and indulge in insinuations about bigotry, intolerance, and all that, if he should chance to find us thinking *aloud* to this effect. To Christianity, as we regard it, we attach a value which we have no words to express. In the labours of Mr. Martineau with reference to this Christianity, we see labours which, with the least conceivable exception, are those of the destroyer. In the nature of things, we cannot bid him God-speed. If honest men, our wishes must

take an opposite direction, and our course of action must be in harmony with our wishes. In all this, however, we take no ground towards Mr. Martineau, which he is not, as all the world knows, at the fullest liberty to take towards ourselves. He may think quite as badly of our orthodoxy, as we do of his heterodoxy, and we beg to assure him he will hear no complaining—no whimpering from us, if it should please him to manifest his dislike of our opinions by never so great zeal to counteract them. Our only stipulation is that the weapons used by him in this warfare be the lawful and the honourable.

With regard to the theory of the discourse under review, were we to attempt to deal with that, it would be our aim in the first place to show, that it is an error to assume that because the light of reason will be progressive in respect to certain departments of human knowledge, to the end of time, the same must be true of the light of revelation. This is to subject the supernatural to the laws of the natural, so as to destroy all distinction between them. It is to limit the All-sufficient, and to say that he can do nothing by special intervention, that he has not done by ordinary law. Whereas the very idea of a revelation supposes the coming in of a new power, and of new law. It is God interposing to do by his authority, what could not be done by our intelligence. This idea once admitted, the nature and the extent of the instruction to be so communicated, and the permanent adaptation that may, or may not, belong to it, are questions that must be left altogether to the wisdom from which the purpose to make a revelation at all has proceeded. Of course, coming in contact with humanity, it will participate, in some degree, in what Mr. Martineau calls 'human conditions.' But the very purpose for which this communication is made is, that there shall be a clear and fixed amount of truth among men, which shall not be subject to the infirmity of the 'conditions' natural to men. Mr. Martineau's doctrine, on the other hand, when reduced to simple terms is, that a revelation to humanity, when once made, becomes a human affair, to such extent as to share in all the frail 'conditions' of human intelligence and of human virtue. In this manner revelation is so humanized as to cease to be divine. Coming to us through man, it comes to us everywhere soiled and damaged by the media through which it has passed. God has spoken with so little effect as to warrant grave doubt of his having spoken at all. It has been deemed well that a revelation should be made, but it has not been deemed well that any effectual means should be adopted to prevent its being mixed up, from the very first, with errors of every description.

But further—concerning this alleged progress of human reason, we do not scruple to affirm that the current doctrine on this subject

is, in the main, a fallacy. With regard to religion or morals, the human mind has given little sign of progress, apart from revelation, for the last two thousand years. Even upon matters of taste, it became then, nearly all it is ever likely to become. Physical science has been progressive—will be so; but to infer from that fact that it must be so with respect to everything included in human intelligence even in respect to a supposed revelation, is to infer rashly. It is not in respect to all things—it is not in respect to the highest things, that this law of progress is perceptible in the history of unaided humanity; and even were it so, the special intervention supposed in a revelation, would have sufficed to warrant our regarding it as an exception. But the reasoning of Mr. Martineau is, that because revelation must be subject in his sense to human conditions, if we suppose it to be wholly of man, so must it be if we suppose it to be specially from God. There must be no more speciality in its means of preservation and purity as coming from special laws, than as coming from ordinary laws. In place of being perfected in the past for the present, it must be, like our chemistry or astronomy, a thing brought out by time. Instead of being perfect at the first, it is of its nature that its first age should be the most obscure, that in all its later centuries it should wax brighter and brighter, becoming brightest in the last.

All this comes from the pantheistic idea which regards human intelligence as a great personality; which puts men upon reasoning about this intelligence as about a great personal development; and which having become in this manner a great world-thought, demands that all other thought, even the thought of a divine revelation, should be brought into harmony with it. The misconception here is twofold. First, it is not true that the history of human intelligence exhibits the law of progress which this theory assumes; it certainly has not so done in respect to matters of taste, and still less, where left to itself, in respect to morality and religion. Secondly, had the history of human intelligence been such as this theory assumes, it would still, we maintain, have been unphilosophical to assert, that as it is in this respect with the *natural* intelligence of the race, so must it be in respect to any *supernatural* intelligence which the Creator of the race may be disposed to impart to it.

There is another assumption lying at the foundation of Mr. Martineau's theory, to which we must be allowed to object no less strongly than to the preceding. It is admitted that the inspired writers often prophesied obscurely, seeing themselves but in part the things which they foreshadowed in their utterances. It is further admitted, that inspiration was progressive—that the later prophets were more fully inspired than the earlier, and that the inspiration of the apostles was a still further advance in

enlightenment. What sort of influence it is which Mr. Martineau regards as proper to be described by the word inspiration, it is not easy to discover—and for the present, we need not concern ourselves with that point.

From the two facts pertaining to inspiration as above stated, Mr. Martineau deduces two inferences, for neither of which do those facts supply a sufficient warrant. First, it is maintained that inasmuch as the inspiration of the *prophets* in the early stages of inspiration embraced a foreshadowing of events only *dimly apprehended* by themselves, it must, on this ground, be fair to conclude that the inspiration of the *apostles* was not of such a nature as to save *them* from great *blindness*, and not a little *misconception*, both as to the *doctrine* of their Master, which *they professed to understand*, and as to the *events* of the future, which *they professed themselves capable of foreseeing*. Here we leave our readers to compare the fact on which Mr. Martineau founds these broad and weighty conclusions, with the conclusions themselves, and to say whether they regard the one as furnishing a valid foundation for the other.

Once more—inspiration was *progressive*:—the later inspiration of the apostles being greater than the earlier inspiration of the prophets. But from the fact that inspiration was thus *continuous* to the time of the *apostles*, Mr. Martineau concludes that it has assuredly been continued to *our* time, and will be continued through *the coming time*:—and from the fact that inspiration was *progressive* to the time of the apostles, it is further concluded that it must assuredly have been progressive down to the *present* time, and must continue so to be to the *end* of time. It follows, accordingly, from the nature of the case, that in respect to religion itself, we are much wiser than the apostles, and that the men who come after us will be much wiser in that respect than we can be. Again we say—we leave our readers to compare the fact on which Mr. Martineau professes to found his conclusion, with the conclusion itself, and to judge for themselves as to his warrant for attempting to rest the one upon the other.

It is thus that error generates error, as sin engenders sin. The pantheistic idea which regards human intelligence as a great personality; and which regards the development of this personality as embracing a natural progress in morals and religion, precisely parallel with a natural progress in chemistry or astronomy, is an idea which demands, that if a doctrine of inspiration or of revelation be admitted at all, it should be only in the subordinate and limited shape consistent with this idea—in a word, that the message of inspiration itself, as known to us, must be limited, growing, consisting of an admixture of error with truth, and leaving it to the future to separate between these opposites;—or of

the mere germs of things, to which the future alone should be expected to secure growth and maturity. We repeat—the first step in this process is a mistake. The law of progress assigned to human intelligence does not affect morals and religion in the manner supposed;—and the attempt to bring inspiration into harmony with this supposed law, by degrading it so low as to render it worthless, is only a second mistake, flowing naturally from the first.

Mr. Martineau may endeavour to sustain his theory when thus assailed, by alleging that the *contents* of the sacred writings are in favour of his views—that however little acceptable such a notion may be to our prejudices, it is a fact patent to all students of the New Testament deserving the name, that the apostles did not see a great deal we might have expected them to see, and that they totally misapprehended a great deal we might have expected them to understand. We regret to say that we have become quite familiar with this style of assertion—and with the tone in which all theologians who have not been so happy as to reach the ground to which Mr. Martineau and his friends have attained, are numbered with the imbeciles and bigots of a past age, and accounted as men who cannot by any possibility become men of reputation in our age. Such language, if it be not artful, takes with it all the effect of artifice. It may mislead the unwary, but we are ourselves much too old to be affected by it, except as feeling surprise that *some* of the men who indulge in it should seem to look upon it as consistent with good taste, and with a due regard to reputation in their own case.

On the points of this novel theory before touched upon, we have merely indicated how we think they might be discussed,—we have not attempted a discussion of them. On this last point, we shall content ourselves with saying,—that we hold the Straussian idea which Mr. Martineau would thrust into the place of the Messianic idea of the apostles, as consisting, with little exception, in a tissue of bold assumptions and denials, made upon grounds the most inconsistent, untenable, and futile; that we hold the true claims of the apostles as the founders of Christianity to be unimpaired after all that Mr. Martineau has opposed to them; and that could the offensive charges of the grossest ignorance and error which he has urged against them be made out, we should be prepared at once to relinquish all faith in the supernatural origin of the gospel.

Many of our readers will be surprised at this revelation of Mr. Martineau's opinions; we can truly say we have done our best to guard against misapprehending or mis-stating them; and the conviction we have expressed as to their nature and tendency, must be our vindication in having ventured to say the little we have said about them.



- ART. X.—(1.) *Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Rome, 1849.* Presented to the House of Commons by command of Her Majesty, in pursuance of their Address of the 14th of April, 1851.
- (2.) *Two Letters to the Earl of Aberdeen on the State Prosecutions of the Neapolitan Government.* By the Right Hon. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P. for the University of Oxford. London. Murray.

THE natural wish of all persons into whose hands the collection of documents named first at the head of the present article has come, has been, to ascertain from it precisely and incontrovertibly what was the line of policy pursued by the English government in the affairs of Italy, and particularly in those of Rome, during the eventful year 1849. We cannot say that the documents, full of interest as they are in themselves, contain much that is explicit on this point. We have marked every passage in the Correspondence that seems to throw light upon it; and we will here reproduce these passages *verbatim*, earnestly entreating that our readers will give them their most serious and accurate attention.

The first passage that we find in the Correspondence bearing on the part played by the diplomacy of England during the crisis of the Roman struggle, occurs in a letter from the Marquis of Normanby, her Majesty's ambassador in Paris, to Lord Palmerston. The letter was written on the 19th of April, 1849, immediately after the vote in the French chamber authorizing the French government to occupy the Roman territory with their troops. It reveals far more of what we should like to know than any other document in the whole collection; or, to adopt the less respectful phrase which some would think justifiable, it lets the cat completely out of the bag. After describing the tenor of the conferences of the catholic powers at the pope's retreat at Gaeta, Lord Normanby proceeds thus,—

‘The question which had been under discussion between the representatives of the two governments at Gaeta thus assumed a practical shape. The Austrians professed to restore the pope without any conditions, whilst France did not pretend to dictate conditions to his Holiness, but to make the offer of her assistance dependent upon his being ready to carry out those administrative reforms which had been proposed eighteen years since, and also to confirm those constitutional institutions which the present pope had previously granted of his own free will: and it was to secure to the Romans that improved government, which it was thought would be much endangered should the pope be left by Austria to the one-sided counsels of the violent reactionary party, that this expedition had been hurried forward, in order that

the French force should arrive at Civita Vecchia before the Austrians could march upon Rome.

'I told M. Drouyn de Lhuys THAT THE OBJECT WHICH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT PROFESSED TO HAVE IN VIEW—the restoration of the pope under an improved form of government—WAS PRECISELY THAT WHICH I HAD ALWAYS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO STATE WAS ALSO THAT OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT, though, for reasons which I had then explained to him, we had not wished to take any active part in the negotiations. I had also expressed our desire that France, SHARING OUR FEELINGS ON THE SUBJECT, should not decline to participate in the negotiations. It certainly had been to the influence of diplomatic concert, and not to active intervention, that we had looked, our great desire being that the pope should be restored by the spontaneous action of his subjects.'—*Correspondence*, No. 12.

Let the reader weigh well every word in this extract, and especially the clauses which we have printed in italic and capital letters. Lord Normanby here distinctly announces that the policy, with regard to the affairs of Rome, which the whole tenor of his instructions had enjoined upon him to favour, was precisely that which the French government professed to have in view, and in support of which they had at last planned their expedition—namely, the restoration of the pope, not on any absolute conditions binding him imperatively, but solely on the understanding that he would set up an improved form of government, based partly on a scheme of administrative reforms, proposed by the friendly powers eighteen years before, and partly on his own previous concessions to the spirit of constitutional rule. This, according to Lord Normanby's statement, was the sum and substance of all that the British government desired or intended, with regard to Roman affairs, in the month of April, 1849; though, for reasons not upon record, they did not wish to negotiate in the matter directly, but rather to put forth France as the agent.

Let us see if anything additional to this view of the case is to be derived from the despatches of Lord Palmerston himself.

On the 12th of June, 1849, the siege of Rome by the French troops being then in its full vigour, Lord Palmerston addressed a despatch to Lord Normanby, containing the following paragraph:—

'Her Majesty's government will, however, feel much interest in knowing what are the views of the French government as to the course which they intend to pursue when their troops shall be in the occupation of Rome; and Her Majesty's government conclude that the French government continue to think, as they have hitherto done, that the reconciliation which it is their object to effect between the

pope and the Roman people ought to be founded on the basis, *that the pope should maintain substantially the representative constitution which he granted last year to his states, and that there should be a real and effectual separation between the temporal and spiritual power of the pope as sovereign of the Roman states.*—*Correspondence, No. 59.*

To the same effect, but more strongly expressed, is another despatch addressed by Lord Palmerston to Lord Normanby on the 3rd of July, before it was known in England that the French had entered Rome, but when it was concluded that they would do so. The following is an extract:—

‘With regard to the intentions of the French government as to the course which they mean to pursue when they are in possession of the city, Her Majesty’s government are glad to find that your excellency has been formally assured that those intentions are the same as the views originally explained by the French government before their expedition sailed to Civita Vecchia.

‘But difficulties of an opposite kind will have to be encountered in carrying those views into effect. On the one hand, the pope, misguided by the persons who now surround him, declares that he will not return to Rome shackled by any conditions, and that he will not be restrained in his sovereign power by any constitutional institutions: on the other hand, the Romans, both of the city and of the provinces, having once got free from the oppressions of priestly government, announce their determination never again to submit to the yoke which has so long pressed upon them; and it seems but reasonable to suppose that, even if the former order of things could be re-established in the Roman states by overruling military force, the people would continue to submit to it only as long as that overruling force continued to be present, and that, upon the retirement of such force, another outbreak would take place.

‘Considerations, therefore, of sound policy as connected with the future tranquillity of Italy, as well as a regard for justice, should lead foreign powers to wish that the pope might be brought to acquiesce in an arrangement, which, while it reinstated him in his position of temporal and ecclesiastical authority at Rome, *should give to his subjects, for their civil and political rights, those guarantees which nothing but a representative constitution could afford.* . . . . If the pope should be brought to agree to such terms, and if the Romans should consent to receive him back upon such conditions, *the detailed execution of such an arrangement would require indeed to be vigilantly watched by the mediating powers,* in order that there might be no want of good faith in carrying it out; but the European embarrassment would be at an end as soon as such an agreement between the pope and his subjects had been come to.

‘But in a matter so difficult, and at the same time so important, failure as well as success must be provided for; and Her Majesty’s

government, therefore, are desirous of knowing what are the views of the French government as to the course which they contemplate pursuing in the event of such an arrangement as that above mentioned being refused, either by the pope or the Romans, or by both. . . . Her Majesty's government are not at present in a condition to express any formed opinion on these matters, beyond observing that a *prolonged occupation of the city or territory of Rome by the troops of any foreign power would be, with regard both to its principle and its consequences, a thing much to be deprecated and greatly to be avoided.*'—*Correspondence, No. 75.*

Not content with making these explanations to Lord Normanby, as the representative of Great Britain at Paris, Lord Palmerston also put Lord Ponsonby, the ambassador at Vienna, in possession of his sentiments. In a despatch to Lord Ponsonby, dated the 13th of July, the foreign minister says :—

'It seems to her Majesty's Government, from the information which has reached them from various sources, that, while on the one hand the great majority of the people of the Roman States feel an invincible repugnance to submit themselves again to priestly government, they would, on the other hand, have no insurmountable objection to receive the pope as their temporal sovereign, provided they were secured in their civil and political interests by such a representative constitution as that which the pope gave to his subjects last year. But if the pope takes his stand upon the grounds laid down in his allocution of the 20th of April, and refuses to maintain the constitution, and objects to a separation of the temporal administration of the State from the spiritual authority of the Church, it is evident that one of two things must happen, either that the pope must be restored to his former power in Rome by the force of foreign arms, or that he must abandon all hope of returning thither. [His lordship then goes on to show that either alternative ought to be dreaded by Austria.] For these reasons *Her Majesty's Government are desirous of engaging the Austrian government to exert that influence which it is known to possess over the papal councils, in order to persuade the pope to maintain the constitutional concessions which he made to his subjects last year, and thus to pave the way for his resumption of the papal throne.*'—*Correspondence, No. 83.*

Now, on comparing these three last quoted despatches of Lord Palmerston with the previous despatch of Lord Normanby, the careful reader must be struck with one thing—namely, that there is a certain discrepancy between the representation given by the ambassador, of the line of policy in regard to Roman affairs inculcated on him by the government at home, and the foreign minister's own version of what he meant that line of policy to signify. The express statement of Lord Normanby is, that he had been uniformly instructed to say to the French

government that the English government agreed with them in the desire to see the pope restored on the terms which they (the French government) professed to have at heart—namely, that, without directly imposing conditions beforehand on the holy father, there should be an understanding that he would conduct his government in accordance with the scheme of administrative reform recommended to the papacy by the European powers eighteen years before, and also with his own previous concessions of constitutional forms. Lord Palmerston, on the other hand, without contradicting the assertion that the English government concurred in the restoration of the pope on the terms professed by the French government, gives a considerably stronger version of what the English government understood these terms to be—namely, an engagement, virtual or actual, on the part of the pope, to maintain the Roman constitution of 1848, and to perfect the separation between the temporal and the spiritual papacy. We invite the reader to refer back to the documents, so as to see whether what we here state is not quite correct.

We have no wish here to resort to any supposition of duplicity on the part of Lord Palmerston, or to any suspicion that the correspondence before us (many of the documents in which are given in an incomplete state) has been garbled, so as to make Lord Palmerston's conduct in the Roman affair seem more liberal than it really was. We will assume that there was fair dealing on both sides; and that the documents before us adequately represent all that Lord Normanby wrote to Lord Palmerston on the subject of the French interference in Rome, and all that Lord Palmerston wrote in return to Lord Normanby. In this case, however, either the ambassador or the foreign minister was under a mistake. Either the ambassador had not a sufficiently clear idea of the terms on which the English government were willing to back the French in their restoration of the Pope; or the foreign minister had an exaggerated idea of the terms on which the French, on their part, professed to be anxious to restore him. We are bound to say that the evidence goes to prove that the mistake was *not* on the side of Lord Normanby. The very day after Lord Palmerston had received the despatch of Lord Normanby already quoted, explaining the objects which the French government had in view in resolving on the expedition to Rome, he received officially, through Admiral Cécille, copies of two despatches sent by the French minister, M. Drouyn de Lhuys himself, to the French ambassadors at Vienna and Rome respectively. These despatches contain an authoritative declaration of the precise intentions professed by the French government, in connexion with the restoration of the

pope. Thus, in the despatch to M. de la Cour, dated the 17th of April, and directed to be submitted to the Austrian minister, Schwartzenberg—

‘The government of the Republic has resolved to send to Civita Vecchia a body of troops, commanded by General Oudinot. Our intention in deciding on this measure has been neither to impose on the Roman people a system of administration which their free will would have rejected, *nor to constrain the pope to adopt, when he shall be recalled to the exercise of his power, this or that system of government.* We thought, we more than ever think, that, by the force of events, by the effect of the natural disposition of men’s minds, the system of administration which the Revolution of last November has established at Rome (the Republic) is destined soon to fall, and that the Roman people will place themselves again under the authority of the sovereign pontiff, provided they are secured against the dangers of a reaction. But we nevertheless think—and in this respect, especially, you know our language has never varied—that that authority will not take strong root, and can only strengthen itself against fresh storms, by the help of institutions which may prevent the return of the old abuses, the reform of which Pius IX. had with such generous zeal begun. To facilitate a reconciliation which would be effected on such grounds; to give to the holy father, and to all those who, whether at Rome or at Gaeta, are disposed to co-operate therein, the assistance which they may require to surmount the obstacles raised by exaggerated pretensions or by evil passions—such is the object which we have assigned to our expedition.’—*Correspondence. Inclosure I. in No. 13.*

This document bears out Lord Normanby’s representation of the design of the French government—namely, the restoration of the pope, without any pre-arranged stipulation as to what he was to do, but on a general understanding that he was to practise a liberal system of administration; the constitutional system, if he chose, or, if not, something approaching to it.

Assuming, then, the entire integrity of Lord Palmerston, and the adequacy of the documents before us to inform us as to his views in the Roman affair, we can account for the discrepancy in question, only by supposing that Lord Palmerston’s views as to the necessity of taking guarantees from the pope, became more and more decided, or were more and more decidedly expressed, as the business of negotiation for the pope’s restoration proceeded. In other words, until the announcement of the intention of the French government actively to interfere, Lord Palmerston must have contented himself with a general assent to the known wish of that government that the pope should be restored; but after that announcement, he must have brought more prominently forward his view of the conditions on which the restoration should

take place. This idea is corroborated by the terms of a despatch of Lord Normanby, dated the 16th of July, in which his lordship expressly comments upon these despatches of Lord Palmerston, and particularly his despatch of the 13th to Lord Ponsonby, in which the propriety of procuring from the pope nothing less than an engagement to maintain the constitution of 1848 had been insisted on.

‘Your lordship, in your despatch to Lord Ponsonby of the 13th instant, *evidently contemplates the establishment of such representative institutions as would fulfil the functions of a regular constitutional government.* Should the forcible reasons which are there given why Austria should desire the permanent establishment of a government in Central Italy, which should realize the just wishes of the people, and thereby avert future commotion, produce such an impression on the Austrian government as to induce them to urge advice in that spirit upon the pope and his counsellors at Gaeta, I cannot doubt that the French government would not only sympathize in such a result, but, secured of the co-operation of Austria, be anxious to bear a part in bringing it about, and risk all other opposition for that object. But they are acting under the conviction, not only that no concessions to that extent could be obtained voluntarily from the pope, but that Austria, as well as Spain and Naples, would support his Holiness in opposition to the demand. France has therefore to consider her own peculiar position from the very outset.’ [Here follow certain observations intended to show, that though it was all very well for England to insist on the necessity of obtaining from the pope a guarantee of constitutional government, France could not, with security to her own interests, commit herself to such an explicit demand.] ‘*It would seem, therefore, that it is worth while to consider how far it would be an advantage to revert to the state of things which existed at the time of the first ‘Consulta,’ almost at the last moment at which Roman affairs were not swayed by extraneous revolutionary influences.*’ [Lord Normanby here, living in Paris, and partaking of the false views of the Roman revolution propagated there, falls into the delusion of supposing that that revolution was the work of foreign demagogues.] ‘It is true that the pope and his people would now again meet, with all enthusiasm lost and much experience gained; and this might enable one the better to examine how far the administrative reforms which his Holiness is ready to promise might in practice assume the character of constitutional guarantees. I understand that large concessions would be offered as to the control over the finances to be given to the municipalities in conjunction with the ‘Consulta.’ Such provisions, like any others, may be obliterated or perverted in careless or corrupt hands; but *history affords many examples where such institutions, more certainly than any written constitution, contained the germ of civil liberty.* If, in addition, the code is purified, and the independence of the judges established, one can easily foresee that when the people

by such means have been prepared for further progress, the change may be effected at some moment more favourable than the present.'—*Correspondence, No. 85.*

This document brings out, in a very remarkable manner, the discrepancy between the views of Lord Normanby and those of Lord Palmerston. It opens with a sentence almost indicating surprise—'*Your lordship evidently contemplates, &c.,*' as if now for the first time Lord Normanby was aware that Lord Palmerston was anxious to have the restoration of the pope arranged on the basis of a guaranteed constitution. Very curious, we must say, this sudden enlightenment on the part of Lord Normanby! Had his lordship not read the despatches to himself of the 12th of June and the 3rd of July, that he now for the first time became aware of Lord Palmerston's intentions from a copy of his despatch to a brother ambassador? Or are we to suppose that the whole tenour of his previous instructions had been so absolutely devoid of any decided reference to the necessity of a constitution, that it took three despatches to drive it into his head that the foreign minister actually took this view of things now? On either supposition, there was a diplomatic delinquency somewhere. In the one case, Lord Palmerston deserves blame for leaving his subordinate at the French court imperfectly informed of his intentions on a most vital point; in the other, Lord Normanby deserves blame for not sufficiently studying his instructions, or for not sufficiently acting up to them when studied. Considering the thoroughly French tone and the disgraceful and pedantic shilly-shallying of the last-quoted despatch of Lord Normanby, in which his lordship evidently tries to indoctrinate Lord Palmerston with the French solution of the Roman question, we are disposed to lay most of the blame on the ambassador. What! a Whig envoy; a man made, and reared, and titled, and paid by a constitutional government, writing home to his chief sermons about the beauty of mere spontaneous concessions to a people by the supreme executive, and the non-necessity of written constitutions!\*

\* It is but fair to state, that after Lord Palmerston had made known his desire that the Romans should have a guaranteed constitution as the price of their taking back the pope, he continued to reiterate it, at least in words. Thus, on the 7th of August, writing to Lord Normanby regarding the reactionary measures with which the restoration of the papal government had already been followed up, he uses this language: 'I said (to M. Drouyn de Lhuys) that the thing which is essentially required for future tranquillity in the Roman states, is some good and valid security against a return of those abuses which priestly government had created and maintained, and that it seemed to me that such a security could only be found in a representative and legislative assembly, and in a well-regulated freedom of the press, and a *bonâ fide* separation of the temporal from the spiritual administration; in short, in such a constitution as the pope had granted to his subjects in the Fundamental Statute of the 14th of March, 1848.'



But, under the most favourable view of the case for the English government as represented by Lord Palmerston, its conduct was in all respects little and deplorable. In the first place, there was a most unstatesmanlike disproportion between the expressed *desire* of the English government in the Roman affair, and the *policy* with which it backed that desire. The *desire* of the English government, if we are to accept Lord Palmerston's despatches as conveying it sincerely, was, that the pope should be restored under the guarantee of a regular constitution substantially identical with that of 1848; the *policy* of the English government was based on the principle that the pope was to be restored precisely on whatever conditions the French government should think most suitable. The blunder and crime of the English government, therefore, even in the execution of its own views, consisted in this—that it abnegated all right to act independently, and handed over to another government, in whom it had no reason to confide, a full commission of proxy. And on what grounds did it proceed thus? The grounds are not upon record; but we guess them to have been connected with the formal scruple that England had no recognised relations with the court of Rome. Trumpery and detestable quibble! Here was a poor Italian people threatened by a combination of European powers with the restoration of a sovereign whom it had, after adequate experience, rejected and disowned as an incubus and a cause of misery; and England, the only power, as it seemed, that retained sentimentally the trace of a wish to see the people get fair play, hesitated and paltered about giving effect to that shadow of a wish, on the score that no relations had been established between it and the sovereign that was to be brought back. 'Help me out of the ditch' was the cry of the Roman people to England. 'I am sorry I cannot,' was virtually the reply; 'never having been introduced to the man who threw you in.'

Still further, had the *policy* of the English government exactly corresponded with the then expressed *desire* in the Roman matter, both would yet have been characterized by absurdity and want of clear or statesmanlike vision. There is no use of mincing matters; and we may now say boldly, that even the restoration of the pope, under the amplest guarantee to his people of the constitution of 1848, would have been an insufficient, illogical, unprincipled, and most un-English proceeding. Insufficient, for it would, in fact, have been nothing more than to arrange the chess-board over again for the repetition of a game already played;—illogical, for the very same reason which made it right that the Romans should have a constitution, legitimized all that

they had done under and in prosecution of the constitution already granted to them; and also because a constitutional pope was and is the greatest of paralogisms;—unprincipled, for to force back a sovereign upon a people, under whatever pretence of care for the interest of both parties, is a gross violation of national right;—un-English, for if there was any one action in the world which England stultified all her past history and all her supposed instincts by taking part in, that action was the restoration of a deposed pope. The richest piece of historic comedy ever seen, we should say, was John Bull, in a fit of magnanimity, lending a hand to lift the pope once more upon his legs. Why, Bull, you old fool, you ought to have been so glad at seeing this pope, for whose downfall you were supposed to have been petitioning Heaven for three centuries, fairly knocked down, that, without giving yourself any particular pains to ascertain who did it, or how it was done, you ought to have accepted the fact as the most splendid thing that had been done for many a long day, and set all the bells in England a-ringing to commemorate it!

And what, after all, was the result of that glorious combination of the powers of Europe, in which England acted so dignified a part? The result was, as all know, that the pope was restored—restored by France; and restored, not only without any guarantee of a constitution for the Romans, but simply, absolutely, and unconditionally. The result was, that Austria carried the day, with this one exception, that instead of acting as the pope's police herself, she saw French soldiers fixed in that honourable post. The result was, that the civilization of Europe lost the most promising opportunity for a great step in progress that had presented itself for ages; and that Central Italy, after a brief taste of well-earned and nobly-borne freedom, was thrown back into all the rigours and all the miseries of a government systematically corrupt, malevolent, and brutal. The result was, that John Bull himself, while occupied in gazing reverently at the rehabilitated pope, received a crack on the head from his Holiness, in the shape of a proclamation re-annexing Great Britain to the Roman see, and putting it under the spiritual care of a gentleman named Wiseman. That was the result of the grand concentration of the diplomacies of England, France, Austria, Spain, and Naples, for the solution of the Roman question; and surely, if policies are to be judged by their results, there was fearful blundering somewhere.

We have dwelt thus at length on the conduct of the British government, with regard to the Roman question, partly because that question formed so large a portion of the whole question of

Italy, and partly because the conduct of the British government in regard to Rome illustrates their general intentions and wishes with respect to the rest of Italy. As Lord Palmerston's ideal of a suitable settlement of the Roman difficulty consisted in the setting up of a constitutional government, with the pope for monarch, in the Roman states, so, as far as appears, his ideal of an arrangement for the whole of Italy consisted in the extension of the same model to the other Italian states—that is, in the permanent erection of constitutional monarchies in Naples, Tuscany, Piedmont, &c. But here an obstacle intruded itself, requiring a course of policy supplementary to the main one. In certain parts of Italy there were natural and, as it seemed, insurmountable difficulties in the way of a constitutionalizing process as applied to the existing materials. In the Neapolitan states, the known character of the reigning king, and the decided rupture between him and large masses of his subjects, rendered a constitutional adjustment almost impossible, unless in the train of certain preliminary changes. In the north of Italy, on the other hand, the question what was to be done with Lombardy introduced a new perplexity. In short, it was plain that the constitutionalizing process could not be applied to Italy as a whole—could not pervade and overrun the peninsula—unless the way were smoothed by certain organic changes in the political partition of the Italian territories. In these circumstances, the British government sought a policy of reserve in the activity and designs of Piedmont. Whatever organic changes in the political partition of the Italian soil—in other words, whatever amount of revolutionary action—might be necessary to make the existence of constitutional monarchies possible in Italy, Lord Palmerston and the British government wished to see accomplished by a Piedmontese instrumentality. Thus, when the Sicilians, encouraged by England, desired to be independent, they followed English advice, and sought for a constitutional monarch in a scion of the House of Savoy. And again, when the war between the Piedmontese and the Austrians was going on in Northern Italy, there can be no doubt that the sympathies of Lord Palmerston were so far in favour of the Piedmontese; so that, when that war had turned out disastrously for the Italian side, it was the policy of the British government to take care that Piedmont should not be extinguished in consequence of the failure, but should remain in full possession of all those liberties which were peculiarly her own.

The erection, therefore, of constitutional monarchies in the Italian states; the restoration of the pope on such terms as would make him also, in his temporal capacity, a constitutional monarch;

and the allowing of a *carte blanche* to the Piedmontese dynasty to do all the properly revolutionary work that might be necessary in Italy to secure these objects—such were the great items in the diplomatic scheme of the British Whig cabinet with regard to the general Italian question in the spring of 1849. Are these three items still in the scheme of the Whig cabinet with regard to Italy; or may the events of the last two years and a half be supposed to have altered and enlarged the Palmerstonian policy in Italian affairs?

One item in the former Palmerstonian policy with regard to Italy we may certainly consider as abandoned. There will be no more diplomatizing on the part of the Whigs for restoring the pope, and making a constitutional sovereign of him. They have played enough at that game, and made little enough by it. The pope, if he should be once more off his throne, will not find much disposition on the part of the Whigs of England to assist in replacing him on it. He has effectually settled that point by his Wiseman bull. So, at least, persons of ordinary intelligence would suppose; and the contrary seems to pass the bounds even of Whig infatuation. To this add that the course of events in Naples seems to have confirmed, beyond any future hope of invalidation, any previous conviction that the Whigs may have entertained of the impossibility of constitutionalizing Southern Italy out of the materials afforded by the present political ownership of that part of the peninsula.

With these exceptions, the policy of our Whig statesmen with regard to Italy may be considered as substantially the same as it was in 1849. To convert Italy into an aggregation of constitutional monarchies, and to do this, if necessary, in spite of the pope and of the King of Naples, and even to the eviction and expatriation of these gentlemen—such, allowing the largest scale of liberality, is the design or desire, with regard to Italy, which we may suppose to animate, at the present time, the councils of the Whig cabinet. Any change in their intentions or wishes during the last two years, therefore, may be said to have consisted in an increase of their Piedmontese leanings. To regard Piedmont not merely as the only state in Italy on which the eye of an enlightened English statesman could rest with pleasure, but also as the only native quarter whence a spirit or a power could come for the reformation of the rest of Italy; to encourage and support Piedmont, therefore, in the course of internal constitutional administration, against Austria, France, or any other threatening power; and further, to nourish the hereditary ambition of the house of Savoy, so as to urge Piedmont at any future time to place herself at the head of a general

Italian movement, and turn the same to her own advantage, while she made it serve the cause of constitutional monarchy—such, could we split open Lord Palmerston's teeming brain, would probably be the secret resolution we should find hid in some corner of it. The policy, it will be observed, is, in its nature, quite revolutionary, as regards the general condition of the peninsula; the only difference being, that whereas the policy of the so-called democratic revolutionists would have the revolution to come from the heart of the whole Italian people, this policy of our Whig statesmen would patronize a military revolution devised and led by Piedmont. Nor is this a mere policy kept *in retentis*. Even now, as the hour seems to be approaching for a new outburst in Italy, Piedmont is said to be putting forth her feelers with a view to ascertain what her chances are. Sardinian under-secretaries, and official subordinates both at home and abroad, are dropping significant words to the effect that, in case of need, there will be a repetition of the Carlo-Alberto strategy. 'Trust in Piedmont,' is the advice which Sardinian politicians are at this moment sedulously inculcating in all parts of Italy which they can reach. The Piedmontese leanings of our English Whigs are, therefore, an element in the Italian question, which may even now be taking practical effect, and contributing, for good or for bad, to the coming issue.

Let us now turn to that other party of English politicians, which, under the present arrangements of English suffrage and English society, is necessarily recognised as the rival of the Whig party, and the alternative into which we must fall if the Whigs are displaced. What would be the probable policy of a Graham-Gladstone-Aberdeen cabinet in regard to Italy; and would it be better or worse than the policy which we have just sketched?

Our data for coming to an answer on this question are unfortunately not of so precise a kind as we could wish. The class of politicians under notice have been so long out of a position in which they could publicly manifest their sentiments, that to know their Italian policy thoroughly, it would probably be necessary to resort to the hazardous experiment of calling in the physician in order to see his prescription. As it is, our conclusions must be based on inference from our past knowledge of the politicians concerned. There is one circumstance, indeed, which, while it is calculated to throw some light on the views of these politicians with regard to Italy, has probably given rise to hasty and exaggerated expectations of what they would or could do for Italy if once more in power. We allude to the publication of Mr. Gladstone's 'Letters to Lord Aberdeen on the State Prosecutions of the Neapolitan Government.' Although these

Letters are undoubtedly the private act of the able and honourable man whose name they bear, and could not, without the meanest and most unjust inattention to Mr. Gladstone's own emphatic declarations, be regarded as in any sense a manifesto of the feelings of a political party, yet there can be no doubt that, written as they were by one of the most distinguished members of the Conservative party in England, and addressed as they were to another distinguished member of that party, formerly its foreign minister, the letters do portray the state of mind of that party, and will exercise an effect upon its future position as regards the cabinets of Europe. Mr. Gladstone himself professes that one of the reasons which led him to the publication of his impressions regarding the state of the administration in the kingdom of Naples, was his anxiety for the character and prospects of the Conservative party to which he belongs:

‘As a member of the Conservative party in one of the great family of European nations, I am compelled to remember that that party stands in virtual and real, though perhaps unconscious, alliance with all the established governments of Europe as such; and that, according to the measure of its influence, they suffer more or less of detriment from its reverses, and derive strength and encouragement from its successes. This principle, which applies with very limited force to the powerful states, whose governments are strong, not merely in military organization, but in the habits and affections of the people, is a principle of great practical importance in reference to the government of Naples, which, from whatever cause, appears to view its own social, like its physical, position as one under the shadow of a volcano, and which is doing everything in its power from day to day to give reality to its own dangers, and fresh intensity, together with fresh cause, to its fears.’—*Letter I., fifth edition, p. 6.*

The Letters, then, *have* a political significance, and *do* indicate, under however deep a guise, the kind of function and aim in the present condition of European society, that so eminent a member of the Conservative party as Mr. Gladstone would desire to give to conservatism as a system. But when we try to discover what this function and aim of Mr. Gladstone's ideal of conservatism would be, as regards Italy specifically, we find ourselves left very much in the dark. The Letters, it will be observed, are wholly and exclusively devoted to an exposition and denunciation of administrative abuses in one of the Italian states; and though this is accomplished so sincerely, so boldly, and so effectually, as to entitle Mr. Gladstone to all, and more than all, the credit which he has received in consequence from good men of all parties, yet when we come to consider what likelihood there is that the man who has acted thus conscien-

tiously in his capacity as a private observer would pursue, when opportunity was given, a right course of public statesmanship, we are bound to pay attention to the fact that there is a studious avoidance, throughout the Letters, of all the larger questions of Italian politics. True, this was probably the best method for Mr. Gladstone's purpose. True, Mr. Gladstone must have his views on these larger questions, though he has not here revealed them—his views as to what might be best politically for Naples, as to how Lombardy might be best pacified, and as to what solution could be most hopefully given to the problem of the papacy. True, there are rumours that Mr. Gladstone's private expressions of opinion on these topics are of a kind that would astonish some of his slow-going Conservative brethren. True, in spite of his present ideas, Mr. Gladstone will hereafter be forced, by that very hatred towards himself which he will have stirred up for ever by these Letters in the hearts of all tyrannical cabinets, to assume positions which he may not now contemplate; nor is it unlikely that Lord Aberdeen, being to some extent implicated, will have to do the same. Still the fact remains, that, however creditable these Letters may be to the moral honesty and the benevolent spirit of Mr. Gladstone, and through him, of his friends among the English Conservatives, there is nothing in them from which we can augur that the statesmanship of the Conservative party, with regard to Italy, would differ much from what, on other evidence, we might have concluded that it would be.

And what, according to all the evidence before us, may we conclude that the policy of the English Conservatives would be with regard to Italy? A just and impartial administration of the law as it stands in the existing Italian states—this, in opposition to such systematic abominations as those which Mr. Gladstone denounces, would probably be the first and most essential item in the scheme of demands, with regard to Italy, that would be favoured by Conservatives of the Gladstone school. To this may be probably added, a sincere desire to see the administration in the various states improved by the concession of specific reforms, securing greater social liberty to the subject, and a closer conformity of the civil system to the requirements of modern progress. With some Conservatives the spirit that would prompt these demands might mount so high, as to induce an acquiescence in the Whig idea of the conversion of all the existing states of Italy into so many constitutional monarchies, with legislative assemblies. But beyond this, so far as appears, the programme of even the most liberal conservatives would not go. More, even than the Whigs, they would shrink from all

the larger questions that concern the Italian future, and in the discussion of which alone is there any real approach to the root of the matter. Far more than the Whigs, the Conservatives who express themselves at all on Italian affairs seem to abstain from the question of Lombardy—their ultimate position with regard to which is, that it were well if the Austrians would govern it more liberally; far more than the Whigs, they abstain from any declaration that might seem to infer a sentence of reprobation on the present Neapolitan dynasty; far more than the Whigs, they leave it uncertain what they would do in the matter of the papacy. The Whigs, as we have seen, do—through their leanings towards Piedmont, and their wishes to see it pursue the career which the ambition of its princes marks out for it—recognise, blindly it may be, but still really, the necessity of some revolution or other in the Italian peninsula; all that the Conservatives as a party can think, speak, or propose regarding Italy, is struck beforehand with impotence and irrelevancy by this simple fact, that revolution is a word they will die, or see the world rotten, rather than approvingly pronounce.

Let there be no mistake, therefore. So far as we have any data from which to form a judgment, a Graham-Gladstone-Aberdeen government would not be the thing to rectify the relations of England to her sister Italy. The policy of such a government might be more open and undisguised than that of a Whig government in foreign questions; there might be less of equivocating, and making-believe, and playing fast and loose between popular principles and heartless practices; but essentially, and upon the whole, there would be a removal of Downing-street nearer to St. Petersburg. The statesmanship of the Whigs with respect to Italy may have been none of the best or most decisive; but the statesmanship of the Conservatives is not the alternative that one would willingly be limited to. What a Gladstone might do individually towards putting us on a right policy in regard to Italy, were he to step out from his party, and allow those strong feelings of humanity and justice which prompted his onslaught upon the administrative enormities of one Italian state to carry him forward into that 'larger question' of Italy as a whole which he has hitherto avoided, is a consideration standing by itself. We speak of Conservative cabinets as known things, and leave out the element of the incalculable.

If, then, neither Whig policy, as we have hitherto known it, nor Conservative policy as we can presume or prefigure it, carries in it a discharge of the debt which England as a free nation owes to Italy as an oppressed and enslaved one; what is the policy that will answer to such a delineation, and of what



desires, general propositions, or rules of procedure, may it be defined as composed? We shall try to answer this question distinctly and briefly.

I. The pre-requisite of all statesmanship on the part of England or any other nation with regard to Italy, the necessary foundation, without which all such statesmanship is mere waste of breath and piling of sea-sand, is *accurate knowledge of what that is, or what those things are, which Italy herself wants*. This, surely, is an obvious maxim; and yet we seem to be most marvellously neglecting it. We treat Italy as we should a crying infant; we let it cry on till we are ourselves annoyed, and then we snatch up anything that chances to be on the table—a spoon, a cork, a paper-knife—and put it into the child's hands with a 'Now, be quiet.' But Italy is not an infant; she can state her wants articulately; and whether we offer her in lieu thereof the spoon of Lord Palmerston, or the cork of Lord Aberdeen, or the Peace-Society's paper-knife, she will equally dash the impertinence away. Italy tells the world what she wants as plainly as a people can. And what is that? In the first place,—independence, nationality, Italy for the Italians. There is no mistake as to this, no hesitation, no difference of opinion. 'We want to expel the Austrian; we want to have our own land which God gave to us; we want to perform that part among ourselves, and in relation to the rest of the earth which God has assigned to every mass of soundly-organized human beings marked by His hand as a separate people, and to the performance of which we, in particular, feel called by an ineradicable, ever-powerful, and daily-growing instinct. Austrian rule as it is, or Austrian rule made milder—is a choice of alternatives which we refuse to entertain; Austrian rule under any fashion is to us a robbery, a blasphemy, a blow at our life—and against this we will protest and fight till either we gain our end, or our national heart ceases to beat.' Such is the language of all parties, of all classes, in Italy; as to this, there are no dissensions, no sects. And what beyond this do the Italians want? Italy once independent, what, after that, do the Italians propose to do? Here, too, their answer is ready. 'One thing,' they will say, '*none* of us want; none of us want that arrangement of diverse constitutional monarchies which would result from a mere compulsory reform of the existing states severally as they are, and which you politicians of England are so fond of prescribing to us. You may preach that solution to us as long as you like; but your words are vain; we, who know better, are all agreed that that solution is an absurdity and a chimera. Up to this point, then, there is also no dissension on our side; but beyond that point we do

‘differ a little amongst ourselves. Some among us—but they are a gradually diminishing party—place their hopes still in Piedmont, and contemplate a military revolution, which shall renovate Italy by converting a large section of her territory into a powerful and constitutional Piedmontese kingdom, the rest organizing itself in one, or perhaps two portions, after the same model. The vast majority of us, however—all, in fact, who are not officials—hold that Italy must, whether for a phase or a permanency, be universally republicanized. Accepting this solution, some of us look to the United States as our model, and hold that the best arrangement for Italy would be that of a number of independent states or cantons federatively combined into a whole; others of us, looking at the moderate size of the peninsula, and impressed with the pre-eminent necessity for the Italians of a moral education in the idea of unity, aim at the consolidation of all Italy into one republican nation.’ Such, stated in the most candid way, are the opinions and aspirations of the Italians at the present hour, as to the future organization of liberated Italy. These and nothing else are the claims and views of Italy, let us judge as we will of them.

II. That which Italy herself wants having been duly ascertained, the true function of foreign statesmanship with regard to Italy is *to pronounce how far this is just, possible, and expedient, and, to that extent, to forward its attainment by all legitimate means.* It will be observed that we here interpose between the decision of Italy as to her own wants and the co-operation of foreign statesmanship towards their attainment, an intermediate process of judgment on the part of the foreign states friendly to Italy. To many this may appear superfluous. That Italy herself has decided on a particular solution of her difficulties, may seem to many a sufficient ground of itself why foreign statesmanship should lend its help towards the accomplishment of that solution. We will not take so absolute a position. That Italy herself should have pronounced in favour of a particular course of national action and development, ought, indeed, with all who believe in the right of a nation to the uncontrolled regulation of its own affairs, to be a sufficient reason why no interference should be made by foreign states, *hostile* to this determination of the Italian will and energies. But, when the co-operation of foreign states—their friendly sympathy and help—is requested, then the case is altered, and there certainly does remain a right on the part of the foreign states to pronounce an independent judgment of their own on the question, whether that which Italy demands for herself is just and good. Nor, such a judgment being allowed, needs Italy fear the issue. Her first want,

we have seen—that which she places before all others—is independence, national existence. Who is there among us that will gainsay this want? What is that sentiment which, by the agreement of the whole world, is regarded as the source of the noblest and most heroic movements in history? Is it not the sentiment of nationality—that sentiment which would lead every honourable man in an invaded and conquered country, let the country be never so poor or never so wretched, to lose his life on the scaffold, or to flee to the remotest mountain-solitudes of the land, rather than sit down in ignominious peace under the protection of the invader's rule, and within the circle of the invader's garrisons? For what kind of characters in history—for what courses of action in the past, do our authors, our poets, all our organs of collective human judgment and feeling, reserve their deepest execrations? Is it not for the men called traitors, whose hearts loved their native land so little that they would help foreign masters to pass within its boundaries—the actions called treacheries, which consisted in schemes for that end? *Vendidit hic auri patriam* is the well-remembered phrase every boy learns at school; and, in spite of all the cant with which this subject of patriotism has been necessarily overladen by our ceaseless literary exertitions upon it, the thing itself remains deep and indestructible in the recognition of all men. Let us but apply all this to the case of Italy. Here are some sentences on this very point, from a recent pamphlet on the Italian question:—

‘Let Englishmen but make the case their own. Let them imagine a fourth part of the soil of England in possession of the Czar of Russia—governed in his name by Russian functionaries, and garrisoned by soldiers in Russian uniform. Let them suppose the wealth of this portion of England drained away to fill the treasury of St. Petersburg, its young men levied to serve in the armies of the Czar in other lands, its courts of justice subjected to Russian control, its schools and colleges regulated by Russian superintendents, its literary men under Russian censorship, all its journals suppressed, with the exception of an official Russian gazette or two, its very catechisms and grammars tinctured to the Russian taste, public meetings of every kind prohibited, the streets patrolled by Russian sentinels, and every English man, woman, child, and thing, at the mercy of Russian insolence. Let them further fancy that the rest of this wretched island of Great Britain were divided into six or seven other states, governed absolutely by dukes or princes, the liveried servants of the czar, and in constant communication with the court of St. Petersburg. Let them fancy that in these states also the people were nothing; that there were no free newspapers, no public meetings, no means of political activity; that society was held down from above by the pressure of military strength, and pervaded within by a remorseless system of secret police, which

kept the prisons always full, and sent annually its scores of victims to the scaffold. And fancying all this, let Englishmen fancy what they would in these circumstances do. Conspire—in the name of freedom, and of all that is holy, conspire; organize, and combine, and scheme, and plot, and dig underground through the whole of England, if they could, one vast connected mine of free association; watch the ripe hour of action; and then, rising in a mass, put the torch to the ready train, and, if possible, blow Russian and despot, and all their accursed trappings and machinery, out of the land together! That is what every Englishman with a soul in his body will say that Englishmen would do. That is what many even of those thoughtless Englishmen who now malign poor Italy for acting in the same manner, would be among the first to advise.

‘And why should that which would be lawful for Britons, be unlawful for Italians. ‘Oh,’ we hear it sometimes said, ‘there is a difference; the Italians are not fit for freedom.’ Who told you that? How do you know who is fit and who is not fit for freedom? By what marks do you, a mere mortal like the rest of us, consider yourself entitled to judge whether your neighbour is fit to be free or not? Is it by looking at his face? Look, then, at the faces of such Italians as you meet; or turn over the leaves of a collection of European portraits, noting the faces of the Italian poets, statesmen, artists, and philosophers, included so numerously in the list—the faces of Dante, Columbus, Michael Angelo, Tasso, and Bonaparte—and say, Are these so very evidently the features given to slaves? Is it by inference from his past history? Where is there a nation in the world that has a history like that of the Italians, stretching back in an unbroken line of Roman greatness through three thousand years, and identical through more than half of that time with the general history and government of the world? Is it by regarding the present state of his mind, and considering how he will fight for liberty, and how much he will endure in order to obtain it? Cast your eye back, then, over the last thirty years; count the martyrs, count the exiles for Italian independence, from 1815 to 1848; see how Italy fought but the other day, and observe the unabated enthusiasm of her down-trodden populations at this hour. What proof remains yet unoffered, that the Italians are fit to be free, but this last and decisive one, that they should succeed in becoming so? For this last proof, therefore, they have a right to demand a fair opportunity; and meanwhile it is surely competent to put the question on the other side, ‘Are the Austrians their masters fit to govern?’ If there are marks by which it may be known whether a man is fit to enjoy liberty, there are, doubtless, marks also by which it may be known whether a man is fit to exercise despotism. Face and physiognomy? Look at the portraits of the Austrian emperors! Past history? Read the Austrian annals! Present intentions? Find them in the instructions of Viennese ministers of state! Our admiration for the deep and great qualities of the German race is almost unbounded; but we protest that among the Austrians of

diplomatic history we cannot, by any species of investigation, detect evidence of a governing faculty, a whit more respectable than that of the Turks.\*

The claim, then, of the Italians for national existence is one that ought to command the sympathy, the unreserved sympathy, of all foreign peoples. But what shall be said of the duty of foreign statesmen in regard to those other plans and aspirations which the Italians append to their claim for national independence—their partially conflicting schemes of a Piedmontese primacy, a federal union of states, and a pure and simple republic? On this point, our answer is, that it is not absolutely necessary for our statesmen yet to aim at extremely precise conclusions. Much here depends on the possibilities of the case as they lie already determined, or about to be more fully determined, in the Italian mind itself, practically grappling with its ‘situation.’ One thing, however, may be positively suggested; and that is, that Englishmen should beware of lifting their own prejudices and incomplete experiences as Englishmen into the field of the dispute, so as dogmatically to settle Italian problems by formulas which belong only to this island. For example, there ought to be a definite abandonment on the part of Englishmen, when trying to scheme for Italy, of that obstinate prepossession of theirs, in favour of a constitutional monarchy system. Englishmen are not usually *doctrinaires* in politics, and yet here they fall into the very error which is the reproach of the *doctrinaire* school. That constitutional monarchy has hitherto been found so suitable as it has been for England, arises simply from the fact that it has been the slow and native growth of the English mind applied for centuries to the consideration of English wants and uses; and that even yet it spreads its attachments, with a greater or less approach to practical completeness, through all the constituent parts of English society. But, for this very reason, it ought to be seen, prior even to all detailed examination, to be absolutely inapplicable to Italy. Italy must work out the solution of her own difficulties; the system Italy shall adopt must be indigenous—that is, it must be the product of the Italian mind, strenuously seizing and perseveringly reducing into order and consistency the *ensemble* of Italian facts. Now there are but two such indigenous solutions recognised as possible by the ablest Italians themselves: either, on the one hand, the personal domination of some Italian Napoleon, who should fulfil the aspirations of Italy, at the same time that he hurried Italy and her accessories along in the direction of his own stupendous, and it might be glorious

\* Address of the Society of the Friends of Italy. Published at the Society's offices, 10, Southampton-street, Strand.

and beneficent, egotism; or, on the other hand, a Republic on some basis or other. The former alternative must, of course, be thrown out in our reckonings: we cannot give an order for the appearance of a Napoleon. Englishmen, therefore, if they will really and in earnest give a thought to the future of Italy, must learn to pronounce, not only without shuddering, but even with some degree of faith and hope, the words *Italian Republic*. And this is rapidly coming to pass. Hundreds of our most eminent men, who, a few years ago, would not have named a republic with patience, and who even now would resent in the strongest manner, as sheer impudence and disorderly pedantry, any attempt to raise a republican controversy in England, have become convinced, and daily and openly declare, in their conversations on the subject, not only that a republic is the only solution possible for Italy, but that that hour is not greatly to be deprecated when all the thrones on the Continent will have to prove themselves before the blast of a republican hurricane. We offer this as a mere statement of fact: let our readers test its accuracy.

III. There is one end towards which, whether the Italians themselves desire it or not, English statesmanship with regard to Italy ought resolutely, openly, and unremittingly, to direct itself; and that is, *the speedy disintegration and ultimate radical extinction of the Papacy*. We no longer discriminate, it will be observed, between the papacy spiritual and the papacy temporal. That is an effete distinction, to be thought of no more. The Papacy, root and branch, head and heel, soul and body—down with it! And this whether the Italians wish it or no. For this question of the Papacy is not an Italian question only; it is a European question; it is a British question; above all, it is an Irish question. Were we to try to concentrate in one practical advice all the best recommendations of a negative kind that could be given to the world for the safety and advancement of all its greatest interests, intellectual, moral, or social, our phrase would be, *Labour for the abolition of the Roman Papacy*. For the Papacy consists of all the worst things in the world, made more permanent and more formidable than they would otherwise be by being tied together into one knot. Cut the knot, and the snapped strings of wrong will shrivel back in all directions, by the force of their own overstrained elasticity, seeking independent and less secure lodgment in society—one here, one there, and all enfeebled by their separation. This, too, it is, that makes the Italian question so great and so important, and that guarantees it against the too frequent fate of other foreign questions. When the Polish question was being discussed, other nations might have stood by in a circle, and permitted it to be fought out without much concern;

only men of peculiar warmth of sentiment, or of peculiar length of view, detecting a reason for European interference. Not so with Italy. Within the Italian question, as if stored up in a bank, lies a mass of unknown results, the property of all nations. Small and narrow pathways, known but to a few, led from the rest of Europe to Warsaw or Cracow; all the roads in the world, or at least on this hemisphere of it, lead to Rome. This is, in itself, a security that the Italian question cannot become extinct. Were the Italians themselves to abandon it, other nations sooner or later would be obliged to take it up. But the Italians do not abandon it; they demand the full amount of their chief partnership in it, and they invite the rest of the world to attend to *their* share if it pleases them to do so. Nay, they offer to take all the work upon themselves, and to give the rest of the world, for the mere price of its neutrality, an adequate share of the ultimate benefit. If we leave the Italians alone, and *oblige others* to leave them alone, they will abolish the Papacy for us. True, their verbal programme still is only for the abolition of the *secular* papacy, for the dissociation of the Roman sovereignty from the ecclesiastical primacy of the catholic world. But they who look well, see deeper. Not only would this, in effect, lead to the larger result; but the larger result itself is growing daily familiar to the Italian mind. A native Protestantism—not, certainly, what we in England call Protestantism; but something nevertheless not inaptly described by the name—is rising up in Italy, out of which, when once events shall have enlarged and consolidated it, there may come who knows what noble modern development. Strange infatuation, then, in those who in this country protest most loudly their desire for the abolition of the papacy, to avoid as they do, and to attack and calumniate as they do, that native Italian patriotism by the instrumentality of which alone, so far as can be foreseen, this great end can be accomplished. Let us avoid this error, and while demanding in a sense higher and larger than that which too often animates the ‘No-popery’ cry, the radical and entire abolition of that soul-killing, world-distracting, and all-corrupting institution the Papacy, let us give the hand of fellowship to that noble and struggling people, whose chief woe it is that their land is the seat where this curse of all the nations has chosen specifically to rear itself.

Such, as we believe, are the lineaments of a true course of statesmanship on the part of England with respect to Italy. Would that either our statesmen would recognise them, or that those who do recognise them were our statesmen!

- ART. XI.—(1.) *The Rise of the Papal Power traced in Three Lectures.* By ROBERT HUSSEY, B.D., Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History. 12mo, pp. 209. Oxford, 1851.
- (2.) *The History of the Church of Rome, to the end of the Episcopate of Damasus in A.D. 384.* By EDWARD JOHN SHEPHERD, A.M., Rector of Luddesdown. 8vo, pp. 542. Longmans.

POPERY is a word of somewhat comprehensive signification, and which consequently is not always used in the same sense by different persons, or even by the same person at different times. At one time it stands as the designation of a peculiar system of theological dogmas presumed to be held by members of the Romish Church, and which enlightened Protestants repudiate as for the most part unscriptural and pernicious. At another time it appears as the symbol of certain practices to which it is believed that the members of the Romish Church are bound to conform, and which Protestants almost universally agree to denounce as incompatible with the higher obligations and the best interests of man. At another time, those who use it mean to indicate by it a certain element in the political system; sometimes exercising a mighty power over the affairs of nations—sometimes struggling for supremacy—sometimes placed under strict restraint and jealous surveillance—always restless, and always working unfavourably for the progress of liberty, intelligence, and good government. It is not in any of these acceptations exactly that we mean to use the word in what we are now about to submit to our readers. There is still another, and, as it appears to us, a more appropriate sense in which this word is employed—as the designation, namely, of that great politico-ecclesiastical organization, which, assuming to itself exclusively the title and the prerogatives of THE CHURCH, and placing all things affecting the order and management of the Church under the power of the Pope, summons the whole world to receive spiritual law from Rome, and to acknowledge in the Bishop of Rome the vicegerent of Christ on earth, the rightful lord of the human conscience, and the virtual representative on earth of God to men. This we take to be Popery in its essence and substance. Other things which sometimes pass under that name are rather *its* than *it*: they are mere accidents of the system, or they are useful appendages of it, or they are simply the results of its development and working in particular circumstances. Other sects may adopt the purely theological errors enunciated in the creed of Pius V.,



and enforced by the decrees of the Council of Trent; or they may embrace the corrupt practices, the misleading ceremonial, and the lax ethics of the Romish Church; or they may band themselves into a political party, and assume a position where they shall be able, if not to wield the resources of government for their own behoof, at least to obstruct every effort to turn them in any other direction; and yet not be in any proper sense of the word popish, or identified with the system of popery. But, apart from the idea of a universal, visible church, presided over by the Bishop of Rome as its head and father, and claiming the submission of all men as God's only authorized institute for spiritual purposes on earth, popery cannot exist. Its germinal notion is here in the representation of the Church, as not the simple aggregate of persons holding the faith of Christ on earth, and which comes into being just as men are persuaded to embrace the Gospel, and has no existence apart from the individuals of whom it is the aggregate,—but as an independent essence, having an existence apart from that of those who belong to it, endowed with mysterious and miraculous powers, invested with boundless authority, possessing the attribute of infallibility, as well as the means of determining the final destiny of individuals, and presenting its proper embodiment in the clergy, who are the channels of divine grace to men, the sole expounders of the Church's doctrine, and the sole dispensers of the Church's blessings in the world. In this conception of the Church lies, we apprehend, the great radical peculiarity of Catholicism, under whatever aspect it may appear; it is this which differences that system from all others, and makes it essentially incompatible with all others. In all discussions between the advocates and opponents of Catholicism, the question comes ultimately to the simple point, Whether it is by men becoming Christians that the Church is made,—or by the Church exerting her power upon men, that they become Christians. In holding to the latter, all Catholics, Anglican as well as Romanist, agree. It is by adding to this the idea of a universal head of the Church on earth, and pragmatizing this idea in the person of the Bishop of Rome, that popery defines its special position, and completes its organization.

The growth of the system from this germinal notion has been the slow work of ages. Popery is not the device of any one mind (at least of any one *human* mind), nor the work of any one hand. By keeping true to its fundamental idea—by watching all opportunities of giving scope to its native tendencies—by unscrupulously sacrificing all things, human and divine, that

threatened to impede its growth—and by never losing sight of any lesson which experience had taught, either as to the means that were most fit to be used, or the expedients which were to be shunned,—the administrators of this marvellous system have built it up into that vast and symmetrical completeness in which it has for ages obtruded itself on the notice of the world. In all its successive stages, also, it has shown an extraordinary power of appropriating and assimilating to itself whatever elements of power and influence were at work upon the minds of the people, however uncongenial naturally with its original essence or avowed design. Popery, in fact, has been the greatest plunderer that has ever appeared amongst men. It has taken all things from all men—the good from the good, the bad from the bad; with only this difference, however, between the two—that the former were taken lest others should enjoy them—the latter that they might be appropriated to the uses of the usurper. During the middle ages, this process of development and appropriation went on rapidly and almost imperceptibly; popery grew like the coral island, whose foundations are laid broad and deep in the darkness of ocean, and which innumerable agencies, unseen by human eye, are incessantly at work to complete—

‘ With toil unwearyable, .  
No moment and no movement unimproved,  
To swell the heightening, brightening gradual mound  
By marvellous structure climbing tow’rds the day.’\*

And when at length the huge mass rose into view, men were startled to find that it had drawn to it nearly all that was most precious to them, and had secured a power over the destinies of Europe far surpassing that even of ancient Rome itself. There remained, in fact, nothing that was not directly or indirectly subject to the pope. Wordsworth has not depicted the ‘ghostly domination’ too strongly, when, speaking in the person of one who saw it in its full bloom, before the blasts of revolt and reformation had come to repress its luxuriance, he says—

‘ From land to land  
The ancient thrones of Christendom are stuff  
For occupation of a magic wand,  
And ’tis the Pope that wields it,—whether rough  
Or smooth his front, our world is in his hand !’

Popery has not suffered the world to remain in a state of indifference as to its pretensions and its efforts; on the contrary, it has only too much forced to it the attention of both nations

\* Montgomery, Pelican Island, Canto ii.

and individuals.\* Even had it been otherwise, however—even had there been no attempts on the part of its administrators to interfere with the affairs of kingdoms, and had it pursued the even tenor of its way without calling to its aid such irritating and appalling auxiliaries, as inquisitorial tribunals and judicial murders, Albigensian crusades, or St. Bartholomew massacres, there would still have been much in the structure and working of this vast engine of spiritual dominion to draw to it the attentive scrutiny of all thoughtful men. It must ever for such remain an interesting and exciting problem how such a system could have arisen—how an officer, whose duties originally were simply those of teaching religious truths, administering a few simple religious rites, and presiding over the spiritual affairs of a congregation of religious people, should by the operation of any ordinary laws or processes of human action, have risen to be the head of a vast, compact, and skilfully adjusted organization, over which he presides with an apparently uncontrolled authority, and every part of which, even in the most distant portions of the globe, obeys immediately and implicitly his will, to whatever risks it may expose, whatever bonds obedience to it may sever, whatever confusion, dispeace, or even bloodshed, it may occasion to the community. It will not appear the less remarkable, that of this organization all the constituent parts should be spiritual officers as well as he—originally of the same rank with himself—tracing up their spiritual ascent, in many cases, to a source independent of him and as honourable as his—in multitudes of instances possessing, as individuals, immeasurably superior capacities for rule than those with which he has been endowed—and yet all agreeing to acknowledge him to be their sovereign-lord, to receive his sentence as infallible, and to obey his will at whatever cost. The phenomenon thus presented is unique; it stands by itself in the history of the world; and its analysis and explanation on historical grounds must ever form an object of interest to men of philosophical tendencies. The dominion of spiritual men over laymen, of bishops over princes, or of the pope over the sovereigns of Europe, when once his supremacy as head of the church was secured, is a fact easily accounted for, and one which excites no surprise. The superstitious reverence which men, especially in times of ignorance, are ever

\* 'The priests of Rome,' says Selden, 'aim but at two things—to get power from the king, and money from the subjects.'—*Table Talk*. This may sound to some a severe and unjust assertion; but what a comment on it has been the whole of Cardinal Wiseman's history, since he first troubled our nation by his missive from the 'Flaminian Gate!'

ready to yield to their spiritual guides, and the superiority which men of education and astuteness always come to acquire over those whose highest ambition is the attainment of great physical strength and of dexterity in the use of it, are quite sufficient to account for the supremacy which the crafty and comparatively enlightened priesthood of the middle ages obtained over the rude barons and illiterate princes of Europe. But where all are alike invested with the spiritual character, and where all have enjoyed the same advantages of educational discipline, it does seem a strange thing that one should possess such a mighty power over all the rest, that they seem to be wholly in his hand, and to be subjugated, body, soul, and spirit, to his sway. And what a marvellous thing it is, that a man who but yesterday was himself subject to this dominion on the part of another, and who was then but a frail, fallible, sinful mortal, becomes to-morrow, through the mere election of a few men, as feeble and peccable as himself, a being of such divine dignity that he sits in the place of God, becomes the vicar and representative of Christ, is invested with such purity that his proper title is His Holiness, and has poured into him such super-creatural intelligence that he must be regarded as infallible :

‘Decide, ordine, guidica; un oraculo  
Tutto a un tratto divien; pare un miracolo.’\*

A miracle, indeed, if true! But whether true or not, it is accepted by thousands as a fact, and is believed, we may presume by the individual himself, and those who, invested with the special function of filling up the dignity when it is vacant, have discharged their trust by placing it in his hands. This, for us, is the aspect of the case specially attractive. We regard the entire system of popery as built upon falsehood and upheld by deceit. We believe nothing can be more unfounded than the pope's pretensions, nothing more audacious than his assumptions, nothing more impious than his claims. But a lie and a pretence that can survive for centuries, and that is accepted as divinely true by multitudes alike in the most enlightened and in the most benighted ages, has something in it that piques our curiosity, and provokes us to study its history and working. There is here no vulgar trick, no shallow and superficial charlatanerie. We have the masterpiece of craft and subtlety at work before us. All other deceptions by which men have been ensnared and misled are but child's play compared with this. There is something superhuman in it after all; and no wonder, for ‘its coming has been after the working of Satan,

\* Casti, *Animali*, Part I.

‘with all power and signs, and lying wonders, and with all ‘deceivableness.’

We propose to sketch with such brevity, as alone our limits will allow, the History of this singular Institute from its origin to the period when it may be said to have reached its culminating point, under the pontificate of Innocent III. We believe that we shall thus supply our readers with information which recent events in this country may have led them to desiderate; and at all events shall invite them to topics which no one can judge otherwise than appropriate to the times. By an acquaintance with the principal facts connected with the history of popery, we shall be best prepared to estimate the bearing of that system upon the social and spiritual interests of mankind, to detect the meaning and drift of its many adroit though stealthy and apparently unpremeditated moves on the chess-board of ecclesiastical and civil politics, and to perceive by what measures its designs may be most effectively counteracted and its plots rendered futile.

Popery, regarded in its essential characteristics, and apart from those accessories which it has gathered around it, includes three great constituent elements:—1. A hierarchy under the form of episcopacy, comprising an order distinct from the membership of the church, and invested with spiritual authority over it; 2. The church as a visible organization into which all true christians are incorporated, and the unity of which is represented in and preserved by the hierarchy; and, 3. The supremacy of the bishop of Rome over this hierarchy as the spiritual father and ruler of the universal church. Of these elements, combined and harmonised into a living structure, popery is the practical synthesis; and as all of them must be regarded as innovations when viewed from the stand-point of primitive christianity, the first step towards a history of popery is to inquire how each of these arose in the progress of the church.

The question of the origin of diocesan episcopacy as a simply historical question, has not drawn to it that attention in this country to which it is, we think, entitled. For this reasons of a controversial kind will probably account. By episcopalian writers it has been found convenient to assume that episcopacy was the order established by the Apostles, and the appearance of which in the church, therefore, in the post-apostolic age presents no phenomenon requiring to be accounted for any more than the appearance of the other institutions of the primitive church. By writers of an opposite school, on the other hand, it has been deemed sufficient to class diocesan episcopacy among the corruptions introduced by the Man of Sin, for the existence

of which nothing further is needed to account. In both cases a grievous departure from the path of true historical investigation has been committed; in the former by the assumption of a state of things in the primitive church which the most abundant evidence is extant to show did *not* exist; in the latter by the overlooking of the obvious fact, that if diocesan episcopacy be a corruption, it is imperative upon the historian to *inquire* at least by what process it came to be engrafted on the earlier institute, so as ultimately to supersede it. The former have forgotten that a historian has no right to assume, either tacitly, or by inference *à posteriori*, what his sources flatly contradict. The latter have forgotten that a historian has no right either to ignore a problem which lies in his way, because it is difficult to say anything very satisfactory upon it, or to offer as a solution of it a mere restatement of the fact in other and figurative words.

We shall not occupy space by proving here that diocesan episcopacy was unknown to the Churches planted by the Apostles and their associates; the fact is one which every writer on ecclesiastical history of any note or authority sets forth as notorious and unquestionable. Starting from this assumption, the problem that meets us is to account for the fact, that as soon as the Church re-appears out of that obscurity which rests over her history during the brief interval lying between the period when we have the New-Testament documents to instruct us as to her condition, and the period when the light of patristic literature begins to shine upon her, we see her, if not universally, yet to a very wide extent, exhibiting a polity in all essential respects identical with that of diocesan episcopacy. This is a curious and somewhat puzzling fact. To account for so great a change in so short a time is not easy, especially in the absence of any contemporary documents by which the successive steps might be indicated to us. We have not space to attempt any examination of the various theories which have been advanced upon this subject, and can only very briefly indicate what appears to us to have been the probable process of transition.\*

The primitive churches were instituted on the congregational model. But the congregationalism of these churches was not absolute and unlimited. It was modified, and in some measure held in check by the body of officers under whose presidency the churches acted. Whilst the voice of the people was always heard

\* The reader who wishes to explore this subject will find much to the point in Neander and Gieseler. He should also study Buddeus *De Origine et Potestate Episcoporum*, in his *Dissertt. Theoll. Syntagma*, Jena, 1715; Baur, *Ueber den Ursprung des Episcopats in der Christl. Kirche*, Tüb. 1838; Rothe, *Die Anfänge der Christlichen Kirche und ihrer Verfassung*, Wittenb. 1837.

in the management of their affairs, and whilst nothing appears to have been done in relation to these apart from the cognizance and consent of the congregation, it formed no less an essential part of their organization, that all things were to be transacted according to order, and for the preservation of this the Church was subjected to rule. Under such circumstances, it must be apparent that the continued existence of the churches in the form in which they were left by the Apostles, depended upon the preservation of an equipoise between two elements, which, though well enough adapted to work harmoniously when duly balanced, might be very easily made to clash, and the undue elevation of the one of which over the other, would very materially alter the entire constitution and working of the original fabric. Any excess on the side of the democratic power might work to an overturning of the whole scheme of rule under which the churches had been placed; and on the other hand, the assumption of an undue or an exclusive power on the part of the ruling body might ultimately reduce the whole under the management of official men alone. It must be further apparent, that the balance on the preservation of which the continuance of the churches in the form appointed by the Apostles depended, is one very easily disturbed—one which could be preserved only by the continual predominance of principles which are opposed by certain very powerful tendencies in the fallen nature of man. So long as the churches retained the character of private spiritual associations, and the feelings and habits appropriate to such were cultivated by all parties within them; so long, and no longer, would they be safe from such changes as those we are now contemplating. But let a secular spirit invade them; let them be infected with a desire to make a show in the eyes of the world around them; let ambition and love of applause, and the anxiety to appear respectable in public estimation seize them; and the balance between the power of the ruler and the power of the people would be immediately disturbed. Nor in attempting to account for the rapid rise of the former over the latter in the Post-Apostolic age, need we imagine the existence of any formal and conscious struggle between the two parties for supremacy. The influence of such a spirit as we have supposed, would perhaps work all the more surely for the end specified, that there was *no* conflict between pastor and flock for power, but rather the greatest harmony. It is when the congregation are disposed to be glorified and honoured by the world *through* their pastor, that the greatest danger to the cause of popular power in the Church is to be apprehended; for it is then that they are most inclined to confer upon him wealth, to encourage him to

assume state and dignity, and to secure to him a standing in the general community, by placing real power in his hands, as well as indulging him in those assumptions which human nature in such circumstances is but too ready spontaneously to put forth. Nay, it will often happen in such a case that power will be *forced* into the hands of the ruler of a church; for where a worldly spirit falls upon such a body, it will usually be accompanied with a spirit of indolence, a want of personal interest in the management of ecclesiastical affairs, a failing sense of personal responsibility in reference to such matters on the part of the members; and the result of this will be, that whilst on the one hand the pastor will often be obliged to assume power which does not belong to him simply to prevent the affairs of the society from falling into disorder, the members, on the other, will be too glad to have all the trouble and unpleasantness which such matters often entail taken off their shoulders to offer any impediment to such an arrangement. It will thus come to be regarded as alike the safest, the pleasantest, and the most respectable way, in a worldly point of view, of managing the affairs of a church, to leave the power of doing this in the hands of the ruler; and such a course may come very speedily and very generally to be adopted as the recognised mode of procedure. It is easy to see how, in this way, without any preconcerted design or even formal thought of such a thing, the early churches might gradually yield up their congregationalism, as the fervour of their first zeal and the purity of their first convictions gave way to the worldly influences to which they were exposed, and under which we know that they to a great extent succumbed. It is to be borne in mind also, that they had no warning example of the evils of uncontrolled clerical power before their eyes to stimulate them to a jealous watchfulness against the first risings of such a state of things. In their love and reverence for those who had the rule over them, all such fears, had they ever occurred to them, would probably have been dismissed as groundless; and in their desire to deliver the Church from some of the odium to which it was exposed, by making its bishops occupy a position somewhat like that of the priests of other religions, they might imagine that they were serving the cause of Christ, and be gratified with the thought that whilst they were bettering their own position, they were also doing God service.

Now, assuming that through the working of some such influences the clergy gradually and speedily rose to the dignity of a separate *order* in the Church, possessing as its distinctive feature the sole power of rule and management in the society, we have only to glance at the actual constitution of the pastoral body in



the primitive churches, and to such facts as we possess bearing upon this subject in the ecclesiastical history of the first centuries, to see in what way this clerical order developed itself in the peculiar form of episcopacy, and came ultimately to present such a hierarchy as popery has incorporated and perpetuated.

The facts bearing upon this subject, which we gather from the New Testament, are simply these two. 1. The *plurality* of spiritual office-bearers in each church, called indifferently bishops and presbyters; and, 2. The constitution of these in each church into a regular body, called the presbytery of that church—a term borrowed from the Jewish Sanhedrim, (Luke xxii. 66; Acts xxii. 5:)\* and nowhere we believe applied to any but a regularly organized body of presbyters. Now of this body, we may infer, from the nature of the case, that there was a head or president; and that this was a permanent office may be gathered from the use of the title, 'the Angel of the Church,' in the Apocalyptic epistles—a title which we apprehend can on no satisfactory interpretation be regarded as other than that appropriate to the presiding officer in the presbyterion of each of the churches addressed.† In the early stages of the Church's history, the superiority of this individual over his fellows in the presbytery was merely that of a president; in all other respects he was their colleague, and they might perform exactly the same functions in the church as he; he was simply *Primus inter pares*. But in this priority lay the germ of a gradual separation between the order of the president and the order of the presbyters. Perhaps, as presbyter was merely a title of *honour*, whilst episcopus was properly the title of *office*, the presiding presbyter, as pre-eminently the official man, came to bear the title of the episcopus by way of eminence; just as among the nine Archons at Athens, the president or first Archon was designated the Archon  $\alpha\alpha\tau' \epsilon\chi\chi\alpha\tau\epsilon\upsilon$ .‡ In this way a superior dignity and rank would come to attach to the holder of this office, and as the clerical body gradually accumulated power distinct from the laity, and obtained status as a separate order, their president would simultaneously ascend to a higher position in reference to them, and obtain a recognised peculiarity of function, as well as supremacy of authority. It is not improbable that the use of the term *episcopus* itself helped greatly to facilitate the change from the simple pastor of the first century to the clerical dignitary of the third and following.

\* Ignatius (*Ep. ad Trall.*) calls the presbyters of a church,  $\sigma\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\epsilon\delta\kappa\tau\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ .

† The title seems evidently to have been borrowed from the synagogue, in which the  $\text{שליח צבור}$ , or legate of the assembly, performed duties identical with those which Justin Martyr tells us were performed in the assemblies of the Christians by their president, (*Apol. I. c. 67.*)

‡ Hermann, *Political Antiquities of Greece*, p. 274.

That term was, among both Greeks and Romans, the title of an office sustained by functionaries, whose duty it was to superintend the affairs of subject colonies and cities. 'The persons,' says the Scholiast on Aristoph. Aves 1023, 'sent by the Athenians to oversee the affairs of subject cities, were called *ἐπισκοποὶ* and *φυλάκες*.' So also Cicero in one of his letters\* writes, 'Pompey wishes me to act as the episcopus of the whole of these maritime districts, as the person to whom the levies and chief part of the business may be referred.' Accustomed to this usage of the term, there would be no small danger at all times of a confusion existing in the minds of the Christians of the political episcopus with the ecclesiastical, so as to associate in their thoughts with the latter somewhat of the same supremacy, and power, and rank, which belonged to the former; or perhaps (especially where a worldly spirit had begun to operate) to ascribe to the latter a still higher dignity and more awful reverence, as the delegate of the King of Heaven appointed to oversee the affairs of his spiritual kingdom on earth.

In some such way as this which we have cursorily indicated, the Church passed from the congregationalism of the apostolic age to that condition in which it is presented in the writings of Ignatius, Tertullian, and Cyprian. To confirm, extend, and establish the power of the clergy over the churches, or the bishop over the clergy, was an object of deliberate and strenuous effort on the part of all these three writers; and to the influence of their writings, accompanied as they doubtless were by efforts of an oral kind, we are inclined to ascribe much of the success with which the movement in this direction was crowned. In Asia Minor, the influence of Ignatius, supported as it was by that of the saintly Polycarp, who in this matter seems to have gone entirely along with him, and invested with an almost sacred authority from the scenes of his martyrdom, would be irresistible; and in the churches of the west, the fervour of Tertullian and the pious zeal of Cyprian, accompanied in both cases with much of real eloquence, and operating in a sphere where a love of power was always a strong passion, would not fail to command a wide assent to the doctrines they proclaimed. With Asia Minor and Rome won to its side, the cause of episcopacy had little to dread in the way of opposition from any other quarter.

The persecutions, moreover, to which the Church was exposed tended insensibly but surely to augment the power of the bishop and clergy. To whom were the harassed and suffering Christians to look for consolation and sympathy, in the season of their sorrow, but to their spiritual guides? and when that appeal was re-

\* Ep. ad Att. VII. 11.

sponded to with courage and tenderness, as it for the most part was, a new glory would in the estimation of the Church gather around the person and the office of the faithful pastor. Often, also, it was upon the bishop that the hand of violence was most heavily laid; not seldom he had to suffer as the scape-goat of his Church; and in such a case his fortitude and his sufferings would throw a sacredness round his memory, and add lustre to the office which he bore; whilst it might suggest itself to all who were made aware of the circumstances, that an office, the holders of which were exposed to such peculiar peril, should not be jealously stripped of such authority as might afford to them, whilst permitted to retain it, some compensation for the risks they encountered in accepting it. We may rest assured, also, that the successors of these martyred bishops would in many cases be sufficiently prompt to fan the flame of reverential homage which the sacred associations connected with their departure were calculated to excite towards the office they had so conspicuously adorned. They would often dwell on the virtues, of whose earthly lustre the fire had deprived them so prematurely—on the wisdom, tried in many a season of perplexity, of which the fury of the lions had for ever robbed the Church—on the meek and saintly excellencies, which all the horrors of martyrdom in its most repulsive form could not perturb, and which death itself only tended to illustrate and dignify. No one can read Tertullian's oration on the Soldier's Crown, and his exquisitely beautiful address to the Martyrs in Prison, without perceiving at how early a period the glories of martyrdom were made the theme of eloquent and seductive declamation in the church. The effect of these was not merely to throw the lights of piety and enthusiasm upon the gloomy path in which the Christian soldier had often then to tread, but also to reflect an undue splendour upon the office of those whose position in the Church especially exposed them to the cruel mockings and the fiery trials of the persecutor.

But perhaps no cause contributed at an early period more directly and more potently to elevate the Christian pastorate from its proper position and functions into those assumed by the clergy of the third and fourth centuries, than the fact that all religions but that of the Christians had a sacerdotal hierarchy. Rightly understood, the want of this constitutes the glory and peculiar excellency of the Christian dispensation;\* but to perceive and accept this, men must be imbued with a relish for the spiritual simplicity of Christianity; to those who are fond of

\* See Whately's Sermon, *Christ the only Priest under the Gospel*, appended to the second edition of his *Bampton Lectures*, and Arnold's *Fragment on the Church*.

pomp and ceremony, and whose religious wants can be met only by the outward and sensible, the absence of priestly rites and priestly grandeur appears a defect in Christianity which they are impatient to see supplied. This feeling, at all times powerful in the bosoms of such, becomes especially so when there prevail on every side the manifestations of such an arrangement on the part of other religions. Such was the condition of the early Christians. All religions but theirs had priests and priestly ceremonies. On every side they were forced to see the contrast in which their institutions stood in this respect with those of others. Not only the heathens who worshipped idols, but the Jews who were worshippers with them of the true God, and from whom so much of their own faith had been borrowed, had their hierarchy and their ceremonial. Why should Christianity not place herself on an equality in the eye of the world with them? Could such things be wrong, seeing they were found belonging to a religion which was of divine origin—nay, seeing they had been specially appointed by God himself? And would not the advantage to the cause of truth be great when it was relieved from the odium or the contempt to which the singularity and the humility of its institutions exposed it? Influenced, probably, by some such considerations, the Christians soon began to imitate the Mosaic institute, and even to borrow from the impurer sources of heathenism, in the construction and nomenclature of their hierarchy.\* Even as early as the age of Tertullian, we find the bishop and his colleagues dignified as the *Ordo*, the *Clerus*: we find the title *Sacerdotes* freely applied to them; and we find even such appellations as *Pontifex Maximus* and *Papa* employed to designate a bishop.† We find the term *Sacrificium* applied to the eucharist and other parts of divine worship; and the Lord's table is called *Ara* and *Altare Dei*, for which Tertullian had already the example of Ignatius and Irenæus.‡ In the works of Cyprian these appellations crowd upon us, and the whole tone of his writings makes it apparent that in his day the Christians had not only exchanged their primitive college of presbyter-bishops for a bishop presiding over presbyters, but had also come to attach the idea of sacerdotal power and dignity to the office of the clergy. The progress of corruption now proceeded rapidly. The mystic virtue ascribed to ordination and to the consecration of churches—the assumption of a vague and awful *Disciplina*

\* See Vaughan's *Congregational Lectures*, especially Lect. 8 & 9.

† See Bishop Kaye's *Eccles. Hist. of the Second and Third Centuries*, illustrated from the Writings of Tertullian, ch. iv.; compare Bingham, *Antiquities of the Christian Religion*, B. II. ch. ii. § 7.

‡ Bingham, *L. c. B. VIII. ch. vi. § 12.*

*Arcani*, borrowed from the Eleusinian mysteries, and intended to command respect for the Christian rites, and reverence towards those who administered them\*—the multiplication of church officers, which added to the power of the clerical body, and swelled the retinue of the bishop—and not least, the increase of wealth which flowed into the ecclesiastical coffers—all tended with a powerful concurrence to advance and secure the pretensions of the hierarchy. The multiplication of church officers had also another effect. Large churches oftentimes sent off a portion of their members and office-bearers to constitute a distinct but dependent society; and churches in the cities sent forth their elders to make converts and collect churches in the surrounding country and villages. There thus arose around each mother church a number of affiliated societies, each with its staff of clerical functionaries, but all under the superintendence of the bishop of the parent society. The latter thus became not only the chief in his own presbytery, but also an *episcopus episcoporum*—a ruler over the pastors in a district—substantially a diocesan bishop.

We have now reached a point when it will be necessary to turn to the second of the elements in the papal system, by which it innovated upon the primitive model—viz., the confederation of the churches into one visible body, under the title of the Catholic Church.

Bishop Kaye† cites the opinion of Tertullian, that ‘all the apostolic churches’ (by which he means all churches planted through the preaching of the doctrines of the Apostles—see his Tract, ‘*De Præscriptionibus Hæreticorum*,’ c. 21) ‘were independent of each other, and equal in rank and authority.’ This independency, however, which all sound historians now admit to have characterized the primitive churches, was not absolute and unlimited. It was qualified by the spiritual relationship in which all the churches stood to each other, and by which an obligation was laid upon them to maintain fraternal communion with each other, as alike belonging to the one family of the faith. There was thus an element of association, which, without interfering with their respective freedom of action and jurisdiction, protected them from isolation, and gave them a right of watching over each other as separate bodies, analogous to that which the members in each had over each other. For the maintenance of this, considerable facilities were afforded by the extensive intercourse which could be kept up through almost all parts of the Roman empire by means of letters or travellers; and of these the early

\* See an elaborate and learned dissertation on this subject, in W. E. Tentzelii, *Exerciti Selectt. Par. post. Lips.* 1692.

† *Eccles. Hist.* illustrated from Tertullian, p. 236.

churches availed themselves, to sustain to a large extent mutual acquaintance with each other's affairs, and mutual sympathy in each other's condition. Thus, whilst the churches were independent of each other, the Church, nevertheless, was, as Tertullian also affirms, in a most important sense, ONE. 'We have 'all one faith,' says he; 'one God, the same Christ, the same 'hope, the same sacrament of baptism—in short, we are one 'church; so that whatever concerns ours, concerns us.'\*

This spiritual and invisible unity, however, was adapted only to the tastes of spiritual men. As soon as a worldly spirit intruded into the Church, something else was desiderated—something more outward and tangible, that should present the Church in her united strength more forcibly to the notice of the observer. Men began to lose sight of the Church as a purely spiritual institution, in which the external co-operation and intercourse of its members was but the index and expression of an internal unity; the outward expression came to be the chief thing; and to preserve this, to give shape and stability to this became the great effort of the most active teachers and leaders of the Christian communities. Cyprian especially laboured at this with his whole heart; but before him the idea had well established itself in the minds of many. The expression of Irenæus, 'Ubi ecclesia, ibi et spiritus 'Dei, et ubi spiritus Dei, illic ecclesia,' shows, by the *order* of the two propositions it contains, what took the precedence in his mind—not the Spirit securing the Church to those in whom He dwelt, but the Church securing the Spirit to those who were incorporated with it. 'An entirely different apprehension of 'the idea of the Church and its necessary unity, would,' as Neander observes,† 'have presented itself by reversing the order 'of these propositions.' But the idea in the mind of Irenæus, was, as he himself goes on to tell us, exactly what we have ascribed to him. 'It is only at the breast of the Church that 'one can be nursed to life. He who takes not refuge in the 'Church cannot partake of the holy Spirit.‡ Thus, the idea grew up in the minds of the Christians, that the Church was something distinct from the persons constituting its membership—that it was a vast body combined into one catholic whole—and that it possessed a unity which was capable of being expressed in an outward organization. The idea which in this way imbedded itself in the minds of the Christians was probably in most instances very vague, but it was, as has been justly observed, 'the germ from which sprang 'the papal monarchy of the middle age.'§

\* De Virg. veland. c. 2.

† Church Hist. vol. i. p. 284.

‡ A Iv. Haer. L. III. c. xxiv. § 1.

§ Neander, lib. cit. p. 288.

There were several things in the circumstances of the early Christians which tended to aid the growth and development of this idea. The persecutions to which they were exposed naturally made them cling to each other, and welcome any project by which their united strength might be brought to bear on the protection of their common interests. Then the differences and strifes by which the churches were often disturbed, and by which their unity was endangered, suggested the expediency of such a confederation amongst them as should counteract this mischievous influence and prevent its working to schisms. Moreover the controversies which at an early period arose on many points of doctrine strongly operated in the same direction. It was desirable that such should be settled, for a difference in faith cut at the root of the Church's unity; but for this it was necessary to come to an understanding what *was* the catholic faith, and for this purpose synods must be held, and an appeal made especially to the tradition which had subsisted in those churches which had been planted by apostles or apostolic men. Hence came several results materially bearing on our present inquiry. An additional reverence and dignity was thrown around the clergy, and especially the bishops, as the channels of apostolic tradition, the arbiters of the Church's *credenda et agenda*. The bishops became, moreover, the proper and accredited representatives of the Church, and in their council was found the embodiment of the Church's unity. It was but a step from this to identify the clergy with the Church, and to invest them with all the mysterious power which could not be separated from those who kept the keys of an institution, on incorporation with which depended a man's eternal welfare. Thus the Church-idea lost somewhat of its early vagueness without parting with any of its mystery; or rather perhaps we should say, it retained all its awful indistinctness as an object of thought and an instrument of superstition, but came forth sharp and defined enough for the purposes of practical working, in the shape of a compact and well organized confederacy of the clergy under the regimen of bishops.

There was another result from these synods or conferences for the suppression of heresy which has not been sufficiently noticed. This was the rise of the idea of a *Sedes apostolica*, or *Cathedra Petri*. At first these phrases had no such meaning as those now attached to the words 'Apostolic See' and 'Chair of Peter.' They simply expressed the conception, that the Church possessed an assurance of the apostolic verity preserved through the channel of tradition in those churches which the apostles or their coadjutors had planted. The 'apostolic see' was

in the early church a mere abstraction; and an appeal to it meant nothing more than an appeal from heretical and unauthorized teachers to the primitive apostolic doctrine as perpetuated in certain churches. Why this should have been identified with the chair of St. Peter a passage in Tertullian may help us to show. ‘Who of sound mind,’ he asks, ‘can believe that they were ignorant of anything whom the Lord appointed to be masters—persons habitually his companions, his disciples, and who lived with him—to whom he privately discussed all obscure matters, saying, that to them it was given to know secrets which the people were not allowed to understand? Did anything lie concealed from Peter, who was called the stone of the church that was to be built, who obtained the keys of the kingdom of the heavens, and the power of loosing and binding in heaven and earth?’ &c. In this extract Tertullian does not ascribe to Peter any power or intelligence beyond that of the other apostles, and in the following sentence he cites the Apostle John as equally unlikely to be ignorant with Peter of any part of the Lord’s will. But it is easy to conceive that in a controversy with heretics an especial force would be felt to lie in an appeal to Peter from the very circumstance to which Tertullian alludes, that our Lord had (as Tertullian at least and most of his contemporaries believed) called Peter the rock on which He would build his church. Such an appeal was tantamount to saying—‘What! will you controvert the statement of the very man on whose teaching our Lord said he would build his church? On what pretence can you belong to a society the very foundation of which you despise? Or by what means can truth be determined by you, if you will not listen to him on whose doctrine the Church was to be built?’ As an *argumentum ad hominem* it must be allowed that this has no small force, and hence we may presume that it was frequently used by the orthodox in their controversies with those whom they deemed heretics. Thus an appeal to the apostolic doctrine and an appeal to the doctrine of Peter came to be identified; and as the former was symbolized as the apostolic seat, (i. e., of judgment or authority,) the latter came to be described, by parallel usage, as the chair of Peter. In all this, however, it was merely to the *teaching* of Peter and his fellow apostles, as handed down in the apostolic churches, that the appeal was made. The identification of this apostolic see and chair of Peter with a single point in the ecclesiastical domain was the idea of a later age, and formed one very important element in the career of assumption by which the bishop of Rome built up his spiritual empire.

We have now to endeavour briefly to trace the progress by



which this last and crowning element in the constitution of Popery arose and arrived at its full development.

According to the theory of episcopacy in the early church, all bishops were equal in rank and authority. In practice, however, this could hardly be maintained. In all synods and councils the bishop of a large and influential see would, as a matter of course, take the precedence of those bishops whose dioceses were limited perhaps to a couple of congregations, and these in remote and rural districts. The very state of feeling which led to one out of a plurality of pastors becoming their bishop, would lead to one out of many bishops becoming a head over the rest. It could not be supposed that whilst the spirit of hierarchical ambition was at work in the Church, the presidents of important metropolitan sees would be content to remain in all respects on a par with those whose sphere of authority was only some provincial town or country village. Besides, as regular councils came to be held in each province, after the fashion of the Greeks,\* it would be necessary to appoint a president of these; and to whom could that honour with greater propriety be conceded than to the bishop of the metropolis of the district—especially if the Church in that city had been planted by an apostle, and could be consequently appealed to as retaining the apostolic traditions. Thus there gradually arose a new order in the Church—that of metropolitans, whose duty it was ‘to undertake the cure of the whole province (τὴν φροντίδα ἀναδέχεσθαι πάσης τῆς ἐπαρχίας), because all who have business in hand betake themselves from all quarters to the metropolis.†’ To such, superior dignity was allotted, and they had also the prerogative that nothing could be done by the other bishops without them, excepting such things as belonged exclusively to the separate sphere of each; beyond this nothing could even be attempted by them apart from him, nor by him without them.‡ But the progress of hierarchical development could not stop with a body so numerous and so diversified as the metropolitans. The principle which led to the formation of this order necessitated that out of it should rise one still higher. All metropolitans were not placed in positions of equal importance; all had not the same command of the means of influence and greatness. The metropolitan of Carthage, or of Ephesus, could not pretend to stand on a par in these respects with the metropolitan of Alexandria, or the metropolitan of Rome. Within the select, therefore, a still selecter company must be found; and as Alexandria, Antioch,

\* See Neander, vol. i. p. 281.

+ Concil. Antiocheni (An. 341) can. 9, quoted by Gieseler, vol. i. p. 262.

‡ Ibid.

• and Rome constituted the largest dioceses, the metropolitans of these three came to be recognised as the chief bishops of the Church. Others were at a later period admitted to the same rank, and the council of Nice confirmed to them the title of patriarchs.

Under this arrangement no special supremacy was conceded to Rome. The tissue of fictions by which the Romish Church has in later times sought to uphold her pretensions to a primordial supremacy over all other churches were utterly unknown in the ante-Nicene period. Peter's primacy and authority over the other apostles—Peter's occupancy of the episcopal office over the Church in Rome—Peter's legacy to his successors in that bishopric of primacy over all other bishops,—of these and such-like putid fables the churches of the first four centuries were profoundly ignorant. From an early period, however, the tradition prevailed that Peter had visited the Church at Rome, and had, whilst there, suffered martyrdom; and whether this were true or not, the belief of it through the Church tended to throw a religious interest around Rome, which came greatly in aid of its subsequent pretensions. It was certain, also, that Paul had been much with that Church, and had left with it his divine teaching; and it was rumoured that he, too, had lent to it the glory of having suffered martyrdom in the place where it was located. It was also indubitable that no other church in the west could compete with the Church of Rome in claiming to be regarded as an apostolic church; and hence to the decisions of this Church in matters of doctrine and discipline all the churches in the west naturally deferred. These sources of distinction arising from religious privilege stood associated with those which were inseparable from the position of the Roman Church in the metropolis of the world. This drew to it the eyes of all men, and invested its bishop with a dignity to which no other bishop or metropolitan could pretend. 'Everything,' says Theodoret, 'conspired to give the Church of Rome the primacy: those advantages which in other cases were found distributed among different churches, and whatever distinguishes a city, either in a political or in a spiritual respect, were here conjoined.\*' If men were caught by outward splendour, the Church which was located in the richest, the mightiest, and most imperial city in the world, would outshine in their eyes all others. If men were impressed by superior religious distinctions, what church could surpass in this respect the Church which had received the instructions of such eminent apostles as Peter and Paul, and whose locality had been consecrated as the scene of their martyrdom?

\* Ep. 113, ad Leon. Mag., cited by Neander, vol. iii. p. 222.

Thus, on either ground the Church of Rome came out with a pre-eminence which was all her own, and which gave her, in the career of ambition, an advantage over every rival.

Of such advantages the bishops of Rome were not slow to avail themselves. From almost the earliest period, one can detect in the western Church that devotion towards the practical as of greater moment than the theoretical and scientific interests of the Church, which distinguishes the ecclesiastical chiefs and writers of this quarter from those of the East. 'The Latins have not that splendid array of philosophical writings which the catalogue of the Greek fathers exhibits; but they had sagacious political leaders, popular advocates of the sacred cause, men of extensive knowledge of the world, combined with a nervous enthusiasm of thought and feeling.\*' With such men, questions of polity and order naturally took the precedence of questions of doctrine and philosophy; and even when the latter were discussed by them, it was rather as subordinate to some practical result in the administration of the Church than for their own intrinsic worth theoretically. If we compare, for instance, the philosophical speculations of Clement of Alexandria with the theological writings of Augustine, we shall see strikingly developed the difference of which we speak. In the one, all reminds us of the meditative recluse; in the other, all bespeak the active spiritual ruler. Clement would have us to know something for the truth's sake that is in it; Augustine would have us to admit something for the sake of the practical results that flow from it. The cares of the one terminate on his book; the other regards his book simply as a means to secure an ulterior result in connexion with the management of the Church. This practical character of Augustine—mighty thinker as he was—is characteristic of the Latin fathers. Tertullian, forcing along his course amid the impediments of his 'knotty Africanisms,' as Milton not inaptly describes his language—Cyprian, with his more fluent style, and his vivid and pointed eloquence—Lactantius, amid his carefully balanced periods, and his affectation of Ciceronian diction—Ambrose, carrying the terse and firm style of a man bred in camps into his theological disquisitions—even Jerome, half denaturalized as he was by his monasticism and his enthusiasm—all exhibit, more or less strikingly, the same characteristic. That things should be managed deftly—that order should be preserved—that the unity and symmetry of the body should be secured,—these were the objects which, above all others, bulked in the estimation of the western churchmen, and drew to them their continued and earnest endeavours.

\* Bishop of Hereford's Bampton Lectures, p. 16, second edition.

Of a body thus strongly determined in the direction of the practical, it could not be but that the head should manifest the same tendency. We find accordingly, that the bishops of Rome, as the chiefs of the great western patriarchate, were ever forward to meddle with questions of this nature, and the superior skill which attention to this department had conferred upon them, added to the stronger will which they brought to bear upon the subject, gave them from an early period predominant influence in the management of the Church at large. Even long before they were recognised as sustaining any such dignity, there had been instances of their assuming a right to adopt resolutions affecting the conduct of the Christian community. As early as the year 196, Victor, bishop of Rome, attempted to excommunicate all the churches of Asia Minor, because they would not follow the western rule for the observance of Easter; and it was only by finding that he had gone beyond the limits of prudence in so vehemently asserting a superiority, which as yet, was not sufficiently consolidated, that he was prevented from carrying his threat into execution.\* During the succeeding half century, we encounter no further instances of an overt assumption of power on the part of the bishop of Rome; but the experience of Victor was not lost upon his successors. They neither forgot the claim he had advanced, nor overlooked the grounds on which it had been repelled; and whilst they stood ready on the first occasion to repeat the former, they took care to remove as much as might be the latter. 'What right has the bishop of Rome 'to dictate to the churches of the east, who have their own traditions, and with whom also is the apostolic seat?'—this was virtually the question with which the bishops of the east met and repudiated Victor's mandate. To this the latter had no sufficient reply prepared; but the very demand probably suggested the policy, which, should it ever be repeated, would enable the bishop of Rome to answer it. Could the world but be persuaded that Rome is the supreme apostolic seat—that the tradition preserved there is superior to all others—that the

\* Mosheim and most writers of church history assert that Victor actually did excommunicate the eastern churches, in so far as he could do so, by declaring that the churches of his province could have no fellowship with them. The words of Eusebius, however, seem to lead to another conclusion. Victor, he tells us, on receiving the reply of the Asiatic bishops, 'forthwith attempts to cut off from the common unity (*ἀπορίμνεν τῆς κοινῆς ἐνώσεως περὶ αὐτῶν*) the dioceses of the whole of Asia with those adjoining, and by means of letters declares [this], publishing aloft, that the brethren there were all out of communion. But this did not meet the views of all the bishops,' &c.—*Hist. Eccl.* lib. v. c. 24. It is plain from this that Victor's aim was to compel the Asiatic bishops to succumb to his wishes by a threat not merely of disunion from the Church of Rome, but from 'the common unity' the Church Catholic, and that he made known this desire to the other bishops, but finding that they did not all agree with him, he let it drop.

bishop of Rome has a divine prerogative, which entitles him to take a lead in regulating the affairs of the universal church:—could this but become to any considerable extent the common faith of Christians, all difficulties would be removed, and the spiritual empire would be placed within the grasp of the Roman bishop. But what more easy than to make out a plausible case in proof of this? Is not the *Cathedra Petri* pre-eminently the apostolic see? Must not, therefore, the tradition which emanates from him be pre-eminently the true one? But was not Peter at Rome? Did he not abide a long time with the Church in that city? Did he not leave with them his teaching? Was he not their bishop? And when he was taken from them to tread the glorious path of martyrdom, did he not commit to the bishops, who should succeed him in that Church, ‘the good deposit,’ alike of his infallible doctrine, and of his official superiority? Is Peter, then, to be revered above all the other apostles, as the rock on which Christ was to build his church, and shall any call in question the supremacy over all other bishops of that line which flows from him, and along which are perpetuated his peculiar prerogative and official pre-eminence? That such a chain of proof was ever formally laid before the world by any bishop of Rome in the early ages of the Church we by no means affirm; but that such dogmas had gradually commended themselves to the practical minds of these ambitious churchmen, and were industriously disseminated by them on all sides, does not with us admit of any doubt. Even as early as Tertullian, we find the institution of the Roman episcopate ascribed to Peter, and ‘authority’ claimed for that Church on the ground that ‘to it apostles had poured forth their whole doctrines with their blood,’\* though in support of this he adduces the martyrdom of Paul and John, as well as that of Peter.† The idea, however, had not found vogue in his time that the promises of our Lord that he would give to Peter the keys, and that on Peter as a rock the Church should be built, concerned any one Church more than another; but that this idea had been *mooted* is evident from Tertullian’s indignant repudiation of it in his tract *de Pudicitia*, (c. 21,) where he contends that these assurances concerned Peter personally, and were accomplished when that apostle preached Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah on the day of Pentecost. ‘The event,’ he exclaims, ‘shows the meaning of the prediction. In him the church was built, that is, through him; he initiated the key: you see how—*Men of Israel, give ear to what I say, that Jesus of Nazareth, a man appointed by God among you*, and so on. (Acts ii. 22.) He,

\* De Præscrip. Haer. c. 32.

† Ibid. c. 36.

‘then, first opened the entrance of the heavenly kingdom, where  
 ‘offences formerly bound are loosed, and those are bound which  
 ‘had been loosed not according to the true salvation; and he  
 ‘bound Ananias with the chain of death, and loosed the lame  
 ‘man from his unsoundness.’ When we reach the age of  
 Cyprian, we find the ideas which had been apparently floating  
 vaguely in the minds of men in the time of Tertullian, assuming  
 definite shape and precision, whilst some by which Tertullian  
 was repelled, found zealous and eloquent defenders. The place  
 of the Roman bishop is now ‘the place of Peter;’\* his see is the  
 ‘Cathedra Petri;’ his church is the ‘ecclesia principalis whence  
 the unity of the priesthood sprang;’† and he is represented  
 as ‘asserting that he holds the succession of Peter.’‡ In the  
 religious romance known by the name of the Clementines, and  
 which probably belongs to Cyprian’s age, these ideas are brought  
 prominently forward, and the idea that Peter was first bishop of  
 Rome is here for the first time plainly broached.§ As this  
 somewhat attractive story was circulated both in Greek and  
 Latin, it was, doubtless, extensively read by the people, and  
 would tend to confirm the notions in their minds which it  
 broaches. In the fourth century we find this idea fully reco-  
 gnised and associated with those views of the outward unity and  
 uniform organization of the church, which, as we have already  
 seen, came to supplant the more spiritual conception of the pri-  
 mitive age. Optatus of Mileve, writing in the latter part of the  
 fourth century, openly asserts ‘that the episcopal chair was first  
 ‘placed by Peter in Rome—that in it Peter himself sat, the  
 ‘head of all the apostles—that in it alone is preserved the catholic  
 ‘unity, and that the sees of other apostles were not independent  
 ‘of it.’|| In such statements we find the theory of the Petrine  
 origin of the papal supremacy fully developed. As all the other  
 apostles derived their power from Peter, so all the lines of  
 bishops by whom the apostles were succeeded, derived from the  
 bishop of Rome who succeeded him. After this, we are quite  
 prepared for the bold and unqualified strain in which Leo the

\* Fabiani locus id est locus Petri et gradus cathedræ sacerdotalis. Ep. ad Antonianum. N. 55, in edit. Gersdorf.

† Ep. ad Cornelium Episc. Rom. No. 59.

‡ Ep. Firmiliani ad Cyprian. No. 75.

§ See Gieseler, vol. i. p. 206. In the Recognitiones Clementis, which are the translation by Rufinus of an abbreviated remodelling of the Clementines, we are told that a certain Theophilus, a person of the highest dignity at Rome, struck with the force of Peter’s doctrine, consecrated the huge basilica of his house as a church, and in it was set up the chair of Peter. He tells us also that Peter, before his martyrdom, convened the people, and ordained as bishop one from amongst them to be his successor.—Lib. x. c. 71, 72.

|| Lib. ii. c. 2.

Great asserted his prerogative in opposition to the decision of the council of Chalcedon (An. 451) in favour of the patriarch of Constantinople; and in his letter to the Illyrian metropolitans, in which he says, 'that by the command of the Lord, his care 'extended to all the churches, since Christ had committed the 'primacy of the apostolic order to the most blessed apostle 'Peter in reward of his faith, solidly erecting the universal 'church on him as a foundation.'

The power of the Roman bishop was thus based at once on the outward accidents of his position, and on inward grounds of a religious kind. We have not space to indicate all the historical circumstances by which it was consolidated, and the church was accustomed to see it exercised. The principal were the appeals which from time to time were made to the Roman see in cases of controversy or schism; the influence which the Roman bishops acquired with the emperors after they became Christian, and which led to such edicts as that, for instance, of Valentinian III., (An. 445,) in which he asserts, that 'as the primacy of the 'Roman see had been established through Peter, and peace can 'be universally preserved only when the whole church acknow- 'ledges its ruler, resistance to the bishop of Rome shall be held 'an offence against the state;' and the practice of holding œcumenical councils, in which, almost as a matter of course, the Roman bishop occupied the place of president, and in the name of which he commanded the assent of the Church to the ordinances they adopted, as sanctioned by the voice of heaven.

By the continued influence of the tendencies and the circumstances at which we have thus glanced, popery rose into existence, and assumed a palpable form. After the fifth century, its progress onward was rapid and unwavering. Gelasius I., in the end of that century, dropped the title 'Frates,' by which his predecessors had been accustomed to address their fellow bishops, and adopted that of 'Filii;' whilst they, in return, began to address him as 'Papa,' or Pope. One of his successors, Symmachus, (An. 498—514,) took courage to assert that 'the bishop of Rome had no judge besides God.' In the sixth century, the popes began to send legates into distant provinces, and to invest favoured individuals with the *pallium*, in imitation of the emperors, who were wont to confer a similar mark of distinction on those of their generals who had rendered eminent service to the state.\* The seventh century introduces to us, soon after its

\* The pall was originally what its name denotes, a mantle of ample size, investing the whole person. But there soon came to be substituted for this, a sort of shoulder-cloth, with a pendant before and behind (Isidore of Pelusium, Ep. 36, Lib. I., calls it *fascia*, which the dictionaries render *bib*—sit venia verbo!); this was made of white lamb's-wool, and ornamented with crosses of a purple colour. Vid. Casalii, De veteribus sac. Christ. ritibus, p. 200.

\*  
commencement, Gregory I., whose services to the cause of the papacy, direct and collateral, were too important to be hastily passed over.

Gregory belonged to a class which must always command respect, but whose influence is, at the same time, the most mischievous when engaged on the side of error. He was thoroughly sincere and conscientious in all he did for the advancement of popery. He seems to have honestly believed himself the successor of St. Peter, and charged with the awful office of bishop of the universal church. For personal aggrandizement or ease he cared nothing. Honours that merely terminated on himself he steadfastly repudiated. He even, in his earnestness for what he deemed a purely religious institute, spurned all flattering titles, and refused to allow them to others. To extend the boundaries of Christendom, to uphold the supremacy of the chair of St. Peter, to connect all the separate fountains of ecclesiastical administration with the papal throne, so as to bring the whole ecclesiastical body into a compact unity, over which the bishop of Rome should preside as universal bishop and head: these were the objects on which he was uniformly bent, and to which he devoted all the time, and thought, and effort, he could secure from the political anxieties and social calamities by which his mind was harassed during the troublous times in which his lot was cast. Pestered with the care of the emperor's interests in Italy, and the intrigues of the emperor's court at Constantinople; endangered by the restless hostility and cupidity of the Lombards; and grieved to the soul while compelled to witness the devastations which pestilence and the sword committed among the people over whom he was more immediately called to watch as their spiritual counsellor; it is marvellous how he found time and energy sufficient to attend as he did to the general interests of the Church. Few things, however, were suffered to escape his vigilance, and nothing to which his attention was directed was treated by him negligently. He had agents in all parts of his extensive patriarchate, with whom he kept up a continual correspondence, and by means of whom he was always enabled to act from full and accurate knowledge of the state of affairs, when he saw meet to interfere either in ecclesiastical or in political questions. He kept his eye upon the heathen states that lay along the confines of European Christendom, eager to avail himself of any opening that might occur for sending a mission to proclaim amongst them the religion of Christ. He was ever ready to give counsel to the missionaries who had gone forth under his auspices, and sought his directions in their arduous and often perplexing work. He watched narrowly the conduct of the bishops, not only in his immediate



vicinity, but in North Africa, in Gaul, and in many parts of the East, and was a prompt and often severe chastiser of their delinquencies. He carefully pondered the changes that were passing in the political relations of the peoples of Europe, and sought by wise alliances to strengthen the stability of the papal see, or by timely interference to extend its authority. In all things he showed himself true to the belief under which he set out, that the interests of the kingdom of heaven were associated with the establishment of popery, and that it behoved him, as entrusted with the oversight of the universal church, to seek above all things the extension and the consolidation of the papal supremacy.

But the most important event for the cause he had so much at heart, was one from which probably he anticipated no such result. This was the conversion of the Anglo-Saxons by the mission of Augustine. Every Englishman is familiar with the circumstances in which this originated—the exposure of the fair-haired Saxon slaves in the market-place of Rome—the effect produced by their appearance on the heart of Gregory, then only an abbot—his emotion on hearing that the people to which they belonged, though so richly endowed with personal gifts, were destitute of the blessings of the gospel—his resolution to send the message of mercy to their shores—his steadfast adherence to this resolution after he was elevated to the popedom—and his prompt seizure of the favourable opening afforded by Ethelbert's marriage with a Christian princess, to despatch Augustine with his company of priests to England. Probably Gregory anticipated no farther result from this than at the best the addition to Christendom of a nation hitherto lying beyond its pale, and holding its religion in contempt. But 'never perhaps,' as Ranke has observed,\* 'was resolution adopted by any pope whence results more important ensued.' By the conversion of the Anglo-Saxons, the pope not only acquired authority over a country where a church almost as ancient as that of Rome had for centuries held itself—alike in the day of its prosperity and in the season of its depression—dependent of his see, but he bound to his service a people of strong religious tendencies, of immense energy and courage, and who, in their grateful enthusiasm, were ready to yoke themselves to his chariot, and bear him triumphantly over all opposition. The devotion of the Anglo-Saxon church to Rome displayed itself in every possible way—in rich gifts, in pilgrimages to the eternal city, in submission to the papal authority, in zealous advocacy of the papal claims. In fact, the great apostle and advocate of the papacy in the north of Europe, and the man who more than any other

\* History of the Popes, vol. i. p. 11, Foster's trans.

tended to establish popery on this side the Alps, was a scion of the Saxon church—Winfred of Devonshire, better known by his ecclesiastical name of Boniface. Having himself sworn unlimited allegiance to the papal see, he imposed the same oath on all the bishops whom he ordained, in the extensive districts over which he presided in Germany, of which he is venerated as the apostle. By his means also the Gallican clergy were brought under the same thralldom. These results were accomplished not without immense labour, and in the face of much opposition; but the Saxon energy and endurance of Boniface carried him triumphantly through, and enabled him to secure for Rome a hold over the most powerful nations of Europe, of which the results are not yet exhausted, though more than eleven centuries of change and progress have since passed. It is remarkable that the most persevering opponents of Boniface and of the Romanizing party generally in the north of Europe, were the Scottish and Irish clergy. From the monasteries of Ireland, and from the cenobia of the Culdees in Scotland, went forth bands of zealous missionaries, who everywhere contended for the liberties of the churches, as opposed to the all-grasping ambition of Rome. Strange that when some centuries later, the Anglo-Saxon race almost universally threw off the papal yoke, it should have been among the Celtic tribes of Ireland and Scotland that the most devoted and persevering adherents of the papacy should have been found!

The times immediately succeeding those of Gregory the Great, we must pass over with a hasty glance. They were times of incessant strife and boundless confusion, but they were not on that account the less favourable for the growth of popery. In such times a spiritual power like that of the pope often remains the only stable power, and thereby draws to its possessor an amount of homage and reverence which might not otherwise have accrued to him. So much was this the case with the pope during the troubles of the eighth and ninth centuries, that when Gregory II. said to the emperor Leo the Isaurian, ‘All the lands of the west have their eyes directed to our humility; by them we are considered as a God upon earth,’ he uttered what might have been adopted as the current boast of the papal see. There were special events also which tended in no small degree to the aggrandizement of the popes. The controversy of Pope Gregory II. with the emperor, terminating in the excommunication of the latter—the severance of Italy from the empire of the East—the alliance formed between the pope and the Carolingian dynasty—the temporal sovereignty which the gratitude of Pepin the Younger conferred, and the prowess of Charlemagne secured,

to the pope—all tended to place ‘his humility’ on an eminence such as no Christian ecclesiastic had ever before reached. The pope was now a temporal prince, swaying his sceptre over a rich and populous territory; his counsel was asked and his blessing invoked by those who held the power of the sword in Europe; the emperor of the West had accepted his crown at his hand; and Europe once more boasted itself the seat of empire through the agency of Rome.

In such times, however, the tenure of temporal power by a priest was but an uncertain possession. Accordingly, in the disorders which followed the death of Charlemagne, the position of the occupant of the papal chair was often that of a mere puppet in the hands of the chief whose arm was for the time the strongest. The darkest period of the papal annals stretches from the early part of the ninth to the closing part of the eleventh century—say from 817 to 1075, a period of 268 years. During that period, not fewer than sixty-three popes occupied the pontifical chair, which is at the rate of a new pope for nearly every four years. Of these, many did not reign half that time. Some were murdered, some imprisoned, some exiled. The lives of many were disfigured by the grossest crime. Some owed their elevation to the most disgraceful influence. One, the descendant of a harlot, ascended the throne of St. Peter, and was proclaimed supreme pontiff and father of the Church at nineteen years of age. It would be easy to fill pages with the record of their crimes preserved to us by the faithful annalists of their own church. But it is painful to dwell on such details, and we therefore hasten from them to meet the approaching footsteps of the great architect and bulwark of popery, Gregory VII.

When this pontiff ascended the chair of St. Peter, two great ideas seem to have supremely occupied his mind: the one was the systematic unity of the hierarchy from its highest to its lowest grade; the other was the independence of the Church—its immunity from the control and interference of the civil power, if not its supremacy over the civil power. These ideas Gregory had often revolved in his mind whilst a humble monk in the monastery of the Benedictines at Clugni; and as ideas which we have much dwelt upon in solitude and in early life gradually come to occupy a place of supreme influence over the mind, he made the realization of them, when elevated to the dignity and power of the pontificate, the grand end of his life. His idea of the hierarchy was probably borrowed from the monastic order to which he had belonged. All the Benedictines formed one compact body; they were dis severed from every other tie but that which bound them to their order; they all owed allegiance

to one man, the Abbot of Clugni—and there was but one such abbot as the Abbot of Clugni in the world. Why should not the entire hierarchy present the same compact and ordered unity? Why should not every priest be a man severed from the world, estranged from the ordinary ties of life, and bound exclusively to the service and the love of his Church? Why should not the whole Christian clerisy depend from and own allegiance to the successor of St. Peter? Why should not his will regulate, and his hand be felt in every movement of the vast machine? Why, in short, should not the monastery of Clugni, with its one abbot and its devoted celibates, become the model of the whole hierarchy, and the entire clergy of Christendom present the aspect of one vast monastery, over which the pope should preside as sole head and ruler? And then, with regard to the liberties of the Church, what indignity was it that the successor of St. Peter—the holder of the keys of the kingdom of heaven on earth—the wielder of the two swords—the father of the Christian world—should owe his elevation to a layman?—should be liable, at that layman's caprice or convenience, to be deposed or exiled?—should see the bishoprics, which surely ought to be under his control, disposed of by temporal princes in the same way as they disposed of fiefs to their barons and counts?—should find himself obliged to accept as his suffragan now some warlike priest, who for form's sake would throw his episcopal vestments over his coat of mail, but liked better the sword or the hunting-spear than the crosier; and now some idle, dissolute libertine, who had entered the priesthood for the better indulgence of his passions, and whose life was the scandal of religion and the apology to all around for every sort of excess? Over these things the severe and self-denying monk had long groaned in secret. He burned to purge the Augean stable of ecclesiastical corruption. He longed to slay the hydra of lay-patronage and lay-supremacy in the Church. He panted to crush the imperial lion, and cover his own shoulders with its terrible mane. And though for such tasks the strength and prowess of a Hercules were barely sufficient, Gregory was not the man to shrink from them on that account. Conscious of his own mighty resources and indomitable courage, he only waited the time when it should be evident that he could strike with effect the destined blow.

We shall not attempt to narrate the fortunes of those tremendous and protracted struggles into which the zeal and courage of Gregory plunged Europe. The history of that memorable time has yet to be written; with the pen of one who has enough of poetry in him to sympathize with the wild romance of many of the scenes he would have to depict—enough of philosophy to pene-

trate to the causes and unfold the theory of that strange series of events—and enough of calm and reflective candour to pronounce righteous judgment on the actors and the acts of that astounding drama. Suffice it here to say, that after many years of reverse and changeful strife—after being often driven to the last extremities—after being twice deposed by the emperor of Germany, and having as many times excommunicated the emperor in return—after many battles, sieges, negotiations, and severities—after breaking many hearts, and filling many houses with shame and woe—the pope succeeded in realizing to a great extent his favourite ideas. He had carried the compulsory celibacy of the clergy in spite of the tears and curses of those whom he forced to break the tenderest of all bonds. He had excommunicated bishops and abbots, princes and barons, who had opposed his wishes. He had wrested from the lay rulers the right of investing bishops with the insignia of their office, and thereby secured to the papal see a veto on every appointment to this office. He had put down simony with a high hand. He had secured for himself and his successors the absolute proprietorship of that temporal sovereignty which the popes have ever since enjoyed. He had levied taxes upon the different states of Christendom for the support of the papacy. He had made an emperor kiss his foot and do penance at his door. And though he died without accomplishing all that he had designed, or consolidating all that he had accomplished, he left to his successors the heritage of his great ideas, of a well-conceived plan for attaining them, and of a vast machinery ready made to their hands for ultimately securing the whole.

The popes who immediately succeeded Gregory VII. did not assuredly lose sight of the dazzling project of which he had left them the legacy. But it was reserved for Innocent III., who became pope in 1198, more than one hundred years after Gregory, to reap the full harvest of the seed which that great pontiff had sown. In him we recognise a spirit less noble and open than that of Gregory, but not less bold and skilful, and equally bent upon securing the triumph of the papacy. During his pontificate, popery reached its complete development, both as a spiritual and temporal power. He augmented the revenues, consolidated the authority, and secured the independence of the papal see. In his time, and through his agency, the Inquisition, that terrible instrument of popish despotism, was instituted. He was the first formally to employ armed forces for the suppression of heresy and the propagation of Christianity; exemplifying the former in the crusades against the Albigenses, and the latter in the crusades against the heathens of the north of Europe.

This was in truth the age of crusades, for it was during his pontificate that the principal attempts were made to recover the Holy Places from the possession of the Turks. Of these Innocent was a strenuous patron, and not without reason, for he could not but see how strongly these turned to the aggrandizement of the papacy. As treasurer for the crusades, immense wealth poured from all quarters into the coffers of the pope, not a little of which remained there; whilst certain taxes levied at first for the carrying on of the holy war, were found so productive of revenue to the pope that it was deemed inexpedient to remit them after the war was ended. As generalissimo of the Christian forces also, the pope appeared before the people of Europe in an attitude which gradually accustomed them to see him or his legate lording it over the highest temporal power, and presiding in the highest places of European authority. Especially, the overthrow of Constantinople by the Latin crusaders, and the degradation of the eastern patriarch, tended powerfully to consolidate the power of the pope. His only rival was thus removed, or at least reduced to obscurity; so that people who had before been dazzled and perplexed with the opposing splendour of *two* suns, were now at liberty to turn their entire homage to that which retained the ascendancy, and had reached its zenith, whilst the other seemed fast sinking amid clouds and vapours below the horizon. Of all these advantages the busy and scheming mind of Innocent was ready to lay hold; and so well did he use his opportunity that he lived to realize to the full the lofty conceptions of Gregory VII., and saw all Christendom crouching at his feet.

Here we must terminate our historical sketch. Omitting details, and passing over much, which, with larger space at our command, might have been appropriately noticed; we have sought to place before our readers the great conspicuous stages by which popery rose and culminated into that tremendous world-power, in which for centuries past it has presented itself to the view of mankind. On reviewing such a history many are the reflections, many the lessons which press themselves on the thoughtful mind. To these, however, we cannot at present advert; further than to request our readers to remark the twofold character, which throughout its entire development adheres to the Romish church as at once a politico-ecclesiastical organization, and a religious society. Unless this distinction be clearly recognised and continually borne in mind, it will be impossible either to understand aright the historical phenomena which mark the agency of that church, or to determine safely in what manner to judge of, and to treat its members. Out of this twofold character arise those

startling contrasts which are continually presented in the conduct, both of individuals and of the hierarchy of the Romish communion: at one time commanding our respect and admiration by piety the most exalted, at another exciting our indignant horror by craft the most dishonest, and cruelty the most diabolical. The Church of Rome has had martyrs worthy of a place beside Polycarp and Cyprian; and she has had plotters, and cheats, and sanguinary tyrants, such as secular history fails to parallel. In both cases the parties have acted in full accordance with their system, though under different aspects of it. The attempt to convert the Albigenses by fire and sword, and the attempt to win over men to Christianity by the devotion of a Xavier, are alike natural and proper results of its spirit. When the late Archbishop of Paris perilled his life that he might stay bloodshed and civic strife, he acted truly as a servant of his church; when Archbishop Cullen sets the government of Britain at defiance, and seeks to kindle the flame of discord among his excitable countrymen, he acts no less truly as a servant of his church. But the obedience of the one was to the church as a religious body, having in it the cardinal truths, and, in spite of manifold corruptions, capable of inspiring its members with the benevolent heroism of Christianity; the obedience of the other is to the Church as a politico-ecclesiastical organization, which aims at supremacy over all other powers, and uses the forms of Christianity simply for the purpose of more effectually securing its political object. We must make the same distinction in judging of the character and tendency of popery from the conduct of its adherents. Some, looking at the piety and self-denying devotion occasionally exhibited by Roman-catholics, hastily conclude that the system of popery is wholly favourable to the higher attainments of Christian excellence; while others looking only at the base, false, and cruel exhibitions, by which its progress has been too extensively marked, denounce it as one unmitigated mass of evil and impurity. Both judgments are erroneous. The Church of Rome is not wholly evil, because, in spite of its popery, there lingers in it the religion of Jesus; the Church of Rome is vicious and mischievous, because, in spite of its Christian beliefs and sympathies, it is enslaved and vilified by popery. Guided by this distinction, we may also safely adjudicate the question of toleration as applied to this system. So far as relates to their *religion*, Roman-catholics are entitled to the fullest toleration; but as respects the huge ecclesiastical organization in which they are included, its movements must be watched and controlled by all states that would preserve any remains of civil and religious

liberty. The 'No popery' cry has too often been the mere watchword of intolerant and selfish bigotry; but there is a sense in which the 'No popery' cry is a wise and a good one. We have no sympathy with—no respect for those who would assign to popery a liberty in this country which no Roman-catholic state on the Continent, that is desirous of preserving the least vestige of independence, is able to allow. France, Austria, Bavaria, even Spain itself, find it necessary to enter into formal *concordats* with the pope, which is neither more nor less than a binding of his Holiness over to keep the peace within their respective dominions. Britain can enter into no such arrangement, being a Protestant country. Is she, then, to be left a prey to the cupidity and ambition of Rome? Must her territory be parcelled out into bishoprics at the bidding of an Italian priest—her cities and towns forced to lend their names as titles to the nominees of this foreign power,—and no remonstrance be uttered—no legislation be interposed, for fear of trenching on toleration? Are her imperial edicts to be trampled under foot, and her Queen and legislative councils set at defiance, by men living within her territory—and the arm of justice, that should descend upon their heads, be stayed by the maudlin cry of 'Don't persecute?' Away with such insane follies—such treacherous and dastardly counsels. Let Roman Catholics have the same political privileges and the same religious freedom as other men; let them be free to build chapels, to perform ceremonies, to make converts, to endow monasteries, or to do aught else that they may be taught to believe connected with their spiritual welfare. But woe worth the day when Britain shall forget that, however good and peaceable subjects Roman Catholics may oftentimes be, she has no deadlier foe than that colossal power, to whose authority and to whose interests hers are ever subordinated in every true papist's heart! Let the hour come when that power shall resume its ancient sway over Britain, and her liberties will be scattered to the wind, to be repurchased only by years of toil, and at the expense of conflicts and agonies which will furnish matter for a second 'Book of Martyrs.' Her true policy is to keep with dignity and firmness her supremacy whilst she has it—placing none of her subjects under civil or social disabilities because of their religion, but at the same time vigilantly marking the movements, and vigorously repressing the advances, of that insidious power, which, under the name of religion, seeks a supremacy fatal alike to national independence, to civil freedom, and to religious privilege.



- ART. XII.—(1.) *Correspondence relative to the Affairs of Hungary*, 1847, 1849. Presented to both Houses of Parliament, by command of Her Majesty, August 15, 1850.
- (2.) *Correspondence respecting the Refugees from Hungary within the Turkish dominions*. Presented to both Houses of Parliament, by command of Her Majesty, February 28, 1851.

WHILE the sheets of our present number are passing through the press, Louis Kossuth is on his way from Marseilles to England, and before these pages come under the eye of our readers he will probably be in our midst. Enough is doing to indicate the kind of reception awaiting this man of mark during his brief stay among us. The heart of the English people will be with him. He will be before them as the advocate and representative of principles and institutions which they value as their great treasure and birthright, and which have grown with our growth and strengthened with our strength as a nation. They will find in the spirit of the man a soul fitted to become the animating principle in those noble forms of law, usage, and freedom which he has braved so much and endured so much to uphold and to perpetuate, and the response of their spirit to his spirit will be as that of kindred natures.

But it will not be all thus. Already our sympathisers with Absolutism have given themselves to their work. Already the foul inventions accumulated by a corrupt diplomacy and functionaryism are being ransacked for material wherewith to damage and destroy. Whatever of this nature *can* be supplied, will no doubt be readily placed at the service of those generous, high-minded—thoroughly English journalists, who may be willing to apply it to such uses. At such a juncture, it becomes every man to do what he may to counteract this policy. Falsehood must not go unrefuted. Calumny must not be left unexposed. The truth must be iterated, emphasised, forced into familiarity with the mind of our people, that it may do its office there, and the right be seen to be the right. It is under this impression that we call the attention of our readers again to the claims of the man Louis Kossuth, and to the wrongs of Hungary, and especially to the state documents placed at the head of this article, which will supply the most authentic materials from which to form a judgment both as to the real case of Hungary, and the course which has been taken in relation to that case by our own government.

Our readers scarcely need be reminded that Hungary possessed

a comparatively free constitution from times quite as remote as those which gave to us our own Magna Charta. In 1301, the family of Arpad, under whose sway the Hungarians rose to be to a great extent, a free people, became extinct. From that time Hungary became more conspicuous as a part of the state-system of Europe. Her institutions partook more of the form and spirit of the European feudalism. But the cause of popular freedom, though often impeded, and sometimes apparently retrograding, was, on the whole, progressive, until the fatal battle of the Mohacs in 1526. It was then that Hungary become connected, *for the first time, with Austria*—connected, not by *conquest*, but by *compact*, the basis of the compact being, that the Constitution of Hungary, consisting of its house of hereditary nobles, and its house of popular representatives, should be *perpetuated in its integrity and independence*, as the chartered constitution for the still continued ‘kingdom of Hungary.’ Oath to this effect was taken by the Emperor Ferdinand for himself and for his heirs on the 3rd of February, 1527. Since that time, as is well known, the constitutional history of Hungary bears a striking resemblance to the constitutional history of England during the same period. We see the same intrigues, and the same frequent resort to oppression and violence on the part of the crown and court of Vienna for the purpose of narrowing and suppressing popular liberty in Hungary, that were resorted to, more or less, by all our own Tudor and Stuart princes; while in both countries the popular element proves too powerful to be destroyed, and makes its way, though by slow and unequal steps, in the face of all that is opposed to it by sovereigns or nobles, or by both combined. During the Napoleon wars, the Emperor of Austria convened the Hungarian parliaments, as King of Hungary, in the manner required by the Hungarian Constitution. The successive parliaments voted large subsidies of men and money. But in 1807, these holders of the public purse for the kingdom of Hungary, made themselves troublesome by venturing to complain of the profligate manner in which the monies so voted had been expended, and by broaching ideas of a free-trade complexion. In 1812, they flatly refused to sanction the state bankruptcy, to which the extravagance of state functionaries, as they maintained, had reduced the Austrian empire. We can easily suppose, that constitutionalism, taking this shape, would be voted as an insufferable bore at Vienna. The year 1815, accordingly, which brought with it the Holy Alliance, brought with it a determination on the part of Austria to put down, if possible, this offensive anomaly in the empire—the Hungarian Constitution. The policy adopted with this view was precisely that which had been tried by our

own Charles I. The Hungarian parliament was suspended, and taxes were levied, or loans solicited in the name of the sovereign. But it was as little consonant with Hungarian law as with English law, that the subject should be taxed without his consent. All the counties, at their respective meetings, protested against this course of procedure. The majority met this policy with a passive resistance, and our own battle of 'ship-money' and 'forced loans' was fought over again. At length, in 1825, after an interval of about the same extent with that in which Charles I. made his experiment of this policy, the Vienna ministry found themselves obliged to admit that this attempt to reduce Hungary to the same abject condition with the other portions of the Austrian empire would not do. The Hungarian parliament was again assembled, and the Hungarian Constitution was again, and for almost the hundredth time, confirmed. In 1832 the patriotic and reform party in the lower house made some strenuous efforts to abate the grievances of the peasantry, and to render the feudal burdens more equal, so as to weigh less heavily on those least capable of bearing them. But every step in this direction was beset with difficulty, not only from the less generous portion of the privileged classes themselves, but especially from the court at Vienna. In 1836, the Vienna ministry supposed that the time had come in which to put an end to the agitation of such questions. Six of the most popular leaders were placed under arrest; and to secure a verdict against them, the law was put into abeyance in a manner so scandalous, that the sentence—'guilty of high treason,' was no sooner published, than the ministers of the crown in Hungary were thankful to be able to make their escape before the storm of indignation which burst forth upon them from the whole country. One of these six 'traitors' was the young jurist and journalist, Louis Kossuth. His labour in the cause of a free press had exposed him to special enmity. But for twelve years from that time, either as suffering in a prison, or as doing his work in the battle-field of public life, Louis Kossuth was the man towards whom the spirit of liberalism in Hungary looked as to its natural centre—for the highest and most certain utterance of its feeling and desires.

The labours of Kossuth during those years were not those of an antagonist to monarchy, or of an antagonist to aristocracy, as such; but they were, nevertheless, the labours of a man whose grand aim was to give sovereignty to law, and to do that in such forms as might tend to diminish the burdens, and to augment the liberties, of the democracy—of the people. The abolition of the Roboth, the Corvée as it is called in France, on which he insisted, by compelling landowners to pay for the services

of the peasantry, in place of being allowed to exact them without payment—deprived the owners of estates of revenue from them to the extent of one-third, in some cases of one-half; besides coming collaterally with a law compelling them to pay taxes which they had never paid before. Kossuth, accordingly, had to lay his account with being called to endure all the hate, calumny, and wrong, which have never failed to be heaped upon the men whose high-born nature has prompted them to commit themselves to such a position. The struggles between the democracy and the aristocracy in every old Greek city; between the same classes in republican Rome; and between parliamentary and royalist, whig and tory, in our own history, especially at junctures when questions like the above have been in agitation, will suggest to the reader what the life of that man must have been, who had to plead the cause of popular freedom in the face of a monarchy that scarcely knew how to brook the slightest resistance to its will, and of nobles entrenched in privileges of such magnitude, and such antiquity.

If a base journalism be disposed to gather up the offal which has been thrown at this champion of human rights by men eager to swell their rent-roll as landlords, or their pomp as functionaries, by means of human oppression, we venture to predict that the vocation will prove too foul to be in any sense profitable. In all that we see in the Hungarian constitution, or in Hungarian society, as inferior to our own, we see, not the impeachment of Kossuth and his coadjutors, but their vindication, inasmuch as to remove such defects was the great object to which they addressed themselves. Hence, too, the resistance which placed so much impediment in their way. No farther back than the year 1847, a million of francs were expended to prevent the election of Kossuth to a place in the assembly of deputies, and expended in vain. So strong were the selfish passions of a class and party as arrayed against him, even then; and so fervent and general was the popular feeling by which he was sustained. We do not expect to find Kossuth infallible. Men who would make him an offender for a word, may have their case against him. Men who must judge of him by small things, and by things which are the exception, and not the rule, in his doings, will not judge him wisely or justly. He has survived attacks of that sort without number. He would never have achieved his great things had his temperament been such as to secure him against small oversights. There are many small things, no doubt, in which dullards may excel him, but can they work his miracles? He has a strong element of the oriental in his nature—a large heart, a prophet mind, *feeling* his way to truth

and nobleness while other men are *thinking* only in that direction, and thinking with an effect that often comes too late, and is often worthless when it comes. We have lived long enough to have become deeply distrustful of all faultless men. They are the stuff that jesuits are made of—machines, not men. With them, to live, is to reckon; not to feel, to be inspired. Kossuth has, no doubt, much to learn in these western regions, and learn it he will, by intuition, and not by rote.

The following extract will suffice to show the sort of charges that have been preferred against Kossuth, and also the manner in which they may be disposed of. The onslaught is from the *Times*; the defence is by parties competent to their work.

‘The article in question begins by saying, of the Hungarian cause, that their ‘ignorance and enthusiasm go hand in hand.’ We will soon demonstrate that the only true characteristic of the *Times* is, that its ‘ignorance and malignity go hand in hand.’ The gross ignorance of the simplest facts connected with the subject, displayed in the article in question, would disgrace a schoolboy, and is discreditable indeed in any public journal—more than all in one which pretends to put itself forth as either a guide or exponent of public opinion. It would occupy too much space to expose all the blunders in the article. We will take a few—more than sufficient to establish our assertion.

‘Kossuth is pronounced to be ‘self-seeking;’ and many kindred crimes are laid to his charge. The notorious fact is, that Kossuth declined to receive even the amount of salary due to him, as voted by the Diet.

‘After a hypocritical pretence that the private life of Kossuth shall not be inquired into, the article proceeds to utter one of the foulest and basest slanders it ever was our fortune to read in any public journal. It asserts, ‘that judicial proceedings were instituted against Kossuth some years ago, for misconduct in the performance of a trust in the county of Zemplin, and that he was not exonerated from the charges then brought against him. All traces of the procedure in this case were carefully destroyed during the period of his government.’ The foulness of this slander is only equalled by the ignorance which its writer shows of all relating to Hungarian modes of procedure. Explicitly denying, as we are enabled to do in the directest manner, that any such judicial proceedings ever were instituted against Kossuth for any such matter, we will show that the convenient pretence of his having destroyed the record is a ridiculous blunder of invention, which none could have made but those who draw so much on their imagination for the facts that may suit them as the writers in the *Times*. The records in our English courts are, very unwisely, usually made on separate rolls. One or a dozen may be abstracted, therefore, without any one being much the wiser. Not so in Hungary. The most effective means, and the most solemn sanctions, are employed to

prevent the possibility of any tampering with the records. They are entered in bound volumes, deposited, not with the officer for the time being, but in the keeping of corporate bodies which hold their possessions by the tenure of being keepers of these records; and any falsification of which, while in their possession, involves a forfeiture of those possessions. These records contain entries interesting and important to every man. All relating to fiscal matters, to dealings with estates, and to the various business of the active institutions of local self-government, in which every man takes a part, are there recorded. Every man has, then, an equal interest in maintaining the integrity of the records, while no single entry could be abstracted or defaced, without its being for ever palpable to every one. The traces of any procedure *could not*, by any possibility, be 'destroyed.' So much for this foul slander. As well as being, in point of fact, unfounded and untrue, it is impossible, from the very nature of the case, that it could be true.

'We are next treated to another display of ignorance no less striking. It is alleged that Kossuth was brought into the Diet by the influence of Count Zichy on the election; and Count Louis Batthyanyi is represented as looking at Kossuth with distrust and disgust. What are the facts? The least informed in Hungarian affairs knows that Count Zichy, instead of being the friend and helper of Kossuth, was taken in the act of bearing communications to the Austrian commander (after actual hostilities had been begun by Austria), and that he was hanged by Gorgey. That was his connexion with the affair; rather a different one from using his influence towards procuring the election of Kossuth. The fact, further, is, that it was Count Louis Batthyanyi himself who, at the election of 1847 (the first at which Kossuth was elected to the Diet), exerted all his influence to procure the return of Kossuth, who was accordingly returned member for the county of Pesth. Batthyanyi knew and appreciated Kossuth's integrity and patriotism. Their respect was mutual and sincere. Each was alike a patriot; and both will live in the hearts of posterity as dear memories of what a patriot can do and suffer for his country.

'After such exposures of ignorant malignity, it can hardly be necessary to say more. But we will call attention to a few more samples of the spirit and qualifications of the writer in the *Times*.

'It is well known (though denied by the *Times*) that active measures were promptly taken to detect and punish those concerned in the death of Lamberg, although the exasperation of the whole populace (which was the cause of his death) was too well justified by the flagrant violation of the constitution, and of all law and good faith, exhibited in the sending of Lamberg to Pesth to supersede the constitution the king had just sworn to respect. The pretended tampering, by Kossuth's agents, with grenadiers, &c., in Vienna, is a calumny often repeated, and unworthy of notice again. The murder of Latour had as little reference as the grenadiers to the government at

Pesth. However much to be regretted, that catastrophe was the result of his own heartless brutality, in ordering the soldiers to fire on the unarmed multitude, which goaded the people to madness, and so disgusted those of his own party, that not a man stayed to defend him.

'The ridiculous stories about the Austrian bank-notes, and the mock embassy from the *Grand Seignior*, are so palpably absurd, that refutation is unneeded. The latter, however, gives another illustration of the hopeless ignorance of the writer. He pretends to be 'credibly informed' as to the mock embassy, and is yet so ignorant of all relating to Hungarian affairs, that he does not even know the difference between Pesth and Debreczin! It is matter of notorious history, that the whole government left Pesth for Debreczin in the first four days of January, 1849, and remained at Debreczin until the spring was far advanced.

'It is strange that it never occurred to the *Times*, that, if the stories it now propagates were true, they would have been eagerly caught at, to embody them in the sentence which doomed Kossuth to death. Not one of them is, however, to be found in that sentence, as elaborately put forth, with the grounds of it, by the Austrian court-martial itself.

'One calumny more only shall we notice; that which relates to Count Casimir Bathyani. It is deliberately alleged in this article of the *Times*, that Casimir Bathyani has quitted Kossuth, with an intimation that he will have no more to do with him. This, like so many other allegations, is a deliberate untruth, which must have been known to be so at the time it was uttered. The falsity of any suspicion of the sort had been expressly contradicted in the *Daily News*, more than a week before this article appeared in the *Times*.

'It is strange that, with the love the *Times* has for romancing, it did not retail in this article some other of the fables which are to be found in the same sources whence its other 'credible information' is drawn—namely, the Vienna government journals. Alongside of the fables which we have above exposed, it will there be found told how Kossuth caused, while at Debreczin, a salute of 101 guns to be fired on the birth of a son; a capital story—only, unluckily, he had no son born there during the whole time. It will there be found how he had Madame Schodel (the actress) beheaded in the market-place of Debreczin, for an attempt to poison him; a capital illustration of his 'arbitrary spirit'—only, unfortunately, the lady is still alive, and delighting the play-goers of Vienna.

'Enough of this. We have fulfilled a duty in exposing to our readers the dishonesty, as well as the malignity of the *Times*. The illustrious object of such foul attacks will, we trust, soon be among us—honoured by all—while his traducers are forgotten, or thought of only with the contempt they deserve. And when the *Times* shall be remembered no more, or only as one of the passed away engines by which despots and oppressors sought help in fixing their yoke on the

oppressed and weak, the name of Kossuth will be a dear and cherished household word in every land, and round every hearth, where truth, integrity, nobleness, and patriotism, are revered and prized, and where free men hold fast by the freedom which their sires have kept or won.'

We could furnish the 'Times' with no small budget of such Austrian inventions against Kossuth and his party, to which similar addenda might be annexed. It is natural that men should lie on a large scale, while they know that the man who should attempt to convict them of lying would do so at the hazard of being shot or hanged. In Austria, governmental liars are all aware that this is the advantageous position which the patrons of order have assigned to them.

In the Hungarian parliament, which assembled in November, 1847, the Liberals, under the leadership of Kossuth, had a small majority in the House of Representatives. The magnates in the upper house, under the leadership of Count Louis Batthyanyi, were about equally divided. The object of the Conservatives was to carry out such measures of reform as they were disposed to favour, with the co-operation of the government, and under what they termed its legitimate and constitutional influence, the term government here being used for a ministry receiving its appointment from Vienna, and acting under instructions from that centre. The aim of the Liberals was for what they termed administrative independence, which included, in their view, a ministry that should be responsible, in a greater degree, to the Diet; and a treasury and army that should be subject, within certain limits, to its control. It was the object of the conservative party to limit its reforms to such changes as might be compatible with strengthening the relations between Hungary and Austria. It was the object of the Liberals, in their bolder projects, to secure to the nation a larger measure of independence. In a vote upon the address, Kossuth succeeded in carrying a resolution which submitted the alleged 'grievances' of the nation to the consideration of the sovereign; but this was rejected by the magnates as misplaced, and on its being sent back to the House of Representatives, 'a very stormy debate, frequently interrupted by the cheers and clamours of the young men in the galleries ensued.\*' This debate lasted three days, and strong language is said to have been used by some of the Liberal party. The following programme of the Opposition, issued some months *before* the insurrection in

\* Not only were the public in the galleries of the Hungarian parliament, both in the upper and lower house, allowed to express aloud their approbation or disapprobation of the sentiments uttered, by applause or hissing, but even ladies were admissible.



Paris, in February, 1848, will show distinctly the ground which the Hungarian Liberals had taken prior to that event. It is a document in the spirit of our Pym and Vanes, but in which that spirit comes forth with a freer eloquence.

‘The Liberals—or the Opposition, as they are now generally called—after one of their quarterly meetings held at Pesth in March 1847, made known their views and opinions by issuing a (lithographed) manifesto or programme, as the French would term it, which has been very widely circulated both in Hungary and Germany.

‘They begin this document by declaring that it is the vocation of the Opposition, in every constitutional state, to exercise a control over the government; and that they are determined to exercise such a control in every way that the constitution allows.

‘They profess that their opposition is not directed against persons, but against the system of government hitherto pursued. For the present government of Hungary, they say, is not a national, but an alien (heterogenous) government; a government which, by ruling with absolute uncontrolled sway over the other states of the empire, is quite unfit for the administration of that state, viz., Hungary, which is in possession of a constitution.

‘They further declare that they can perceive no tendency towards the adoption of a better system, but that, on the contrary, the recent acts of the government prove that the same anti-constitutional spirit still prevails. Their grievances, they say, which have been repeatedly laid before the throne, are still unredressed; and they contend that a government that thus slights the legitimate voice of the people, violates the laws in as great a degree as the former government by whose illegal acts these grievances arose; and that both are equally unentitled to claim the confidence of the nation.

‘As a proof of what they advance, they cite the grievances mentioned in the address; viz., the non-execution of the Dietal Acts relating to the re-incorporation of the Transylvanian counties; the non-promulgation of the acts relating to bills of exchange and religious affairs within the districts constituting the military frontiers; the affairs of Croatia, &c.; and, above all, the introduction of what they term ‘an illegal and unconstitutional system of Comitatal administration,’ viz., the recent nomination of administrators alluded to in the address.

‘Under these circumstances they declare that they will use all their efforts to obtain further guarantees for the independence of the country. Among such guarantees they mention—

‘A responsible ministry;

‘Liberty of the press;

‘Union of Hungary and Transylvania;

‘Publicity respecting everything relating to public affairs.

‘Among the reforms which they intend to propose at the next (that is to say at the present) diet, they enumerate—

‘A system of general taxation for all classes, noble and non-noble, without distinction;

‘The co-ordination of the free towns (Municipal Reform);

‘Equality before the law;

‘A reform of the Urbarial laws (law for the removal of feudal burdens from the peasantry);

‘The abolition of the Aviticity laws (laws relating to the more equitable disposal of property.)

‘They conclude by saying—

‘We shall continue, with unwearied zeal, to make use of every effort in our power for the attainment of these objects, without being unmindful of the relations which, in accordance with the Pragmatic Sanction, exist between Hungary and the Austrian hereditary states. We must observe, however, that our nationality is clearly laid down in the Dietal Act, § 10, anno 1790, and guaranteed by the sanction of a royal oath. To this act we shall tenaciously adhere; for by it Hungary is declared and acknowledged to be, in all its administrative departments, a free and independent country, and therefore not subordinate to any other country. But while we shall carefully avoid placing the interests of Hungary in opposition to those of the entire monarchy, or rendering them incompatible with its unity and safety, we shall not suffer these interests to be rendered subservient, in an unreasonable and illegal manner, to those of the other states of the empire, as is actually the case in respect to our manufacturing industry and our commercial relations.

‘Professing our willingness to support any measure that may tend to an equitable adjustment of the conflicting interests of Hungary and the hereditary states, we at the same time declare that we cannot tolerate a system that would sacrifice all our interests and our constitution itself to the so-called general administrative unity; a kind of unity which by many is regarded as correlative with that of the monarchy. It was in the last quarter of the past century that the government, by acting on this system of administrative unity, and offering us material advantages in exchange for our constitutional rights, attempted to subvert the nationality and independence of Hungary. It is to this system of administrative unity, developed, as it has constantly been, on the principles of absolutism, that all the free institutions of the Austrian hereditary states have been sacrificed. Our constitution is, however, a treasure which we cannot sacrifice for any advantages whatsoever. To maintain and invigorate this constitution is the first and most sacred duty that we owe to our country.

‘We are convinced that if the whole constitutional rights and liberties of the Austrian hereditary states still existed; if these states, in conformity with the demands of the age, and the principles of equity and justice, could be ranked amongst the constitutional nations of Europe—and the government of the entire monarchy, in its general system, as well as in every department of the administration, was grounded on constitutional principles, and animated by a constitutional

spirit—we are convinced, we say, that our interests could then be easily combined with those which are at present in conflict with and even inimical to them; and that by a greater unity of interests and a greater degree of confidence being thus established, every part of the empire would be invigorated and knit together by a common tie, and the united monarchy, by a guarantee being thus afforded for its material and intellectual development, be enabled to brave with impunity the storms and convulsions by which it might hereafter be assailed.'

How little did the majority of Englishmen, at the close of 1847, suspect that constitutional ideas were seized with an intelligence like this, and expressed with such clearness and power by men under the sway of Austria. On the 14th of January, 1848, Kossuth spoke for two hours on a motion for the reincorporation of the Transylvanian counties with Hungary. The drift of the speech was to show, by an appeal to facts and documents which only an expert lawyer could have conducted, that the union which the two parties immediately concerned were anxious to see realized, was one which should take place according to law, but one which had been frustrated by the bad faith and sinister policy of the government. 'He was listened to,' says our ambassador, 'with profound attention, the popular orator only being interrupted by loud cheers from all parts of the house, as well as from the turbulent young jurisconsults in the galleries, whenever he relieved his dry statement of facts, by an impassioned burst of his peculiar eloquence' (*Correspondence*, p. 22). In a letter by the same writer, dated the 3rd of March, we are informed of the effect produced on the course of affairs at Pesth by the news of the insurrection in Paris. The letter is addressed to Viscount Ponsonby, English ambassador at Vienna.

'Presburg, March 3, 1848.

'It is needless for me to inform your Excellency that the news from Paris has caused the greatest sensation here. It has also had the effect of forcing the Hungarian legislators to quit the tedious routine with which the Dietal proceedings are conducted.

'The delegates went on leisurely with the co-ordination of the Free Towns' Bill; but when the news arrived (on Wednesday) of the revolution in France, they saw that some decisive step must be taken. Frequent conferences were accordingly held yesterday by both parties. Count Stephen Szechenyi proposed that they should proceed in a body to the Palatine, and request him to make known their wishes to his majesty; but this proposal was not listened to. It was finally decided that Kossuth should make a motion to-day to the effect, that in a representation to his majesty they should express their sentiment of loyalty, attachment to the imperial dynasty, &c., but at the same time intimate that the system of policy hitherto pursued must be entirely

changed; for which purpose they should request his majesty to appoint, without delay, a certain number of men in whom the nation could place confidence as members of the vice-regal council; that these councillors should forthwith attend the Diet, in order that the questions under discussion might be terminated in a few weeks without going through the tedious routine of representations, royal rescripts, &c.; and that the said councillors should afterwards be intrusted with the execution of the laws and be responsible to the legislature; which is, in plain language, demanding a responsible ministry of the Liberal party.

‘The reason they adopted this way of proceeding is, that, *de jure*, though not *de facto*, the members of the vice-regal council are responsible to the Diet for their official conduct. If, therefore, his majesty should name, say six members of the Liberal party, vice-regal councillors, and each of them be charged with the execution of laws relating to a special branch of the administration, Hungary would possess a responsible ministry under another name—a circumstance which, it is hoped, may induce the Austrian government to comply with the request.

‘At a conference held yesterday evening the Conservative delegates agreed to give their tacit support to the motion, or, in other words, that the motion should be carried, without a single observation being made from either side of the house, by general acclamation.

‘A circular sitting was accordingly held this morning. Kossuth made a *very animated though moderate speech*; the motion was carried by acclamation, and before twelve o’clock the sitting was over.’

The important document prepared by Kossuth at this juncture, approved by the two houses, and laid before the emperor, we give entire.

‘May it please your Majesty, &c.

‘The events which have recently taken place make it our irremissible duty to direct our attention to what our fidelity to your majesty’s dynasty, our lawful relations with the united monarchy, and our duty to our country demands.

‘On taking a retrospective view of our history, we acquire the sad conviction that for the last three centuries we have not only been unable to render our constitution conformable to the spirit of modern times, but have been obliged to use all our efforts for its maintenance.

‘The reason of this has been, that your majesty’s imperial government\* has not had a constitutional tendency, and therefore could not be brought in unison either with the independence of our government or with the chartered rights of the nation.

‘This tendency has hitherto only prevented the development of our constitution; but we are now convinced that if such a system of policy be any longer maintained, your majesty’s throne and the monarchy, to which we are bound by the pleasing ties of the Pragmatic Sanction, will be involved in consequences of which it is impossible to foresee

\* The Central Austrian Government.

the final issue, and our country moreover suffer an inappreciable detriment.

‘Your majesty summoned us to the present Diet in order that we might lay the foundation for the reform of our social institutions. We hailed this summons as the fulfilment of wishes long entertained, and have proceeded to the task of legislation with redoubled ardour and activity.

‘With the adoption of the principle of general taxation, we have resolved to share with the people\* those public burdens hitherto exclusively imposed for defraying the expenses of comital administration, and to raise in the same manner the funds now required for regnicular purposes.

‘We have resolved, on the principle of an equitable compensation being afforded, to take the necessary steps for the liberation of the peasants from urbarial services, and by thus adjusting the conflicting interests of the people\* and the nobles, to augment the national welfare and strengthen the throne of your majesty.

‘To lighten the burden of the alimantation and quartering of the troops stationed in Hungary is among the more weighty matters to which our attention has been directed.

‘We regard the political and administrative co-ordination of the royal free towns and the free districts as a question that cannot any longer be postponed; and we are of opinion that the time has already come when our political rights must be shared with the people.

‘That effective measures will be taken for the promotion of our trade, manufacturing industry, and agriculture, is what the nation has a right to expect.

‘Our constitutional life also requires to be developed in a real representative direction†—our intellectual interests demand a support grounded on freedom.

‘Our defensive system requires to be radically changed, and rendered conformable to the national character, and compatible with the common interests of the different classes of society; for which purpose it is highly necessary, both for the dignity of your majesty’s royal throne and the security of the country, that effective measures be immediately adopted.

‘The responsible administration of the Hungarian State revenue and finances, with due publicity of the accounts, is a question that we cannot any longer postpone, as it is only in this manner that we can fulfil those constitutional duties relating to the expenses for defraying the splendour of your majesty’s royal throne and the exigencies of the country, as likewise all other lawful duties that can but tend to a wholesome result.

‘In respect to several of these questions, it will be necessary that the conflicting interests of Hungary and the hereditary provinces of the empire be equitably adjusted; in order to effect which we shall always

\* Peasants and Burgesses—the non-noble.

† A real representative legislature, Liberty of the Press.

be ready, with the due maintenance of our independent national rights and interests, to lend a helping hand.

‘We are moreover convinced that the laws which will have to be enacted for the development of our social institutions, as well as for the promotion of the intellectual and material welfare of the nation, can only acquire vigour and reality when, for their execution, a national government, totally independent and free from any foreign influence whatsoever, shall be called into existence, and which, in conformity with constitutional principles, must be a responsible government, and the result of the majority of the people. We therefore regard the conversion of the actual collegial system of government into a responsible Hungarian ministry, as the principal condition and the essential guarantee for every measure of reform.

‘It is in this manner that we have the conception of the duties of our vocation.

‘To bring these questions with the agreement of your majesty to a satisfactory conclusion during the present Diet, is our fixed and earnest design.

‘Our country expects this from us; millions expect it. It is commanded by that impulse of loyalty and attachment that binds us, with indissoluble ties, to your majesty’s dynasty. We are moreover convinced that it is only in this manner that tranquillity, peace, and concord, can be so firmly established in our fatherland, that no unforeseen events or storms will be able to shake the solid foundation; and it is only by such a guarantee of peace and contentment that we can endow the united powers of the State with that force and harmony, in which your majesty’s dynasty, under any circumstances whatsoever, may calmly and confidently rely.

‘But your majesty will share our conviction that peace and tranquillity are the essential conditions for attaining to so desirable a result.

‘In this respect it is impossible for us not to perceive without apprehension those symptoms of disturbance that, in many parts of the monarchy to which we are united by virtue of the Pragmatic Sanction, are but too apparent, and of which the unforeseen complication caused by the most recent foreign events, will greatly increase the intensity.

‘We will not grieve your majesty’s paternal heart by entering into any details respecting these lamentable symptoms, neither will we examine the palpable effect which, in a financial point of view, they have already produced; but the sentiments of loyalty by which we are animated, and the responsibility we are under, compel us to declare that we can only look for the source of the evil now becoming so manifest, as well as for the principal cause of our social retardment, in the principles on which your majesty’s imperial government is founded. We are also thoroughly convinced that your majesty will find the most secure guard against any possible untoward contingencies, as well as the most cordial agreement with your loyal people, and the most complete fusion of the different provinces of the monarchy, and consequently

the firmest support of the throne and the reigning dynasty, when your royal throne is environed by those constitutional institutions imperatively called for by the exigencies of the age, and which can be no longer postponed.

Sire,—Events are in the hands of the Almighty. We place our trust in the protection of Divine Providence, but at the same time feel it to be our duty to remind your majesty, that your loyal kingdom of Hungary must not be unprepared to meet an uncertain future. We regard the bringing of the above-mentioned questions of reform to a satisfactory conclusion, on constitutional principles, during the present Diet, as the irremissible means of allaying our anxiety; and we fear that the usual course of Dietal business, and the tedious negotiations with the government, consequent on the actual collegial system, will dangerously retard our arriving at a result responding to your majesty's paternal intentions and the legitimate expectations of the country.

‘We therefore venture, with steadfast loyalty and confident reliance, humbly to beseech your majesty to be graciously pleased, on account of the extraordinary circumstances in which we are placed, to send to the Diet, as the powerful organs of your most gracious royal will, such individuals who, in the manner prescribed by existing laws, are members of the highest government office—viz., the vice-regal council; and who, being honoured beforehand with your majesty's gracious confidence, will appear as the constitutional representatives of the executive power, and have entrusted to them, in a prescribed manner, and under their personal responsibility, the execution of the acts of the legislature. They will also have to take an immediate part in the Dietal proceedings; to direct the Diet in respect to your majesty's gracious intentions; to furnish, especially in respect to the finances, the requisite explanations and statements; and to afford such assistance in bringing the questions under discussion to a satisfactory conclusion, that the contemplated salutary laws may the sooner be submitted for your majesty's sanction; and, whatever unexpected turn affairs may take, peace and tranquillity being thus securely established in the country, a foundation will be laid for the development of that intellectual power and material welfare which your majesty, with our steadfast loyalty, in every possible contingency of the uncertain future, will find to be the firmest support of your royal throne.’

It is to be remembered that this paper was prepared at the juncture when the flight of Louis Philippe filled all men with amazement, and with the expectation of strange things to follow; at a time when the Austrian empire was on the verge of bankruptcy; and in the fresh recollection of all that had been done in recent years, directly, or by intrigue and delay, to frustrate the efforts of those who were intent upon giving a fuller development to the resources and institutions of Hungary. The grave, respectful, affectionate loyalty of this document, and the moderation of

its tone, as requiring little more than that the measures of improvement which had been urged, matured, and all but current, in circumstances so much less favourable to such demands, should now be accepted and confirmed, must, we think, commend itself to every sober-minded man. Only ten days later Vienna was in insurrection, and Metternich himself was driven into exile. Mr. Blackwell, the English minister at Pesth, writing on the 25th of March, when Vienna was in the whirl of revolution, says:—

‘No one here supposed for a moment that a government, having such a strong military force at its command, could fall before a handful of students. The Liberals, in their famous programme, stated their views without the least disguise, that they would use all the efforts in their power to obtain a responsible ministry, liberty of the press, &c., at the same time recommending to his majesty to grant constitutions to the hereditary estates of the empire. This programme, and the representation of March 3, together with Kossuth’s speeches in the Lower House, no doubt exercised a great influence on public opinion in Vienna; *but this is the only kind of conspiracy the Hungarian Liberals have been guilty of. They have determined to realize their views by constitutional means, and by constitutional means only.*’ — *Correspondence.* 53.

But while the Hungarian Liberals conducted themselves thus loyally and constitutionally, the Austrian party in the Upper House succeeded in suspending the sittings of that assembly; and Metternich, at the moment of his fall, was preparing to place Hungary under the sternest military rule. The men into whose hands his power fell ceded everything—constitutions, liberty of the press, and the like, not only to Hungary, but to all claimants. On the 11th of April the new Hungarian ministry assumed office, with Count Batthyányi as President, and Kossuth as Minister of Finance. Reforms—which the Liberal party had been intent on realizing long before,—were now completed. Feudal burdens were removed from those who suffered under them: the Magyars added to this concession to their peasantry the assignment of portions of land for their benefit; Slavonians were invested with the full rights of citizenship; and measures were taken to place the franchise on a much wider basis. By the following July a new Diet was to be assembled on the basis of the new Reform Bill. Croatia and Slavonia, in place of sending only three members to the Diet, were now to send eighteen. Everything done was in accordance with this spirit. As the consequence, Germans, Servians, Slovacks, Wallachians, Slavonians, Croats—all, for the time, were disarmed of their resentments, and seemed prepared to confess that the Magyars could not do more to attest their wise and humane intentions than they had done.



Within two short months, however, the Viennese furnished the emperor with an excuse for removing his court to Innspruck; and from that point we have to trace the steady effort of the court to rally the military power of the empire under Windischgrätz, and to weaken the Magyars by fanning the almost extinct jealousy and disaffection of the Croats, and the Slavonians of Hungary, into a new flame. Jellachich was a man to their purpose in prosecuting this policy. We shall not attempt to describe the shameless, almost incredible, system of treachery and double-dealing to which this man lent himself on the one side, and the Austrian court on the other. The same policy was pursued in Bohemia—for they too were of the Slavic race; and in connexion with all these perilous intrigues at home, the Magyars had to reckon upon what was likely to follow from the news which now reached them of Radetsky's victories in Italy. Still, on the 2nd of July, the new parliament was returned on the suffrage of the new Reform Bill. The emperor was invited by the Hungarians to honour Pesth with his presence, and to open the parliament in person. This was declined. The first business of the two houses was to open negotiations with Jellachich, at the head of his army of Croats; and with the Austrian ministry, relative to the warlike and menacing position assumed by that general. The mask now fell. The time had come in which it could be dispensed with. It was no longer doubtful that Jellachich, while his conduct stood condemned by more than one royal proclamation, had been all the while acting according to secret instructions from the court: and on the 9th of September he invaded Hungary at the head of 65,000 Croats, tracking his way towards Pesth with devastation and blood.

And now came the 'hour'—it was to be seen whether the 'man' would come. The choice placed before the Hungarian patriots was *unconditional submission* to the Austrian government, placing *revenues* and *army* under Austrian control—OR RESISTANCE. In this crisis Count Batthyanyi resigned, and the ministry of which he was the head ceased to exist. But what had the popular leaders to expect—what had the whole people to expect, should they place themselves at the mercy of the imperial government and the imperial army in such circumstance? Let the fate of Count Batthyanyi who *did* so trust to that mercy answer the question. In that moment Kossuth appears to have felt that the time had come from which Hungary would be a more wronged, and more degraded nation, than ever; or from which a struggle should be dated that might give to her a greater freedom, and a higher mission among the nations than ever. All possessing the head and heart wherewith the best to serve the country, were

## DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

more or less committed men, and were seen as foredoomed to exile, the gallows, or the dungeon, if the merciless imperialists should be successful. The patriotic, the just, the humane resolve of Kossuth and his coadjutors accordingly was, that whatever the resources and the soul of a virtuous and brave people could do to preclude so dire a catastrophe should be done. The responsibilities of the hour were laid upon Kossuth, and upon the men whom he called about him. The thunder of his proclamations were heard in the streets of every town, in the villages of every county. Armed men seemed to be created in myriads by his words. Jellachich and his Croats were beaten in the first onset, and sent to tell their disgraceful tale beneath the walls of Vienna. •

But Vienna became the seat of a new insurrection: Windischgrätz and Jellachich laid siege to it, and on the 30th of October it fell into the hands of the besiegers. The Hungarians might have prevented this. But the councils of the timid prevailed. Men who were ready to fight the imperial troops in Hungary, shrunk from invading the Austrian territory; and when Kossuth succeeded in disposing them to abandon this scruple, it was too late. The month of November had now come, and the conflict was reduced to a death-strife between Hungary on the one side, and all that the Austrian empire could command upon the other. General Moga, the Essex of the parliamentary army in Hungary, had done mischief enough, through his hesitancy and half-measures, in causing the loss of Vienna. More trustworthy men came now into prominence as military leaders—and ten millions of people looked to the few months before them as big with events which the Omniscient only could foresee!

Five months later, that is, in April, 1849, the Hungarians had defended themselves against the invaders of their territory with so much success, and had come so utterly to despair of any amicable relations with Austria, that a Declaration of Independence was published by the parliament, proclaiming Hungary an Independent State, and the House of Hapsburg perjured and dethroned. This proclamation is a record of the grounds of this determination, and may be taken as *the case* of the patriots of Hungary, as furnished by themselves, for the instruction of their contemporaries and posterity. Though it is not usual with us to insert documents of such length in our pages, we depart from our practice in this instance, as we wish the real nature of this question to be accessible to our readers, and it is not possible that it should be stated more ably, briefly, or, as we believe, more faithfully, than as here presented:—

## 'DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

' We, the legally constituted representatives of the Hungarian nation assembled in diet, do by these presents solemnly proclaim, in maintenance of the unalienable natural rights of Hungary, with all its appurtenances and dependencies, to occupy the position of an independent European state, that the House of Lorraine-Hapsburg, as perjured in the sight of God and man, has forfeited its right to the Hungarian throne. At the same time, we feel ourselves bound in duty to make known the motives and reasons which have impelled us to this decision; *that the civilized world may learn we have not taken this step out of overweening confidence in our own wisdom, or out of revolutionary excitement, but that it is an act of the last necessity, adopted to preserve from utter destruction a nation persecuted to the limit of the most enduring patience.*

' Three hundred years have passed since the Hungarian nation, by free election, placed the House of Austria upon its throne in accordance with stipulations made on both sides and ratified by treaty.

' These three hundred years have been for the country a period of uninterrupted suffering.

' The Creator has blessed this country with all the elements of wealth and happiness. Its area of nearly 6000 square miles presents in varied profusion innumerable sources of prosperity. Its population, numbering nearly 15,000,000, feels the glow of youthful strength within its veins, and has shown temper and docility, which warrant its proving at once the main organ of civilization in Eastern Europe, and the guardian of that civilization when attacked. Never was a more grateful task appointed to a reigning dynasty by the dispensation of Providence, than that which devolved upon the House of Lorraine-Hapsburg. It would have sufficed to do nothing to impede the development of the country. Had this been the rule observed, Hungary would now rank amongst the most prosperous nations. *It was only necessary that it should not envy the Hungarians the moderate share of constitutional liberty which they timidly maintained during the difficulties of a thousand years, with rare fidelity to their sovereigns, so that the House of Hapsburg might long have counted this nation amongst the most faithful adherents of the throne.*

' This dynasty, however, which can at no epoch point to a ruler who based his power on the freedom of the people, adopted a course towards this nation from father to son which deserves the appellation of perjury.

' The House of Austria has publicly used every effort to deprive the country of its legitimate independence and constitution, designing to reduce it to a level with the other provinces, long since deprived of all freedom, and to unite all in a common sink of slavery. Foiled in this effort by the untiring vigilance of the nation, it directed its endeavour to lame the power, to check the progress of Hungary, causing it to minister to the gain of the provinces of Austria, but only to the extent

which enabled those provinces to bear the load of taxation with which the prodigality of the Imperial House weighed them down; having first deprived those provinces of all constitutional means of remonstrating against a policy which was not based upon the welfare of the subject, but solely tended to maintain despotism and crush liberty in every country of Europe.

‘It has frequently happened that the Hungarian nation, in despite of this systematized tyranny, has been obliged to take up arms in self-defence. Although constantly victorious in these constitutional struggles, yet so moderate has the nation ever been in its use of the victory, so strongly has it confided in the king’s plighted word, that it has ever laid down arms as soon as the king by new compacts and fresh oaths has guaranteed the duration of its rights and liberty. *But every new compact was futile as those which preceded it; each oath which fell from the royal lips was but a renewal of previous perjuries. The policy of the House of Austria, which aimed at destroying the independence of Hungary as a state, has been pursued unaltered for 300 years.*

‘It was in vain that the Hungarian nation shed its blood for the deliverance of Austria whenever it was in danger; vain were all the sacrifices which it made to serve the interests of the reigning house; in vain did it, on the renewal of the royal promises, forget the wounds which the past had inflicted; vain was the fidelity cherished by the Hungarians for their king, and which in moments of danger assumed a character of devotion; they were in vain, because the history of the government of that dynasty in Hungary presents but an unbroken series of perjured deeds from generation to generation.

‘In spite of such treatment the Hungarian nation has all along respected the tie by which it was united to this dynasty, and in now decreeing its expulsion from the throne it acts under the natural law of self-preservation, *being driven to pronounce this sentence by the full conviction that the House of Lorraine-Hapsburg is compassing the destruction of Hungary as an independent state; so that this dynasty has been the first to tear the bands by which it was united to the Hungarian nation, and to confess that it had torn them in the face of Europe.* For many causes a nation is justified before God and man in expelling a reigning dynasty. Amongst such are the following:—

‘When it forms alliances with the enemies of the country, with robbers or partisan chieftains, to oppress the nation.

‘When it attempts to annihilate the independence of the country and its constitution, sanctioned by oaths; attacking with an armed force the people who have committed no act of revolt.

‘When the integrity of a country which the sovereign has sworn to maintain is violated, and its power diminished.

‘When foreign armies are employed to murder the people and to oppress their liberties.

‘Each of the grounds here enumerated would justify the exclusion of a dynasty from the throne. But the House of Lorraine-Hapsburg is unexampled in the compass of its perjuries, and has committed every one of these crimes against the nation; and its determination to extin-

guish the independence of Hungary has been accompanied with a succession of criminal acts, comprising robbery, destruction of property by fire, murder, maiming, and personal ill-treatment of all kinds, besides setting the laws of the country at defiance, so that humanity will shudder when reading this disgraceful page of history.

‘The main impulse to this recent unjustifiable course was the passing of the laws adopted in the spring of 1848, for the better protection of the constitution of the country. These laws provided reforms in the internal government of the country, by which the commutation of servile services and of the tithe were decreed; a fair representation guaranteed to the people in the Diets, whose constitution was before that exclusively aristocratical; equality before the law proclaimed; the privilege of exemption from taxation abolished; freedom of the press pronounced, and, to stem the torrent of abuses, trial by jury established, with other improvements. Notwithstanding that as a consequence of the French February revolution troubles broke out in every province of the Austrian empire, and the reigning dynasty was left without support, the Hungarian nation was too generous at such a moment to demand more privileges, and contented itself with enforcing the administration of its old rights upon a system of ministerial responsibility, and with maintaining them and the independence of the country against the often-renewed and perjured attempts of the crown. These rights and the independence sought to be maintained were, however, no new acquisition; but were what the king by his oath and according to law was bound to keep up, and which had not in the slightest degree been affected by the relation in which Hungary stood to the provinces of the empire.

‘In point of fact, Hungary and Transylvania, with all the possessions and dependencies, never were incorporated into the Austrian empire, but formed a separate independent kingdom, even after the adoption of the Pragmatic Sanction by which the same law of succession was adopted for Hungary which obtained in the other countries and provinces.

‘The clearest proof of this legal fact is furnished by the law incorporated into the act of the Pragmatic Sanction, and which stipulates that the territory of Hungary and its dependencies, as well as its independence, self-dependence, constitution, and privileges, shall remain inviolate and specially guaranteed.

‘Another proof is contained in the stipulation of the Pragmatic Sanction, according to which the heir to the crown only becomes legally king of Hungary upon the conclusion of a coronation treaty with the nation, and upon his swearing to maintain the constitution and the laws of the country, whereupon he is to be crowned with the crown of St. Stephen. The act, signed at the coronation, contains the stipulation that all laws, privileges, and the entire constitution, shall be observed, together with the order of succession.

But one sovereign since the adoption of the Pragmatic Sanction refused to enter into the coronation compact and swear to the constitution. This was Joseph II., who died without being crowned, *but for*

*that reason his name is not recorded amongst the kings of Hungary, and all his acts are considered illegal, null, and void.* His successor, Leopold II., was obliged, before ascending the Hungarian throne, to enter into the coronation compact, to take the oath, and to let himself be crowned. On this occasion it was distinctly declared in Act X, 1790, sanctioned upon oath by the king, that Hungary was a free and independent country with regard to its government, and not subordinate to any other state or people whatever, consequently that it was to be governed by its own customs and laws.

‘The same oath was taken by Francis I., who came to the throne in the same year, 1790. On the extinction of the imperial dignity in Germany, and the foundation of the Austrian empire, this emperor, who allowed himself to violate the law in innumerable instances, had still sufficient respect for his oath, publicly to avow that Hungary formed no portion of the Austrian empire. For this reason Hungary was separated from the rest of the Austrian states by a chain of customs guards along the whole frontier, which still continues.

‘The same oath was taken on his accession to the throne by Ferdinand V., who, at the diet held at Presburg last year, of his own free will sanctioned the laws that were passed, but who soon after breaking that oath entered into a conspiracy with the other members of his family, with the intent of erasing Hungary from the list of independent nations.

‘Still the Hungarian nation preserved with useless piety its loyalty to its perjured sovereign; and during March last year, while the empire was on the brink of destruction, while its armies in Italy suffered one defeat after another, and he in his imperial palace had to fear at any moment that he might be driven from it, Hungary did not take advantage of so favourable a moment to make increased demands; *it asked only that its constitution might be guaranteed and those abuses rectified,—a constitution to maintain which fourteen kings of the Austrian dynasty had sworn a solemn oath, which every one of them had broken.*

‘When the king undertook to guarantee those ancient rights, and gave his sanction to the establishment of a responsible ministry, the Hungarian nation flew enthusiastically to his support, and rallied its might around his tottering throne. At that eventful crisis, as at so many others, the house of Austria was saved by the fidelity of the Hungarians.

‘Scarcely, however, had this oath fallen from his lips, when he conspired anew with his family, the accomplices of his crime, to compass the destruction of the Hungarian nation. *This conspiracy did not take place on the ground that any new privileges were conceded by the recent laws which diminished the royal authority. From what has been said, it is clear that no such demands were made. The conspiracy was formed to get rid of the responsible ministry which made it impossible for the Vienna cabinet to treat the Hungarian cabinet any longer as a nullity.*

‘In former times a governing council, under the name of the Royal

Hungarian Stadtholdership, the president of which was the Palatine, held its seat at Buda, whose sacred duty it was to watch over the integrity of the state, the inviolability of the constitution, and the sanctity of the laws; but this collegiate authority not presenting any element of personal responsibility, the Vienna cabinet gradually degraded this council to the position of an administrative organ of court absolutism. *In this manner while Hungary had ostensibly an independent government, the despotic Vienna cabinet disposed at will of the money and blood of the people for foreign purposes, postponing its trading interests to the success of courtly cabals, injurious to the welfare of the people, so that we were excluded from all connexion with the other countries of the world, and were degraded to the position of a colony.* The mode of governing by a ministry was intended to put a stop to these proceedings which caused the rights of the country to moulder uselessly in its parchments, by the change these rights and the royal oath were both to become a reality. *It was the apprehension of this, and especially the fear of losing its control over the money and blood of the country, which caused the house of Austria to resolve the involving of Hungary by the foulest intrigues in the horrors of fire and slaughter, that having plunged the country in a civil war it might seize the opportunity to dismember the lands and to blot out the name of Hungary from the list of independent nations, and unite its plundered and bleeding limbs with the Austrian monarchy.*

‘The beginning of this course was by issuing orders during the existence of the ministry, directing an Austrian general to rise in rebellion against the laws of the country, and by nominating the same General Ban of Croatia, *a country belonging to the kingdom of Hungary.* Croatia and Slavonia were chosen as the seat of military operations in this rebellion, because the military organization of those countries promised to present the greatest number of disposable troops; it was also thought that since those countries had for centuries been excluded from the enjoyment of constitutional rights, and subjected to a military organization *in the name of the emperor*, they would easily be induced to rise at his bidding.

‘Croatia and Slavonia were chosen to begin this rebellion, because in those countries the inhuman policy of Prince Metternich had, with a view to the weakening of all parties, for years cherished hatred against the Hungarian nation, by exciting in every possible manner the most unfounded *national jealousies*; and by employing the most disgraceful means, he had succeeded in inflaming a party with rage, although the Hungarians, far from desiring to oppress the Croats, allowed the most unrestrained development to the provincial institutions of Croatia, and shared with their Croatian and Slavonian brethren their political rights, *even going the length of sacrificing some of their own rights, by acknowledging special privileges and immunities in those dependencies.*

‘The Ban revolted, therefore, in the name of the emperor, and rebelled openly against the king of Hungary, who is, however, one and

the same person, and he went so far as to decree the separation of Croatia and Slavonia from Hungary, with which *they had been united for eight hundred years*; as well as to incorporate them into the Austrian empire. Public opinion and undoubted facts threw the blame of these proceedings on the Archduke Louis, uncle to the emperor, or on his brother the Archduke Francis Charles, and especially on the consort of the last-named prince, the Archduchess Sophia; and since the Ban in this act of rebellion openly alleged that he acted as a faithful subject of the emperor, the ministry of Hungary requested their sovereign, by a public declaration, to wipe off the stigma which these proceedings threw upon the family. At that moment affairs *were not prosperous for Austria in Italy*; the emperor therefore did proclaim that the Ban and his associates were *guilty of high treason and of exciting to rebellion*.

But while publishing this edict the Ban and his accomplices were covered with *favours at court*, and supplied for their enterprise with *money, arms, and ammunition*. The Hungarians confiding in the royal proclamation, and not wishing to provoke a civil conflict, did not hunt out these proscribed traitors in their lair, and only adopted measures for checking any extension of the rebellion. But soon afterwards the inhabitants of South Hungary, of Servian race, *were excited to rebellion by precisely the same means*.

‘These were also declared by the king to be rebels, but were nevertheless, like the others, supplied with money, arms, and ammunition. The king’s commissioned officers and civil servants enlisted bands of robbers in the Principality of Servia, to strengthen the rebels, and aid them in massacring the peaceful Hungarian and German inhabitants of the Banat. The command of these rebellious bodies was further intrusted to the rebel leaders of the Croatsians.

‘During this rebellion of the Hungarian Servians, scenes of cruelty were witnessed at which the heart shuddered, the peaceable inhabitants were tortured with a cruelty which makes the hair stand on end. Whole towns and villages, once flourishing, were laid waste. Hungarians fleeing before these murderers, were reduced to the condition of vagrants and beggars in their own country: the most lovely districts were converted into wilderness.

‘Thus were the Hungarians driven to self-defence; but the Austrian cabinet had dispatched, some time previously, the bravest portion of the national troops to Italy, to oppress the kingdoms of Lombardy and Venice, notwithstanding that our country was at home bleeding from a thousand wounds; still she had allowed them to leave for the defence of Austria. The greater part of the Hungarian regiments were, according to the old system of government, scattered through the other provinces of the empire. *In Hungary itself the troops were mostly Austrian*, and they afforded more protection to the rebels than to the laws or to the internal peace of the country.

‘The withdrawal of these troops and the return of the national militia was demanded by the government, but was either refused, or



its fulfilment delayed; and when our brave comrades, on hearing the distress of the country, returned in masses, they were persecuted, and such as were obliged to yield to superior force were disarmed and sentenced to death for having defended their country against rebels.

‘The Hungarian ministry begged the king earnestly to issue orders to all troops and commanders of fortresses in Hungary, enjoining fidelity to the constitution, and obedience to the ministers of Hungary. Such a proclamation was sent to the Palatine, Viceroy of Hungary, Archduke Stephen, at Buda. The necessary letters were written and sent to the post-office. But this nephew of the king, the Archduke Palatine, shamelessly caused these letters to be smuggled back from the post-office, although they had been countersigned by the responsible ministers; and they were afterwards found amongst his papers when he treacherously departed from the country.

The rebel Ban menaced the Hungarian coast with an attack, and the government, with the king’s consent, ordered an armed corps to march into Istria for the defence of Fiume, but this whole force received orders to march to Italy. Yet such abominable treachery was declared by the Vienna cabinet.

‘The rebel force occupied Fiume and disunited it from the kingdom of Hungary, and this abominable desertion was disavowed by the Vienna cabinet as having been a misunderstanding. The furnishing of arms, ammunition, and money to the rebels of Croatia was also declared to have been a misunderstanding. Finally, instructions were issued to the effect that until special orders were given, the army and the commanders of fortresses were not to follow the Hungarian ministers, but were to execute those of the Austrian cabinet.

‘Finally, to reap the fruit of so much perfidy, the Emperor Francis Joseph dared to call himself King of Hungary, in the Manifesto of 9th March, wherein he openly declares that he erases the Hungarian nation from the list of the independent nations of Europe, and that he divides its territory into five parts, dividing Transylvania, Croatia, Slavonia, and Fiume, from Hungary; creating at the same time a (Woywod shaft) principality for the Servian rebels, and having paralysed the political existence of the country declared it incorporated into the Austrian monarchy.

‘Never was so disgraceful a line of policy followed towards a nation. Hungary unprepared with money, arms, and troops; and not expecting to be called on to make resistance, was entangled in a net of treachery, and was obliged to defend itself against this threatened annihilation, with the aid of volunteers, national guards, and an undisciplined, unarmed, levy *en masse*, aided by the few regular troops which remained in the country. In open battles the Hungarians have, however, been successful; but they could not rapidly enough put down the Servian rebels and those of the military frontier, who were led by officers devoted to Austria, and were enabled to take refuge behind entrenched positions.

‘It was necessary to provide a new armed force. The king still

pretending to yield to the undeniably lawful demands of the nation, had summoned a new Diet for July 2, 1848; and had called upon the representatives of the nation to provide soldiers and money for the suppression of the Servian and Croatian rebellion, and the re-establishment of public peace. He at the same time issued a solemn proclamation in his own name, and in that of his family, condemning and denouncing the Croatian and Servian rebellion.

'The necessary steps were taken by the Diet. A levy of 200,000 men, and a subsidy of 40,000,000 florins, were voted as the necessary force, and the bills were laid before the king for the royal sanction. At the same moment the Hungarians gave an unexampled proof of their loyalty by inviting the king, who had fled to Innspruck, to go to Pesth, and by his presence to tranquillize the excitement amongst the people, trusting to the loyalty of the Hungarians, who had shown themselves at all times the best supports of the throne.

'This request was proffered in vain, for Radetzky had in the meantime been victorious in Italy. The House of Lorraine-Hapsburg, restored to confidence by that victory, thought the time come to take off the mask, and to involve Hungary, still bleeding from past wounds, in the horrors of a fresh war of oppression. The king from that moment began to address the man, whom he himself had branded as a rebel, as 'dear and loyal' (Lieber Getreuer); he praised him for having revolted, and encouraged him to proceed in the path he had entered upon.

'He expressed a like sympathy for the Servian rebels, whose hands yet reeked from the massacres they had perpetrated.

'It was under this command that the Ban of Croatia, after being proclaimed as a rebel, assembled an army, and announced his commission from the king to carry fire and sword into Hungary; upon which the Austrian troops stationed in the country united with him. The commandants of the fortresses Esseg, Arad, Temeswar, Gyulaschervir, and the commandants of the forces in the Banat and in Transylvania, breaking their oaths taken to the country, treacherously surrendered their trusts. A Slovak clergyman with the commission of colonel, who had fraternized at Vienna with the revolted Czechs, broke into Hungary, and the rebel Croat leader advanced with confidence through an unprepared country, to occupy its capital, expecting that the army in Hungary would not oppose him.

'Even then the Diet did not give up all confidence in the power of the royal oath; and the king was once more requested to order the rebels to quit the country. The answer given was a reference to a manifesto of the Austrian ministry, declaring it to be their determination to deprive the Hungarian nation of the independent management of their financial, commercial, and war affairs. The king at the same time refused his assent to the laws submitted for approval respecting the troops and the subsidy for covering the expenditure.

'Upon this the Hungarian ministers resigned; but the names submitted by the president of the council, at the demand of the king,

were not approved of for successors. The Diet then, bound by its duty to secure the interests of the country, voted the supplies, and ordered the troops to be levied. The nation obeyed the summons with readiness.

‘The representatives of the people then summoned the nephew of the emperor to join the camp, and, as Palatine, to lead the troops against the rebels. He not only obeyed the summons, but made public professions of his devotion to the cause. As soon, however, as an engagement threatened, he fled secretly from the camp and the country like a coward traitor. Amongst his papers a plan, formed by him some time previously, was found, according to which Hungary was to be simultaneously attacked on nine sides at once, from Styria, Austria, Moravia, Silesia, Gallicia, and Transylvania.

‘From a correspondence with the minister of war, seized at the same time, it was discovered that the commanding generals in the military frontier and the Austrian provinces adjoining Hungary, had received orders to enter Hungary, and to support the rebels with their united forces.

‘The attack from nine points at once really began. The most painful aggression took place in Transylvania, for the traitorous commander in that district did not content himself with the practices considered lawful in war by disciplined troops, he stirred up the Wal-lachian peasants to take arms against their own constitutional rights; and aided by the rebellious Servian hordes, commenced a course of vandalism and extinction, sparing neither women, children, nor aged men; murdering and torturing the defenceless Hungarian inhabitants, burning the most flourishing villages and towns, amongst which Nagy-Enyed, the seat of learning for Transylvania, was reduced to a heap of ruins.

‘But the Hungarian nation, although taken by surprise, unarmed, and unprepared, did not abandon its future prospects in any agony of despair.

‘Measures were immediately taken to increase the small standing army by volunteers and a levy of the people. These troops supplying the want of experience by the enthusiasm arising from the feeling that they had right on their side, defeated the Croatian armaments, and drove them out of the country. One of the leaders abused the generosity of the victors after a battle in which the rebels were defeated, and a truce was granted to them, to decamp by night. Another body of 10,000 men was surrounded, and the whole to a man taken prisoners.

‘The defeated army fled towards Vienna.

‘One of their leaders appealed, after an unsuccessful fight, to the generosity of the Hungarians for a truce, which he used by night and surreptitiously to escape with the beaten troops, the other corps of more than 10,000 men, were surrounded and taken prisoners, from the general to the last private.

‘The defeated army fled in the direction of Vienna, where the

emperor continued his demoralizing policy, and nominated the beaten and flying rebel as his plenipotentiary and substitute in Hungary; suspending by this act the constitutions and institutions of the country, all its authorities, courts of justice, and tribunals; laying the kingdom under martial law, and placing in the hand, and under the unlimited authority of a rebel, the honour, the property, and the lives of the people, in the hand of a man who, with armed bands, had branded the laws, and attacked the constitution of the country.

‘But the House of Austria was not contented with this unjustifiable violation of oaths taken by its head.

‘The rebellious Ban was given under the protection of the troops stationed near Vienna, and commanded by Prince Windischgrätz. These troops, after taking Vienna by storm, were led as an imperial Austrian army, to conquer Hungary. But the Hungarian nation persisted in its loyalty, sent an envoy to the advancing enemy. This envoy, coming under the flag of truce, was treated as a prisoner, and thrown into prison. No heed was paid to the remonstrances and the demands of the Hungarian nation for justice. The threat of the gallows was, on the contrary, thundered against all who had taken arms in defence of a wretched and oppressed country. But before the army had time to enter Hungary, a family revolution in the tyrannical reigning house was perpetrated at Olmütz. Ferdinand V. was forced to resign a throne which had been polluted with so much blood and perjury; and the son of Francis Charles, who also abdicated his claim to the inheritance, the youthful Archduke Francis Joseph, caused himself to be proclaimed Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary. But according to the family compact, no one can dispose of the constitutional throne but the Hungarian nation.

‘At this critical moment the Hungarian nation demanded nothing more than the maintenance of its laws and institutions, and peace guaranteed by their integrity. Had the assent of the nation to this change in the occupant of the throne been asked in a legal manner, and the young prince offered to take the customary oath that he would preserve the constitution, the Hungarian nation would not have refused to elect him king in accordance with the treaties extant, and to crown him with St. Stephen’s crown, before he had dipped his hand in the blood of the people.

‘He, however, refusing to perform an act so sacred in the eyes of God and man, and in strange contrast to the innocence natural to youthful breasts, declared in his first words, his intention of conquering Hungary, which he dared to call a rebellious country, although he himself had raised rebellion there, and of depriving it of that independence which it had maintained for a thousand years, to incorporate it into the Austrian monarchy.

‘And he has but too well laboured to keep his word. He ordered the army under Windischgrätz to enter Hungary, and at the same time directed several corps of troops to attack the country from Galicia and Styria. Hungary resisted the projected invasion, but being unable

to make head against so many countries at once, on account of the devastation carried on in several parts of the interior by the excited rebels, and being thus prevented from displaying its whole power of defence, the troops were in the first instance obliged to retire. To save the capital from the horrors of a storm like that to which Prague and Vienna had mercilessly been exposed, and not to place the fortunes of a nation which deserved better, on the die of a pitched battle, for which there had not been sufficient preparation, the capital was abandoned, and the Diet and the national government removed in January last to Debreczin, trusting to the help of a just God and to the energies of the nation, to prevent the cause from being lost, even when it should be seen that the capital was given up.

‘Thanks be to Heaven the cause was not lost.

‘But even then an attempt was made to bring about a peaceful arrangement, and a deputation was sent to the generals of the perjured dynasty. This house, in its blind self-confidence, refused to enter into any negotiation, and dared to demand an unconditional submission from the nation. The deputation was further detained, and one of the number, the former president of the ministry, was even thrown into prison. The deserted capital was occupied, and was turned into a place of execution; a part of the prisoners of war were there consigned to the axe, another part were thrown into dungeons, while the remaining were exposed to fearful sufferings from hunger, and were thus forced to enter the ranks of the army in Italy.

‘The measure of the crimes of the Austrian house was, however, filled up, when, after its defeat, it applied for help to the Emperor of Russia; and in spite of the remonstrances and protestations of the Porte and of the consuls of the European powers at Bucharest, in defiance of international rights, and to the endangering of the balance of power in Europe, caused the Russian troops stationed in Wallachia to be led into Transylvania for the destruction of the Hungarian nation.

‘Three months ago we were driven back upon the Theiss; our just arms have already recovered all Transylvania; Clausenburg, Hermanstadt, and Cronstadt are taken; one portion of the troops of Austria is driven into the Bukowina; another, together with the Russian force sent to aid them, is totally defeated, and to the last man obliged to evacuate Transylvania and flee into Wallachia. Upper Hungary is cleared of foes.

‘The Servian rebellion is further suppressed, the forts of St. Thomas and the Roman entrenchment have been taken by storm, and the whole country between the Danube and the Theiss, including the county of Bacs, has been recovered for the nation.

‘The commander-in-chief of the perjured house of Austria has himself been defeated in five consecutive battles, and has with his whole army been driven back upon and even over the Danube.

‘Founding our line of conduct upon all these occurrences, and confiding in the justice of an eternal God, we, in the face of the civilized

world, in reliance upon the natural rights of the Hungarian nation, and upon the powers it has developed to maintain them, further impelled by that sense of duty which urges every nation to defend its existence, do hereby declare and proclaim in the name of the nation, legally represented by us the following.

Then follows the declaration that Hungary and Transylvania have been and are one territory; that the House of Hapsburgh is deposed from all sovereignty within the borders of this territory; and that the government of the state shall in future be strictly independent, the form of the government to be adopted being left 'to be fixed by the Diet of the nation. But until this point 'shall be decided, on the basis of the ancient and received principles which have been recognised for ages, the government of 'the united countries, their possessions and dependencies, shall 'be conducted on personal responsibility, and under obligation 'to render account of all acts by Louis Kossuth, *who has been by 'acclamation, and with the unanimous approbation of the Diet of 'the nation*, named Governor President, and the ministers whom 'he shall appoint.'

If the memorable state paper now placed before the reader has been well considered, we cannot doubt that the impression produced by it must be, that history has hardly another case in which the wrong has been so manifestly on the side of the victors, and the right on the side of the vanquished, as in this case of Hungary. Nevertheless, while Russia showed herself prepared to do her best on the side of the wrong,—on the side of the right not a hand was raised, not a word of protest was uttered, by any government, from one end of Europe to the other! All cared 'for their own,'—and for nothing more. Peoples, indeed, sympathised with the injured, and some gave strong expression to that sympathy, but that, in the mood of the governing, was necessarily an affair of words—and much fewer words were uttered than would have been, as it was seen that they were not likely to be more than words. International law, it seems, has come to be understood as a system which gives its sanction to any degree of interference to perpetrate wrong and to put down freedom, but prohibits the slightest interference to promote the ends of justice, or to uphold the interests of general liberty. The war on the part of Russia is admitted by Lord Palmerston (*Correspondence*, p. 286) to have been a war waged 'for interests which could only be *indirectly* or *constructively* its own.' In fact, there was a more valid ground for our taking part against Russia at that juncture, for the protection of Turkey,—than there was for the movement of Russia against Hungary, on the plea of giving protection to Austria. Is it ever to be thus? Is the power of

empire to exist that it may interfere upon any scale for evil, in no degree for good?

On the 14th of August, 1849, when he had ceased to be Governor of Hungary, having resigned everything into the hands of Georgey, Kossuth wrote a letter to General Bem, which was intercepted by the Russians. Here it is—as a frank revelation of the humane sorrows of a noble heart:

‘Terezova, August 14, 1849.

‘I am indifferent as to my personal safety. I am tired of life; for I see how the splendid edifice of my country, and with it the sanctity of European freedom, is overthrown, not by our enemies, but by our brothers.

‘It is not the dastard love of life which has induced me to go away, but it is the conviction that my presence has become injurious to my country.

‘General Guyon writes that the united army at Temeswar is in complete dissolution. You, General, are unfit to fight. Georgey, at the head of the only army which, according to this report, still exists, has declared that he will no longer obey, but that he will rule. I have conjured him, patriot, to be true to his country, and have made way for him. For the present I am a simple citizen, and nothing more. I went to Lugos to look at the aspect of affairs there, and to find out on what means we can reckon in order to continue the struggle. I found the corps of General Vecsey in good order, and well affected; all the others in complete dissolution.

‘Dessewffy, Kmety, declared to me that this army would fight no more, but would run at the first cannon-shot. I found an utter want of provisions, and that we were obliged to take them, a lamentable means, which made the whole population our enemies; the bank at Arad, and therefore in Georgey’s power. I came then to the conviction, that if Georgey submitted, the army at Lugos would not hold out twenty-four hours, as it would have no provisions. An army can subsist by forced contributions of money and food in an enemy’s country; but in one’s own land! . . . .

‘I will never lend a hand to measures of oppression and hostility against my own people; I would save it by sacrificing my life; but oppress it, never. You see, therefore, General, it is a matter of conscience. I cannot abdicate yesterday, and to-day again assume the reins of government. If the nation and the army decide otherwise, the thing will assume another form; but the army of Georgey, the bravest of them all, must also agree to it; if not, I am but a simple citizen, and as such I will never give even the passive countenance of my presence to measures of terrorism, plunder, contributions, and oppression of the people. If even Georgey’s army desired I should again take up the government; if they should succeed in some operations for the purpose of revictualling their army without being obliged to have recourse to measures of oppression and terrorism against the people;

if there be a possibility of the bank again working, and it be placed at my disposal; under these three conditions I would, at the call of the people, again take the government; if not, not. As for me, the war is not the object, but the means only of saving the country; and if I see no probability of arriving at that goal, I will not aid in carrying on the war for war's sake. I therefore advise you, as a good citizen and an honourable man, to call a committee of the representatives of the people, as the sovereign power only can dispose of the government. Send couriers to Comorn and Peterwardein to hold out; be certain of the co-operation of the commander of Arad. This is above all necessary—not my presence; for as you are obliged to have recourse to measures of violence against the people to maintain your army, I will never by my presence countenance them.'

Within a fortnight from the date of this melancholy epistle Kossuth was in Turkey, and steps were being taken for his safe-keeping in Widden.

In the letter of Lord Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby, dated the 1st of August, 1849, when the Hungarians had so far beaten the Austrians that nothing but the coming in of Russia could have given them the least prospect of success, we find the following statement:—

'The earnest wish of the British Government is, that this great war may not be fought out to an extreme result; and most heartily would her Majesty's Government rejoice if they could entertain a hope that this conflict between an entire nation and the armies of two great empires might be brought to an early termination, *by an arrangement, which, on the one hand, should satisfy the national feelings of the Hungarians; and, on the other hand, should maintain unimpaired the bond of union which has so long connected Hungary with the Austrian crown.*

On these grounds, the English ambassador at Vienna was to express to Prince Schwarzenburg the readiness of the British Government to exert its influence in favour of peace: while the inexpediency, even to Austria, of attempting to vanquish Hungary, and to treat it as a subdued country, was strongly pointed out. But the case was one not to be affected by the expressions of opinion, of mere wishes, or by offers of mediation. Russia had not contented herself with that species of intervention, and she prevailed accordingly. We learn, also, that this policy, which gave so little satisfaction to the English people who looked with so much solicitude upon the odds that was allowed to marshal itself against Hungary, found scarcely more favour at Vienna. When the Russo-Austrian power became dominant, Lord Palmerston ventured to express the hope that Austria would evince her wisdom by a humane treatment of the vanquished; the reply



to this, and the preceding communication, by Prince Schwarzenburg stated that events had supplied the best answer to the opinions and proffered services of 'the principal Secretary of State of her Britannic Majesty in relation to the affairs of Hungary;' and having reminded his lordship that the conduct of the Hungarian insurgents was that which the English law denounced as high treason, and punished 'without fail with death or transportation,' the prince concludes his epistle thus:—

'The world is agitated by a spirit of general subversion. England herself is not exempt from this spirit; witness Canada, the island of Cephallonia, and finally, unhappy Ireland. But wherever revolt breaks out within the vast limits of the British Empire, the English Government always knows how to maintain the authority of the law, were it even at the price of torrents of blood.

'It is not for us to blame her. Whatever may, moreover, be the opinion which we form as to the causes of these insurrectionary movements, as well as of the measures of repression employed by the British Government in order to stifle them, we consider it our duty to abstain from expressing that opinion, persuaded as we are that persons are apt to fall into gross errors, in making themselves judges of the often so complicated positions of foreign countries.

'By this conduct we consider we have acquired the right to expect that Lord Palmerston will practise with respect to us a perfect reciprocity.'—*Correspondence*, 285, 286.

It is not often that a paper of more cool and measured insolence passes between ministers even when the states they represent are in actual warfare. So much do men commonly gain when they affect a neutrality which results from fear more than from principle—contenting themselves with words in place of deeds, even when great questions of right and humanity are at stake.

Whether it was that our government began to feel that it would not be expedient to court further insult of this description, by resting to any greater extent on this spiritless policy or not—certain it is, that when Russia and Austria demanded that the fugitives in Turkey should be delivered up to them, the English cabinet not only spoke, but acted more in the manner becoming them. The ambassadors of those powers, on finding that their demands were not likely to be complied with, proceeded the length of suspending their diplomatic relations with the Porte, the Austrian minister declaring that he should regard the escape of a single refugee from the safe-keeping of the Sultan as tantamount to a declaration of war! But the articles of treaties on which these claims were founded did not warrant them. That appealed to by Russia had been practically interpreted by Nicholas himself as bearing no such meaning; and that appealed

to by Austria, if applicable to political refugees at all, left it with Turkey to manifest its spirit of good neighbourhood towards Austria, either by subjecting such persons to imprisonment, or by compelling them to leave the country. On these grounds the Porte was prepared to resist the demands so offensively pressed upon it; and when the question was put to England and France—may we depend ‘on your moral and material support’ if we act on this resolution?—the answer, to the honour of both countries, was, decidedly—you may. De Tocqueville, on the part of the French government, spoke as clearly and emphatically as did Lord Palmerston in behalf of the English government; and the English and French fleets in the Mediterranean, were ordered, in consequence, to take positions from which they might act with promptitude for the protection of Constantinople if necessary.

But for this decided policy Russia and Austria would, beyond a doubt, have persisted in their demands; and Turkey would have had to make its choice between a surrender of the unfortunate persons to whom it had given shelter, or a war with its two powerful and pitiless neighbours as the consequence of a refusal.

So far as Russia was concerned, the demand served its purpose. Had it proved that England had really fallen so low as to have feared to do more than remonstrate or protest against the degradation with which Turkey, her old and faithful ally, was thus menaced, it would then have been no longer doubtful that the time had come for preparing to set up the Russian flag on the walls of Constantinople.

The demand of Russia from the first, had been for the surrender of such refugees only as were Russian subjects. But observing the demonstration—the preparation for the worst, which England and France had made, Nicholas affected to be comparatively indifferent about the surrender of his Polish rebels; spoke of his ambassador as having exceeded his instructions; and complained of the unwise and unfriendly course taken by England, as having brought an unnecessary difficulty into the question, by placing him in a position to seem to be yielding to dictation from a third party, what he had not been unwilling to concede, for reasons of his own, to the party immediately concerned. Such being the mood of Russia, the course of Austria, which had now fallen into the hands of her powerful ally, was determined. Schwarzenburg was obliged to content himself with the promise of a temporary detention of the rebels in the Turkish territory. Thus, for the present, the independence of Turkey has been saved, and to this course of policy we owe it that Kossuth, and his brave confederates, are still living, and placed at liberty to choose their home among the free nations willing to receive them.

The tendency of our foreign policy has been so little of this more manly complexion, that we are quite willing to cede to the British Government the full share of honour to which it may in the present instance be entitled. For this purpose we shall submit to our readers a few passages from the 'Correspondence' respecting the Hungarian refugees, placed at the head of this paper, that the real history of the case may be placed beyond dispute.

In a letter to Lord Palmerston, dated September 16th, Sir Stratford Canning thus writes:—

'The pending question between Russia and Austria on one side, and the Porte on the other, has assumed not only a serious aspect, but a character of immediate urgency. It would seem that the former two powers are determined to obtain possession of the refugees, or at least that their representatives are prepared to go the full length of diplomatic intimidations, in order to force the hands of the Porte. Count Stürmer (Austrian minister), and M. de Titoff (Russian minister), after expressing their regret at the decision of the council (the decision *not* to surrender the refugees), and their hope that the Turkish ministers had well considered the consequences, and after having endeavoured to undermine the firmness of Aali Pasha and the grand vizier, by the insinuations of their agents, have sent in official notes repeating their previous peremptory demands of the extradition of the refugees, and suspending their diplomatic relations with the Porte from after this evening, unless a categorical and satisfactory answer be given to them in the meantime.'—*Correspondence*, pp. 9, 10.

Consulted by the ministers of the Sultan, Sir Stratford Canning says:—

'I should have thought myself highly to blame if I had concealed from them my conviction that they were bound by no specific engagement of treaty to give up the refugees to Russia and Austria; that in offering to send them out of the country, or to place them in the interior under guard, they did all that could be fairly expected of the Porte; that by submitting to the imperious demands addressed to them in so dictatorial a form, they would dishonour themselves and their country, violate the common principles of humanity, and entangle themselves in a system of policy of which they had hitherto struggled to keep clear, and which they could hardly adopt without chilling the sympathy of their friends, and gradually estranging their most cordial supporters.

'These opinions, taken as a whole, are not entertained by me alone. They are prevalent among all classes of persons, whether native or foreign. I have more particularly found them where I felt most interest to look for them—in the language of my colleague, the French minister—I may venture to state, that on more than one occasion I

have found General Aupick inclined to stimulate my exertions, though, at the same time, declaring his readiness to follow rather than precede me in the course prescribed by humanity and consistent policy.'

In communications made to Lord Palmerston by Aali Pasha, the minister of the Sultan, and Mehmed Pacha, the ambassador of the Porte, in London, the government of Turkey expresses its confidence 'that the government of Her Britannic Majesty is 'ready to support, *morally* and *effectively*, the Sublime Porte in a 'question where it exposes itself to very great dangers in obedience to its sentiments of honour and humanity' (p. 15). The support sought was not merely 'moral,' but moral and 'material,' or moral and 'effective;' and the reply of Lord Palmerston, dated a few days after the reception of these documents, contains the following passage:—

'Her Majesty's government thus appealed to, cannot hesitate to comply with such a request. The close relations of friendly alliance which, for a long period of time, have connected the two crowns; the great political and commercial interests which are involved in the maintenance of the independence of the Turkish empire; and the solemn declarations by which, no longer ago than July, 1841, the Five Powers recorded their desire and determination to respect the inviolability of the sovereign rights of the Sultan; the nature of the demands now made upon the Porte; and the strength of the reasons assigned by the Porte for declining to comply with those demands; all these circumstances and considerations have led Her Majesty's government to determine that your Excellency should be instructed, as you are hereby instructed, to state to the Porte, that Her Majesty's government will comply with the request contained in the application transmitted to me by the Turkish ambassador. . . .

'Her Majesty's government mean to propose (to the French government) that the British and French squadrons in the Mediterranean shall proceed at once to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, to be ready to go up to Constantinople, if the Sultan should, by a written application from his ministers to your Excellency and General Aupick, invite them so to do, to assist in defending the Turkish capital or territory from attack: and instructions will at once be sent off to Sir William Parker, to go with his squadron to the Dardanelles, and to make known his arrival there to your Excellency.'—p. 27.

Having made this communication to the Turkish minister, Sir Stratford Canning writes on the 25th of October—

'Rashid Pasha manifested a deep feeling of gratitude for the support thus given by her Majesty's government to the independence and vital interests of the Ottoman empire, and a conviction equally deep of the sound policy which was apparent in every part of your Lordship's advice on this occasion. His highness repeated the Sultan's thanks, as well as his own, in reference to the confidential intimation which

had preceded the present official announcement of the course adopted by her Majesty's government, and no doubt to be pursued by the French government also. He expressed emphatically his satisfaction at the approaching arrival of a British squadron in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles.'—pp. 55, 56.

Thus the lives of the ill-fated men who had sought temporary refuge in Turkey, and the independence and honour of Turkey itself, were saved—would that an earlier and a bolder intervention had taken place so as to have saved the freedom of Hungary! It is sad that France, which acquitted herself so well as the friend of the patriot Magyar in 1849, should have sullied her fame so deeply in this respect in 1851. But, all things considered, we have ourselves little to boast of as compared with our Gallic neighbours. If there be a leading man in France capable of doing as Louis Napoleon has done, there is a leading journal among us capable of doing worse. It would be bad enough to scowl the noble exile from our shores—it is worse to heap every foul thing upon him, and to waylay him in the spirit of the assassin when he lands among us. But, happily, the 'Times' newspaper is no more England, than Louis Napoleon is France, as events, we trust, will ere long show. At such a juncture, it is but just to bear in mind that to France, as truly as to England, the refugees in Turkey owed their lives and safety; and that to the English government, and eminently to Lord Palmerston, the chief of that band of patriots is indebted for liberty to breathe the free air of Britain and America.

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